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ART. I.—SENIOR'S IRISH VOYAGES.

Journals, Conversations, and Essays relating to Ireland. By NASSAU WILLIAM SENIOR. Second Edition. London, Longmans, Green, and Co.

Realities of Irish Life. By W. STEUART TRENCH, Land Agent in Ireland. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

THE startling discoveries of the late Mr. Nassau Senior, during his occasional expeditions to Ireland, are, we respectfully submit, obtaining an undue and even dangerous degree of acceptance in England at present. Within a few months, the book, which is not light reading, has gone to a second edition; and is already cited by the choir of newspapers as an authority with a sort of oracular sanction. The higher organs of opinion have been suspiciously emulous in exalting its value. They speak of it as a complete revelation of the great Celtic mystery. Before the book was a week old, the *Quarterly Review*, to our extreme astonishment, declared:—"This work as a whole will enable England to understand Ireland as she has never done before, and will show us how much hitherto we have been alike legislating, sympathizing, and declaiming in the dark." As one half of the whole of Mr. Senior's Irish lucubrations consists of articles reprinted from the *Edinburgh Review*, the latest in date of which was published twenty years ago, we may, while admiring the generosity of the criticism, humbly wonder at the length of time which the rays of even so sublime an intelligence have taken to traverse the space that intervenes between the atmosphere of the one periodical and the other. The *Edinburgh Review* naturally considers Mr. Senior's message as part of its own properties and trophies. Words are hardly adequate to assay its value. "These volumes," we are told, "are a lasting monument of Mr. Senior's sterling ability and wisdom . . . a mine of sound thought on Irish affairs; and a repository of attractive research and keen observation in the

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same field." Is it presumption to suggest that these epithets are somewhat inept, if not extravagant? Ability and wisdom in public affairs generally find a more lasting monument even than books. The thoughts of a sound thinker on the policy of a great state, who has the opportunity to be heard (and Mr. Senior had great opportunities), gradually translate themselves into laws and institutions. Mr. Senior made many suggestions for the good government of Ireland, of which not one—not even the occasional Convocation of the Imperial Parliament in Dublin, not even the abolition of the Lord Lieutenantcy, not even the pensioning of the priests—was attempted in his own time, or can be reckoned as other than superannuated and impracticable now. English travellers, ever since the time of Giraldus Cambrensis, have been remarkable, according to the opinion of their own countrymen, for the "attractive research" and "keen observation" which they have devoted to the study of that island and its inhabitants. The English nation, to do it justice, has always been anxious to listen to any one who could give it an argument capable of being comprehended with complacency, for its occupation of a country which it is unable to understand, and which revolts unceasingly against its rule. Giraldus wrote before the age of reviews, but we have evidence little less valuable of his success with his contemporaries, who wished to understand offhand all about Ireland once for all. Giraldus said it was a country in which there was a talking wolf, a bearded woman, and a bull with a human head; that in remote parts of it, baptism was very irregularly administered; that its people had musical tastes and homicidal propensities, its very saints in heaven were vindictive, and its priests addicted in the evening hours to the worship of Bacchus, *vino variisque potionibus*—all obviously good and sufficient grounds for the conquest of the country. Ireland was conquered accordingly, and has been repeatedly more or less completely conquered since. The views of the more enlightened English of the present day take the direction of depopulation. Mr. Senior's views differ in so far from those of Giraldus Cambrensis. He objects that the priests of the present day do not preach the Gospel according to Malthus; that the landlords as yet only imperfectly apprehend that their true mission on earth is to check the increase and multiplication of mankind, and to further the spread of civilization by cattle; and that the British Government and the British nation are bound to sustain the landlords in their efforts to "prevent the whole country from becoming a warren of yahoos." "Keen observation" and "attractive research" thus equally characterize

the British traveller in the nineteenth century as in the twelfth.

It was not reasonable to expect that Mr. Senior's book should be a profound book. The character of his mind and his sources of information equally forbade that; and tended to make it a book in many respects worse than worthless—in some respects, we do not hesitate to say, even wicked. He was a man with the heart of a mere economist, the "obdurate heart," in which "there is no flesh," and no feeling for man as man; and he was unable both from the narrow and pragmatical quality of his intellect, and the specialty of his studies, to form any broad and liberal conception of the condition of the Irish people, to enter into any sort of sympathy with them, therefore to understand or enable anybody else to understand them. So far do we differ from current criticism that we venture to say the English student of Mr. Senior will know rather less of that aspect of Ireland which really needs to be known by England, when he has come to the end of these volumes than he probably did at their commencement. The fair-minded Englishman's ordinary impression that Ireland is a country half conquered, half colonised, never conciliated, in which the law of the land has for a long time been opposed to the genius of the people, and in which a class tyranny has been implanted, such as is unknown in any other free country, will probably have been considerably confused. Mr. Senior believed that so base and abnormal were the instincts and habits of the race inhabiting the island, that only the energetic action of the English law, by the hands of the Irish landlords, could prevent it from sinking into a swarming barbarism, held together by a bond of murder. Prepossessed against the country by character and training, Mr. Senior was, besides, peculiarly unfortunate in the class of persons with whom he came in contact when he visited it. Any intelligent Irishman could tell beforehand what views of the state of Ireland a stranger was likely to form, who went from Archbishop Whately's house to Lord Rosse's, thence to Lord Monteagle's; and who always received his latest lights from Mr. Steuart Trench. It is like the case of an officer who is taken blindfold through a camp, having the bandage taken off only at the points where it is desired to produce a false impression. Mr. Senior naturally cites each and every one of these authorities as infallible, equally infallible, the wise men, and the only wise men of Gotham. He drew them out, they knew he was drawing them out, he wrote down what they said, and they revised it. Not every one knows his Boswell beforehand. Not every one has the privilege of assisting his

Boswell in the concoction of his memoirs. But Mr. Senior first noted the conversations at Redesdale, or Birr Castle, or Cardtown, and then asked the various interlocutors to revise their parts. Bishop Blougram neither knew nor cared what use Gigadibs was going to make of his confidences; but here Gigadibs gives his friends notice beforehand that he is about to embalm all their favourite hobbies, and that the higher they trot, the better he will be pleased. That paradox and affectation should characterize the conversation of a coterie of persons periodically assembled under such auspices, is not surprising. That a peer, with a mechanical turn of mind, should flounder when invited to dogmatize on affairs of administration—that even the dry archbishop should pose himself a little absurdly, conscious of being thus brought on the sly face to face with posterity, is no more than it was natural to expect. That a series of conversations, held together by this covenant of egotism, among a group of persons, who were all, for one reason or other, malignants and *frondeurs* against the public spirit of the country in which their lot was cast, should also produce upon the mind the effect of a conspiracy of scandal against the character of that country, is not so strange; but we confess to some surprise at their occasional scurrility. Lord Rosse, Dr. Whately, with Mr. Senior himself, have passed away, and are beyond reach of the melodious acclaim with which their mutual admiration is still saluted by the “chorus of indolent reviewers.” But Mr. Steuart Trench is alive, and he has been encouraged by the far-spreading shade of Mr. Senior’s fame and the indefatigable indolence of the British reviewer, to attempt his own apotheosis. Mr. Steuart Trench is the land agent of the Marquis of Bath, the Marquis of Lansdowne, and the Lord Digby. He was Mr. Senior’s favourite authority in regard to the tendencies of the Irish race towards Yahoodom. Mr. Senior had designed to present him to posterity in the part of the Hero as land agent; but Mr. Trench has been able to survive Mr. Senior, and so to anticipate posterity; and suddenly finding himself famous, he will not shrink from “the peril of his own panegyric.” Accordingly, in a volume with the romantic title “Realities of Irish Life,” he has written a considerable proportion of his own autobiography. He describes himself as a person of heroic courage, overflowing humanity, benign wisdom, indomitable will, indefatigable energy, polite manners, and engaging affability. This enumeration does not, doubtless, comprehend the sum of his virtues. The rest may be learned on application to the tenantry of the Lansdowne, the Bath, or the Digby estates. The book has been illustrated by Mr. Trench’s son. Appear-

ing at the Christmas season, when goblins and giants task the efforts of our best artists, it at first occurred to us that it might be intended to pourtray the adventures of some Irish Munchausen. Opening its pages, as it happened, about the middle chapter, an extraordinary scene met our view. Under lofty cliffs, three male persons navigate a boat. The inscription says, "The guide wore a waistcoat"; and, as a matter of fact, among these adventurous gentlemen there is no superfluity of raiment apparent. They all wear their hats, however, on which are planted flaming torches; and the effect, sufficiently absurd, is made inconceivably ludicrous by the evident seriousness of the artist. Four more illustrations, one full-length, are devoted to the adventures of the three gentlemen; and we are informed, by the accompanying text, that this is the way in which seal-hunting is sometimes conducted in the county of Kerry. As to Mr. Trench himself, it would appear, that on all the great and heroic occasions of his life, he was either dressed as a Bond Street exquisite of the days of D'Orsay, or hardly dressed at all. The frontispiece represents him stripped to the waist, like some accomplished prize-fighter, who waits the ring to be formed, and his rival for the belt to advance. A little further on, Mr. Trench, still stripped to the waist, but evidently attired by Poole as to the rest of his person, addresses with beaming countenance and graceful gestures an apparently enthusiastic crowd of Irish peasants. On the cover of the book we see him, as he suddenly confronted in his own house one of Lord Bath's tenants, who was in arrears of rent, with a revolver in either hand, but obviously in a state of wild panic. The unfortunate tenant behaved remarkably well at the moment; but he died of the shock a fortnight afterwards. Then we have an illustration of a truly historical occasion, upon which Mr. Trench and another land-agent, named Morant, who dressed himself in a buffalo-hide for the occasion, and who, we are told, "looked down on the admiring peasantry with the most supreme indifference and contempt for his enemies expressed in every feature of his face" (Mr. Morant's enemies, it would appear, were his neighbours, and he did not love them as he loved himself) left the town of Carrickmacross one morning, bristling with pistols, amid, as Mr. Trench naïvely confesses, "the incessant nudges and winks" of the bystanders, under the impression that they might possibly be shot before their return. They were not shot, nor even shot at; but there is another illustration of their return late at night, with the Ribbonmen, who are supposed to have intended to have shot at them, but who did

not, picturesquely posted behind a hedge. The finest effort of Mr. Townsend Trench's artistic genius, however, is his sketch of the meeting of the Ribbon Lodge, at which his father was sentenced to death. As the book professes to deal only with the "Realities of Irish Life," we are sorry to be obliged to surmise that Mr. Townsend Trench was present on such an occasion. The British reader can, however, in consequence, study an authentic representation of the Yahoo in council, taken with all the details from the life; and he can elsewhere see a drawing of the insignia of a Grand Master of Ribbonmen, which seem to have suggested those of the Star of India. It is a very remarkable fact that, throughout his career, Mr. Trench appears to have been always on the point of being shot, but that he never costs the Ribbon armoury so much as a detonating cap. Is it possible that some of his "Realities" may only be unconscious romances, with some basis of original fact, exaggerated at the time by panic, afterwards by imagination, and gradually distended by dramatic recitation to admiring audiences in the myth-developing after-dinner hours at Cardtown or Carrickmacross? In our humble opinion, imagination is, with Mr. Trench, much more powerful than memory. It so happens that we are not unacquainted with some of those sad episodes of Irish history in which he has played so remarkable a part; and we observe that what seems to us to be the key of the enigma is almost always wanting in his narrative. The book appears to have been written as an exegetic commentary on Mr. Senior's doctrine about Ireland and the Irish; and in it we therefore find facts selected and collocated so as to sustain a theory, and thus give the effect of fiction; some of the most important links of evidence dropped; the principle upon which the peasantry acted, often criminally, no doubt, utterly ignored or misrepresented; and a hue of rosy benevolence flowing over acts of the most questionable morality and justice. For example, Mr. Trench was chiefly instrumental in exporting some 4,600 people from Lord Lansdowne's estate in Kerry to the United States, at a cost of £3. 10s. a head. It was a very good bargain for the estate, on which they were of course chargeable for life as paupers; and the cost even of an Irish pauper, Mr. Senior says, is £4. 11s. *per annum*. "It must be admitted," he says, "that the paupers despatched to America on such a sudden pressure as this were of a very motley type; and a strange figure these wild batches of two hundred each—*most of them speaking only the Irish language*—made in the streets of Cork, as well as on the quays of Liverpool and America,"—where they landed without a shilling in their pockets. . So far the

enterprise was managed doubtless with keen economy and with reckless disregard of consequences. The people were glad to go anywhere rather than to the workhouse. The landlord got rid of them altogether for less than one year's rates. "Happily," Mr. Trench adds, "no accident ever occurred in a single ship which carried out the Kenmare emigrants. Almost all, down even to the widows and children, found employment soon after landing, and escaped the pestilence of the workhouse; and to this hour I can never experience any other feelings but those of pleasure and gratification at having been the means of sending so many miserable beings to a land far richer and more prosperous than Ireland." The peculiar pestilence of the Kenmare Workhouse is doubtless bad enough, both for landlord and tenant; and Mr. Trench is entitled to whatever pleasure and gratification he may feel at having been the means of sending many miserable beings to a land far richer and more prosperous than Ireland—or even than America. He can hardly fail to be aware, but he has forgotten to mention the fact, that in one of the principal hospitals of the city of New York there is a ward which is called the Lansdowne Ward; and the reason why it bears this name is that for months and months together, it was crowded by the emigrants from the Lansdowne estate, who left it commonly in their coffins. America must be a generous country to tolerate such a thing as this—that one Irish absentee landlord, wanting to reduce his rates, should summarily disembogue 4,600 half-starved, penniless, and diseased outcasts on one of its ports. Had this been tried at Liverpool or Bristol, what would people have said of Lord Lansdowne! That Mr. Trench should now relate it to the British public as an example of magnanimous philanthropy shows at once the cast of his character, and his estimate of the state of opinion, generated considerably by indolent reviewing, on such subjects.

Mr. Thomas Trench, the second son of Mr. Stenart Trench, and sub-agent of Lord Digby's property, a gentleman who followed his daily pursuits with revolvers in his pockets and an escort of police lounging at his window-sill or balancing his outside-car, was one day walking with Mr. Senior on the side of the hill of Baureigh, in the Queen's County. Mr. Senior was very anxious to know all about landlords and tenants, and here was a fine opportunity. Trench the younger had had manifold experience; had seen many estates and the bailiffs thereof; knew all about the raising of the highest amount of rent, as scientific people understand hydraulic pressure; also about extermination on the grand scale and the small, whether

by clearance or by consolidation; believed himself withal a leading agent of civilization in Ireland, civilization and man in that country being, if not incompatible, at least inconsistent, and it being the manifest duty of two out of every three Irishmen to go to America in order to make room for bullocks—a doctrine so little appreciated in Mr. Thomas Trench's neighbourhood, that he came to suspect every bush of hiding a blunderbuss, but nevertheless had his father's luck, and was never shot or even shot at.

The way in which Mr. Trench came to be agent of the Digby estates is itself a striking illustration of the law of landlord and tenant in Ireland. The old Lord Digby had given his tenants liberal leases. The new Lord Digby was advised that he had exceeded his legal powers in so doing, and resolved to annul the leases. At this moment Mr. Trench was appointed agent. He succeeded in settling terms with the executors of the old lord for compensation of the various leasehold interests, on the very eve of the trial of the whole question at the Tullamore Assizes; and the tenantry—who do not love the law, it is true, feeling that the law has never yet learned to love them—took the terms, agreed that their leases should be treated as cancelled, and entered upon the earthly beatitude of tenancy at will under the auspices of Mr. Stenart Trench. As usual in Ireland, all the improvements which separated the condition of the country from a state of nature had been made by the tenantry. They became the property of Lord Digby. The rents were raised all over the estate by a valuation—that is to say, in proportion as a tenant had improved his farm on the faith of his lease, in so far did he find that he had succeeded in racking his rent.

Mr. Thomas Trench appears to have thought not utterly in vain of these things, and he even complained to Mr. Senior in a general sort of way that there was no protection by law for the property of the tenants:—

There is no tribunal, he said, which is entitled to say, "the value of the improvements made by the tenant is A.; he has had the use of them, without additional rent, for B. years; the compensation to which he is entitled if the farm is taken from him is C."

This seems reasonable, especially on the lips of a land-agent. But it was too much for the professor of civilization by cattle: Mr. Senior replied:—

I suppose, I said, that the verdict of such a tribunal would frequently be, "What the tenant calls improvements are mischiefs. This cabin ought never to have been built. No attempt ought to have been made to till this

land ; it ought to be returned to the sheep and black cattle from whom it was taken."

This view, fully drawn out, would lead to the conclusion that sheep and black cattle had a prior existence and prior rights to man in Ireland. Mr. Senior would, we doubt not, be lavish of praise to the industry which had reclaimed a Swiss crag or a Dutch fen. But it comes natural to an English economist of his school to conclude that the industry of the Celt is, if possible, a worse quality than his indolence.

"Without doubt," Mr. Trench answered ; "and such is the necessary result of the Irish system of allowing the tenant to deal with the land without the interference of the owner. But if the owner do interfere, he does so at the peril of his life. *One of my father's great difficulties at Kenmare is his determination that if a younger son or daughter marry, the new couple shall quit the parent cabin.*"

Now this passage is, we submit, a passage to meditate upon. One can make points out of it, pictures out of it ; it suggests what the ascetic writers call "a spiritual bouquet" of strange flavour. Consider, in the first place, that there is nothing in the context to mitigate its unconscious, unsophisticated atrocity. Mr. Senior wrote it down, Mr. Trench long afterwards revised it. Neither thought it necessary to add a note of extenuation or explanation. Such a frame of mind on the part of a white man in the nineteenth century, probably baptized, certainly what is called educated, may, we believe, afford a curious psychological study to future generations. The dialogue will be suggestive to some playwright, who finds that audiences weary of scenes drawn from the life of the French peasantry before the great Revolution, or the Virginian negro before the great Civil War. If every other record of Irish landlord power shall have been obliterated, some historian of genius may reconceive the whole structure from that single sentence, as a great naturalist is said to have designed the whole frame of a mastodon from a single joint of its toe. Was there, we ask in all simplicity, anything worse than this thing in the theory of the seigniorial rights or in the planter's power ? Crimes of a more grievous die were, we doubt not, committed in either case ; but the crimes were against, and not according to, French or American law. Now we cannot call Mr. Trench's conduct in this matter a crime, because it appears to be according to English law ; and being according to law, he is, wherever his power extends, giving it the effect of custom. But the right that he claims, to put it in the plainest terms, is the right to compel a father to turn his child out of doors, because the child has presumed to marry

with the father's consent, but without Mr. Trench's. That is the point to which landlord power has been carried in Ireland; and the English opinion, which accepts Mr. Senior as an authority and applauds Mr. Trench as a hero, appears to regard it as a good thing. But will not the verdict of history be that it was a very bad thing; and will not men who walk these islands a century hence wonder that the fate which befell the French seigneurs and the Southern planters was, in the case of the Irish landlords, so long averted? Conceive the utter helplessness of insecurity to which the Irish tenant must have been reduced before such a barbarous power as this should dare to trample, should dare to make him trample, on the holiest ties of life; and at the very moment when his humble home knows the rare joy which the pure and happy marriage of the Irish peasant generally brings, compel him to banish his child from his hearth. When those who have been thus driven forth from home next become expatriated, and tell their tale to the men who dwell in free lands, is it any wonder that the law which tolerates such things acquires an ill name from end to end of the earth? What Head Centre has enrolled so many Fenians as Mr. Trench? It is a rule, then, it would appear, of the Lansdowne estate—if not an express rule, at least implied most clearly in the practice stated by Mr. Thomas Trench—that the license of the agent is a necessary preliminary to marriage in the family of a tenant. This is one of the "Realities of Irish Life" of which Mr. Steuart Trench's Memoirs omit all record; yet of that impious custom he is undoubtedly the author. Another rule of the Lansdowne estate is that which renders a tenant liable to eviction for giving shelter to any one, however nearly related, who may have been evicted from a holding on the estate, or to his children, or to any member of his family. The sentence of the agent of the Lansdowne estate has the power to stamp its subject as a Pariah, whom it is dangerous to know and ruinous to harbour. In consequence of this unnatural rule, a boy was once done to death on the Lansdowne estate; and his uncle and aunt were convicted of manslaughter not murder, because they had killed the boy, not out of malice, but because of the rule of the estate. It would be impossible to state the facts of the case with such force and feeling, not to say accuracy and authority, as they were detailed by Chief Baron Pigott, in passing sentence on these unfortunate persons. They are the words of a Judge whose scrupulous conscientiousness is such as to intensify the force of every word he uttered on such an occasion; and Mr. Steuart Trench is the agent referred to:—

The poor boy whose death you caused was between twelve and thirteen years of age. His mother at one time held a little dwelling from which she was expelled. His father was dead. His mother had left him, and he was alone and unprotected. He found refuge with his grandmother, who held a farm, from which she was removed in consequence of her harbouring this poor boy, as the agent on the property had given public notice to the tenantry that expulsion from their farms would be the penalty inflicted on them if they harboured any persons having no residence on the estate. This poor boy was then left without a house to shelter him or a friend to assist him. He was an unhappy outcast.

. . . He went to the house of a man named Coffey, whose wife humanely gave him a little food, but she was afraid to shelter him in her house, as the agent had given orders that distress for twelvemonths' rent would be made on any tenant who should harbour persons not resident on the estate, and that they would also be expelled from their farms. He is turned adrift to the world, friendless and unprotected. He came to Casey's house, where you, his uncle and aunt, resided. He applied for relief, as he was in a state of destitution. Casey, with whom you lodged, desired you to turn him from the house, as he was afraid the orders of the agent would be enforced against him. . . . You committed the offence, not with a desire to inflict death, but influenced by fear that Casey would be expelled from his holding. The poor child is turned out of doors; and the next proof was, that you, Judith, took a pike-handle and beat him violently with it while lying on the ground.

. . . He implored of you to spare him, and he promised to leave the place. He raised himself from the ground, and bound, as he was, went tottering along from house to house, but there was no refuge for the wretched outcast. As a last resource he turned his steps to Coffey's house, but some of the neighbours threatened to tell the agent if Coffey harboured him. Coffey had, however, the humanity to take him to Casey's house, where you resided. He fell twice from weakness and the result of the injuries you inflicted on him. He is supported to the house, and a scene ensued which I find difficult to describe. The door was opened by you, Judith, and a struggle ensues. Coffey and another man endeavoured to force the boy in—you keeping him out. He bleeds profusely. The threshold is smeared with blood. You succeed in keeping him out; and he, unable to walk, rolls himself along the ground, till he gets to the wall, where he remains. Night passes over him, and on the following morning he is found by the neighbours, cold, stiff, and dead.

. . . I do not think, however, that you inflicted the injuries with an intention to cause death; it was through fear that the threat would be carried out against Casey. Casey acted under the influence of the threats of those in authority, but such is no justification for the offence. It forms no defence, that such an order was given as that which appeared in evidence on the trial. For an order from the execution of which death ensues is not only not sanctioned by law, but is directly at variance with it.

Mr. Steuart Trench appears to have thought the Chief Baron a very presumptuous person. The rules of the estate survived the sentence of the Donoghues. Their trial took place eleven years before the conversation at Baureigh in which Thomas Trench complained to Mr. Senior that one of his father's great difficulties at Kenmare was his determination that if a younger son or daughter marry, the new couple shall quit the parent cabin. "He knows," said Mr. T. Trench, "that if they remain, the consequences will be the subdivision of the farm, the almost invariable quarrelling of the family, and the misery of its occupants. This they will not at the time admit, and they accuse him—and above all the priests accuse him—of forbidding marriage and of encouraging profligacy." And obviously profligacy is encouraged by such a system as Mr. Trench pursues. If it is not a common result of it, that is due to the innate morality of the Irish peasantry. We know, even from the trial of the Donoghues, that it is a system destructive of the tenderest ties of flesh and blood, fatal to Christian charity, and that it has directly caused one most barbarous and unnatural murder. In all the "Realities of Irish Life" which Mr. Trench has witnessed, there is no ghastlier tragedy than the death of that poor boy whom he outlawed, and who died a cruel death, because he was an outlaw, on Lord Lansdowne's estate. It is a fine example of Mr. Trench's extraordinary effrontery of character that he never even alludes to this case, or to the existence of the rules of which it was one of the results. The argument for the rules is that they are necessary in order to prevent the subdivision of farms. A landlord is within his right when he forbids the subdivision of his farms: but he has no right to do so by a series of rules which are repugnant to the spirit of English law and of the Christian religion, and to the very instincts of human nature. It is possible to introduce such stringent covenants into agricultural leases as will make it the tenant's absolute interest not to sublet. But the rules of the Lansdowne estate are a code for tenants at will. They represent the lowest and basest form of tenure now existing on the face of the civilized globe; and it is evident that the tenants who live under such conditions can call neither their souls nor their bodies their own. The Russian serf, the Virginia slave were not obliged by rule to turn their children out of doors on the day of their marriage, or to refuse food and shelter to their kith and kin. The application of such rules to great properties and large masses of tenantry has another effect, that it encourages the smaller landlords and agents to acts of almost inconceivable arbitrariness. When the Marquis of

Lansdowne, the rising hope of the great Liberal party, who has just done Mr. Gladstone the honour of taking a seat on the Treasury Bench without salary, governs his Irish tenantry in such a fashion, what is to be expected from Mr. William Scully? When Lord Lansdowne makes it a cause of eviction for a tenant to shelter, even for a night, any one, however near by blood, or infirm, or forlorn, and ruthlessly exterminates even the grandmother who harbours for a while her orphan grandson, against whom the excommunication of the estate has gone forth, need we wonder that there are properties in the south of Ireland on which the very keeping of a dog, even where there are sheep to be watched, is a cause for eviction? And this brings us to the main argument of Mr. Senior's book which is that there are two laws in Ireland. "Ireland is still governed," he says, "by two codes, dissimilar and often opposed—one deriving its validity from Acts of Parliament, and maintained by the magistrate, the other laid down by the tenants and enforced by assassination." This is, like so many other sweeping generalisations about Ireland, which English writers have made from imperfect data hastily scraped together and impatiently digested, only a blunder with a smart air about it. There are extensive districts of Ireland, and in all its provinces, where a landlord or agent has not been murdered within the memory of man, or indeed within record; nor has landlord power been less abused in those districts than in others where there has been an almost continuous calendar of crime. If Mr. Trench were to endeavour to enforce the same rules in Monaghan that he has succeeded in establishing in Kerry, his life would not be worth a month's purchase. The tendency to agrarian conspiracy and assassination is in Ireland most frequently associated with districts where there is a considerable admixture of race, combined with a peculiar tradition or custom of tenure—in Tipperary, for example, where a very large proportion of the tenantry are descended from the soldiers of Cromwell, who originally got their lands on the same terms that settlers now get land in Iowa or at Brisbane, and whose descendants or representatives conceive, not without historical, if without legal reason, that the landlord power has been—they cannot exactly explain how—produced by a gradual, stealthy usurpation of their original rights, and a violation of the spirit and terms of the settlement. The same spirit has at times extended through the adjoining counties, which were similarly colonized, and notably through Waterford, Limerick, King's County, and Westmeath. These counties were, of the Ten which were given directly to Cromwell's soldiers and the "Adventurers," the most closely settled; and in addition they

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Mr. Senior, who believes that the exterminating landlord is an instrument of God's good providence, and that the tenant is an assassin by blood and training, nevertheless understands perfectly well their respective contributions to the present

condition of the country. This is his succinct statement of the case :—

The Irish landlords, partly politically, and partly to obtain additional rent, by means of the potato, encouraged or (what was enough without active encouragement) permitted sub-division and the increase of population. The inhabitants of Ireland, from 4,088,226 in 1792, rose to 8,175,124 in 1841. The landlords were unable or unwilling to expend money on their estates. They allowed the tenants themselves to make the provision, by building and by reclaiming land from its original state of bog, or heather, or stony field, necessary to lodge and feed this increased population. It is thus that many estates have been created, and almost all have been enlarged, by generation after generation of tenants without assistance. It was the tenants who made the Barony of Farney, originally worth £3,000 a year, worth £50,000 a year."

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But why dwell upon such incidents? Mr. Shirley was in his right; nay, he was doing his duty.

"That duty," says Mr. Senior, "the duty for the performance of which I believe that Providence created landlords is, *the keeping down population*. If there were no one whose interest it was to limit the numbers of the occupants of land, it would be tenanted by all whom it could maintain, just as a warren is tenanted by all the rabbits that it can feed; competition would force them to use the food that was most abundant—every failure of crop would produce a famine; they would have no surplus produce, and therefore no division of labour; no manufactures, except the coarse clothing and furniture which each family must produce for itself; no separation of ranks, no literature—in short, no civilization. . . . *To prevent all this, Providence created landlords—a class of persons whose interest it is that the land should produce as large as possible an amount of surplus produce, and for that purpose should be occupied by only the number of persons necessary to enable it to produce the largest possible amount beyond their own subsistence.*"

Minimum of population, maximum of rent! Minimum of man, maximum of beast! If this was the design of Providence in the creation of the human race, is it not strange that landlords were provided on such an utterly inadequate scale? Strange it is that there have been and are so many nations with surplus produce, separation of ranks, even literature and civilization itself—and yet utterly without landlords, utterly unconscious that they are frustrating the designs of Providence in not having landlords, and stranger still, that these God-forgotten nations are not becoming nevertheless like unto rabbit warrens, even Yahoo warrens. In Ireland indeed, where landlords have had very much their own way; where (to take the present century only into account) in one generation

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they stimulated the growth of population because that paid, and in the next generation proceeded to exterminate because that paid better still—Parliament impartially assisting both processes, enfranchising or disfranchising, giving facilities for subdivision or for depopulation, abolishing the forty shilling freeholders, or passing the Quarter Acre clause as required—the tenantry have not nevertheless learned to associate the institution with fine clothing and handsome furniture, with letters and æsthetics, with culture, and sweetness, and light. Mr. Senior, believing in the providential function of landlords, was at one time forcibly struck by the idea that it was possible to connect the economy of Malthus with the theology of Calvin. He had a conversation at Birr Castle in 1862 with a person who is designated by the initials A. B. (Archbishop Whately we suspect), and the question was as to the number of the elect.

"Real Calvinism is logical," said A. B. ; "if you assume the omnipotence and omniscience of the Deity, and deny his benevolence. It supposes that for the purpose of displaying His powers He created man. That for the same purpose He decreed that out of the millions of the human race a certain number shall be saved, and the rest, being the great majority, shall be damned. That the sacrifice of our Saviour was made for the redemption of the elect, being a small minority, and that its benefits extended only to that small minority."

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perfect veracity, gave him (and years afterwards in deliberate cold blood revised), the following account of the result in the King's County :—

Captain Bernard, the Conservative candidate, had, according to his promises, an overwhelming majority. His opponent, a whisky seller—whose uncle, the head of the family, still lives in a cabin—beat him at the poll by two to one.

All the facts in this case happen to be easy of reference. The Liberal candidates at the King's County election of 1852 were Mr. (at present Sir Patrick) O'Brien and Mr. Loftus Bland, Q.C. As Mr. O'Brien was returned at the head of the poll, by 1,976 votes against 1,148, given for Captain Bernard, there can be no question that he is the person whom Lord Rosse demeaned himself by describing as "a whisky seller." The English reader, ignorant of the case and the place, taking the phrase with its context, and presuming Lord Rosse to be an exceptionally high-minded and accurate nobleman, would naturally presume that the Liberal candidate so spoken of was some low publican, projected into Parliament in defiance of decency by the villainy of priests and the violence of mobs. Now the whole statement was untrue, and Lord Rosse knew perfectly well that it was untrue. Mr. O'Brien was at the time of his election a barrister at law of eight years' standing, the eldest son of a baronet, who was also at the time a Member of Parliament of six years' standing, and who had received the Queen as Lord Mayor of Dublin, when Her Majesty visited Ireland in 1849. The only possible foundation for the expression was the fact that part of Sir Timothy O'Brien's large fortune was made by the sale of Irish whisky. Many great fortunes, and not a few titles, in England as well as Ireland, are due to the distillery or the brewery. In Dublin there has been created since a Conservative baronet, Sir Benjamin Guinness, whose fortune was made by the manufacture of Dublin stout. Can any one suppose that if the eldest son of Sir Benjamin Guinness had offered himself to contest the representation of the King's County on Conservative principles, Lord Rosse would have considered it fair to describe him as "the keeper of a beershop?" A hasty expression of this sort, used in the heat of a general election among people who knew all the circumstances and could take the phrase at its just worth, might be excused, but it is notable that Lord Rosse revised and even annotated Mr. Senior's journals, and that the terms are used so as to convey to a person who influenced English opinion, and to cause him to

put upon permanent record, a wholly false impression as to the way in which Irish Catholic politics are managed.

"I have looked carefully over the returns," Lord Rosse continued, "and Ireland I find will give you in this Parliament only one Whig."

It is a pity Mr. Senior did not ask him who the one Whig was. It would be curious to ascertain by this exceptional example what was Lord Rosse's conception of a real Whig. The result of the general election of 1852 was that Ireland sent to Parliament at least forty only too steadfast supporters of the successive Ministries of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, of whom certainly not the least docile were the two honourable members for King's County.

The manner in which O'Connell was regarded by Mr. Senior's Irish coterie reminds one of the stories that are told of the style in which the more silly Legitimists used to speak, sixty years ago, of the "Corsican ogre." This portentous and unprecedented personage, whose eloquence moved such masses of men as had never been stirred to the same depth by the voice of a mere politician since the days of Demosthenes; whose personal ascendancy over the nation amid whom he loved to dwell was a dominion that it would not be extravagant to compare to Napoleon's; who possessed more legitimate power in the State than any single subject then possessed or had ever possessed; and the fame of whose genius, whose great achievement, whose further designs filled the whole world—this great tribune, to produce the like of whom nature and history combine so rarely in the course of centuries, was, in the eyes of this circle of crabbed sciolists, only an obstreperous charlatan, and a sort of supreme incarnation of the spirit of Irish mendicancy.

O'Connell, said Lord Rosse, has left no successor, because from the time that emancipation was gained, his objects became purely personal; and even as personal objects they were sordid, for they scarcely rose above the acquisition of money to be spent in keeping open house for his tools and flatterers.

Lord Rosse was about as capable of comprehending the character and policy of O'Connell, as O'Connell would have been capable of setting a speculum to Lord Rosse's great telescope. But Lord Rosse must have known about O'Connell's personal position, when emancipation was gained, certain facts that were notorious. One such fact was that he had at that time the largest practice at the Irish Bar; that there was hardly any limit to its extent, or almost to its lucrativeness, except his inability to attend to it, caused by his devotion to

the public interest ; that he was, moreover, a man who, in his keen, athletic, manifold way, highly enjoyed the practice of his profession ; and that, after emancipation, there was no station of whatever rank or emolument, save one, among its many dignified offices which he might not have had simply by signifying the wish. Another such fact was that Mr. O'Connell, apart from his professional and political position, was a country gentleman of a very considerable inherited estate, for a Roman Catholic, in the county of Kerry ; and was as much at home with his pack of beagles on the hills over Darrynane, as when volubly pleading in his wig and gown at the Four Courts, or amid the ringing peals of cheers, thunderous in their volume, yet so touchingly tremulous with human tenderness and passion, that used always to break forth when he stood face to face with the people. He was by circumstances alone placed as much above such sordid objects as, so to speak, Lord Rosse himself. Mr. Senior hated O'Connell in just the same small silly way. In one of his *Edinburgh Review* articles, published in 1843, after premising that O'Connell "cannot be a sincere repealer," he proceeds to account for the formidable agitation against the Union, which was then convulsing the empire, in the following shallow and rancorous sentence :—"He appears to be influenced by all the religious and national antipathies of his least civilized countrymen ; and he has to avenge his own failure in the British Parliament, and what is more stinging—in British society." This idea was so pleasing to Mr. Senior's mind, which seems to have had a good deal of semi-feminine spite in it, that towards the close of the same article he resolved to elaborate the view ; but the editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, it would seem, had the good sense to expunge the passage, which is now, however, restored, for the benefit of all who admire "the infinitely little," in a note. "In the House of Commons," he says, "O'Connell failed. His dishonesty, ignorance, and utter want of taste, moral and intellectual, rendered him of all speakers the least agreeable to a British audience. The same faults almost excluded him from good society. His wounded vanity and ambition drove him back to Ireland. To supply the funds necessary to feed or pay his sub-agitators he invented the rent. To obtain a further means of power, he supported the Melbourne administration. As a bond for his party he selected repeal—an object unattainable, and therefore not to be worn out like emancipation." This passage, it will be observed, combines with Mr. Senior's fine idea the view subsequently attributed to Lord Rosse. This is not the place to attempt a survey of O'Connell's career except in so far as is absolutely

necessary to exhibit what a cantankerous and unscrupulous critic Mr. Senior was. To say that O'Connell failed in Parliament is an assertion simply preposterous. His great contemporaries and antagonists would be the first to repel such an outrage on history. It would have been all but an impossibility for O'Connell to have failed, where human speech was the weapon, and human affairs the stake, in any assembly of articulate-speaking men. One towards whom he once used words that certainly were ungentle, but who was too generous to remember them on such an occasion—one peculiarly qualified to estimate Parliamentary greatness—Mr. Disraeli has recorded in words memorable and very touching the last appearance of O'Connell in the House. The passage is from the "Life of Lord George Bentinck"—:

He sat in an unusual place—in that generally occupied by the leader of the opposition—and spoke from the red box, convenient to him from the number of documents to which he had to refer. His appearance was of great debility, and the tones of his voice were very still. His words, indeed, only reached those who were immediately around him, and the ministers sitting on the other side of the green table, and listening with that interest and respectful attention which became the occasion. It was a strange and touching spectacle to those who remembered the form of colossal energy, and the clear and thrilling tones that had once startled, disturbed, and controlled senates. Mr. O'Connell was on his legs for nearly two hours, assisted occasionally in the management of his documents by some devoted aide-de-camp. To the House generally it was a performance in dumb show, a feeble old man muttering before a table; but respect for the great Parliamentary personage kept all as orderly as if the fortunes of a party hung upon his rhetoric; and though not an accent reached the gallery, means were taken that next morning the country should not lose the last and not the least interesting of the speeches of one who had so long occupied and agitated the mind of nations.

Posterity will probably prefer on such a point the evidence of Mr. Disraeli to the evidence of Mr. Senior. As to O'Connell's supposed still more stinging failure in society, the real reason why he began the Repeal agitation, what is to be said? Was it in general deportment, or the turning of *bons-mots*, or only at short whist, or in dancing that he failed? O'Connell probably thought, with Sir George Lewis, that the world would be a very endurable place were it not for its pleasures—meaning specifically the pleasures of society. We must wait for "Mrs. Grundy's Memoirs," "The Autobiography of a Lady Patroness of Almack's," "The Diary of a Duchess in the reign of William IV.," and other forthcoming works of fashion, to test this point. British society to Mr. Senior

meant probably, in the first place, the society with which Mr. Senior mixed, and in which, let us suppose, he succeeded. We admit it is as difficult to conceive O'Connell succeeding in that set as it is to conceive an Irish wolf-dog performing the tricks of a parlour poodle. Do men of his stamp care to what is called "succeed" in what is called "society"? Was Mr. Cobden a success in society? Is Mr. Bright? It is impossible to write their honoured names in this connection without recognising how much they both owed to the example and the political method of O'Connell. His great system of moral force agitation has indeed been far more fruitful in legislative benefits and political training to the English people than to the Irish. But in some respects O'Connell had superior advantages. He was a man of old, and, in the true sense of the word, noble family; and his appearance singularly befitted his genius and his rank. His power of personal fascination and adaptation was extraordinary; his manners distinguished (faulty, if at all, towards complaisance); his humour exuberant and genial. If such qualities do not succeed in society, so much the worse for the society in which they fail. The real difficulty is to conceive O'Connell caring for such success, unless in so far as it came in his way, and could not fairly be avoided. Mr. Senior's other statements are flagrant fictions, which it is hardly worth while to contradict. What he calls "the rent" existed long before O'Connell entered Parliament. O'Connell supported Lord Melbourne's administration rather than Sir Robert Peel's, for precisely the same reasons that Irish Catholics now support Mr. Gladstone rather than Mr. Disraeli. He was a Repealer from the moment the Union was carried. He spoke in that sense, if once, a hundred times before the Clare election; and he introduced the question to Parliament, in one of the most remarkable of his speeches, ten years before he commenced the great agitation, of which Mr. Senior was actually writing.

It would be a weary task to expose the ignorant and scandalous calumnies against the Catholic Church and the Irish priesthood with which almost every page of Mr. Senior's *Journal* abounds. It would be difficult to believe that he believed many of the things that he puts upon paper, were it not that the book has obtained, and still continues to obtain, a reception from well-informed critics, never qualified by a syllable of doubt or censure. On all matters connected with religion, even the most interesting historical and literary questions, Mr. Senior appears to have been profoundly ignorant. This is a passage from a conversation with Archbishop Whately:—

"What is Thomas à Kempis's book, 'De Imitatione Christi?' " I asked.

"It is a misnomer," he answered. "It is a very pious, very dull book, a dialogue between Christ and the Soul, and contains only a few passages really on the imitation of Christ."

Here Dr. Whately's inability to comprehend the beauty and depth of a Christian classic is hardly so strange as Mr. Senior's blank ignorance of a book itself so famous, and the cause of one of the most curious of literary controversies.

In the same conversation Mr. Senior says—

Every Roman Catholic is a polytheist. When a Roman Catholic, praying to the Virgin, says, *Monstra te esse matrem*, he puts her, in fact, above God.

Any Roman Catholic who has had much acquaintance with Protestants must have remarked, that in proportion to a Protestant's difficulty of stating in a clear and definite form what he himself believes, is his confidence that he knows what a Catholic believes better than the Catholic himself can possibly know. But it may be simply said of this particular passage that the difficulty is to get a Roman Catholic's intellect to comprehend how his saying to our Blessed Lady, "Show that you are a Mother," puts her, in fact, above God Almighty.

Romish sanctity, says Archbishop Whately, is essentially and ostentatiously ascetic. It differs from that of a Hindoo fakeer only in degree.

The life of St. Francis de Sales, or St. Vincent de Paul, differs from that of a Hindoo fakeer only in degree!

Whole pages of the book are studded with equally grotesque absurdities; but, after all, these are its venial offences. Some of the charges against the character of the Irish priesthood are of a different order, and give us deep cause to lament the posthumous publication of the book, which renders it impossible to bring their authors to public account. The most shocking of these statements are attributed to Archbishop Whately, and such a one as follows is a sad revelation at once of his gross credulity and his reckless malignity. It concerns the conduct of the Irish priests during the famine:—

Their incomes were spent during the famine, as they were spent before it, and as they are now spent, on themselves, or hoarded until they could be employed in large subscriptions to chapels or convents. And this was not the worst. In some cases they refused to those who could not or who would not pay for them, the sacraments of their Church. In ordinary times this may be excusable. A clergy unendowed and unsalaried must be supported by

voluntary contributions, or by dues. In so poor a country as Ireland, voluntary contributions cannot be relied on. The priest might often starve if he did not exact his dues, and as he has no legal rights, his only mode of exacting them is to make their payment the condition on which his ministrations are performed. But during the famine payment was often obviously impossible. When under such circumstances the sacraments, which the priest affirmed to be necessary passports to heaven were refused, the people could not avoid inferring either that the priest let men sink into eternal torment to avoid a little trouble to himself, or that absolution or extreme unction could not be essential to salvation.

It is almost impossible to a Catholic to conceive any priest under any circumstances, except deliberate impenitence, refusing absolution to a dying man—but above all, we may venture to say, an Irish priest. The tender wisdom of the Church restores to the fallen and degraded priest the full plenitude of his jurisdiction for that supreme moment, and binds him to its exercise. The authority of the Church, on the other hand, would promptly smite the priest who was known to be guilty of such a shocking scandal as is here alleged, with at the least suspension from the cure of souls. Dr. Whately tells Mr. Senior that the practice was so common that it produced a certain effect on the mind of “the people.” Every Irish Catholic, especially every Irish Catholic who remembers the period of the famine, will, we are sure, agree with us in repelling such a statement as a malignant outrage against the known truth. We are not concerned to claim all the virtues under the sun for the Irish priesthood; but if there be one which, like the eminent purity of their morals, has been always traditional, characteristic, and, as it were, instinctive to them, it is their devotion to the dying. A “sick call” is a summons to the Irish priest with which there is no parley. Distance, weather, night, contagion, his own ailments or fatigue are pleas of no avail—he seems to share for the time the agony of the dying, and can know no rest until his tender ministry has smoothed the passage of the parting soul. To think of his dues at such a moment would be against his very nature. Ordinary Protestants are not aware that there are no dues attaching to the administration of absolution or extreme unction,—that dues are rather connected with the public and festive ceremonies of the Church, like baptism and marriage. But Dr. Whately is no more to be excused for the ignorance of such a series of statements as he made to Mr. Senior concerning the practice of the Catholic Church in Ireland—a practice which, if he believed in his function there to the extent that he professed, he was bound to understand

accurately before he spoke so confidently—than Cardinal Cullen would be justified in telling an Italian traveller, about to produce a book on Ireland, that the Irish Protestants annually immolated a Papist infant on the first of July to the shade of William III.

We may pass the passages relating to the conversion of Ireland to Protestantism, which was supposed in Dr. Whately's circle to be imminent when Mr. Senior visited Ireland in 1852. Even before the census of 1861 disposed of that fond and costly illusion, Dr. Whately had learned to doubt what he was in the habit of hearing on the subject. "For some time," Mr. Senior writes in his diary of 1852, "a considerable conversion to Protestantism has been going on in Ireland. The converts are to be numbered by thousands, not by hundreds." When Dr. Whately revised this passage, he inserted in italics the significant words "*it is said*" in the last sentence, after the word "numbered." That he believed that the national system of education would ultimately prove fatal to the Catholic faith in Ireland—that he was determined to use his considerable influence in its direction to this end, the reader of his memoirs may be already aware. Speaking to Mr. Senior on the subject, he more than once expressed himself in this way:—

Though the priest may still perhaps denounce the Bible collectively, as a book dangerous to the laity, he cannot safely object to the Scripture extracts which are read to children with the sanction of the prelates of his own Church. But these extracts contain so much that is inconsistent with the whole spirit of Romanism that it is difficult to suppose that a person well acquainted with them can be a thorough-going Roman Catholic.

This ludicrous delusion appears to have pervaded the Archbishop's circle. A Mr. C., a Dublin lawyer, says, in much the same strain:—

Archbishop Murray was a sincere believer in the peculiarities of his faith. Thinking them true, he thought they would be diffused and strengthened by the diffusion of knowledge. If he had not thought so, he would not have given the sanction of the Board to Archbishop Whately's "Christian Evidences," a book decidedly anti-Roman Catholic, since it founds belief on reason, not on mere authority. His successors are less confident. They have forced the withdrawal of the "Christian Evidences," and I have no doubt that they will get rid as far as they can of the common religious instruction.

It is useless, of course, to comment on the astounding assertion, uttered quite as a notorious commonplace, that the priest is in the habit of denouncing the Bible collectively as a book dangerous

to the laity—useless also to dwell on the irresistible conclusion that reading a little Scripture once a day at school must inevitably turn all the rising generation of Irish Catholics into Protestants. It does not appear to have had that effect. For nineteen centuries Catholics have been in the habit of reading much more of the Scriptures than is contained in the lessons of the Irish National Board, at Mass, at Vespers, in the various offices of the Church, without becoming Protestant. But this is a point upon which the Protestant intellect, after a little exercise in Ireland, appears to become incurably idiotic. Can honest Protestants, however, wonder at the deep distrust and keen suspicion with which the infliction of a system of mixed education is regarded by the Catholics of Ireland, when they are aware that, notwithstanding the most liberal professions, the system was thus designedly used by one of its principal authorities, with a distinct proselytizing purpose? This is the kind of conduct that Protestants would call "Jesuitical" conduct if they could find a Catholic archbishop engaged in it. The grand result of the system, however, so far as it is really a mixed system, has been to spread, not Protestantism, but Fenianism. The Irish Establishment is not consoled for her impending severance from the State by a noble army of neophytes, who found the logic of Whately's "Christian Evidences" irresistible: but we have unfortunately, on the other hand, on Lord Mayo's authority, the suggestive fact, that more national schoolmasters were arrested under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act than there were proportionately of any other class or occupation in Ireland.

We lay down these volumes with a feeling, we confess, which is akin to despair. The information and the opinions which they contain are those which an enlightened Englishman had, from long reflection and sedulous inquiry, formed as to the state of Ireland and the character of the Irish people. They appear to be in course of general acceptance by English public opinion as a sort of political gospel on Ireland. "The work will enable England to understand Ireland as she has never done before," says a great quarterly organ of opinion. "These volumes will, in our opinion, do more to make Englishmen comprehend Ireland, to explain Irish difficulties, and to throw light upon Irish questions, than any book that has ever been published about that much misunderstood country and that very perplexing people." So speaks a great daily organ of opinion. We, on the other hand, deliberately believe that the account of the Irish nation, its character and circumstances, which Mr. Senior has drawn, is at least as far

from the truth, as dangerous to the State, as calculated to work on the worst passions of the two countries, as the most outrageous caricature of England and the English that Fenian animosity ever produced. And there is an acrid and cold-blooded malignity in it, besides, which is wanting to the racy, home-spun language of Celtic sedition. The English wonder at the extraordinary pleasure which the Irish undoubtedly take in the literature of their national press, a literature of invective against the English character, English laws, English institutions; of sympathy with every power on the face of the earth that is hostile to England. But, as Napoleon said, "there is nothing that one nation hates like another nation"; and the avidity with which Mr. Senior's book is accepted as an authentic expression of the true theory that Englishmen ought to hold about Ireland is as much an evidence of the blindness and bitterness of national animosity as is Fenianism. That theory, roughly stated, is that the Irish are a nation of polytheists, assassins, and Yahoos. The reception which such a book meets with raises this question, which goes to the bottom of every other: How is it possible that two nations should remain united, which appear, after a connection of seven hundred years, to be more incapable of understanding each other than they were at first? The *Topography of Giraldus Cambrensis* was not, we are convinced, so far astray from the truth regarding Ireland and the Irish in the twelfth century as Mr. Senior's book is from the truth of nowadays. The animosities which the book of the Welsh Dean produced between the two nations were fierce and active four hundred years after he had been laid in his grave. We will not predict for Mr. Senior so long a spell of posthumous strife. But we firmly believe that if his most characteristic views should come to be believed and acted on by the English nation in regard to the Irish, the era upon which we are now entering would not be one of hope and reconciliation, but one of increasing animosity and eventual separation.

ART. II.—THEORIES ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAITH.

The Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ ; Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1866, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury. By HENRY PARRY LIDDON, M.A., student of Christ Church, Prebendary of Salisbury, and Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Salisbury. Second edition. London : Rivingtons.

An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, Author of Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church. London : Toovey.

Katholische Dogmatik. Von Dr. J. KUHN, ordentlicher Professor der Theologie zu Tübingen. Tübingen : Laupp. 1859-1862-1867.

THE Act by which Pius IX. defined the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is as remarkable for its effects on Theology as for its immediate contents; and amongst them not the least noteworthy is its influence on the theory of development. To some thinkers on the subject, that great doctrine seemed to require and to authorize the laxest and the broadest theory in order to extract it from the Fathers. We have known Catholics who considered that the Immaculate Conception was unknown to S. John, and had been by some process or other discovered by the later Church. The Bull *Ineffabilis* has put an end for ever to such views as this. It declares that that great doctrine was a part of the original deposit, that it was in vigour from the most ancient times, that it always existed in the Church, was received from our predecessors in the faith, and has upon it the stamp of a revealed doctrine. The Bull, however, does more than this. It refers to the view of Vincent of Lerins as to the growth of doctrine; and it uses the word *explicare*, which, at least since the time of St. Thomas,* has become the technical word for development.†

* Summa 22 Qu. 1. a. 7.

† Hanc "Catholica Ecclesia *tamquam doctrinam possidens divinitus acceptam et celestis revelationis deposito comprehensam*, multiplici continenter ratione splendidisque factis magis in dies *explicare*, proponere, et fovere nun-

The effect of all this is twofold. First it throws us back upon the Fathers. Curiously enough, the lax views about development to which we have adverted are by no means confined to the liberalist school. Some who are most loyal to the Church, from the very fact of their firm hold on the doctrine of the all-sufficiency for practical purposes of the present Church, have been apt to forget that by the very terms of the Catholic Faith we are as much bound to the past as to the present. It is our glory and our strength that we have never changed. As we are the Church of the present and the future, so we are the Church of the past. We are just as much obliged to yield internal assent to the dogmatic decisions of a dead Pope as of a living one. For us the Pope never dies, and S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian is as binding and irreversible as the Bull "*Ineffabilis*." We are like soldiers who have to defend a grand empire with a world-wide frontier. If it be pierced at any one point, it receives a mortal wound. Let it be made out that a single Pope *ex cathedrâ* taught what is untrue, our cause is lost at once. It is quite true, that while all Christians outside the Church are turning melancholy eyes towards the darkness of the past to interrogate Antiquity on the origin of Christianity, and are trembling lest their faith should turn out to be baseless, the simple believer, on the contrary, feels secure in the living Church. But the theologian is not a simple believer, or rather, he is something more. For the ordinary purposes of the pulpit and the confessional it would be well if all knew accurately one great divine, such as Suarez; but he cannot be a perfect theologian who knows nothing of the treasures of Christian antiquity. How can he estimate the *sensus communis* of theologians unless he knows the Fathers? It would be well if all remembered the dictum of a learned Jesuit, whose mind is as broad as his loyalty to the Church is great. "In passing judgment on particular cases, a man must avoid two extremes. On the one hand he must not too lightly pin his faith on pronouncements that this or that is *sententia communis* or *communissima*. For some too easily make the assertion because they only know the theologians of their own time, their own country, or their own order. On the other hand, a man must not be too captious; some few theologians swimming against the stream do not

quam destitit." So teaches the Bull "*Ineffabilis*." The "*Æterni Patris*," which summons the coming Council, speaks perhaps even more significantly. It declares that Councils have been called together from time to time "*ad Catholicam propugnandam, illustrandam, et evolvendam doctrinam.*" See our last number, p. 530.

break its resistless strength."* His is but a shallow mind who can despise the study of the Fathers. The decision of Pius IX. is a fresh call to all who love the honour of Mary, to look the matter in the face, and to study the idea formed of her by the great theologians of old.

The document which we are studying, however, has a second tendency, with which at present we are most concerned. By declaring that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was a part of the original deposit confided by the Apostles to the Church, the Pope has narrowed the circle of lawful theories of development. Of course, after all, the question is principally one of fact. Do or do not the Fathers of the first centuries teach clearly the whole doctrine of the Holy Trinity or the Immaculate Conception? How much do they teach implicitly and how much explicitly? Yet here, as in everything else connected with history, mechanical fact needs theory to help it. As in secular history, any writer, who should go on the assumption that man's will is not free, would be a bad historian, so in telling the grand tale of the fortunes of the Church, he would be sure to fail who lost sight of the great truth that the facts of Christianity are dogmatic. We have therefore a deep suspicion of all writers on development who make a pomp of being purely and fearlessly historical. There is a school amongst us dry, spiritless, and barren, who profess to give us simple facts, without paying attention to ecclesiastical theories. They forget that development itself is a theory to account for facts, and, like all theories, it has a double office; it must conform itself to the facts of the case, while it interprets them, and at the same time it must be consonant with religion and with ethics. It is equally a failure, if it is faithless to either of its duties. Nay, if it is faithless to one, it is sure to be false to both, since both the Faith and the facts are true. It is plain then that a theory of development may be false on two counts; it may not fit the phenomena of the case, or it may be wrong in doctrine. It is plain that there are certain theories which may be condemned at once, as soon as stated, either as plainly against known facts or against the Christian Faith. Our object in this article is by the examination of various theories which have been put forward, to clear the way for approximating to something like a right theory on this momentous subject. Our task is a very humble one, for we shall make unlimited use of the labours of previous thinkers. But we are the rather desirous to lose no time in expressing ourselves on the subject, because F. Bottalla, S.J., has ex-

* Schneemann, *Die Kirchliche Lehrgewalt*.

pressed an intention—after he has brought out his forthcoming volume on infallibility—of treating the whole question which concerns “Catholic teaching in its true origin and real development.” We shall be very glad to obtain F. Bottalla’s judgment on the truth and value of the present view, as far as it goes. We will begin by two extreme opinions, which will at once enable the reader to estimate how deeply the question of development is rooted in the very first principles of Christianity, and how it is connected with the profoundest problems which have ever occupied the human mind.

Long have we waited for a sign from Oxford to indicate that F. Newman’s book on Development had even reached its intellect. One fault of the book is its excellence; it was too profound to be effective against Anglicans. It was, to use the words of its author, like sending an army to arrest a house-breaker. Dr. Pusey still goes on complacently talking about the Fathers, as if his interpretation were the right and the only one. Will he ever before the day of doom open his eyes to the patent fact of his monstrous exercise of private judgment upon them? His view of the Fathers is directly opposed to that of the Roman Church, the Constantinopolitan Greek Church, the Slavonian Church of Russia, and of every other of those bodies which he considers to be Churches, all of which consistently anathematize him; without reckoning the curses both loud and deep of his own communion.

A man whose intellect and conscience are not stirred by this, may sit calmly under F. Newman’s logic. At length, however, we have an attempt on the part of Mr. Liddon to neutralize the facts, fatal to Anglicanism, by treating the differences between the Fathers on the subject as mere differences of intellectual expression arising from differences of time. The writers of the fourth century, it seems, clothed in the language of the period the self-same doctrine which S. Justin expressed in the language of his time. He uses this assertion for a polemical purpose, in order to draw a contrast between the definition of the Immaculate Conception and the definition of the Homoeousion by the Council of Nicæa. The former he calls a new dogma, the latter a matter of “expression.” We do not wonder at his attempt; to an Anglican who thinks at all (and Mr. Liddon’s book is full of thought), the fact of real discrepancies between the early Fathers, and of a subsequent contrary definition at Nicæa, is death, as he full well must know. The Fathers alone are not a standard of faith, if they need the Church to interpret them.

Mr. Liddon’s position then is this: “The Apostles taught our Lord’s Divinity, but did not teach the Immaculate Con-

ception. Hence, the broad contrast between the two above-named definitions." But we are here referring not to the general dogma of our Lord's Divinity, but to the particular *analysis* of that dogma which was virtually defined at Nicæa. We ask Mr. Liddon this simple question: did the Apostles, or did they not, teach that particular doctrinal analysis? To say that they did *not*, would be to admit that very thesis which Mr. Liddon so strenuously denies; viz., that the Church of a later century can define what the Apostles never taught. He must say, therefore—and so far we heartily agree with him—that the Apostles did teach, not merely the general dogma of our Lord's Divinity, but that particular analysis of the dogma which is symbolized by the word *ὁμοούσιον*. Yet so soon as he admits this, the whole ground is taken from under his feet when he would argue that the Apostles did not teach the Immaculate Conception. "How can the Apostles have taught this dogma!" exclaims the Anglican, "when S. Thomas and the Dominican Order denied it in the thirteenth century? It must be a new dogma, when such a man as the Angelical Doctor did not believe it." To this it is a perfectly sufficient answer to say that on the same ground the Anglican ought to consider the Consubstantiality of the Divine Word to be a new dogma framed at Nicæa. We assert that there is the same evidence for thinking that the Apostles did not teach the *ὁμοούσιον* as that they did not teach the Immaculate Conception. The cases are exactly parallel. In neither case does the disbelief of some individual doctors prove that the Church had not from the first received it. When a Christian doctrine is in question, four centuries of unbelief are as fatal as thirteen. The Alexandrian school denied the *ὁμοούσιον*, as the Dominican denied the Immaculate Conception. Why is the former fact not fatal at once to the early belief of the Church? Because the Church received it, though individuals denied it. The comparison holds good in very minute particulars. As S. Dionysius undoubtedly held our Lord to be God, yet held that there was a time when He was becoming something which He was not before; so S. Thomas, though he knew Mary to be the Mother of God, yet imagined a brief interval of time when the stain of original sin was on her. Curiously enough, S. Dionysius, and perhaps even Origen, contradicted himself, and does use the term "Consubstantial" of our Lord, and some have defended him on that ground: on the same ground of self-contradiction it has been asserted that S. Thomas held the Immaculate Conception. We hope to show that they can be defended on other grounds, but in any case the difficulties and their solution are the same, and are equally

fatal to Mr. Liddon. On one ground, and one alone, can he attempt to get off;—that of asserting that in the case of the Council of Nicæa the doctrine defined differed only in words from that before expressed by Origen and certain other writers. He could hardly have made a more perilous assertion.

Of all the Fathers of four centuries, Mr. Liddon must needs pitch upon Origen to show that the doctrine of the ante-Nicene theologians was only a "different aspect of the truth" defined at Nicæa. Now we have on many grounds and in many respects, as we have often expressed, a sincere veneration for Origen's memory; and it must never be forgotten that he wrote at a period when the doctrine defined at Nicæa had, at all events, not been promulgated throughout the Church. But if words mean anything at all, if in any sense they stand for thoughts, Origen's difference from that doctrine was not a difference of philosophical language, but a difference of conception. When Origen uses the miserable expression of the "first God," speaking of the Father, he did not mean what the Apostle meant by the expression "One God and Father of all, who is above all;" for the Apostle calling Him One God would not have excluded the Son, while Origen, in calling the first God not only implicitly but explicitly calls the Son "the second God."* Origen did not "implicitly mean that, independently of all time and inferiority, the Son's life was derived from, and, *in that sense*, subordinate to the life of the Father." He meant it in quite another sense. That according to Origen there was no inferiority in time, we are quite aware; for Origen's speculative system required the eternity of the Son, and he was no Arian: but a real inferiority there was on another count. We will even allow, what is very doubtful, that the passages in which he uses the *ὑποούσιον* are genuine. This would only prove that he did not understand the term, and that Origen the speculative theologian was not as orthodox as Origen the simple believer. Let us remember that his system was a scientific explanation of the difficulty raised, not only by Monarchianism, but by the Faith itself. If the Son is at once One with the Father, and different from the Father, in what is He One and in what is He different? To this the answer that He is two because derived from the Father is true, but insufficient. The question remains, in what is He One? The Nicene answer is that the difference wholly regards the Person, but that in Essence they are simply

* Kuhn. iii. 228.

identical. In other words, the Son is the Absolute Monas, precisely as the Father is. This was exactly what Origen denied. His answer to the Noetians is that the Son differs from the Father in that He is the relative, while the Father is the Absolute God. Whether Origen was a material heretic, whether what he had in his mind was heresy, is quite another matter; but that what he says, that the objective meaning of his words is not what the Fathers of Nicæa said, is perfectly plain. He thus, for instance, comments on S. John:—

When the expression Θεός is used of the ingenerate Cause of All, he prefixes the article, ὁ Θεός; when, however, it is used of the Logos, it is without the article. In like manner, ὁ Λόγος is to be used of the being who is the author of reason to rational creatures, while for those who possess reason by derivation from Him, the article must be omitted. This distinction resolves the difficulty which troubles many who in their piety tremble lest they should be Ditheists, but nevertheless have fallen into false dogmas which are contrary to piety. They either deny that the Subsistence (ἰδιότης) of the Son is different from that of the Father, and think that the Son of God is only another name for God himself; or they deny the Godhead of the Son, and think that the Subsistence, the particular Being of the Son, is foreign to the Father.* To these persons we must say, that in the one case, God is the Absolute God (Ἀνρόθεος) as Christ himself says in His prayer to the Father "That they may know Thee, the only true God." But whatever beside the Father is made God through participation in His Godhead, cannot be called the God, but only a God. This name belongs especially to the First-born of all creation, who as and the first in the companionship of God, received the Godhead in himself, and is much higher than the other gods whose God is the God, because He made them gods. The true God then is the God; and those who are made gods after His form are images of the Prototype. On the other hand, the Logos who is with God stands to these copies in the relation of archetypal Image; He is God for the very reason that He was with God in the beginning, and remains God, which He would not be unless He continued in unending contemplation of the Father's Infinity.†

This is but one passage among many which show as plainly as language can speak that Origen's theory to account for the Oneness of the Father and the Son, combined with their difference, in other words, his conception, was not that of Nicæa. Further on, Mr. Liddon substitutes for what we have quoted from him a very safe but very different sentence: "As a matter

* Τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσιν ἑτέρα τοῦ Πατρὸς. What Origen means by οὐσία κατὰ περιγραφὴν is a nature in an individual. The Artemonist section of the Monarchians, against whom he is aiming, thought that not only our Lord's Person, but His nature was human.

† In Joan, tom. ii. 2.

of fact the Nicene fathers only affirmed, in the philosophical language of the fourth century, what our Lord and the Apostles had taught in the popular dialects of the first." This no Catholic will deny, either of the *ὁμοούσιον*, or of the Immaculate Conception. It was no accretive development, as Mr. Liddon calls it, to the Apostles. Nay, we will go further, the Consubstantiality of the Word was no such development to S. Irenæus, to S. Callistus, or S. Dionysius of Rome; but it was an accretive development to Origen and S. Dionysius of Alexandria: as was the Immaculate Conception to S. Bernard and S. Thomas, and as it was not to S. Hippolytus, S. Ephrem, and S. Anselm, or to any Pope who sat on the throne of S. Peter.

There is but one hypothesis on which words as plain as those of Origen and the letter of his disciple S. Dionysius against the Sabellians can be made to have the same meaning as the definition of Nicæa; that is, that they both mean nothing. If theological terms do not stand for thoughts, but are mere words, of the sense of which the human intellect can form no conception whatsoever, then the author, who calls Christ "a second God," may mean neither more nor less than the Fathers, who decree that He is Consubstantial with the Father. In his last lecture we are glad to admit that Mr. Liddon has spoken of the inferences to be drawn from theology in terms which are inconsistent with the hypothesis which we are contemplating. He ought to have seen that this view, which he uses with such force against his opponents, prevents the Immaculate Conception of our Lady from being a new dogma. We are, however, at this moment concerned with the theory of development; and so certainly is this hypothesis, viz. the unmeaningness of theological terms—at the root of the view of those who, like Mr. Liddon, deny any real development, that there is nothing extraordinary in the assertion that it underlies his language, and was at the very least latent in his mind, even though he would not consciously accept it. It is very unpleasant to hear him speak of the decisions of Nicæa, "adding to the sum of *authoritative ecclesiastical language*." Did not the Council impose a conception, a mode of thinking of the Holy Trinity, as well as a term or mode of expressing it? The words which we have printed in italics remind us but too forcibly of a theory propounded by another Bampton lecturer.

All this is the more significant when we remember that in 1858, in the same pulpit of S. Mary's, from which so much has issued during the last thirty years, another preacher has propounded in distinct terms the very theory of the impossi-

bility of development which we are now considering. His intention was to set a limit to irreligious thought, by showing that all thought on religion was a physical impossibility to man ; with what success experience has since shown. During the last ten eventful years in Oxford, thought has progressed with fearful strides. The theory which was intended to set bounds to it was expressed in no ambiguous terms.

The conclusion which an examination of the conditions of human thought unavoidably forces upon us is this : there can be no such thing as a positive science of speculative theology ; for such a science must necessarily be based on an apprehension of the Infinite ; and the Infinite, though we are compelled to believe in its existence, cannot possibly be apprehended in any mode of the human consciousness. The same impediment which prevents the formation of theology as a science, is also manifestly fatal to the theory which asserts its progressive development. We can test the progress of knowledge only by comparing its successive representations with the objects which they profess to represent ; and as the object in this case is inaccessible to human faculties, we have no criterion by which to distinguish progress and mere fluctuation. The so-called progress in theology is in truth only an advance in those conceptions of man's moral and religious duties which form the basis of natural religion ; an advance which is regulative, not speculative ; which is primarily a knowledge not of God's nature, but of man's obligation ; and which is the result not of an immediate intuition of the nature of the Infinite, but of a closer study of the laws of the Finite.*

To some of the grounds of this view we shall afterwards recur ; but at this moment we only pause to notice that the conclusion is based upon a philosophical opinion which the author has expressed as follows :—"All the various processes of thought may be referred to the single faculty of thought or reflection ; the operation of which is in all cases comparison. The unit of thought is always a judgment based on a comparison of objects ; and the several operations of thought are in ultimate analysis nothing more than judgments derived from different data." From these premisses Dean Mansel has inferred that the human mind can have no conception whatever of an Infinite Being ; and that though we can believe in His existence by faith, yet faith is not an intellectual process at all, and no notion of Him is ever formed by our reason. "The Absolute and the Infinite are thus like the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, *names* indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness

* Dean Mansel's Bampton Lectures.

is possible." Nor is this only true of the abstract Infinite; but far more is it true of the concrete notion of an Infinite Being. A concrete Infinite is a contradiction; and Personality involves a further contradiction. The attempt to conceive it is "the suicide of Rationalism." We can only say that Dean Mansel's view is the suicide of Reason, and of something far more precious. He cures the headache by cutting off the head. He effectually destroys wild thoughts by blowing out his brains. The deadly sickness and vertigo of doubt is gone; but we have got instead of it intellectual death on all the grandest subjects which can occupy human thought. Let us go over the steps by which this miserable conclusion is reached. From the assumed fact that every idea is a judgment, he has inferred that the human mind is physically incapable of forming any real idea of God. Every judgment implies comparison, and what terms of comparison have we by which we can measure God? It implies limitation, and therefore the Being who is illimitable is utterly beyond its apprehension. It is essentially a relation, and therefore the Absolute is an unmeaning term. Above all, a judgment is by an inexorable necessity partial, while the Infinite is very Oneness without the possibility of parts. God must be apprehended wholly, or not apprehended at all. For this reason there are contradictions fatal and inevitable in the very notion of the Infinite. It is not an idea at all, since it is incapable of being included in a judgment. Now as to Dean Mansel's premisses, we say as little as possible; for we wish in this article to be as nearly as we can mere historians of views on development. But it is scarcely possible to speak too severely of the conclusion. If it be true, then God is to the human intellect a word symbolizing the want of thought. With perfect consistency the author applies his theory to the mysteries of the Faith. Theological terms are simply and absolutely conventional, conveying no idea whatsoever to the hearer, and implying none in the speaker. On such a view as this, development vanishes as a matter of course. That which has no sense is struck at once with barrenness. It can only bring forth wind. How can a man develop Abracadabra? But, then, what becomes of Revelation? What is the meaning of a Revelation which adds in no way whatsoever to the sum of human knowledge, which reveals nothing?

It is a portentous fact that a system such as this should have issued from Oxford. We do not accuse Dr. Pusey and his friends of having thought out all this. In general we may say that the process of thinking is foreign to their minds. We do say, however, that the whole of their tone falls in most

remarkably with the conclusion. They are ever systematically taking refuge in vagueness and in mist, and that on the ground of the irreverence of precision. They quarrel with the Tridentine definition of Transubstantiation, and retire into a vague Real Presence, utterly inadequate to convey the Catholic doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. Let them beware lest the Consubstantiality of the Divine Word should share the fate of the Blessed Sacrament, and become "scholastic language."

It is not, however, with these principally that we are now concerned. The examination of the above views already furnishes us with one absolutely necessary condition of a true development. It can only be exercised upon a thing really apprehended by the intellect, and all theories which do not provide for a knowledge of the object to be developed are at once to be regarded as faulty. Development is a process of reflection on an object previously seized by the thought. Nor does anything in the notion imply that that apprehension is small. It is requisite to bear this in mind, because some writers use terms which imply that the first steps in the process must be despicably small. Of course such expressions as germs and seeds are perfectly allowable; but if they are employed to exaggerate the imperfection of the beginnings of Christian theology, they are dangerous and false. The very peculiarity of Christian development is that the stream is broadest at its source. No theologian to the end of time will know more than the Apostles. Nay, there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent the knowledge possessed by their immediate successors from being better in kind than that of subsequent theologians. This is historically borne out by the facts of the progress of Christian dogma. The enunciations of the earliest writers on our Lord's Godhead are more downright and unequivocal than those of the Fathers who followed them. Who ever found fault with S. Clement and S. Ignatius? It is with the Apologists that difficulties begin. So it is with Our Lady. The doctrine of S. Irenæus and of the author of the second Epistle to Diognetus is far higher than that of Origen.

The difficulties begin with Origen. Before him she is simply the second Eve, and is thus compared to one immaculate in the first moment of her existence. Of course development is an advance; but we must not be deceived by words, nor make a mistake as to that in which the advance consists. An object reaches our apprehension first as a whole. Subsequent knowledge splits into parts what at first was one. It sees difficulties, and it struggles to harmonize them. The time of

struggle may be inferior to the first impression until the harmony is found. Even the knowledge gained at last, while more extensive, may yet be less intense than the first. This will become more clear from the examination of the opposite extreme to that which we have hitherto been criticising.

A few years ago the consideration of the theory of which we are now to give an account would hardly have been a practical matter. We fear, however, that a fearful change has taken place. Even Dr. Pusey is terrified into an attempt to fraternize with dissenters, in order to escape the rationalism which has invaded even the common-rooms of Oxford; nor are we reassured because, in one of those curious semi-conscious parentheses, which often betray that a dim view of the reality has just sufficiently reached his mind to call forth a denial of it, he tells the Wesleyan Conference that rationalism is diminishing. May he be right! In the meanwhile it is certain that the shallow barrier set to rationalistic thought when first the tide was flowing, has been utterly overborne, and not so much submerged as swept away.

A view of development has become, at the very least, not uncommon, which, not long ago, was utterly unknown, and which, if known, would have found absolutely no response. Whether the view would be formalized precisely in the German way we have no means of knowing, yet we believe we do not calumniate Oxford when we say that something like the Hegelianism, which is no longer believed in Germany, finds many adherents there. We will state it in its native form, which we borrow from a Catholic writer, whose fairness is undoubted:—

Rationalism has fastened itself on the form in which the organs of the Christian revelation have expressed their religious consciousness in terms which suited their own time, and has drawn the conclusion from it that that expression could not possibly convey the Christian Truth to all time. This view, however, could not possibly stop short at the Apostles, it must ascend up to Christ Himself, who is in the same position as they. Accordingly it is said by Semler that the word spoken by Christ and His Apostles to the Jews and heathen could not be the standard for all times and all degrees of civilization, and that a distinction must be made between their doctrine and their mode of teaching, in the sense that the latter could not have an absolute value, since it was accommodated to the imagery of that time. Then much is said about the infinite developing power of Christianity, and about its aim, to make its truths fruitful for all following generations. Furthermore, it is argued that words could not be framed so as to contain the whole compass of the conceptions of Christianity, which were to progress in never-ending development. Of this development, which entered into the world with Christianity, the Apostolic writings form but the first shape, the

first link in a chain, the first and the most narrow of the concentric circles raised in the boundless ocean of thought by the flinging of Christian truth into it, the first impulse to the movement. The True and the Perfect is not to be found in the commencement but in the progress to the end. "The text of the Bible," says Hegel, "contains the mode of the first appearance of Christianity; this is what it describes, and such a description can only contain what is in the principle of Christianity, and even that not as yet in an express manner, but only a presentiment of it! What the spirit which reveals itself in Christianity is in and for itself (an und für sich) does not come out at first. One might almost say, when one leads back Christianity to its first appearance, it is reduced to the stage of vacancy of spirit (Geistlosigkeit)." Schelling speaks in the same sense. "The first books of the history and doctrine of Christianity are themselves nothing but a special, and therefore imperfect, appearance of it; its Idea is not to be found in them, and their worth is only to be estimated according to the degree in which this Idea is expressed in them."*

This, however, only gives us, as yet, an imperfect view of the part played by development in Hegel's system. Christ and His Apostles are not only the first feeble beginning of Christianity, but that beginning does not, even in any real sense, contain the germ of future developments. Each step is a spring forward on the last: it does not properly spring out of it. This is apparent from the fact that in that system heresies are as much real developments as are Catholic verities. The truth lies in the very developing, in the movement, in the flux and the succession, in the contradictions reconciled at last by the knowledge to which the spirit attains that each is a necessary step in its life. The Christian notion that our Lord taught a grand body of truth once for all, of which all forms of doctrine are developments, and out of which they come without the least substantial change, is expressly denied and despised as dead, monotonous, lifeless, spiritless. Unambiguously, and without equivocation, it is laid down that each development must be a real, essential change upon the last, and that their substantial truth lies in their being all equally the spontaneous movement of the Absolute Idea, which struggles through them all into a consciousness of Self. So incredible does it appear that any one calling himself a Christian should hold this view, that we quote Kuhn's summary of the views of Dr. Baur, a Protestant professor of Tübingen, which are almost his own words:—

Dr. Baur distinguishes three modes of looking upon the process of the history of dogma: the first he calls that of the ecclesiastical belief; the

* Kuhn, i. 132.

second that of subjective reason (the ordinary rationalistic) ; the third is that of the speculative criticism (Hegelianism). According to the first there is to be found, in the history of dogma, only a substantial matter, without that movement in which the life of history consists ; according to the second, nothing but movement and change, without the substantial reality which is the kernel of historical movement. These two are but one-sided modes of viewing the question, and the one-sidedness can only be taken away by taking one's stand on the principle, according to which the historical movement is considered as the indispensable reconciliation of the matter (Inhalt) with itself, or as the objective self-movement of the Idea.

According to this view, there is no such thing as a heretic ; heresy and orthodoxy are equally accounted for by the view that "the Spirit, filled and penetrated by the contents (Inhalt) of the absolute Idea, feels in itself the impulse to go out of itself, to project out of itself the objective contents of the Idea ; to throw itself into its mould (sich in ihn hineinzubilden), to make itself an object to itself in it, in order to bring its contents to consciousness before itself according to its various moments."* Those acquainted with Hegel will recognize at once the parentage of this sentence. A little consideration will make its meaning clear to an English reader.

Of course we have nothing to do with Hegelianism, except in as far as it is a Christian heresy, and as it bears on the question of development. A reference to old errors will make its purport plain.

In the original Arian view, God the Father, their only real God, was Incomprehensible in a peculiar way. In their theory He could hardly be said to be our Creator. In the very act of our creation we should have perished, for we could not bear His Almighty hand. It was their express theory that the Son was created to create us. The inexorable abyss, however, between God and man could not really be bridged by such a being as the Son. Like Semele in the pagan myth, He too ought to have been burnt up in the fiery splendour in giving birth to us. The consequence is, that the Arian God is not so much incomprehensible as unintelligible. He is the simple abstract notion of being, without enough of determination to have any attributes—not even sufficiently known to the human mind to enable it to see so much as contradictions in Him. Such was the early Arian God. Much later, however, in its history, the tactics changed, and veered round to the other extreme, which always lies in wait for a Unitarian God. Eunomius, in controversy with S. Basil, maintained that

* *Theologische Quartalschrift*. Tübingen, 1850, p. 280.

God is perfectly within the compass of human comprehension. The real, essential notion of God, they argued, is that He is the Unbegotten. This exhausts Him as well as compasses Him. This is His Essence. The Son then being confessedly begotten, is not the Supreme God. Accidentally this verbal quibble opened up abysses of thought, of which probably Eunomius, himself was quite unconscious. The cold, slippery surface of icy logic all at once moved, yawned, and disclosed sudden unsuspected depths. It is evident that it was necessary to the argument of Eunomius that the term Unbegotten should be the whole, and therefore the only idea of God. It must exhaust His being. Otherwise, if there is any distinction in God, if there be composition in the notion of Him, this at once gives room for the Catholic answer:—"There are in God substantial predicates, and predicates which have to do only with the mode of His being. The Son has all the substantial predicates of Godhead; He is Eternal, Immutable, Infinite. To be Unbegotten, however, is only a predicate of the latter class—it is personal to the Father, and has to do with the mode of His being, with His hypostasis; not with His essence as God." Eunomius, in his rejoinder, at once denied the reality of these substantial attributes of God. Eternity, immutability, infinity, are mere words—names without any meaning—adding nothing whatsoever to the notion of Unbegotten, which alone is the Essence of God. If, he argued, they are more than mere names, if they are realities, if God has more than one attribute, then there are real distinctions in God.

It is curious how early the view of meaningless developments came into the Church, and how disreputable is its origin. The shallow reasoning of Eunomius, however, gave occasion to the Fathers to see more explicitly a momentous truth, which had never before come out so accurately in Christian thought. God is Incomprehensible: all our thoughts of Him are inadequate; nevertheless, human thoughts of Him are real, and represent real truth. We are compelled by the very constitution of our minds to split up into various concepts that Being who is very Oneness. Our understanding is so constructed, that absolute identity is nothing to us. That which is One we must look upon as Many; and this necessarily introduces negation into our notion of God, for multiplicity implies, in human minds at least, that one thing is not another. The concept of justice in God is other than the concept of mercy; though in reality both express the very substance of God, in which are no alternations, and in which each quality is but the substance itself. Yet let us beware

of supposing that justice and mercy in God are mere meaningless words, which are empty of contents, and do not stand for thoughts. They are a necessary part of our idea of God, and do express truth, though what that truth is, we only partially know. That there is a distinction between absolute and relative truth, and that that distinction does not brand the latter with falsehood, is well known to theology. Its strongest expression is the Scotist Realis formalis distinctio between the attributes of God; which has never been banished from the schools, though it has found but little favour there. It conveys at least the fact that the formality of God—that is the indispensable human thought of Him—without which He would become the empty abstract Absolute of logic—conveys reality. If it were not real, theology would become impossible. It is inadequate, but true. There is a strange mixture of the subjective and objective in it. Nay, that the notion of Infinite Being is not to us an empty term, but has a real, positive function in us, is proved by the fact that it corrects the inadequacy of the multiplicity of our conceptions. When we look upon God as a collection of attributes, we know that we are wrong. No sooner do we posit multiplicity, than we take it away. Negation is only affirmed to be denied. We never rest a moment in the numerous contradictions into which we are landed by speculations on God. An irresistible force pushes us beyond, and we transcend them; and that force is a dim view of His Absoluteness, which lies under all relative thought; for how should we know that it was relative, if an anticipation of its correlative, the Absolute, did not force us on? There is a marvellous mixture of strength and impotence in human thought, and it is the movement resulting from the combination which we call development. Because the grand object of theology is Infinite, and because we have an apprehension of it, we never rest without seeking to harmonize our knowledge. Because we are weak, and our apprehension is inadequate, succession is a condition of advance.

It is most curious to see what at once a denial, and yet a strange caricature of these truths, is exhibited in Hegel. That which an obscure heretic in the fourth century started more in order to puzzle the doctors of the Church than from a real insight into the question, was carried out by Hegel boldly and inexorably to its utmost conclusion. We have seen that Eunomius asserted that one conception of God, that is, the thought of Him as the Unbegotten, was absolutely true. In other words, it is not the truth relatively to our faculties and coloured by them, so that, without ceasing to be true, it is inadequate; but it is a knowledge of God as He is in Himself, and

therefore absolutely true. Hegel affirms this of all thought. The Absolute is thought and human thought. Beyond that there is no Incomprehensible, for there is nothing to comprehend. By thought of course he did not mean your thought or mine, but he did mean the laws of man's thought erected into the universal reason. In this way he got rid for ever of the question—why should the laws of thought be the laws of things? Thought is the universe. Bearing this in mind, we can understand why Hegel's system must be one of development, and why the very principle of that development is one of contradiction, in which each step forward must be the negation of its predecessor. This being the case, of course Christianity must develop, and must include in itself substantial change; thus what we call heresy is in reality an indispensable phase of truth. It is plain that, unless, like Eunomius, we take one abstract thought to be the absolute, and arbitrarily exclude all others except as far as they are identical with it, such a system as Hegel's must produce contradiction. If human thought is absolute truth, and if the laws of its logic are the laws of all intellect and all being, then the very contradictions which arise from the imperfection of our faculties are raised to the dignity of necessary phases of truth. Let any one look in the face the many problems involved in such elementary notions as Space, Time, or Matter, he will find himself bewildered with difficulties, from which he will take refuge in the thought of the inadequacy of his intellect to cope with truth, and thus find a reason for declaring that contradictions are only apparent. This refuge is cut off from Hegel, and accordingly in the Hegelian, "space is unity, and space is plurality, space is identity, and space is difference, space is limitation, and space is illimitation. And as it is with space so it is with time." Much more is this the case with that idea which, after all, alone concerns us here,—the human thought of God. A Christian theologian knows that God is One, yet he is forced by the very constitution of his mind to consider Him as One Substance with many qualities. Nor is this a difficulty to him, because he knows that the Oneness alone is the absolute truth, while the multiplicity is only the truth in relation to his imperfect powers, and therefore inadequately conceived. Such a solution, however, is neither desired by, nor possible to Hegel. If all the thoughts of the human intellect with respect to God are true, then contradiction penetrates into the very substance of God. He is both One and Many, Simple and Composite, Infinite and Finite. We need not say that this principle does not stop with God; it is made to account for the existence of all creation. Thus the universe becomes

a gigantic system of development, in which the contradictions of human thought are turned into the cause of things, and into so many steps in the evolution of being. In the most rigorous manner the genesis of things is made to correspond to the genesis of thought. "Go down," says the Hegelian, "to the primal element of all thought, you will find that all springs from the idea of abstract Being. As, however, this primal notion is an absolute void, and utterly without attributes, it must evidently become the very contrary to itself, that is, Nothing, before it can be productive and pass into any real existence. In other words, the original vast illimitable Being must limit itself by Nothingness before it can bring any special thing into existence. Is not Nothing becoming Something the very idea of creation?" Thus contradiction, which is the law which directs the spontaneous movement of the inner dialectics of thought, also presides over creation, or to speak more properly over the transition by which the One passes into the Many. This is the first stage in the great series of the development at once of conceptions and of things. Being, Nothing, Becoming is the first group of human thoughts, the beginning of that endless chain, each link of which is a triad of terms, two of which contradict each other, and are reconciled by a third.

Is all this nonsense, as Lockhart is said to have pronounced it to be, with the addition of a common English expletive which would hardly be seemly in the pages of the DUBLIN REVIEW? We fear it is not nonsense, but something worse; it is very definite sense on condition of its being blasphemy. We have not yet reached the term of the development. In contradictions no man can rest, and even a Hegelian must find some means of introducing harmony into the wild discords of reasoning to which we have been listening. When a Christian theologian meets with what looks like a contradiction, he never acquiesces in it as the absolute truth. It is to him a healthful warning that his intellect after all is an imperfect instrument, and that the analogical reasoning which he is applying to Incomprehensible things has come to its limit. A Hegelian, however, is bound to discover that the contradictions represent some actual truth, or to relinquish his principle that thought and thing are absolutely identical. He at once accounts for and reconciles them by asserting that they represent a real process in the life of God. Their very movement is His life. He too must needs be subject to the law by which an intellectual being can only attain to full consciousness by making Himself an object of reflection, and turning His own thoughts upon himself. This, it is argued, He cannot do

without abandoning His own simplicity. By this very act multiplicity is introduced into His inmost being: He contemplates Himself as though He were another. Thus the Infinite must not only apparently but really pass through the step of Finiteness in order to attain to the consciousness of His own Personality. This development through contradictions is no accident to the system; it enters into the very essence of its God. It is considered to account for the existence of the universe. It is an express dictum of Hegel that the world is as necessary to God as God to the world, for the immense multiplicity of creatures is indispensable to the Spirit, in order to think out His own Infinity. In the same way, finite thoughts are necessary to Him, in order to enable Him to evolve the contents of the Absolute Idea, which is Himself. The individual thinker is thus merged in the Universal Reason. What we take for the activity of our own intellect is God thinking in us. That strange dialogue between subject and object which ever goes on in our own bosoms, and which we call thought, is the Infinite Spirit talking to Himself in finite conceptions. Thus the stage of contradictions is passed and the mind rests in the discovery that its intellect is really that of the Absolute. The name of Pantheism is often recklessly used, yet surely to Hegel, at least, it may be most conscientiously applied.

We have dwelt on this system in order to lay bare the springs of a theory of development which we fear is very widely spread, as well as to exhibit what is the opposite extreme to the tendency of Anglicanism.

It is easy now to see the meaning of the strange terms in which Baur has couched his theory of development. We can understand what appears to be the wild dramatizing of the Idea, and its interchange with Spirit. The objective Being of God compels Him to think out its contents in an inexorable way, and all the history of the Universe is but the self-development of this great Logic. In this process Christianity is but a stage, and each age, even the Apostolic, only one link in the series. Hence the variations in the Fathers, and even the presence of heresy. Verbal differences are not enough. Contradictions are absolutely necessary. If there were no real change, all the parts of the great drama could not be played out.

We need hardly say that, considered simply as a theory of development, the theory is baseless; for that out of which all things are developed must plainly be wider and deeper than all. Even, however, if this were not the case, it must be so, at least, with a revelation given once for all. Of course, Hegel

does not believe Christianity to be a revelation in this or in any real sense. We, however, believe Christianity not only to have been a revelation, but we believe it to be exclusive in the strictest possible sense. It ceased absolutely with the Apostles. They deposited the faith, their successors only transmitted it. All subsequent definitions of faith* are simply the unravelling of matter given by them. Their state of mind was quite different from that of their successors. Theirs was what we may call inspiration; after them the teachers of the Church had only that special guidance of the Holy Spirit, which was promised them by Christ. The Apostolic teaching, then, was not only the first link in a chain; it was that out of which all future developments came, and in which all were implicitly contained. We cannot exaggerate the importance of this fact, on the subject of which we are treating. It seems to us to follow that the Apostles must have had explicitly in their minds all the future definitions of faith, though not, of course, necessarily in the same terms. They must have so framed their teaching that it was capable of all subsequent developments. If they did so by a conscious intellectual act, must they not have had them before their minds? We can only answer the question in the affirmative. Thus, if the Immaculate Conception of our Blessed Lady was a part of the original deposit given by Christ to His Apostles, it must have been clearly before the intellect of S. Peter. Furthermore, since there has been no subsequent revelation to the Church, that truth must have been transmitted to their successors at least in such a shape that without any extraordinary supernatural interposition, it can be extracted from the propositions left with them. Besides this, these propositions must have in some way reached the understanding of the teaching body of the Church. In other words, the truth must have been really contained in the explicit teaching of the Apostles, and have been really known by their successors at least implicitly.

All this seems to flow from the very primary notion of Christianity, as a revelation given once for all. Thus stated, there is little difficulty. The real difficulty begins when we come to analyse our conceptions, and reduce them to scientific precision. Development is the process by which what was given implicitly becomes explicit. From what we have already said, it is quite plain that there may be right and wrong theories of development. On the one hand, it must not be

* "All subsequent definitions of faith": we are not denying, of course, that the Church often puts forth other infallible determinations, for the purpose of protecting the Deposit.

a meaningless, monotonous iteration of terms,—a senseless echo repeating what it does not understand; on the other, it must not be a substantial change. The truth must lie between Anglican death and Hegelian convulsions. It is not a spirit to be evoked out of the “vasty deep” of human opinion, without being interrogated as to whence it comes. It is full of questions, which go down to the depths of great mysteries. It is irritating to see shallow writers on development attempting to conjure with a name which they do not understand, and after walking complacently blindfold, beside red-hot questions which they have never perceived, look back and think that they have done a miracle. The miracle would be in walking unhurt over them, not *beside* them. The real question, after all, is one of fact; and, as we have said before, it does not seem to us at all hard to point out the idea in the teaching of the Fathers, which really contains, for instance, the Immaculate Conception. It requires, however, a thorough knowledge of the subject, and a patient industry, which all do not possess. In the meanwhile the speculative difficulties are plain enough, and exist not only with respect to Our Lady, but also to the Holy Trinity.

After all that has been said, we are now in a condition to apprehend what these difficulties really are, and in part to suggest a solution. It has never been sufficiently remarked, that in his book on Development, Father Newman by no means denies that the consubstantiality of the Divine Word was taught explicitly, and in equivalent terms, from the beginning; not only by the Apostles, but by their successors.* We therefore perfectly agree with Mr. Liddon, as we have already said, that it was taught explicitly from the beginning, though not formally imposed by a General Council till the fourth century. The difficulty really lies in accounting for the fact that such important writers as Origen and S. Dionysius should say what is quite inconsistent with an explicit Apostolic tradition. The answer is not as Mr. Liddon thinks, that their *thoughts* were perfectly in accordance with it; nor, as Baur says, that real contradictions are a part of the essence of Christianity. The truth is, that some peculiar mode of conceiving the idea of the Faith, such as the *ὁμοούσιον*, may be denied by some writers previous to the solemn promulgation of it by the Church. To what extent they really denied it, we shall see presently; but already it is evident that the whole view of the question of development is altered if the fact be that

* *E say on Development*, p. 11.

the first and second centuries held the *ῥησούσιον*, while the hesitations and conflicting statements came later on in the third. Then there is no difficulty in accounting for the facts by saying that the hesitations of these later Fathers were scientific; that is, that they arose not from a wrong idea, but from a difficulty of harmonizing one mode of conceiving the Truth with some other portion of it. This is only what we should expect, if the Faith is left to be elaborated and formed by human intellects. The movement of development thus conceived is by no means a direction in a straight line, where each stage is an ever-increasing progress upon the last; on the contrary, it moves in a circle, and ends where it began. Amidst all the wild theories of Hegel thus much is true, that he has rightly described the movement of development, as a progress the second stage of which is one of conflict, harmonized by a return in the third stage to the unity of the first. The question which remains rather concerns the state of mind of the Fathers whose faulty conceptions cause the whole difficulty. Were they heretics? Did they fully acquiesce in even materially wrong views? How can they be said really to have held the Faith? In what way can we express the relation of their view to the truth?

Furthermore, if the right answer be, as we fully believe, that suggested by S. Thomas, that it was known, but known only implicitly to those whose language and whose conceptions were utterly inconsistent with it, then what is the meaning of implicit knowledge? How is it real knowledge? If explicit knowledge means nothing more than the expression in equivalent terms of what was known implicitly, that is, in other terms,—then evidently the whole is a matter of words; and we give up the grand doctrine an easy prey to those who are already too well disposed to look upon it as a squabble about metaphysical terms. If we do this, let us be consistent and take refuge with the Dean of Westminster in the secure haven of picturesque theology. Let us be real, and not use the term development as dust to be thrown in the eyes of a wavering partisan or of a less acute antagonist, making the process meaningless in the case of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, accretive in the case of the Immaculate Conception. The question is to be looked in the face. How can implicit knowledge be looked upon as knowledge at all? And if explicit knowledge is an addition or an advance, what is added, and in what does the progress consist?

Such are some of the speculative difficulties of the case; and we must not be surprised to find that the ground has been to a great extent prepared for us even by the most im-

perfect sketch which we have given of the Hegelian system. The theological requirements which must serve as landmarks to guide us are sufficiently plain; we must keep them steadily in view, and with their help it will not be so hard to thread our way amidst the mazy labyrinth of paths which lie before us. Any theory of development must provide for three conditions. It must presuppose that the whole Faith was left on earth by the Apostles at least in an implicit shape. Secondly, it must provide for some real apprehension of the whole arriving at the minds of their successors: for implicit knowledge is real, and that which is in no way apprehended by the mind cannot be developed. Thirdly, it must show cause why that knowledge is imperfect: in other words, it must point out the need for development, in order to account for the fact; and it must do so in such a way as to save the honour of the Fathers of the first centuries, whom the Church will not consent to consider as heretics.

If these three conditions are fulfilled, then the remaining questions lie very much within the compass of philosophy. It is not wonderful that Germany, which is the very classical land of development, should help us to point out those natural processes which are analogous to, and which justify the theological notion. We will draw this out by contrasting as briefly as possible the theories of the two distinguished Catholic writers, whose names stand at the head of this article,—Father Newman and Professor Kuhn, of Tübingen. It will be seen that both in different degrees have used as a means of accounting for the fact of development, that very theory of the human understanding, which Hegel used to account for what he represents to be the inner dialectical movement of human thought.

We will begin with Father Newman: which we are the more anxious to do, because without some attention his theory might be mistaken for that which we found in Dean Mansel, though we hope to show that this appearance only arises from the imperfect way in which he has sketched his view. We will give it as much as possible in his own words. Unlike other writers who have covered themselves with the ægis of his name, Father Newman starts with doing the fullest justice to the knowledge possessed by the Apostles. "The holy Apostles," he says, "would know without words all the truths concerning the high doctrines of theology which controversialists after them have piously and charitably reduced to formulæ, and developed through argument" (p. 83). This is allowing far more than a knowledge of what is *de fide*; it assigns to them a view down to the deepest depths of Christian

thought. "After the death of the Apostles the whole of the Christian Faith was left in the shape of written or unwritten traditions; but with this great difference, that these great truths were henceforth received and transmitted by minds not inspired and through media which were human." Again, "The time at length came when its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments." Nor would Father Newman have a difficulty in allowing that Christianity in this respect was on a level with sects and doctrines of the world. "Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies, in what it has in addition to them; not in kind, but in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics, being informed and quickened by what is more than intellect, by a Divine Spirit" (p. 85). As far, however, as the intellects and minds of the recipients are concerned, no special grounds of exception can be assigned to it. It must develope like other religious systems. It can claim no exemption from the ordinary laws which govern human ideas. It has, indeed, an infallible developing authority, and thus has objective external means of distinguishing between true developments and false; but the subjective process is precisely the same, because the intellect of a Christian and the intellect of a heathen are precisely the same.

Now there is a special reason why all ideas, in this sense purely human, must develope; namely, because all ideas are necessarily judgments, and every judgment is necessarily only a partial aspect of a whole. "Whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into a series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness, approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image" (p. 94). A judgment is in its very nature a comparison of parts of an object, a process of analysing and of splitting up. Thus it can only be one view or aspect of a whole. These aspects, taken individually, are indeed not identical with the whole, because they are essentially parts; but they are practically identical with it, as far as we are concerned, because it cannot possibly be viewed except under its aspects (p. 34). The human mind can know nothing whatsoever about an object, except as far as it judges it; and therefore its present judgments, that is, its partial views, are simply the measure of its present knowledge. Hence the absolute need of developments. For Christianity is an idea, or a collection of ideas; and ideas, being judgments, are not

"ordinarily brought home to the mind except through the medium of a variety of aspects, like bodily substances, which are not seen except under the clothing of their properties and influences, and can be walked round and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights." Thus time is a necessary condition for the apprehension of the whole truth, and this gradual unfolding of its various aspects is what is called its development.

It is curious how, in all systems, this same faculty of human judgment plays its part. Alike in Hegel, Dean Mansel, and Father Newman, the problem to be solved is the relation of our finite judgment to our knowledge of the Infinite. Curiously also, Father Newman's theory of the necessity of development is founded on premisses which look very like those on which Dean Mansel founds his view of its impossibility. As that writer makes a judgment to be always the unit of thought so Father Newman defines ideas to be "habitual judgments." It is true that further on there is this difference: Father Newman only asserts the *practical* identity of ideas and judgments, without saying what Dean Mansel says, that they are absolutely the same. He does however at least imply, that to the human mind practically an idea is non-existent except as far as a portion of it reaches it through judgments. All its other portions and the idea as a whole are zero. If the human mind possesses any other faculty, natural or supernatural, by which it can obtain even a rude view of the whole, then the necessity for development is not proven; for the need is based by Father Newman on the assumption that, though the whole idea exists somewhere objectively, it cannot reach the human mind in any sense except partially and by degrees. In his view, immediately after the Apostles the sun of divine truth suffered a partial eclipse; no human eye saw, even dimly, the full disk. Its development is its gradual unveiling. That part which is hidden is to us total darkness. Under these circumstances, development of course is a necessity. The case, however, is by no means so clear, if the full orb is still visible, and only the parts have grown less clear through the decrease of strength in our sight as compared with the Apostles.

This comparison is already enough to show that there is a difference between Father Newman and Dean Mansel. In the view of the latter, the eclipse is total; in that of the Catholic writer, it is partial, though, as far as it goes, absolute. As a whole, the object is hidden, and the parts which are not seen are total darkness. The difference and the likeness between the writers are more forcibly brought out

by Father Newman's view that a doctrine, so far as it is a mystery, "cannot be developed," because, "relatively to us, its statements are mere words" (p. 98). In other terms, he makes a sharp and complete division of a mystery into the incomprehensible and the comprehensible part; the former is to us not twilight, but absolute darkness. Its light never reaches the mind at all, and will never reach our planet, not from its distance, but from inherent impossibility of apprehending it with our faculties. Is this, however, true of any part of revelation? Is not this equivalent to saying that partially, at least, Christianity is inconceivable? That there are hopeless contradictions in it, which make it to us no-sense? Is not the incomprehensible part precisely the supernatural part, and if the residuum is purely human knowledge, we may ask, as in the case of Dean Mansel, what has been revealed?

It would, however, be manifestly unfair to press too far an obiter dictum of an author who was not a Catholic when he penned those words. The real difficulty of the whole thing seems to us to be, that if there were no counter-statement of the author, it would seem to leave no provision for, or rather would exclude the possibility of, any knowledge, even implicit, of the whole Christian faith during the process of development. If the whole idea of Christianity is not contained in minds, which, on the hypothesis, it has never reached, it may fairly be asked, where is it? Where are the undeveloped parts? Are they contained in a set of words? But we know that words are incapable of development. Is the hidden portion contained in the sum of the portions which are known and of the judgments which have been formed? On the contrary, these judgments, as we know, are not equivalent to the whole. Nor again do they contain each other, nor act as an impulse to further knowledge, without some previous knowledge, however dim, of the whole. Surely it must be that the power of forming judgments, that is, of splitting up an idea into parts, implies some previous possession of the whole. It is not the entire account of the formation of our ideas to say that they are simply judgments. A thing to be judged must already, in some sense, be understood; and if it is ever so imperfectly apprehended by the mind, then, even practically, our simple apprehension of it goes beyond our judgment. It must have been placed, so to speak, at the bar of our mind, have been rendered present to it, and at least have been roughly conceived by it, before it can be judged. Some act of presentation must have taken place before we can represent it to ourselves even in thought. Judgment is essentially a reflective act, but

reflection implies a mental object to be reflected on. Judgment is an analysis, and every analysis implies a previous synthesis ; it implies that an object has reached the mind in some sense as a whole, else it could not be split up into its parts. The old dilemma about the relation between judgments and concepts might be quoted here. A judgment is itself composed of at least two concepts, and therefore presupposes them ; but if concepts are simply the produce of the faculty of judging, they in their turn presuppose judgments. Here then we have an infinite series, judgment presupposing concept, and concept presupposing judgment. This therefore is not the entire account of the faculties concerned in the formation of ideas. A rudimental knowledge of the whole performs some practical function in the process. Even in Father Newman's own illustration, the mind has some rough view of the whole material object at least simultaneously with its judgment that it is coloured, round, or smooth. What we judge is the whole object in some sense known.

Still more is this certain in objects of faith. In point of fact, that of which the intellect first catches a view is the doctrine as a whole. What was first known was the Holy Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Out of this came various judgments; the notion of the Monas, the Consubstantiality, and the Circuminsession of the Persons. A very real knowledge of the whole was absolutely necessary to act as the impulse to the evolution of the parts. Otherwise they would have lain like geological strata, one upon another, without being fused in the furnace of thought. It was not a mere question of formal logic. All A is B would not have been enough to decide the Arian controversy. The question was, what was the *idea* attached from the first to the word God by all Christians, when they used it of the Son. The sense was the point, not the word. Without the knowledge of the whole Trinity, the Procession of the Holy Ghost could not be evolved out of the Consubstantiality of the Son. One part does not imply the other, and the knowledge of one part is not even implicitly the knowledge of another, without some knowledge of the whole. The parts are the real objective contents of the whole, they do not necessarily contain each other. A dim knowledge of the whole is ever the grand impulse to the irresistible movement of the inner dialectics of the idea, which, through the judgment, forces its contents into the consciousness of the intellect.

For this truth we gladly appeal to Father Newman himself. We wish that we had space to quote the whole passage, for every word tells, and to curtail is to mar its eloquence.

The mind which is habituated to the thought of God, of Christ, of the Holy Ghost, naturally turns with a devout curiosity to the contemplation of the object of its adoration, and begins to form statements concerning it before it knows whither or how far it will be carried. One proposition necessarily leads to another, and a second to a third; then some limitation is required; and the combination of these opposites occasion some fresh evolutions of the original idea, which, indeed, can never be said to be entirely exhausted. This process is its development, and results in a series or rather body of dogmatic statements, till what was an impression upon the imagination has become a system or creed in the reason. Now such impressions are obviously individual, and complete above other theological ideas, because they are impressions of objects. As God is One, so the impression which He gives of Himself is one; it is not a thing of parts, it is not a system, nor is it anything imperfect and needing a counterpart. It is the vision of an object. When we pray, we pray not to an assemblage of notions or to a Creed, but to One Individual Being. This being the case, all our attempts to delineate an impression of Him go to bring out one idea, not two or three, or four; not a philosophy, but an individual idea in its separate aspects. This may be fitly compared to the impression made on us by the senses. Material objects are real, whole and individual, and the impressions which they make on the mind, by means of the senses, are of a corresponding nature, complex and manifold in their relations and bearings, but, considered in themselves, integral and one.*

Most true and most nobly said, but at the same time most inconsistent with what had been said before. Here is a whole object creating in the intellect a whole idea, a direct contradiction of a passage which we have elsewhere quoted. Here is an idea which is not a judgment but "an impression on the imagination." Previous then to the partial aspects into which the great Object of our faith is split up by the faculty of judgment, we have the power of catching a sight, however obscure, of the whole. The human intellect is not so cribbed, cabined, and confined as Father Newman's former expressions seemed to imply. It can see beyond its judgments, and they are not even practically identical with its knowledge of an object. There comes upon it an impression of the Infinite and the Absolute previous to and beyond its own fragmentary statements. Surely the faculty by which this is effected is too important to be left out of sight in a theory of development. It seems to furnish us with the very thing of which we are in search, a nucleus out of which all the series of developments is drawn. It is a real knowledge of a whole idea, which implicitly contains all future explicit statements. According to this view, Catholic truth is not a series of views like a diorama,

* University Sermons, p. 331.

which can only be unrolled one after another. It is like a grand landscape spread out before the mind, obscure from its very greatness, and only gradually to be mastered, yet whole from the first.

It is curious to contrast the Oxford theologian with the Professor of Tübingen. What Father Newman calls an impression on the imagination becomes in German hands an idea of the reason; while what he names a metaphysical* development as opposed to logical, comes before us in Kuhn disguised under the Hegelian term of dialectical.† Although, however, Father Newman has too acute and profound a mind not to have perceived that at least in the case of such a doctrine as the Holy Trinity, the Christian intellect has an impression of the dogma as a whole, yet this most important principle occupies but a small portion of his system of development. He has not analysed it, nor sought to find an analogy for it amongst our natural faculties. He has not shown how this, which he calls an impression on the imagination, is transmitted to the intellect, nor the process by which this one idea is converted into many judgments. He has with his usual sharp-sightedness seen that this process was not one of formal logic; but he has not wrought it into his theory, nor pointed out its functions in the course of the history of doctrine. In this respect his system is far inferior to that of the German professor whose name stands at the head of this article. If the English writer is more original, the German is far more complete. Though the space which is left us is very inadequate, yet we hope that we have so far cleared the way by what has been said, that we shall be able briefly to give a view of Kuhn's system.

There is hardly anything more deeply imbedded in German thought than the distinction between ideas and concepts. Among English writers Whewell has observed the difference. Of Space, Time, and Number, he says that they are "not notions," because they are "not general conceptions, abstracted from particulars," but ideas, that is "intuitions, out

* Essay on Development, p. 54. v., also 81, 337.

† The following is a German definition of dialectics. "As its instrument for contemplating in thought the self-development of the absolute Reason, philosophy has for its indispensable form the dialectical method, which reproduces in the consciousness of the thinking subject the spontaneous evolution (*Selbst-bewegung*) of the matter thought upon." (*Ueberweg*, iii. 240.) This is singularly like F. Newman's language respecting development, "that it is not an effect of any mechanism of reasoning, but comes of its own innate power of expansion within the mind in its season" (p. 113).

of which entire sciences are unfolded."* In Germany the distinction is much better known. Commonly there is even assigned a different faculty for them;† Reason for ideas, Understanding for concepts. A concept is a general notion, the result of many judgments formed from a comparison of a multitude of phenomena, which it binds together into one, according to the laws and categories of the understanding. An idea is an original unity, not formed out of a multiplicity of judgments, but at once a whole, out of which many judgments may be evolved and of which commonly they are an analysis. If this be true, some of our thoughts are not partial judgments, but are a totality and a matrix out of which they issue. Considering the exceeding variety of opinion as to the origin of these ideas, the harmonious assertion of the distinction is very remarkable. Most conflicting are the tests which are given of them, but in all cases the characteristic of the idea is the same, a notion of the mind which is a whole impression, which is cast at one jet, and which, while it is not made up out of a number of previously existing parts, is capable of being expanded into many concepts. Kant's ideas are God, the universe, and the soul, each of which has a stamp of oneness and totality, not one of which is obtained out of an exercise of the judgment on a number of individuals of the same species. In Hegel the one Idea is the Absolute. The distinction is found in Catholic philosophers, though they differ very much in their account of its origin. It is the foundation of the yet unfinished system of Greith, the Bishop of St. Gall. His list of ideas is the True, the Good, the Beautiful, each an underived notion of the mind, of which experience is at the very utmost the condition, not the cause. According to this author, the first time that the mind comes across an instance of right and wrong, it forms to itself the idea of Goodness, which is an original whole, out of which all subsequent moral judgments are developed; thus then these ideas are the nucleus of which Science, Morality, and Art are the expansion. His expression is, "The Reason takes

* Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, pp. 29, 74, 88.

† Vernunft and Verstand. It is curious that Vernunft is in the schoolmen, intellectus or understanding, Verstand is ratio or reason. We do not forget that in German phraseology there are concepts of the Reason; but we here use concept in its English sense of general notion. Kant's account of the idea is "a necessary concept of the reason to which no corresponding object can be given by the senses." Begriff, or concept (of the understanding), is that which joins together in one representation the multifariousness of (empirical) intuitions reproduced (by the imagination).—Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, iii. 175, 180.

up the Idea in its Totality, the Understanding goes into the dissection, the systematising and the clearing up of the Idea.”* Even in the German portion of the Neo-scholastics, who, while they profess to follow the schoolmen, are not content with a shallow imitation of their language, the same distinction is perceived, though they assign ideas and concepts to the same faculty. Kleutgen† finds the analogue of Kant’s Reason in the mind’s capacity for seeing those first principles which are self-luminous, because they are a light to themselves, while in their light many other truths are seen and concepts formed. What is most remarkable in the theory of cognition advocated by the authors of this school, is their tendency to idealize the notions formed by the intellect of material things. Their general notions have thus much of the characteristics of an idea, that, as soon as the reason is awakened into activity by the presence of an object, without waiting for a multitude of similar objects to serve as a basis of comparison, at once, and by its own laws, it binds into one concept the phenomena presented to it, and grasps the object with a notion already capable of expressing the whole class. Kleutgen‡ here asserts the same truth with respect to material objects, as is enunciated by Father Newman, who says that “the impressions which they make on the mind by means of the senses are real, whole, and individual, complex in their bearings and relations, but considered in themselves integral and one.” In all philosophers worthy of the name, we meet with the same view, that some of our mental operations have this quality, that while they are one, they are pregnant with many thoughts and are capable of development, because they have real contents and a capacity for expansion. All bear witness to the fact, that our conceptions of objects presented to us have more in them than we ourselves at first suppose. Furthermore, in the schoolmen one notion at the very least is a real idea. The part played in their philosophy by the notion of Being shows that they are no strangers to the distinction which we are considering. It is not a judgment yet it underlies all our mental acts. Again, it evolves spontaneously out of itself three other notions, Oneness, Goodness, and Truth, which are called transcendental, because they transcend all the categories of the understanding. They may even be called a synthetical development, for they belong essentially to Being, yet are more than its mere analysis. Above all, there stands out in our mind an idea, which transcends all others, and has characteristics of its own,

* Handbuch der Philosophie, i. p. 68.

† Philosophie der Vorzeit, i. 249. ‡ Philosophie der Vorzeit, i. 570.

the idea of God. We feel that it is capable of infinite expansion, because, though we know that our thought of Him is true, yet we also know that He goes far beyond not only what we say, but what we think. The scholastics express this by saying that God is above all genus, and that even the qualities of Being and Substance, which we assign to Him, are not to be conceived univocally, but analogically. These are all conditions of a true development. The idea is individual and one, yet it has an infinite capacity of being expanded into endlessly multiform thoughts. It is understood yet can never be comprehended. It has a real residuum beyond all the concepts which we can form of it, for Infinite Being is something positive even after all finite imperfection has been thought away. There the highest Mysticism and scientific Theology meet. We are able to see that whatever we think of Him is nothing compared to what He is, yet that that Nothing transcends all finite Being, and has in it a positive power which impels us on to think out what is and must ever be beyond all thought.

Now whatever may be thought of the truth of this view, no one can doubt its importance, or fail to see its bearing on the question before us. Here is a real intellectual whole, out of which judgments are developed, and of which they are parts. Here is an intellectual act, a simple apprehension of an object which is not absolutely identical with the concepts formed of that object, which goes beyond them, and is not exhausted by them. It may be that only so much of it is available for thought and words, as is conveyed in judgments; yet the undeveloped residue is a reality and serves a real purpose; the whole idea steadies and corrects the waverings and aberrations of the judgment. It is the ideal curve which guides the movements of the thought, and to which it must ever return amidst all the wildness of its flight. It is to this view of the distinction between ideas and concepts that Professor Kuhn points to explain many difficulties in the history of Christian doctrine. He uses the analogy of the natural idea of God, and applies it to the revealed; and he thus accounts for the fact that certain Fathers might not be theologically orthodox in their statements of certain doctrines, while their mind was right. In the natural order, the human intellect has a view of God as a concrete, infinite, personal being. This idea is a great whole, in which is included all that can be known of God. Out of this can be developed all the judgments which can be formed of Him. Between the first rough sketch in the mind of an orthodox savage and the *actus purus* of S. Thomas, lie a vast number of judgments—in which it is

quite conceivable that a believer in the one true God might lose his way, and yet be substantially right. The grand Infinitude of an Incomprehensible being is perfectly inexhaustible; and the moment that we begin to be scientific, and to analyse our idea of Him, innumerable apparent contradictions bewilder and dazzle us. Our method of reconciling them may be quite wrong, yet our idea may all the while be right. Not only our words, but our very concepts may be faulty; yet we have something to fall back upon, namely, the original idea of God as a whole, amidst all the partial blindness and confusion of our thought. If this be true, then implicit knowledge becomes a reality. It is no longer a matter of words when we say that implicitly the early Fathers knew all Christian doctrine. They possessed the idea which was implicitly all the concepts of subsequent theology, and out of which all were developed. The analogy of natural ideas can, of course, only be applied with great caution to revelation, yet we are convinced that it is both real and useful. Kuhn has only enunciated, in philosophic terms, the grand statement of S. Augustine; "*Deus veriùs est quàm cogitatur, et veriùs cogitatur quàm dicitur.*" According to our author, this is true both of the natural and revealed knowledge of God. In the natural order, there is an idea of God, not won without the help of creatures, yet ever pushing us beyond them, because it involves a consciousness that He is not only far beyond, but different in kind from all thoughts derived from them. This idea we are constantly struggling to express in thoughts which we know to be inadequate, and in words more inadequate still. Far more is this true in revelation. There is supernaturally impressed upon the mind of the Church an idea of God as Triple in Personality. This idea, while it is so incomprehensible and ineffable, that the human intellect, even supernaturally illumined, can only dimly see a certain way into it, has got to be expressed in human concepts. Hence the struggle called development.

S. Justin, S. Dionysius of Alexandria, and S. Irenæus, all had the same grand object before them. Not only the wants of their intellectual being, but far more, love for their God and Saviour, urges them on with an irresistible impulse to grasp with their thoughts what is far above their understanding.* With a sort of loving agony their mystical intuition of God will not let them rest till they have realized the Incomprehensible in concepts which they joyfully

* See a fine passage in Kuhn, i. p. 249.

acknowledge to be inadequate, and till they have announced to their fellow-men the Ineffable in words, strong with the strength of enthusiasm, though utterly feeble as compared, not only with the grand Object of their love, but even with their own thoughts. Hence the variations of the first centuries. Theology had to be framed in the midst of the fire of persecution. Not only the captious questions of the heathen, but the inner questionings of the spirit, impelled the understanding to conceive in human concepts the Divine idea impressed upon the soul by the Holy Ghost. Until the Church spoke and declared that not only the right expression, but the right thought was the Son's Consubstantiality with the Father, individuals might vary as to the scientific concept which best conveyed it, while the idea in their minds was really identical.

Here, however, we are met with a difficulty which we have already mentioned, and the solution of which by Kuhn will initiate us further into his view of the connection between ideas and concepts, and of the intellectual process by which the latter are evolved out of the former. According to his view of the facts of development, although from the very first all the Fathers believed that there was but one God, and that the Son was as truly that one God as the Father, yet the Church had never authoritatively imposed the peculiar conception of the Oneness of Substance as the only scientific mode of expressing the truth both in thought and word. Thus it was possible for some ante-Nicene Fathers to take methods which were theologically imperfect for translating into human thought the grand mystery which all believed. In other words, though the Oneness of the Godhead of the Son with that of the Father was always the idea of the whole Church, and consequently, even previous to Nicæa, the Arians were always heretics, yet that particular mode of conceiving the Oneness involved in the *ὁμοούσιον* was not defined before the great council. Here, then, comes the double question: why did the Church not make this definition from the beginning; and what was the state of mind of the Fathers who differed from it before the fourth century? Was their view (materially) false, or was it only imperfect? and what is the distinction in matters of dogma between what is false and what is imperfect?

Hitherto we have simply stated, that in Kuhn's theory the idea differed from the concept; without stating his view as to the origin of the idea. Many who have followed him thus far in his analogy between the natural and revealed idea, will pause before they accompany him further; nor are we by any means disposed to accept his whole view. So con-

vinced, however, are we that truth in such matters can only be attained by the utmost charity to all men who are sincere Catholics, and by an equitable judgment of their views which presupposes accurate knowledge, that we do not hesitate to continue our history of his theory. We have seen that Father Newman accounts for the imperfect statements of some early Fathers by supposing what is undoubtedly true, that the aid given by the Holy Ghost to the Church after the Apostles differed from that which was bestowed on the first founders of Christianity, and that their successors were left to the ordinary processes of the human intellect. This of necessity entails partial judgments of the doctrine delivered, and consequently time in mastering it. To this Kuhn has added the perpetual existence of supernatural ideas in the mind of the Church, in order to give an account of such an apprehension of the doctrine as is presupposed in the judgment. The idea is what is judged and mastered. Now, however Kuhn proceeds to a more minute analysis of the process of judgment, by which the idea is converted into judgments. This process is in language well known to German scholars one of moments, that is, of successive stages, which apparently clash with each other, and each of which is imperfect, yet essentially necessary for the final result which reconciles contradictions. The movement of the inner dialectics by which the mind coins ideas into concepts, is essentially one of three stages, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. First comes the rude apprehension of the idea, which is positive; then comes a negative stage, when the judgment analyses its view, sees contradictions in it, and struggles to harmonize them; lastly comes the final harmony, which brings back the confusion to its original unity.

The reader will recognize views which recall what we have already said of Hegel; the principles, however, of the Catholic theologian and the Hegelian philosopher are utterly different. Instead of being the produce of the intellect, the idea of Christianity of course is revealed from on high. All ideas, according to Kuhn, natural and supernatural, have this much in common, that they are immediate, that is, not the produce of deduction. Even the natural idea of God is "given and inborn." There is much that is vague in the author's account of the matter; and he has been accused, we fear with some justice, of an insufficient apprehension of the distinction between the orders of nature and grace. Nevertheless he has taken pains to correct his statements, so as to attempt to meet the remonstrances of Perrone and the decisions of Roman Congregations. His view in his second edition amounts to little more than that the idea which is native to the human intellect, and gained

immediately without a process of deductive reasoning, is that of a possible Infinite Being; the possibility of whom is converted for us into real existence by an inference from His works in the world.*

That such an idea must involve at first sight apparent contradictions is plain. If it is to cease to be the mere abstract notion of being, it must have attributes assigned to it, that is, it must pass through the moment or stage of appearing composite. It must appear both One and many. Furthermore, these contradictories do not, as in the case of ordinary formal logic, destroy each other. The dialectics of development follow other laws. The contradiction is passed by and transcended, but never destroyed. It is a real truth to the last that God has many attributes. To the last it cannot be said that this is false; it is relatively true, though theology finally closes the circle by declaring that God is pure actuality. Whatever may be thought of Kuhn's view as to the immediate natural idea of God, there can be no question that revealed truths are immediate in this sense, that they are not gained by reasoning, but accepted immediately on God's testimony. The application to the theology of the Fathers is obvious. Here, in matter still more beyond the reach of intellect, moments or stages in the conception of the object of faith are indispensable; here, too, they may be only relatively false. Thus S. Dionysius of Alexandria, and the Greek Fathers in general, are perfectly aware that the Son is absolutely One God with the Father, and they say so. This is their starting-point. They also know, however, that there must be a difference, and they seek for a scientific concept to harmonize the difference without destroying the unity. This is the moment of antithesis. S. Dionysius attempts to reconcile it by the concept of the origin of the Son from the Father, and uses words which imply time and a sort of spiritual creation. Other Greek Fathers use the representation (*Vorstellung*) of a generic unity between the Father and the Son, of which we find traces very late in the term "three hypostases."

* This view seems to be that of the *Katholik* for 1860, quoted in Schmid's *Wissenschaftliche Richtungen*, p. 85. Kuhn's expressions are as follows: "Even the immediate God-consciousness of our spirit is a purely relative knowledge of God," being "a mediate knowledge of His being drawn from His revelation of Himself in it (our spirit). Thus what the mind is immediately conscious of is not God, but itself in which God is mirrored." Kuhn calls the mind both eye and mirror. Again: "The knowledge of God native to the spirit is only called immediate comparatively; i. e., in comparison with that drawn from creation, because the spirit need not go out of itself to seek it."—(Kuhn, ii. 590.)

That these concepts are quite inadequate and imperfect, without the addition of the *ὁμοούσιον* to define an identity of Substance, is quite plain. Were they, however, even materially false in the mind of the writer? It depends entirely on this, whether the Fathers looked upon them as moments or as the absolute truth. If they said to themselves: this concept of mine, involving time and substantial difference, is the adequate truth, then they were material heretics. If, however, they were perfectly conscious how far their representation fell short of the truth, then it was only imperfect, not false. It is quite true that the Son derives His Godhead from the Father, and that the notion of generic unity goes a certain way to help us to conceive the Trinity, and that all acts even in the Godhead are to be expressed as taking place in time. All this, however, is imperfect; and it becomes false unless the mind goes forward to the further final moment of synthesis, to the identity of Substance which harmonizes, corrects, and crowns the process of development.

We hope that this sketch, however rude, will give some notion of Kuhn's theory of development. We are by no means prepared to accept it all; nevertheless, it seems to us to contain many elements which may be worked up into a true theory, while it completes what appears to us imperfect in Father Newman's book. We trust that a few words will enable us to sum up what we have said, as well as to offer by the way some suggestions towards correcting Kuhn's theory.

1. Though Kuhn is a man of far different principles from Günther, against whom he has expressly written, yet he does not seem to us to assign a sufficient place to the supernatural in his account of doctrinal ideas. Most fully does he teach that Christian dogmata are simply, as he expresses himself, "given" by a purely supernatural act on the part of God, and utterly undiscoverable by reason. Nevertheless he does not seem sufficiently to make the part of grace in the formation of the ideas which are the vehicles of dogma in our minds, an integral portion of his system. It seems to us that the operations of grace and nature are so interwoven in the ideas which bring home the faith to us, that no sharp division can be instituted between them, and consequently it is impossible to argue about such intellectual acts precisely as we should about natural ideas. Certain it is that theologians look on such ideas as really divine. A few, as Ripalda, consider them as wholly supernatural; all, however, look upon them as supernaturalized and elevated, either by the very habit of faith, or by a supernatural light, or, as is gathered from S. Thomas, by an interior supernatural help, strengthening the

intellect.* Kuhn compares the idea to the red thread running through the web of the faith. Is it not more like the melody which as a living spirit animates the whole composition so that all variations wind themselves around it, while all at length return to it?

2. Again it seems to us that Kuhn has not given sufficient prominence to the fact that since the infusion of dogmatic ideas never takes place except through teaching, whether oral or written, the Church after the Apostles necessarily starts with at least a sufficient number of explicit judgments, to convey the whole deposit, and its implicit conclusions, to the end of time. In other words, we think that the original explicit judgments were more numerous than Kuhn seems to suppose. It does not seem to us a right mode of stating the difficulty which we have proposed, to say that the Alexandrian school did not originally teach the Consubstantiality of the Son. The real phenomenon is that not only they, but other Fathers also, did teach it in equivalent terms, but also taught what was quite inconsistent with it. For instance, Lactantius,† who is one of the most erroneous in language, uses the very word "una substantia" of the Father and the Son, and expresses the view contained under the term, that the Son is as much the One Absolute God as the Father. The same is true of Origen, who, in a passage which seems to be genuine, speaks of the Substance of the Holy Trinity as One. The conclusion which we draw from this is that the notion that the one Substance, which is the Godhead, is not only common to but identical in the Father and the Son, was one of the original judgments left with the Church by the Apostles. What was at fault in the Fathers who are blamed was their scientific theology. They did not see the connection between the concept of Consubstantiality and the rest of their belief. They did not perceive it to be the necessary and indispensable concept in which the Christian idea must be conveyed. Two things were defined at Nicæa in the decree which imposed the *ὁμοούσιον*; the term was obligatory, and the notion conveyed by it was declared to be a part of the Faith. This was new to some earlier theologians, and therefore they sometimes asserted it in equivalent terms, and sometimes denied it. To such theologians the *ὁμοούσιον* was "an accretive" truth. Henceforth identity of substance

* Florez, *Theologia Scholastica*, tom. i. p. 201. He quotes S. Thomas, *Summa*, 2, 2, q. 173, art. 2 ad 3, where the Saint, though he is speaking of prophecy, yet seems to lay down a general principle.

† Kuhn, iii., 213, 221.

was the only absolute way of thinking of the Holy Trinity. Nor let any one suppose that this addition to theology was a small one, or had little influence on the Faith. The right mode of scientific thought is inseparable from the right mode of belief. The relative value of the two modes of conceiving the Unity of the Trinity as a generic or a numerical oneness, is all-important. The former may be used as an analogy, helping us to understand the truth; but if a man stops short at it, he becomes a heretic. The identity of Substance is the truth; and the authoritative definition of it as such at Nicæa was an addition to the knowledge of very many Christians, though no addition to what the Apostles had explicitly taught.

3. We cannot consider the description which Kuhn has given of the course of development to have proved the inexorable necessity of a passage through the stages, which he no doubt in general correctly enumerates. One fact, which he has himself pointed out without seeing its bearing, ought to have modified his view. Kuhn* thus states the facts of the case:—"Not a single ante-Nicene Father taught that the substance of the Son was foreign to that of the Father; but only a few (such as Callistus and Dionysius of Rome) raised themselves up to the concept of *Consubstantiality*, and held thoroughly to it throughout their teaching." It is strange that he did not see that there was no such fatal necessity to pass through stages of imperfect teaching, since some actually did not pass through them. One Church at least, on his own showing, was raised up above the laws of development, and that was the Church of Rome.

Not in a spirit of captious controversy, but in deep earnestness and charity we recommend this fact to Mr. Liddon's consideration. We know that he loves the Faith; his book, with all its faults, shows a profound enthusiasm for the Person of Jesus. He is, however, unjust to and rebellious against the Roman Church, as though it had taught new doctrine in defining the Immaculate Conception. But so far at least as his case is concerned, the parallel is complete. Some Fathers in the third century not only deny the expression "*Consubstantial*," but show that they have an inadequate conception of the doctrine by statements perfectly at variance with it. Nevertheless, we believe that it was the Church's doctrine, nay, her explicit doctrine at the beginning, though not from the beginning promulgated as strictly of faith. In like manner S. Thomas denies the Immaculate Conception in

* i. 172.

the thirteenth century ; in spite of this we believe that it was taught by the Apostles, and left as a part of the deposit with the Church. Again, the difficulties felt by S. Dionysius in receiving at once the *ὁμοούσιον* as the one truth were scientific; he did not see how it harmonized with the real distinction between the Father and the Son. In like manner, the hesitation of S. Thomas was scientific ; he could not understand how the Immaculate Conception could be reconciled with the real redemption of Mary. Lastly, who taught the clear and complete dogma of the Holy Trinity from the beginning ? The Church of Rome. Who, while Alexandria wavered and Antioch denied it, unequivocally inculcated it, though he may not have promulgated it throughout the Church ? The successor of S. Peter. This is a most pregnant fact ; for, be it remembered, facts are dogmatic in matters of Faith. What is, is a guide to what ought to be. Fact and theory go together. Now we find from the first a theory that Apostolical Churches are especially the standards of faith imposed, and Rome more than all others. This is the very least that can be conveyed by the words of S. Irenæus and even of Tertullian. Various Churches have the Catholic tradition ; Rome has the whole tradition.* What can this mean except that Rome is the developing authority in the Church ? Such is the theory ; now what is the fact ? The doctrine of the Holy Trinity was more fully and completely taught at Rome in the third century than anywhere else. Right and fact go together. Rome was meant to be the teacher of the Church, and she did teach the Church. This fact occurs perpetually in ecclesiastical history. A hundred years before Nicæa, Rome had fought and won its battle against what was afterwards Arianism by condemning Hippolytus. It is true of the doctrine defined at Ephesus and Chalcedon, as well as at Nicæa. In every case the result is the same ; the doctrine proposed by Rome, however Rome herself may wait, ends by being accepted by the whole Church. Let us compare the two letters extant written by S. Dionysius of Alexandria. In the first letter he uses expressions afterwards distinctly condemned at Nicæa as Arian. In the second he asserts the Consubstantiality of the Son. What had happened in the meanwhile ? The Sovereign Pontiff had spoken, and the Patriarch of Alexandria submits. In like manner S. Thomas denies the Immaculate Conception, and a long debate ensues. There is as much discussion as about the

* *Ista quam felix ecclesia cui totam doctrinam Apostoli cum sanguine suo profuderunt. De Præs. Hæret. 36.*

ὑποούσιον. The Roman Church tolerated for a time the denial of the doctrine concerning Mary, without ever ceasing, as the Bull *Ineffabilis* declares, to defend, vindicate, and assert that doctrine; but its voice became ever stronger and more clear. Pius IX. was enabled, in the Bull *Ineffabilis*, to recount the steps taken by his predecessors, ever to intimate their own view on the doctrine. At length the time came when he could proclaim that to be of faith which all Catholics already believed.

In conclusion, we now sum up, in a few words, the results of our inquiry. The facts to be accounted for are these. In the third century a large and important school of theologians, comprising not only suspicious writers, like S. Hippolytus and Origen, but even S. Dionysius of Alexandria, teaches not Arianism, but something which may be called Tritheism. Does this prove that the doctrine of the Consubstantiality of the Divine Word is not an Apostolic tradition, but an addition to the faith made in the fourth century? Certainly not: first, because this teaching was unknown to earlier times; secondly, because they themselves, except *perhaps* S. Hippolytus, in simpler statements teach the truth; thirdly, because the Roman Church, at least on two occasions, in the condemnation of S. Hippolytus and in the letter of S. Dionysius of Rome, explicitly teaches the **ὑποούσιον**. What, however, do the facts prove, and how are they to be accounted for? What theory will take in the double fact of the Apostolic origin of the doctrine of Consubstantiality and of the contrary teaching of such a man as S. Dionysius the Great? The Anglican theory is that the difference between the Pope and the school of Alexandria was merely verbal; a theory contrary to fact, and only to be maintained on Dean Mansel's view that theological terms do not stand for thoughts. The Hegelian theory is, that Christianity, being a collection of ideas, must necessarily involve a process of real change, each step of which is as true as another; consequently that Pope and Patriarch were contradictory and both equally true. The Catholic view is that the whole Faith was delivered once for all to the Apostles, and has never changed, but that its contents have been elucidated through the decrees of the infallible Church. The particular theory which has been advocated by us in order to express this doctrine is that of development, which may be defined to be the evolution of judgments out of ideas wholly conveyed by the teaching of the Apostles. The process of this development we have found to consist of three stages. First, the teaching of the Apostles conveyed to their successors an idea of the Holy Trinity, the legitimate analysis of which is

all that is now held to be *de fide* on the subject. Of course this idea could only be conveyed through some express teaching, a part of which was, as we believe, in equivalent terms, the *ὁμοούσιον*. Secondly, there came a period, which we may call the scientific. In the first stage the doctrine was held unsystematically, or without reflection on its place in the system of theology. As the Unity of God may be held together with the multiplicity of attributes, without reflection on the fact that it is the highest truth, before which multiplicity must disappear,—so the identity of Substance was held without its being perceived that it is the truth, before which the notion of a generic unity must vanish and be acknowledged as an imperfection. In this second stage, some theologians did not perceive the supremacy of this truth, and were in danger of Tritheism, by giving undue weight to the view of a generic unity of hypostases. This was a period of confusion, in which a wrong theology was endangering the faith. Thirdly, came the period of Nicæa, when the Church brought theology into harmony with the original idea, and imposed the *ὁμοούσιον* authoritatively, as the only concept which was absolutely true. It was the old truth with the important scientific advance, that it alone was the concept which adequately expressed the reality, while all others, which had hitherto been used side by side with it, were most imperfect representations, which must either be corrected or excluded by it. It was the old Apostolic doctrine, but it was now the result of a process by which it was ascertained that of the two rival views of unity, the numerical and generic, the former was the truth; the latter, if held alone, was false.

After all, we are so conscious of the difficulties of the subject, that we, in all sincerity, wish the foregoing pages to be considered only as an essay towards a theory for others to complete. Of two facts, however, we are certain. First, it is possible to assert that the Church from the beginning inculcated, if she did not promulgate, the *ὁμοούσιον*; but only possible on the Catholic hypothesis that the teaching of the Church of Rome, the centre of unity, is the true standard of the teaching of the Catholic Church. The only one of the three great original Patriarchal Sees which without a break and without hesitation taught the *ὁμοούσιον*, at least in equivalent terms, was that of Rome. In other words, the whole history of the *ὁμοούσιον* proves that no argument can be drawn against the Apostolicity of a tradition, because in some places it is denied; and that from the very earliest times the only guarantee for orthodoxy was submission to the Holy See. Secondly, as there was from the first an idea of the Holy

Trinity, and of the Sacred Humanity, remaining one, notwithstanding variations of conception and of expression, so there was also from the first impressed on the mind of the Church the idea of Mary. It was seen in the visions of S. Gregory Thaumaturgus. It found expression on the lips of S. Justina when her chastity was in danger. It persuaded S. Irenæus of the salvation of the guilty Eve. It consoled Saints in the wilderness. It had its poet in S. Ephrem; its preacher in many a Saint. It was a power in the Church. It was like nothing else, being the idea of a Virgin and Mother of God. It was one and integral, in spite of variations. It was too real to be turned aside, even by so great a Doctor as S. Thomas Aquinas. Its legitimate development, which it contained from the first, is the Immaculate Conception.

ART. III.—THE JESUITS IN CANADA.

The Jesuits in North America. By FRANCIS PARKMAN. Second Edition. Boston.

IT is one of the characteristics of our age, but chiefly of men outside the Church, that, doubting all else, they never doubt themselves. Every one is intimately persuaded that he is able to do everything. And this assurance, which on ordinary occasions is serene and tranquil, becomes vehement and magisterial when such men treat of the mysteries of religion, for which they have a peculiar attraction, but which to them are no mysteries at all. There are thousands in our day—the author whom we are going to notice is probably of the number—who would cheerfully engage to write a “Life of the Creator,” with authentic details, and an appendix containing “Suggestions for the general improvement of all things in Heaven and on Earth,” if the task were proposed to them by an enterprising publisher. Why not? To such men nothing is difficult, nothing impossible. They would teach philosophy to Aristotle, eloquence to Bossuet, and Christian doctrine to S. Francis Xavier. When some one asked Proudhon if he could not have offered some useful hints to the Almighty in designing the universe, he is said to have calmly replied, without astonishing either himself or his interlocutor, “*Cela se pourrait bien.*”

The most notable fact in connection with non-Catholic philosophers is, that they *will* write about religion, though it is

almost the only subject of which they know absolutely nothing. Yet there are many topics, lying within their intellectual sphere, upon which they are really qualified to offer valuable contributions. They might write about the Suez Canal, or the Antiquity of Man, or the Silurian System, or even about that curious financial institution, the *Crédit Foncier* of England. They have indeed a good deal to say about these, and a thousand other subjects, but none of them appear fully to satisfy their literary ambition. They seem possessed by the idea that they *must* teach the world a new view of religion, or forfeit all claim to originality of thought. And so, in discharge of their responsibility, they proceed to teach religion.

Mr. Parkman, whose book about the Jesuit missionaries in North America is before us, impresses us favourably in many respects. He is intelligent, in which he resembles most of his countrymen, and he writes good English, in which he differs from most of them. He is evidently amiable, sincere, and truthful. It need hardly be said that he manifests the candour which, though it be sometimes only the candour of indifference, is the honourable distinction of almost all American writers. He would disdain to be the organ of dull and querulous bigotry. Yet with these various claims to our sympathy and respect, we wish that he had not thought it necessary to write about Catholic missionaries, much as he admires them. He might write excellently on many themes, but not on this. He lacks the primary qualification. A man who begins such a labour by telling you that he does not believe the supernatural, and has little esteem for those who do, is no more able to explain the phenomena of Christianity, of which the apostolic vocation is one of the most impressive, than an astronomer would be competent to construct a theory of the Cosmos who should begin by denying Kepler's *Laws*, and scoffing at Newton's *Principia*. Deride as fables the doctrines of attraction and gravitation, the sphericity of the planets, and all the truths established in our treatises on Conic Sections and Dynamics, and you will occupy about the same position towards astronomy as a man who laughs at vocation, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the ministry of the angels, and the action of God in His own creation, occupies in relation to Christianity. If Christianity deals only with what is human, it does not proceed from God. Mr. Parkman is like the astronomer who denies even the postulates of his own science, and is therefore in a condition of radical and hopeless incapacity to discuss the subject which he has chosen. But it is time to let him speak for himself.

This American writer, who has carefully studied his

authorities, and learned to appreciate them, lauds the unfailing accuracy both of the Jesuit annalists and of their recent continuators. It is this manly truthfulness which distinguishes him from English writers of the same school. "Dr. Taché," he observes, "after a zealous and minute observation of the Huron country, extended through five years, writes to me as follows:—'I can vouch for the scrupulous exactness of our ancient writers.'" (Introd. p. xxviii.) Of the modern historian of the Canadian mission, the Abbé Faillon, he says in like manner:—"It is impossible to commend too highly the diligence, exactness, and extent of his conscientious researches." Having acquitted his own conscience as a sincere and upright critic by this unreserved statement, his Protestant nature resumes its supremacy, and he goes on thus:—"The credulity of the Abbé Faillon is enormous, and he is completely in sympathy with the *supernaturalists* of whom he writes; in other words, he identifies himself with his theme, and is indeed a fragment of the seventeenth century still extant in the nineteenth." This means, as he proceeds to explain, that the Abbé Faillon, who probably thinks it very natural that Christians of one century should resemble those of another, ventures to record, on the testimony of the missionaries themselves, "the visions and miracles" which accompanied their labours. The same reproach might be made against those inspired narratives of the primitive Apostolic missions, abounding also in visions and miracles, bequeathed to us by S. Luke and S. Paul. Whether Mr. Parkman rejects *them* also as "credulous supernaturalists," we can neither affirm nor deny. If he does not, we may congratulate him on the happy inconsistency; if he does, most people will think that he is only moderately qualified to write on Christian themes. M. Ernest Rénan is not more impatient of the supernatural, the very sound of which is intolerable to Mr. Parkman. And this determination to recognize in Christianity only its human elements, because he has detected that its Protestant preachers are manifestly *not* supernatural, and rashly assumes that all others are in the same unfortunate condition, obliges our intelligent author to involve himself in endless contradictions. Thus, at one moment, he speaks of the missionaries with genuine enthusiasm, as "saints and heroes," and elaborately proves, with evident satisfaction to himself, that they were indeed both; and the next, he is equally careful to prove that, although saints and heroes, they were, after all, only splendid lunatics. It is true that in one place he modestly excuses this adverse judgment by observing, "this is the view of a heretic" (p. 159); and in another, that their strange

ardour in administering baptism "is beyond heretic appreciation" (p. 65); and, finally, that "to estimate a virtue involved in conditions so anomalous,"—i.e., accompanied by the supernatural—"demands a judgment more than human" (p. 207). But this modesty was only fugitive and evanescent, since he immediately proceeds, without apparently professing to be "more than human," to pronounce a judgment than which nothing can be more decisive and peremptory. "They were surrounded," he says, "with *illusions*, false lights, and false shadows—breathing an atmosphere of *miracle*—compassed about with *angels and devils*—urged with stimulants most powerful, though *unreal*—their minds *drugged*, as it were, to preternatural excitement," &c., &c. (p. 207).

Mr. Parkman does not appear to have noticed, when he wrote this passage, that his somewhat rhetorical description applies, in every detail, to S. Peter and S. Paul. Or perhaps he did see it, but did not care to enforce the application. It is possible that, even in America, Protestants are not yet quite prepared to jeer at the first preachers of Christianity. Yet it is certain that the "virtue" of the Apostles was "involved" in precisely the same "anomalous conditions" as those which he reprobates in their successors. S. Peter assuredly "breathed an atmosphere of miracle." It was a small thing to him, if we may believe the New Testament, to control the elements and the forces of nature. His very shadow healed the sick, though according to scientific principles it was a very irregular proceeding, and an offence against the laws of cause and effect. As to "visions," they were almost his normal state. He might well be excused also for believing in "angels," since one of them came to take him out of prison at rather a critical moment of his life. It is quite clear that he believed no less firmly in "devils," like the missionaries in Canada and elsewhere, since he was constantly warning Christians to be on their guard against them—a caution by which Mr. Parkman does not seem to have profited. S. Paul, again, was a "supernaturalist," if ever there was one. He also had visions, healed the sick, and raised the dead. He was once, as he relates himself, "caught up to heaven;" and if any one had told him, as perhaps our American author would have done, that he was "surrounded with illusions" because he said so, we would rather have been, for our own part, at the bottom of the deepest well in Damascus or Antioch than in the position of that philosophical objector, standing face to face with S. Paul. The Apostles were meek and humble men, in spite of their superhuman gifts, but it

was not always quite safe to question those gifts, nor to trifle with those who possessed them, as Ananias and others learned to their cost.

Let us return to Mr. Parkman, who has nothing, we are persuaded, in common with Ananias. If we propose to notice briefly the contradictions in his interesting narrative, it is with a grave motive, which we hope will become sufficiently apparent in the course of these observations. The method pursued by our author makes the task an easy one. He enumerates, one by one, the illustrious martyrs of the Canadian missions, and the more celebrated of the religious women by whom their labours were shared; not neglecting even the eminent laymen who, during the same epoch, held civil or military offices in the French colony. After recording, with apparent enthusiasm, their marvellous lives, unmatched in heroism, as he would be the first to admit, except by the career of other missionaries of the same Church, he anticipates the inevitable argument that only a *supernatural* vocation could inspire or sustain such lives, by boldly affirming that it is precisely the supernatural features of their lives which we ought to reject with disdain, and which cast discredit upon their whole history. And this he does, not with the malice of a heretic, but because he knows nothing of the apostolic vocation, nor of the gifts which accompany it. A heathen would have reasoned more justly; even the Mahometans cried aloud that the great S. Francis was "the friend of Allah," when they saw his manner of life. Such a life has no lesson for Protestants. We do not know to what denomination, if any, Mr. Parkman is attached; and it would perhaps be unprofitable to remind him that even the frigid writers of the school of Paley, who would have smiled at the religious enthusiasm of the disciples of Islam, and of whom it has been said that they regarded Christianity only as something which required to be constantly proved, were accustomed to argue, in a purely mathematical spirit, that the supernatural lives of the Apostles amply sufficed to demonstrate the truth of their mission. According to the theory of Mr. Parkman, however, of which we will presently give some additional illustrations, the school of Paley was too romantic and sensational; and the mere fact that the Apostles professed to see visions and to work miracles ought to be deemed fatal to their claims, and therefore, though our author does not say it, to the religion which they taught. His reasoning, if pursued consistently, would deprive the New Testament of all credit, and relegate its divine narratives to the picturesque domain of fable and fancy. Yet his book, of which this is, consciously or otherwise, the logical conclusion,

has been ardently praised by the editors of at least one Anglican journal. They do not, probably, wish to reprove the Apostles as visionaries and enthusiasts, nor to degrade Christianity to a purely human level; but Mr. Parkman helps them to believe that the pre-eminence of Catholic missionaries—which they also have detected with uneasiness and aversion—is not due to supernatural causes, but only to some peculiarity of temper and disposition; and for this they are grateful. When we see such men heartily commend a volume which reduces all sanctity and religious heroism to the category of “illusion,” we gladly persuade ourselves that their gratitude is rather a blunder than a crime. If it were otherwise, we should be forced to believe that, if they love Christianity much, they hate the Church more, and would rather the first should be proved to be human, than the second admitted to be divine.

It is in such terms as the following that our author speaks of the missionaries as a body:—

The Jesuits gained the confidence and good-will of the Huron population. Their patience, their kindness, their intrepidity, their manifest disinterestedness, the blamelessness of their lives, and the tact which, in the utmost fervours of their zeal, never failed them, had won the hearts of the wayward savages, and chiefs of distant villages came to urge that they would make their abode with them” (p. 70).

Again:—

When we see them, in the gloomy February of 1637, and the gloomier months that followed, toiling on foot from one infected town to another (the small-pox was raging everywhere), wading through the sodden snow, under the bare and dripping forests, drenched with incessant rains, till they desisted at length through the storm the clustered dwellings of some barbarous hamlet,—when we see them entering, one after another, these wretched abodes of misery and darkness, and all for one sole end, the baptism of the sick and dying, we may smile at the futility of the object, but we must needs admire the self-sacrificing zeal with which it was pursued (p. 98).

Alluding to the terrible perils which they daily encountered among other tribes, and which conducted so many of them to an appalling martyrdom, he says, “Nowhere is the power of courage, faith, and an unflinching purpose more strikingly displayed than in the record of these missions” (p. 142). Once more:—“The Jesuits had borne all that the human frame seems capable of bearing”—*i. e.*, mutilation, tortures, famine, and the menace of death, in its most frightful forms, at every hour of the day and night—“Did their zeal flag, or their courage fail? A fervour, intense and unquenchable,

urged them on to more distant and more deadly ventures. They burned to do, to suffer, and to die; and now, from out a living martyrdom, they turned their heroic gaze towards an horizon dark with perils yet more appalling, and saw in hope the day when they should bear the cross into the blood-stained dens of the Iroquois" (p. 146). Mr. Bancroft, in his history of the United States, speaks of them with even deeper admiration. We know no American writer who has done otherwise.

This, then, not to multiply citations, is the bright side of the picture. Now for the dark one. The Catholic reader will hardly anticipate that the missionaries who have just been described so eloquently—many of whom were men of noble lineage, who could have enjoyed all the honours which worldly ambition covets; most of whom were men of vigorous and cultivated understandings; and all of whom had received a liberal and refined education—were trained to the labours of missionary life by a "horrible violence to the noblest qualities of manhood" (p. 11). It is Mr. Parkman who says so. He has deeply studied the question, and this is his view of the institute of S. Ignatius. It will surprise those who, like ourselves, are intimately acquainted with many Jesuits, whom we have found wholly unconscious of the oppression they have endured, and displaying, in spite of it, "the noblest qualities of manhood." But Mr. Parkman, who feels for them the compassion which they do not feel for themselves, considers them the victims of "horrible violence." And this is not all. Mr. Parkman's heroes, perhaps owing to their pernicious training, do all their works, in Canada and elsewhere, as the blind and submissive agents of an imperious Church, which "astounds the gazing world with prodigies of contradiction: now breathing charity and love, now dark with the passions of hell; now beaming with celestial truth, now masked in hypocrisy and lies; now a virgin, now a harlot" (p. 84). It is not wonderful that the missionaries of such a singular Church as this, infected by her spells, should display similar contradictions of character; that they should be at one time "saints and heroes," at another, dreamers and lunatics. Why should they be more consistent than the Church which they serve, and which knows how to captivate their souls by so subtle a mastery?

Among the Canadian missionaries, few displayed the gifts of an apostle more abundantly than the martyr Jean de Brébeuf. Mr. Parkman calls him "the Ajax of the Huron mission, its truest hero, and its greatest martyr." He exhausts in his favour the language of eulogy. "Of the same

race as the English earls of Arundel, never had the mailed barons of his line confronted a fate so appalling with so prodigious a constancy" (p. 389). Even the ferocious Iroquois were astounded at his fortitude, under torments of which it is difficult to read the narrative with composure. His whole life was a victory over the flesh, and he had "a courage unconscious of fear, yet redeemed from rashness by a cool and vigorous judgment" (p. 390). He was conspicuous for exquisite common sense, which his sanctity did not obscure; he was a scholar, a gallant gentleman, a fast friend, a gay and cheerful companion; and having been, so to speak, a thousand times a martyr, he was at last slowly tortured to death by the monsters for whose sake he had cheerfully accepted such a life and such an end. Yet it is of Jean de Brébeuf that his American biographer could say—because, like S. Paul, he was familiar with "visions and miracles,"—"extravagant chimeras fed the fire of his zeal;" and that, in the narrative of his superhuman life, "one may throw off trash and nonsense by the cart-load, and find under it all a solid nucleus of saint and hero" (p. 392).

It was De Brébeuf himself, as our author notices, who recounted, in obedience to his superiors, the "innumerable visions" and other supernatural incidents of his career. It follows that, although "saint and hero," he must either have been all his life the victim of puerile delusions, or a deliberate impostor. Either supposition is more injurious to his Master than to himself. Both are inconsistent with common sense, and with the accepted laws of evidence. But if Mr. Parkman, writing upon subjects wholly beyond his comprehension, talks foolishly, it is fair to him to say that at least he is not inspired by the malice of a sectary. He is simply ignorant of the elements of Christianity, and of God's dealings with His saints. Protestants have no more definite idea of such a man as De Brébeuf than the mass of them have of our Lord Himself. They can appreciate, in a dim and confused way, a heroism which, as they perceive, was not displayed by fits and starts, but was the habit of a whole life, and had no conceivable earthly motive; but they are simply irritated by "visions and miracles," because such events take them into a region full of light for the Christian, but to themselves darker than night, and in which they grope their way with lapses and misadventures painful to the humane spectator. They are acquainted only with a form of religion in which they know the supernatural to be impossible, and which resembles the religion of the Apostles as the skeleton of our museums, to which not a sinew nor a muscle any longer adheres, and which

is held together only by wires and bands, resembles the living man, "in godlike form and majesty erect."

If our author detected, with the characteristic penetration of a Protestant, the "illusions" and other infirmities which marred the piety of De Brébeuf, he was not likely to be blind to the defects of his companions. Jogues and Bressani, Chabanel and Lalemant, Daniel and De Noué, and the rest of this marvellous company, were indeed "saints and heroes," but, nevertheless, do not quite realize Mr. Parkman's ideal. Charles Garnier, who had one brother a Capuchin, another a Carmelite, and a third a Jesuit, was of a frail and delicate constitution. Yet "he entered, not only without hesitation, but with eagerness, on a life which would have tried the boldest. . . . His fellow missionaries thought him a saint; . . . all his life was a willing martyrdom" (p. 101). "His companion Bressani says that he would walk thirty or forty miles in the hottest summer day, to baptize some dying Indian, when the country was infested by the enemy." At last the Iroquois slew him. "Thus died Charles Garnier," observes Mr. Parkman, "the favourite child of wealthy and noble parents, nursed in Parisian luxury and ease. His life and his death are his best eulogy. Brébeuf was the lion of the Huron mission, and Garnier was the lamb; but the lamb was as fearless as the lion" (p. 407). Mr. Parkman, contemplating this martyr from the serene heights of Protestant self-sufficiency, regrets that "his sensitive nature, severed from earthly objects, found relief in an ardent adoration of the Virgin Mary." Would that this were all! but "one can discern, amid his admirable virtues, some slight lingerings of mortal vanity." Alas! "he speaks of his great success in baptizing."

Joseph Marie Chaumonot, a martyr only in desire, accepted toils and sufferings before which the vulgar vanity of the greatest military heroes would have quailed; but it was a defect, we are told, of this imperfect Christian to love our Lady, and to believe in miracles. As he was constantly witnessing the latter, his faith in them was not surprising. "A warrior rushed in like a madman, drew his bow, and aimed the arrow at Chaumonot. 'I looked at him fixedly,' writes the Jesuit, 'and commended myself in full confidence to S. Michael. Without doubt, this great archangel saved us, for almost immediately the fury of the warrior was appeased'" (p. 145). These things were happening to him and his companions almost every day, but, saint as he was, his religious views, our author assures us, were very defective. S. Michael—who is constantly defending us, as we learn from the Prophet Daniel, assisted by the archangel Gabriel and other princes of

the heavenly host, against more formidable demons than the Iroquois (Dan. ix., x.)—saved his life, but neglected to teach him a more enlightened religion. "The grossest fungus of superstition," writes our author, "that ever grew under the shadow of Rome, was not too much for his omnivorous credulity, and miracles and mysteries were his daily food; yet, such as his faith was, he was ready to die for it" (p. 370).

The Prophet Daniel, let us repeat it, for even Mr. Parkman will hardly deny this, believed exactly what Chaumonot believed; but perhaps some Protestants think that *he* also was addicted to the "grossest superstition"? One of them has dared to accuse even the Master of the Prophets of favouring this vice. Calvin laments, *in loco*, that our Blessed Lord did not rebuke what he calls the "superstition" of the woman who came behind Him to touch the hem of His garment. And since Protestants are not afraid to instruct the Church, they are perfectly consistent in undertaking, like Calvin, to teach the Creator. The crime is exactly the same in both cases, because in both man revolts against the Holy Ghost. But Anglicans regards the Church as a purely human institution, composed of many different and opposing confederations, each teaching doctrines contradictory of the others, and naturally do not comprehend that in rebuking the Church they are admonishing the Holy Ghost. This is their excuse. *Nesciunt quid faciunt*.

One of the chapters of Mr. Parkman's book is entitled "Devotees and Nuns." In this chapter he appreciates, from his own point of view, and with such qualification as he possesses for the task, the holy women who quitted France to aid the Canadian missionaries in their toils. There were Indian women to be instructed, and Indian children to be rescued from a twofold death. Father Le Jeune had said, in a document which reached Europe, "Alas! is there no charitable and virtuous lady who will come to this country to gather up the Blood of Christ, by teaching His word to the little Indian girls?" The invitation was accepted. Neither the rigour of the climate, nor the perils of such a mission, nor the squalid misery which awaited them, could discourage the charity for which such trials were only attractions. Tender and delicate women, who had been the light of many a peaceful home in France, and compared with whom the heroines upon whom Shakespeare lavished all the treasures of his genius were but dross, left all to follow Jesus Christ to this new land. Marie Madeleine de Chauvigny, a young and noble widow, was the foundress of the first convent in Quebec. "Whatever may be thought of the quality of her devotion,"

says our fastidious author, who is evidently "a discerner of spirits," "there can be no reasonable doubt of its sincerity or its ardour." But it is this gentleman's fate, in the execution of a task for which he did not suspect his own unfitness, to contradict himself at every page. "One can hardly fail to see in her," he says, "the signs of that restless longing for *éclat* which with some women is a ruling passion" (p. 173). When a Protestant contemplates an act of Christian heroism for which he has no taste, he straightway attributes it to a bad motive. By the help of this interpretation every difficulty disappears, and he contrives to pull down the supernatural to his own level. Yet it might have occurred to his critical mind that if this lady had a vulgar passion for *éclat*, the first Canadian winter, and the scenes to which it introduced her, would have effectually extinguished it. The ship which conveyed her from Dieppe bore such a company of Christian women as the Virgin Mother might have acknowledged for her children. Marie Guyard, afterwards the venerable Marie de l'Incarnation, was of the number. Mr. Parkman would have done well to distrust himself for once, and either not to speak at all of such as her, or only with extremest caution. Mystically espoused to her Lord, after a vision which she has recounted herself, she uses in her journal such expressions as we find in the inspired *Canticle*, and in the lives of many saints of the same order as herself. Of such passages our American Protestant says (we omit worse things, which a Christian reader could not endure), "What is most astonishing is, that a man of sense like Charlevoix, in his *Life of Marie de l'Incarnation*, should extract them in full, as matter of edification and evidence of saintship" (p. 177). What is much more astonishing is, that Mr. Parkman, who is rational on every topic which does not pertain to religion, should fail to reflect that, even on purely intellectual grounds, Charlevoix was at least as capable of judging such a woman as himself. But every Protestant naïvely supposes that he possesses faculties granted to no other human being.

The newly-arrived nuns, so celebrated in later times as "the Ursulines of Quebec," "were lodged at first in a small wooden tenement under the rock of Quebec, at the brink of the river." We are quoting Mr. Parkman again:—

Here they were soon beset with such a host of children that the floor of their wretched tenement was covered with beds, and their toil had no respite. Then came the small-pox, carrying death and terror among the neighbouring Indians. These thronged to Quebec in misery and desperation. The labours of the Ursulines were prodigious. In the infected air of their miserable hovels, where sick and dying savages covered the floor, and were

packed one above another in berths,—amid all that is most distressing and most revolting, with little food and less sleep, these women passed the rough beginning of their new life. Several of them fell ill" (p. 184).

Perhaps this was the *éclat* which these ladies had gone so far to seek?

"How did these women bear themselves," continues our author, "amid toils so arduous?" He proceeds to answer his own question, and is especially moved by the gladness and mirth which reigned among them, though he probably did not know it to be the invariable attendant on true holiness. There might be gloom all around them, but there was none in their own hearts. "A pleasant record has come down to us," he says, "of one of them, that fair and delicate girl, Marie de S. Bernard. . . . Another Ursuline, writing at a period when the severity of their labours was somewhat relaxed, says, 'Her disposition is charming. In our times of recreation she often makes us cry with laughing: it would be hard to be melancholy when she is near.'" And then follows a passage, grotesquely contradictory and blandly presumptuous, which is perhaps the most characteristic in the whole book.

One figure stands nobly conspicuous in this devoted sisterhood. Marie de l'Incarnation, no longer lost in the vagaries of an insane mysticism, but engaged in the duties of Christian charity and the responsibilities of an arduous post, displays an ability, a fortitude, and an earnestness which command respect and admiration. Her mental intoxication had ceased, or recurred only at intervals; and false excitements no longer sustained her. . . . Marie de l'Incarnation neither failed in judgment nor slackened in effort. She carried on a vast correspondence, embracing every one in France who could aid her infant community with money or influence; she harmonized and regulated it with excellent skill; and, in the midst of relentless austerities, she was loved as a mother by her pupils and dependants. Catholic writers extol her as a saint. Protestants may see in her a Christian heroine, admirable, with all her follies and her faults" (p. 186).*

Marguerite Bourgeoys was at Montreal what Marie de l'Incarnation was at Quebec. "Her portrait has come down to us," says our author, "and her face is a mirror of frankness, loyalty, and womanly tenderness." And then he proceeds to daub with rude hand the fair face which had won his admiration. "She had known no miracles, ecstasies, or trances." But she was destined to lose this singular merit, for "after-

* He observes in a note, but only for the diversion of his readers, that when mother Anne de S. Claire saw her for the first time, she wrote to a friend, "I perceived in the air a certain odour of sanctity, which gave me the sensation of an agreeable perfume."

wards, when her religious susceptibilities had reached a fuller development, a few such are recorded of her; yet even the Abbé Faillon, with the best intentions, can credit her with but a meagre allowance of these celestial favours." It was the only blot in her history.

In 1653, renouncing an inheritance, and giving all she had to the poor, she embarked for the savage scene of her labours. To this day, in crowded schoolrooms of Montreal and Quebec, fit monuments of her unobtrusive virtue, her successors instruct the children of the poor, and embalm the pleasant memory of Marguerite Bourgeoys" (p. 202).

The seventeenth century, which in England saw the almost total extinction of religious faith and practice, till a fierce outburst of fanaticism, crying shame on the torpid national Church, filled the land with a hundred new sects, produced in every Catholic region saints and heroes. The laymen who represented France in Canada were not unworthy to witness the virtues of the Ursulines and the Jesuits. Mr. Parkman is almost as curiously infelicitous and contradictory in appreciating the one as the other; but as the laymen were for the most part innocent of "visions and miracles," he finds less in them to disapprove. "Paul de Chomedry, Sieur de Maisonneuve, was a devout and valiant gentleman, who in long service among the heretics of Holland had kept his faith intact, and had held himself resolutely aloof from the licence that surrounded him. He loved his profession of arms, and wished to consecrate his sword to the Church. Past all comparison, he is the manliest figure that appears in this group of zealots. . . . His father opposed his purpose, but he met him with a text of S. Mark: 'There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father for My sake, but he shall receive an hundredfold.'" When Maisonneuve was urged to abandon the perilous post at Montreal, and take refuge at Quebec, he answered, "It is my duty and my honour to found a colony at Montreal, and I would go if every tree were an Iroquois" (p. 203). Even Mr. Parkman is constrained to exclaim, "The spirit of Godfrey de Bouillon lived again in Chomedry de Maisonneuve, as in Marguerite Bourgeoys was realized that fair ideal of Christian womanhood, a flower of earth expanding in the rays of heaven." "Quebec and Montreal," adds our author, "are happy in their founders. Samuel de Champlain and Chomedry de Maisonneuve are among the names that shine with a fair and honest lustre on the infancy of nations" (p. 275). And these men, with all their companions, were, as far as laymen could be, apostles. "From Maisonneuve, as brave a knight of the cross as ever

fought in Palestine for the Sepulchre of Christ, to the humblest labourer, these zealous colonists were bent on the work of conversion" (pp. 267-272). At the very moment when Protestantism was everywhere undermining faith, substituting the material for the spiritual, and converting men into mere intellectual machines, the children of the Church were displaying in all lands the same supernatural virtues, and accomplishing the same works, by which, in earlier ages, the Europe of our barbarous ancestors had been won to religion and civilization.

The American historian whom we have been quoting, and upon whose volume we have still a few observations to make, is himself, in spite of many excellent qualities, an unconscious illustration of the contrast referred to. He can admire what he believes to be *natural* in the heroes whom he describes; he has only scorn for all that seems to be *supernatural*. When Champlain died, and, in the words of our author, "his heroic spirit bade farewell to the rugged cliff where he had toiled so long to lay the corner-stone of a Christian empire," there was a moment of anxiety for the missionaries. "Would his successor be found equally zealous for the faith, and friendly to the mission?" The doubt was soon removed. In June of the following year, Charles de Montmagny, a knight of Malta, followed by a gallant train of officers and gentlemen, landed at Quebec. The Jesuits, still solicitous about the character of the new-comers, met them on the shore. "As they all climbed the rock together, Montmagny saw a crucifix planted by the path. *He instantly fell on his knees before it*; and nobles, soldiers, sailors, and priests imitated his example." Our author cannot resist this unexpected provocation. "The Jesuits," he says, satirically, "were comforted. Champlain himself had not displayed a zeal so edifying" (p. 150). If this crucifix had been a bag of gold, a statue of Washington, or even a model of Bunker's Hill, every one perceives that an attitude of veneration would have been appropriate. But a feeble representation of the Crucified, and a Christian warrior kneeling before it! *Risum teneatis amici?* Do you hear our American friend laughing?

With a few words on the historical results of the mission inaugurated by so many martyrs, and adorned by so many saints, we shall have completed all that we have to say on the book before us. "The primitive Indian," says Mr. Parkman, "yielding his untutored homage to One all-pervading and omnipotent Spirit, is a dream of poets, rhetoricians, and sentimentalists. No race, perhaps, ever offered greater difficulties to those labouring for its improvement" (Introd.

p. lxxxix.) Yet the missionaries converted almost the whole Huron nation, not to speak now of other northern tribes. If only a feeble remnant survive to this day, this is chiefly because the powerful Iroquois, stimulated by the English to destroy the Christian Indians in alliance with France, never laid aside the axe and the tomahawk till the work was accomplished. English and Dutch Protestants in North America, as in so many other regions, have been the most formidable obstacles to the evangelization of the heathen, and have ruined, again and again, flourishing missions, established by the blood and sweat of martyrs, whom they have often helped the savage to slay! They would, no doubt, as Charlevoix observes, have subdued the Iroquois by apostolic arts, but they could not hope to subdue their employers. "The cause of the failure of the Jesuits," says Mr. Parkman, "is obvious. The guns and tomahawks of the Iroquois were the ruin of their hopes" (p. 447). And the guns were supplied by the English. What the missionaries would have done for the natives of North America, if France had maintained her domination, may be judged by such facts as the following, which we owe to the truthful candour of our author:—

When the Christian Indians had, on a certain occasion, vanquished the Iroquois, though a woman of the victorious tribe could say, "they have killed, burned, and eaten my father, my husband, and my children," they showed a self-control which our own troops failed to show, under less provocation, towards the rebel Sepoys of Hindostan. "To the credit of their Jesuit teachers, they treated their prisoners with a forbearance *hitherto without example*." The missionary, Mr. Parkman adds, had "given them a lecture on the duty of forgiveness" (p. 281).

Again. When the Huron nation was finally overpowered by the Iroquois, a certain number of the former "migrated in a body to the Seneca country," where they were allowed by their enemies, whom they could no longer resist, "to form a town by themselves." They identified themselves with the Iroquois in all but religion, "holding so fast to their faith that, *eighteen years after*, a Jesuit missionary found that many of them were still good Catholics" (p. 424).

Finally, Mr. Parkman sums up in these words what he calls "the influence of the missions." He is speaking of Father Gabriel Druillete's converts, on the northern boundary of Maine:—

They built their bark chapel at every camp, and no festival of the Church passed unobserved. On Good Friday they laid their best robe of beaver-skin on the snow, placed on it a crucifix, and knelt around it in prayer.

What was their prayer? It was a petition for the forgiveness and conversion of their enemies, the Iroquois. Those who know the intensity and tenacity of an Indian's hatred will see in this something more than a change from one superstition to another. An idea has been presented to the mind of the savage, to which he had previously been an utter stranger. This is the most remarkable record of success in the whole body of the Jesuit *Relations*; but it is very far from being the only evidence that, in teaching the dogmas and observances of the Roman Church, the missionaries taught also the morals of Christianity. When we look for the results of these missions, we soon become aware that the influence of the French and the Jesuits extended far beyond the circle of converts. It eventually modified and softened the manners of many unconverted tribes. In the wars of the next century we do not often find those examples of diabolic atrocity with which the earlier annals are crowded. The savage was a savage still, but not so often a devil. . . . Thus Philip's war in New Zealand, cruel as it was, was less ferocious than it would have been. . . . Yet it was to French priests and colonists that the change is chiefly to be ascribed (pp. 319, 20).

By these candid and generous words, honourable to himself and to his nation, Mr. Parkman has earned a title which, we may be sure, will be recognized, to the prayers of the Canadian martyrs, and of all who love their memory. If we have pointed out his contradictions, and lamented his rash judgments, it has not been our purpose to give offence to an upright and intelligent man, whose fault is that he has spoken of subjects too high for him, and has spoken unwisely. We see in his book only a new proof, and this has been our motive for referring to it, that Protestantism, wherever its deadly influence is unchecked by lingering Catholic tradition, or indirect piety, is simply anti-Christian. Considered apart from such of its professors as have, in various measures, renounced its principles and repudiated its maxims, Protestantism has proved to be the most powerful dissolvent of Christianity which a diabolical chemistry ever compounded for the use of its adepts. The arguments which it has taught men to employ against the Church are as fatal to the character of the Apostles as to that of their living representatives. If miracles are a delusion and visions a dream; if the most awful sanctity is only a kind of madness; if men and women, who seemed most intimately united to God, and whose virtues and labours have regenerated whole kingdoms, were, after all, but the victims of "preternatural excitement," and the dupes of "an insane mysticism,"—the New Testament is only a record of kindred illusions and infirmities, and they who were supposed to have written it by the inspiration of God were either hypocrites and impostors, or sentimental visionaries and unprofitable

dreamers; for their language is the language of modern Catholic saints, and their lives have never been more exactly imitated than by modern Catholic martyrs. It is evident that the same spirit lived in both. If De Brébeuf and Marie de l'Incarnation were only mystical dreamers, S. Paul, whom Festus supposed to be insane, was no better.

Mr. Parkman's error has been to judge men and actions wholly beyond the comprehension of an ordinary Protestant, for whom the material alone has any value, and the natural any meaning. The spiritual and the supernatural belong to a sphere from which he is self-excluded. If he had wished to make a safe and prudent use of his talents and industry, he should have made himself the biographer, not of Catholic, but of Protestant missionaries. He would at least have understood the latter; and if we judge him rightly, his unflinching candour and his sympathy with all that is heroic, he would probably have given just such an account of them as we have lately read in the work of an English Protestant, who has watched their operations in many lands. "No men that I know of," says this gentleman, who never gets out of his depth by talking of the supernatural, "take better care of themselves than missionaries—I mean those of our own Church; for the Roman Catholic propagandists go where duty calls them, without making any fuss about dangers and privations to which they are about to be exposed. All honour to them for it! But our clergy most do congregate where skies are bright and natives tractable, and their cry is always the same—'Money! Money!! Money!!! We cannot save another soul without money.' " *

ART. IV.—PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION.

Essay on Education. (Irish Annual Miscellany, Vol. II.) By Rev. PATRICK MURRAY, D.D. Dublin: Bellew.

What does it profit a Man? By the SON OF A CATHOLIC COUNTRY SQUIRE. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE "Month" of last October makes a statement, which we believe to be substantially true. "If . . . the universality of a particular topic of conversation," it says, "amongst our higher and middle classes is a true index of the feeling of

* "Recollections of a Life of Adventure." By William Stamer. Vol. ii. c. 7, p. 147. 1866.

Catholics, there can be little doubt that the great want which makes itself more and more urgently felt among us, is a liberal education analogous to that given at Oxford and Cambridge." But though Catholics are agreed on the great desirableness of a certain end, we hardly remember an instance on which so much difference of opinion has existed as to the appropriate means. In fact, no fewer than six different plans have from time to time been proposed. Firstly, the frequentation by Catholics of existing colleges at Oxford and Cambridge. Secondly, the foundation of a Catholic College at Oxford. Thirdly, an agitation for the admission of non-resident candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations. Fourthly, a frequentation by Catholics of the Irish Catholic University. Fifthly, a college in England for higher Catholic education. Sixthly, an English Catholic University.

Of these various plans, the two last-named (as we have more than once argued) appear to us in every respect preferable; while the two first are now, thank God, entirely out of the question. But at all events, so long as the existing divergence continues in regard to the appropriate *means*, no combined effort can be put forth for attaining the desired *end*; and it is very important therefore that such divergence should, if possible, be reduced. It has occurred to us that there will be greater hope of this result, if the question of principles be kept distinct in argument from that of application. In our present short article therefore, we purpose to consider exclusively the *principles* of Catholic higher education. This may possibly lead to discussion; and this again may result in the correction or enlargement of our views on this or that particular. In such a manner by degrees thoughtful Catholics, or the large majority of such, may arrive at such general agreement on the matter, as shall greatly facilitate the path of ecclesiastical superiors. For whenever there comes to be general agreement on principles, we do not think any great discrepancy of opinion will arise on the best method of applying them.

We have named at the head of our article two very different works, written by two very different writers; which agree however in this, that they treat with signal ability the question of principle. Dr. Murray's Essay was published not less than seventeen years ago, on occasion of the then projected "Queen's Colleges" in Ireland; and it is interesting to see how many of his remarks are precisely applicable to the present crisis of Catholic England. "The Son of a Catholic Country Squire" wrote at a much later period, in reference to the "Castlerosse

Memorial" of ignominious renown. His pamphlet performed very effective service in its day; and we hope some of the passages we shall select may again on the present occasion do execution. We shall not however follow either of our authors in the plan of our article, because our immediate purpose is by no means the same as theirs.

Higher education, we need hardly say, is for the comparatively leisured classes; for those who can carry on their education to the age of twenty-one or twenty-two, and not only to that of eighteen or nineteen. At present no system whatever of higher education is offered to English lay Catholics; and the want of such an education is more and more urgently felt by them. For want of it, they are both at a moral and intellectual disadvantage; they are almost obliged to employ, in comparatively useless occupations and amusements, those very years, which are immeasurably the most precious for purposes of intellectual training.

When boys have grown into men, we have no universities to send them to. We have schools and colleges; and though they are deficient in many points, we can content ourselves with them. But at that very period at which the mind is most capable of receiving impressions and at which the character is fashioned and stamped for life,—when the energies and powers of the intelligence are most keen and are open to the greatest peril,—and we look around for a place to send our boy to be educated in the real sense of the word, and formed into a man,—nothing but blankness presents itself to us.

Universities of our own we have none. Is he to remain at home, eating the bread of idleness, and exposing himself to the awful dangers of doing nothing? (Pamphlet, p. 27.)

We need not however enlarge on the great need which exists for Catholic higher education, because such need is now unanimously admitted by all. Let us rather proceed to consider of what character this higher education should be, and in what particulars it should consist.

Firstly it must of course be such, as shall correspond with the earlier education which has been imparted, and conjointly with that education shall give due and effective cultivation to the various mental faculties. Many questions have lately been started in England, on the appropriateness of respective instruments for this purpose: on the comparative value, e.g., of classics and physics; of ancient and modern languages; of philosophy, philology, history. We shall not here enter in detail on these questions, though they are undoubtedly of great practical importance. We shall not enter on them in detail, because none of them are questions raised between Catholics and Protestants as such, or between Catholics

of different schools as such. We will but briefly and generally express the views to which we incline, and to which indeed we think that English public opinion is on the whole rapidly converging.

We hold then, that no better intellectual foundation can be laid than in classics and mathematics; though we also hold that in various ways—such as by the excision of very much superfluous verse making—a solid classical education can be given, with very far greater economy of time than has hitherto been the case. As to physics, we think that all should be instructed in the general principles by which physical truth is discovered and authenticated, and that well-chosen illustrations should be given of these principles; but we greatly doubt the effectiveness of physical studies, pursued in *detail*, towards first-rate intellectual training. We think that study of modern languages, such as German no less than French and Italian, may be made of great value in the way even of intellectual culture; while for practical purposes, they may in these days be almost counted as a necessity. We hold, as we suppose every one holds, that historical facts in great abundance should be from the first mastered and chronologically arranged in the mind; and that on these, as the faculties expand, a wide and scientific study of history should be based. Nor lastly, of course, is any higher education worthy the name, which does not contain philosophical discipline as a very prominent portion of itself.

At the same time, for reasons which we shall give before we conclude our article, it seems to us of less importance that the intellectual discipline of Catholics be in itself the very best attainable, than that it should be altogether similar in character to that prevalent among their non-Catholic fellow-countrymen of the period.

But now secondly—and this is the point on which, for present purposes, we lay by far our greatest stress—it is the business of education, not merely to impart mental cultivation and *power*, but far more emphatically to impart speculative and practical *truth*. A great deal might be said on this subject, in the way of general principle and argument. We venture e.g. to consider it a most serious defect in a work, otherwise so unusually powerful as F. Newman's volume on "the scope and nature of University Education," that the author lays so little stress on this particular function of universities. But on the present occasion it will be perhaps more useful, if, instead of treating this grave question comprehensively and in the abstract, we look at the matter with a direct and immediate view to practical results.

By giving Catholic youths a higher education, you give them ipso facto a far keener interest than they would otherwise have, in philosophy, history, literature. But here in England, philosophy, history, literature are saturated with principles the most violently and fundamentally anti-Catholic. Unless therefore you have provided them with a special antidote against those principles, not only your education will have conferred on them no benefit, it will have done them unspeakable injury. Take these two cases. On the one hand, a clever youth remains pure in morals and heartily loyal to the Church; but after the age of eighteen or nineteen he devotes himself to such occupations as these; he talks and acts on party politics; frequents county society; reads in a superficial way reviews, magazines, and newspapers; amuses himself with hunting, shooting, yachting, cricketing; while he gives at the same time to his priest both money and full moral support. Well, at all events he is leading a life considerable less frivolous than "seventy per cent. of those who take degrees at Oxford": for these, according to the Rector of Lincoln College in that University, are either "the foppish exquisites of the drawing-room," or "the barbarous athletes of the arena." (See our last number, p. 412.) However you make it your boast that you rescue him from this comparatively torpid life; you make him free of the intellectual guild; you inoculate him with a keener taste for philosophy, history, and literature; and then—you leave him without any carefully devised intellectual defence against those godless principles, which he will thus imbibe with unintermitting draughts. "*Pol me occidistis amici, Non servastis, ait.*" Of youths so exposed, we have no doubt at all that some would actually apostatise. The remainder would grow up a noxious school of disloyal, minimising, anti-Roman Catholics: Catholic in profession, but anti-Catholic in spirit: Catholics, who combine the naked dogmata of the Church with the principles of her bitterest enemies, and place the priceless gem of the Faith in a setting of every basest metal: a constant cause of anxiety to ecclesiastical authorities: a canker eating into the Catholic body: a standing nuisance and obstruction.

Indeed even as things are now, many well-intentioned children of the Church, who are very far from meriting the severe epithets which we have just recited, yet find serious difficulty in submitting their intellect to the Holy Father's doctrinal instructions. Whence does this difficulty arise? From this circumstance, that those instructions imply throughout certain momentous, consistent, long-established principles, which Catholics have unconsciously learned (from the godless

spirit of English literature and science) to eschew and contradict. It is no very unreasonable requirement, to demand that Catholic higher education shall bring its recipients into harmony with the Church's doctrinal teaching.

Although then Catholics confined themselves to defensive purposes, it would still be absolutely essential, that their higher education should include a most careful inculcation of religious truth, within the spheres of philosophy, history, and the like. But they will surely not be so pusillanimous as to be contented with self-defence. They must assume the aggressive; and aim not merely at holding their own, but at enlarging the Church's borders. In one word, they must embark seriously on the enterprise of convincing the non-Catholic intellect. But in these days, as has been so often observed, the Church's more intellectual enemies care very little about theology. Controversy can only be carried on against them by enforcing Catholic views on philosophy and history; and unless any so-called higher education prepares the rising generation to learn this task, it is but a mockery and a sham. Our educated youths must be animated by a holy anger against the prevalent unbelieving literature and philosophy, similar to that martial zeal which inspired the crusader of the past, which inspires the Zouave of the present.

Some will reply perhaps, that it is only a small number of men, from among the recipients of higher education, who will ever be fitted for influencing the world. Were this so, our argument would not be affected: it would still remain true, that those particular studies which are requisite for *all* to save them from perversion, are also most useful to *some* as preparing them to carry deadly intellectual war into the enemy's camp. But the fact is not as the objection supposes. Consider the anti-Catholic ranks themselves. Their intellectual strength by no means consists exclusively in those few very able men, who hold irreligious tenets with full intelligence. On the contrary, it consists to an even greater extent in a large number of half-instructed or second-rate persons;—persons who hold the tenets in question with full and undoubting confidence, partly from being surrounded by similar thinkers, and partly from the great intellectual respect which they feel for the leaders of their respective schools. It is the union of these second-rate with first-rate men, which makes up that vigorous and self-confident anti-Catholic opinion, so widely spread throughout England, and so grievously injurious to the Church and the Gospel. In like manner then on the opposite side, a number of educated men, who when young have been carefully trained in Catholic intellectual habits, could make a formidable aggres-

sion on infidelity: they could make such aggression, we repeat, not merely as represented by a few able thinkers, but as, *together* with those thinkers, constituting a compact and united body, filled with confidence in the truth of its convictions. And such body would have this omen of success peculiar to itself, that those convictions, and no others inconsistent with them, are alone in accordance with reason and with facts. To train this body is among the most indispensable ends of Catholic higher education.

It is always useful to descend from generalities to some particular instance. We will take therefore, as an illustration, what is certainly among the most momentous and perverse of all points at issue between the Catholic and infidel schools: we mean the standard of human virtuousness. The Catholic's ideal is most distinct and unmistakeable—saintliness. As we urged in our last number (p. 502) those men, in the Catholic's judgment, are of all the most virtuous, who are most given to the thought of God; to prayer; to mortification of intellect; to mortification of will; to self-examination: those who have the deepest sense of their own nothingness and sinfulness. It is a far more difficult matter—we believe it is an impossible one—to draw out with any precision the standard of virtuousness opposed to this by non-Catholics: they are far more consistent, harmonious, and intelligible, in expressing their contempt or hatred of saintliness, than in explaining their own positive moral theory. But we may say generally, that they regard courage, "high spirit," "sense of honour," zeal for political liberty, zeal for one's country's aggrandizement,* love of science, and the like, as indefinitely

* We have often pointed out, that worldly and indifferentist self-styled patriots do not in general care much for their country's welfare, even its temporal welfare; but rather for its glory and aggrandisement. But we were hardly prepared for so perspicuous an exposition of the devil's creed, as is presented in the "Pall Mall Gazette" for October 10th, 1868. It runs thus; but the italics are ours:—

"Whatever may be said by particular sections of the community, we still regard patriotism as a virtue. *The lasting glory and greatness* of the English nation and the British Empire is about *the highest object* at which, as it appears to us, English politicians can aim. Cases may be imagined in which the general *interests* and sympathies of Europe would be in favour of the enemies of England; but it would not be the less true in that case that an Englishman who took *that view* and acted upon it would be *an infamous traitor*."

We are very far from meaning to imply, that all those who are unhappily more or less enmeshed in the snare of spurious and worldly patriotism, go the whole of this detestable length; but it is worth while to see what an English newspaper, universally accounted respectable, has ventured to state. The highest aim then of a politician, it seems, is not at all his country's

higher virtues than humility, purity, forgivingness, mortification of intellect, mortification of will, contrition, self-abjection : if indeed they condescendingly admit these latter to be virtues at all.

Now it is plain, as soon as stated, that no intellectual question can possibly be more fundamental, than this one on the true standard of virtuousness : it pervades the whole body of history and literature ; it pervades every study of every kind, which is concerned with human acts, energies, aspirations, and emotions. If there is one part of Catholic higher education more indispensable than another, it must surely be, that students are trained habitually and practically to estimate human conduct according to the Church's measure ; that they are carefully guarded against estimating it according to those maxims—at once so detestable morally and so contemptible intellectually—which prevail in the godless society of modern Europe. Nor again is there any portion of the Church's present intellectual warfare more vitally momentous, than her efforts to overthrow the world's standard of morality and substitute her own. The alternative then which we are now to consider, is simply this : whether a few chosen men will sufficiently help her in her protests against the prevalent moral standard, or whether she needs the co-operation of all educated Catholics in her labour. Surely the

moral and religious welfare ; the diminution of crime, the increase of contented industry, increased purity of morals : nor even is it the advancement of temporal welfare ; the increase of innocent enjoyment, the diminution of squalid poverty, the accessibleness of medical aid for illness and of legal redress for injuries. All these, it seems, should be aims entirely subordinate to that paramount one of "lasting glory and greatness." Nay, the English politician who should shrink from sacrificing (if possible) the "glory and greatness" of all other nations to the "glory and greatness" of England, would be "an infamous traitor."

It is only fair to add the sentence which follows, as that may be considered to express more clearly the writer's meaning. "The human race is so large," he adds, "and its interests are so complicated, that the only possible way by which men and nations can really promote its interests is by the old rule of minding your own business." But the preceding sentences strictly determine the word "interests" as here signifying "lasting glory and greatness." The politicians of every nation should occupy themselves paramountly in forwarding that nation's "glory and greatness," and defending it against all other nations.

We pointed out more than five years ago (July 1863, p. 92), that "the pursuit of national *good* tends to international *union*, but the pursuit of national *greatness* to international *discord*." If the "*Pall Mall Gazette*" principle were admitted, those would be the most approved patriots, who should be most busy in promoting wars of aggression ; and a politician who should prefer his country's welfare to its greatness, would be next door to a renegade and a traitor. Well, at all events even the school of Mr. Mill protests against such shocking immorality as this.

answer is quite evident. It is quite evident that she will bring no adequate force against this mighty stronghold of the world and the devil, by merely training a few unusually able champions to assail it. And on the other hand, the view she is opposing is so intellectually contemptible, that all youths who receive any education at all, can be taught to see quite clearly its shallowness, hollowness, and humbug. It is "a stronghold of the world and the devil," not at all from any intrinsic strength which it possesses—for never was there a more rotten edifice—but exclusively from the vast numerousness of its garrison. Numbers then must, as far as possible, be opposed by numbers. Let the whole body of educated Catholics be loud and clamorous in their expressions of hatred and contempt for that pitiful imposture, the anti-Catholic standard of morality,—there is some chance that one of its upholders after another may come to be ashamed of it. It is utterly incapable of any intellectual defence, which is even plausible: to examine it is to abandon it: its strength consists in the number of its adherents. But unless Catholics train numbers to oppose numbers, the few deep thinkers may protest in vain to the end of time.

What has been said on this fundamental question, applies in its degree to others also. No sufficient impression can be made on the non-Catholic intellect by a few isolated thinkers contending against the current. The whole body of educated Catholics should exhibit themselves as animated by one spirit of abhorrence for the prevalent anti-Catholic speculations and views, and of intelligent zeal for the Catholic verities opposed thereto. This is one very principal purpose of Catholic higher education.

It would fill a volume if we attempted to express in detail the various matters, philosophical, historical, and the like, on which the opinions now dominant in England (for to England we are confining our view) are in various degrees contradictory or dangerous to the Faith. We have already stated one of these, the prevalent standard of virtuousness. We will select a very few more, exclusively from the spheres of philosophy and history.

The present spirit of English philosophy is, beyond the possibility of doubt, atheistic; indeed, we are not aware of any Theistic school which has of late exhibited philosophical life. Dr. M'Cosh indeed individually, writing from Ireland, has done real service so far as his influence has extended; and it gave us great pleasure to insert a communicated article in January, 1867, which did some justice to the doctrines of this

distinguished and Christian-spirited teacher. In one of our "notices" again we draw attention to a reaction which seems at last setting in, and refer particularly to Mr. Martineau, Dr. Thompson, and Mr. Maurice; but Mr. Martineau himself speaks of the atheistic view as that "now prevalent in the schools." Nor, lastly, do we by any means forget the labours of Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel, who really *have* in some sense founded a school. We are well aware how highly some English Catholics think of these philosophers: though, on the other hand, it is quite possible for Catholics to hold—in fact we ourselves hold—that Sir W. Hamilton's principles, at all events in the shape given them by Dean Mansel, involve practical atheism.* At all events, it is not Dr. M'Cosh, Mr. Martineau, and Dean Mansel who now influence the minds of thinking Englishmen, but rather such writers as Mr. Mill, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and Mr. Bain. The "Month" of October, 1868, quotes (p. 400) an impartial writer as testifying that, at the London University philosophical examinations, a knowledge of Sir W. Hamilton's works would be almost useless. Again, if there were any place in England where Theistic philosophy would be likely to retain its existence, it would be at Oxford; yet we mentioned in our last number—and that on unimpeachable authority—that it is only Mr. Mill and the German pantheists whose works tell in the Oxford schools (p. 425). It is most evident that immeasurably less harm would be done by leaving our Catholic youths as they are, than by any middle course; than by giving them on the one hand a higher education and so a taste for philosophical studies, without supplying them on the other hand with a vigorous and satisfactory Theistic philosophy, fitted to meet the questions now raised in this country.

Remarks altogether similar may be made on the doctrine of Free Will, and on the theory of moral obligation. The "Month" for October, 1868, in the article which we have so often quoted, points out (p. 400) a question proposed by the London University examiners, which implied in its very expression, as quite a matter of course, that "moral rules" are certainly founded either "on sentiment" or on "views of utility." Again the Duke of Argyll, who is very far from being an extreme partisan, speaks of the necessitarian doctrine as one which all who know their own mind would at once hold not only as a

* It can hardly be necessary to explain that we never dreamed of doubting Dean Mansel's most firm belief in a Personal All-holy God. We refer in the text exclusively to what we consider the legitimate outcome of his philosophical principles.

truth but as a truism. (See our number for April, 1867, pp. 414-425; and our last number, pp. 555-6.) But let false principles be imbibed by a Catholic on Free Will or on moral obligation, his fall from the Faith is but a matter of time and accident: he holds the premisses of apostacy, and may at any moment draw the conclusion.

We have been urging, as it was important to urge, the profoundly anti-Theistic character of English philosophy as a whole. But we must not for a moment be suspected of conceding what we would rather die than concede. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that English philosophy at the present day were in as satisfactory a state as non-Catholic philosophy can possibly be; even on that supposition, our general argument would not be affected. As the "Month" ably points out, philosophy is considered by the Church "ancillary to theology," and indissolubly bound up therewith. "The difficulties which beset the latter emerge generally first in the former; and therefore her guidance and restraint are no less necessary in the one than in the other." (p. 397.) Never would she permit her children to be taught such a subject by an alien body, or permit them to consider the verdict of such a body as any test whatever of their proficiency therein.

As we are only professing to give a few illustrations out of the large number available, we shall here leave the theme of philosophy. We will only remind our readers in passing, that that vital controversy on which we spoke so earnestly, concerning the standard of human virtuousness, is in itself a philosophical controversy, though its practical bearing extends also most widely over the regions of history, literature, and the like.

Next then on the sphere of history. We have just pointed out how profoundly irreligious are English historical treatises, in their view of man, his end, and his proper work; and how intimately and indissolubly that irreligiousness pervades their whole texture. But they are no *less* profoundly anti-Catholic in their view of the Church, her mission, and her success. Those same facts which the carefully instructed Catholic reads as teaching one lesson, are so handled by contemporary literature that they shall inculcate the very opposite. "Put history," says Dr. Murray (p. 258), "into the hands of a rationalist"—and now-a-days in England nearly all non-Catholic thinkers are rationalists—"put history into the hands of a man of this kind, the era of Hildebrand or Charlemagne or Luther, and its colour will be completely changed without the apparent distortion of a single substantial fact;

as the earth at midnight is that which basked a few hours ago in the meridian sun." Every age, since Christ came upon earth, is (as the French say) "denaturalized" and distorted by the Protestant historian. The Apostles, the ante-Nicenes, the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, the mediævalists, —all are made the victims of consistent and elaborate misrepresentation. We do not ascribe intentional misrepresentation to the general body of Protestant historians: far from it. But they can no more appreciate Catholic men and periods, than a blind man can discern the gradations of colour. Nor on the other hand are they much more trustworthy expositors of heathendom than of Christianity: witness the contrast between Merivale and Champagny. In vain, except from Catholic teaching, will students look for true guidance on the real value of heathen civilizations and of heathen morality.

We may mention one pervading feature in particular. If there is one doctrine more uniformly assumed by Protestants than another as the simplest matter of course, it is that liberty of worships and of the press confer a real benefit on society. The civilization of one period, in comparison with another, is commonly measured by the degree of "toleration" respectively prevalent in the two. Now this doctrine has again and again been condemned by the Church in every variety of shape. Indeed there is hardly a Pontifical Act that can be named, as we have repeatedly argued, in regard to which there are such multifarious and incontrovertible proofs of its *ex cathedrâ* and infallible character, as the "*Mirari vos*." Listen to its emphatic lessons:—

And from this most corrupt source of indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather insanity (*deliramentum*), that liberty of conscience is to be asserted and vindicated for every man (*asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuique libertatem conscientie*). To which *most pestilent error* a way is prepared by that full and unrestrained liberty of opinions which is spreading far and wide to the ruin both of religious and civil interests; while some men say, in the extremity of impudence (*per summam impudentiam*), that some advantage flows from it to the cause of religion. But "what worse death is there of the soul," said Augustine, "than liberty of error?" In fact, all those reins being removed whereby men are kept in the paths of truth, their nature (which of itself is inclined to evil) now rushing madly towards destruction (*proruente in præceps*) in very truth we see the bottomless pit opened, from which John saw that smoke ascend whereby the sun was darkened, while locusts issued from it to lay waste the earth. For thence arises unsettlement (*immutationes*) of mind; thence the corruption of youth; thence a contempt among the people of sacred things and of the most holy interests and laws; thence arises, in one word, a plague more deadly

to the state than any other, inasmuch as it has been known by experience from the earliest antiquity that nations which flourished in wealth, power, and glory, have fallen by this one evil, unrestrained liberty of opinions, licence of speech, desire of change.

To this may be referred that liberty—most foul and never sufficiently to be execrated and detested—that liberty of the bookselling trade to publish any kind of writings, which some men dare to demand and promote with so much violence (*tanto convicio*). We shudder, venerable brethren, in beholding with what monsters of doctrines, or, rather, with what portents of errors, we are overwhelmed—which are disseminated everywhere far and wide by the immense multitude of books, and by tracts and writings, which are small, indeed, in bulk, but in wickedness very large, and from which a curse has gone forth over the face of the earth which we lament with tears (*e quibus maledictionem egressam illacrymamur super faciem terre*). But there are some, alas! who are carried away to that degree of shamelessness, as pugnaciously to assert that the foul mass of errors thence breaking forth is compensated with sufficient abundance (*satis cumulate compensari*) by some book which, in this so great storm of depravity, may be put forth to defend religion and truth. It is sinful, in truth, and condemned by every law, that a certain and greater evil should be purposely inflicted, because there is hope that a certain amount of good will be thence obtained. Would any one in his senses say that poisons should be freely circulated and publicly sold, because something of a remedy is possessed, which is such that it sometimes happen that those who use it are delivered from destruction?

Such are the principles which the Church has placed before Catholics in an infallible decree, as those by which the facts of history are to be estimated. Liberty of worships and of the press, she teaches, are not in themselves goods, but heavy calamities; and none the less heavy, because in most parts of Europe they are now preferable to any practicable alternative. The Church's faithful son must read as it were backward the whole rhetoric of Protestant historians. And no one surely will maintain, that he will carry with him such lessons as Gregory XVI.'s from his historical studies, unless special trouble be taken to give him a Catholic historical training. In other words, he will be perverted into an erroneous system of doctrine which the Church has peremptorily condemned, unless those who impart his higher education are assiduously solicitous to inculcate that contradictory doctrine which she teaches as infallibly true.

Both our authors dwell with much force on the terrible evils which must ensue, wherever the interest of young persons has been aroused in secular studies, without the accompanying regulation of carefully inculcated Catholic truth. We italicise the sentences to which we desire especial attention.

Dr. Murray reasons as follows on the results of mixed education:

The great and intrinsic difficulty remains, that the whole course of literary and scientific knowledge is imparted without any reference to religious principles, and without any intermixture of those occasional hints and observations which may be necessary in our day and in these countries to explain the apparent inconsistencies of several of the facts of secular knowledge with the Catholic religion or with revelation in general ; to turn the discoveries of science into evidences, when they are, as they often are, evidences of religion ; to show in all things the harmony between natural and supernatural truth, between the Catholic system and the facts of civil and ecclesiastical history, of philosophy, of the history of philosophy, and of the human mind ; in one word, to make secular knowledge, what it should be, the handmaid of religion, *as it were to baptize it and pour into it the vivifying spirit of a diviner knowledge*, as this inner body is quickened by the immortal spirit hypostatically united to it ; to make the progress and elevation of the mind a progress and elevation in the right direction—towards its last end in God.

I freely admit that a case may be supposed where this union of secular and religious instruction from the same chair, or rather this direction of the secular by the religious, is not at all so necessary, and the proposed end is sufficiently attained without it. For example, suppose a Catholic country where not only the faith is strong as well as universal, but where the desolating indifferentism and monstrous speculations of latter days not only have no place but are in little danger of being introduced ; where consequently the minds of youth are safe from the influence of an heretical or infidel or sceptical or sensual and mundane literature, and safe from the contamination of those endless, baseless, shapeless but not less seductive theories which are for ever flashing in our eyes and impregnating the whole atmosphere of thought about us ; and where there is a *permanent, silent, all-pervading influence of Catholic ideas*. In such a country—if such exists now in Europe—I admit that the whole body of science might, without any probable risk, be communicated as drily and as much devoid of religious sentiment, as the modes and figures of syllogism or the five common rules of arithmetic (pp. 231-3).

Nothing can be more notorious than the decidedly anti-Catholic spirit of English literature in all its departments. It has grown up since the reformation in an anti-Catholic soil and an anti-Catholic atmosphere and from an anti-Catholic stem. It is essentially anti-Catholic, tending, wherever it comes in contact with them, to sully, to infect, and utterly to corrupt Catholic feelings and principles. *Sound knowledge, a sound head, strong faith, and great grace combined together* will preserve untainted the minds of those whom the necessities of their position may lead into dangerous pastures. But it were idle to set about proving to Catholic readers the immense influence for evil which such a literature would naturally exercise over the large mass who, without adequate preparation from nature or grace, plunge into it in the pursuit of amusement or knowledge, or of both. The natural action of Protestant ideas on the Catholic mind is not to turn it from the creed of Pius to that of the Thirty-nine Articles, but to unsettle and send it adrift ; to wear or pluck out its principles without putting others in their place ; to *relax and deaden the whole spiritual man*. Moreover, a very large

proportion of our ablest and most attractive books is directly and undisguisedly of an infidel character, or of that low rationalistic form of Protestantism to which I have already alluded, and whose adherents have, of late years, if not increased in numbers, at least assumed a more defined, imposing, and influential attitude (pp. 234, 5).

So our other author :—

Look across the length and breadth of the country ; look at the varieties of unhealthy sects and denominations that spring up, and grow rank like clusters of fungi that revel in an undrained coppice, and render no other service than proclaim the nature of the soil. Read the light literature of the day, from Tennyson's *Vivien* or *Enoch Arden*, to the penny sporting paper, with its notices of pugilistic encounters and dog-fights, and with its still more foul advertisements. Cast your eyes upon the book-stalls in our crowded railway stations,—one broad mass of yellow-ochre, so covered are they with exciting, sensational, and, to say the very best of it, most dubious morality. See the teeming press ; mark its tone ; read its leading articles ; note its favourite topics ; observe its hatred, its fear, of the only really antagonistic power to itself (p. 15).

Read the *Times*, the exponent of the hour, the exponent of the special modifications of the great ruling principle of the day ; open the endless variety of periodicals that, weekly and monthly and quarterly, break into flower ; all growing out of the same earth, all manifesting one identical principle, and yet all declaring and witnessing, one against the other, that they are not the children of absolute truth (pp. 15, 16).

You will find that in this great Babel and bewilderment ; in this endless and dizzying metamorphosis and change ; in this mutability of voice, and of gesture, and of tone, and of principle, and of thought ; in this external manifestation of an internal, energizing life,—this much is certain,—viz., that though, indeed, the manifestations are different,—as the oak differs from the fragile anemone that grows under it,—still, they are all voices of the same great reality, and are but variegated signs of the one great, pervading, energizing, Protestant principle that is, *forma corporis*, the animating spirit of the variety of movements we observe. They are, after all, one consistent whole,—differing indeed, yet receiving their being, their vitality, their force from, knit and dovetailed and jointed together by, that all-pervading principle which has taken possession of the mind of this country, at least, since the days of the twenty-fourth of Henry VIII.

And it may be well here to ask, How does this great organism keep together ? whence comes the power, the food, which renews it with constant life ? whence comes its appalling energy and vigour ? and why should it breathe so freely in this nineteenth century ? I answer, in short : Its tongue is the *Times*, and it maintains its life in "*the University*." It is there this great monster principally feeds, and takes in and masticates, and digests, and converts into blood and bone and muscle and sinew, the food which has been carefully prepared to his English palate at the great proscholia or grammar-schools of the kingdom,—at Eton and Harrow, and Rugby and Winchester,

and Westminster and Shrewsbury, and Marlborough and Wellington, and Merchant Taylors' and Cowbridge, and the Charterhouse and St. Paul's. Indeed, from the first dawn of intelligence, the young mind finds itself under the control of that very same principle which at Oxford and Cambridge manifests itself in its fullest perfection (pp. 16, 17).

Have they [Catholics who wish to be influenced by Oxford] measured the spirit of the times, the freedom of thought, the irreverence of intellect, the mental pride, the impatience of authority, the independence of judgment in things the most sacred and august, the poison that exudes from every pore of the monster University, mixing itself in science, in literature, in society, pouring itself into the minds and the hearts, by its tenderness, its delicacy, its sensitiveness, its refinement, by its gentleness of manner, its charming address, its convincing, reasoning, and embellished style—

“*Impia sub dulci melle venena latent?*” (p. 34.)

We have been dwelling on that careful and elaborate instruction in the Catholic view of things secular, which is peremptorily needed, unless Catholic higher education is to be an inexpressible calamity. But much more than this is really required: *a certain and not inconsiderable portion of direct doctrinal teaching is absolutely indispensable*, if students are to be retained as loyal Catholics. Dr. Murray's remarks are especially deserving attention on this head:—

Religious knowledge is, both as to extent and kind, painfully low among that very class of young men by whom it is most needed: young men who are destined for some liberal profession; and still more perhaps those who are destined for no particular calling except that of enjoying a comfortable patrimony; and still more, certainly, that very considerable and, in not a few of its members, very influential class of persons, who are by choice or circumstances destined for a merely literary life (p. 240).

When I speak of a deficiency of *religious* knowledge, I do not mean a knowledge of such articles of faith as are of precept to know and believe; nor a knowledge of the usual topics and arguments of what is called religious controversy. . . . I at present mean by religious knowledge that which implies a *clear and full insight into the spiritual nature and authority and destiny of the Church*; which implies a perception intimate and sound not only of isolated dogmas but of the leading principles of Catholic doctrines and of the *spirit that pervades them and combines them into one perfect whole*; so that one *adequately appreciates their truth and grandeur and connexion with each other and adaptation to the spiritual wants of man*, and, still more, sees in their clear light the utter absurdity of all that contradicts them and the utter deformity of all that caricatures them (pp. 240, 241).

In the present day it is more than ever necessary that those who cultivate secular learning should have acquired a stock of sacred learning sufficient to counteract the tendency to judge the supernatural by the natural, the ways of God by the ways of man, the wisdom that is from above by the wisdom

that is of this world. Such learning is, alas ! rare indeed among those who require it most (p. 243).

It is now more than four years since we ourselves dwelt earnestly on this theme (See Oct. 1864, pp. 377-384) ; on the amount of religious instruction which should rank as an indispensable part of Catholic higher education. We may be permitted to repeat part of what we then said :—

No Catholic then can consider an education as really liberal, unless it comprise those verities which express the highest and truest of all relations,—the relations between the Creator and the creature, the Church and the world, things eternal and things temporal. Moreover, it is quite proverbial that the mere torpid reception of truth is no adequate educational result. The Catholic cannot be said to have learned those verities to which we just now referred, except in proportion as he may have so mastered them that he views under their light, and estimates by their standard, the whole range of facts which comes within his cognisance, psychological, historical, political, and social (p. 377).

There is no more virulent disease of the intellect—none, we may add, whose remedy more characteristically appertains to the higher education—than the inveterate habit of accepting truth otiosely and speculatively, without practically holding what is professed, or even understanding what is meant by it. . . . This intellectual fault is more or less to be dreaded in all scientific pursuits : but there is no object of knowledge in regard to which it is so flagrant and so prejudicial (and that, as we believe, in consequence of man's moral corruption) as in religious truths. All Catholics, for instance, admit speculatively that one additional grade of spiritual perfection is more valuable than the loftiest intellect, the most aristocratic birth, or the largest wealth : yet some of them continually imply just the opposite of this in the various judgments which they form on the individual events of every-day life ; in their speculation on their children's future ; in their estimate of political events ; and in a thousand other practical ways. They hold one doctrine as a general truth, and they hold a doctrine precisely contradictory on almost every particular which that general truth comprises. And so in the case before us. It is very easy, no doubt, to induce a Catholic student to accept speculatively such truths regarding the Church's office and claims as those which we stated above ; but as it is very easy, so also it is very useless. What we need is, that those great truths shall spread fruitfully through his whole intellect, not remain barren in one little corner of it ; that they shall habitually affect his whole attitude of mind towards Rome and towards England ; that they shall pervade his views of history, of politics, of literature ; that they shall be his very stand-point for estimating the whole range of social phenomena (pp. 382-3).

It is impossible, within our limits, to enter on any detailed statement as to the character and extent of this doctrinal instruction : we must content ourselves with two remarks. It would differ in many important respects from the professional teaching received by clerics, and would, of course, be

contained in much smaller compass; while it would include, nevertheless, some real and careful study of the great Catholic verities, in their relation to each other, to the dicta of reason, and to the facts of experience. On the other hand, the bearing of Catholicity on the various secular sciences would be imparted much more fully to these laymen than to ordinary clerics, from the very fact that with the former secular science is so far more prominent a pursuit (p. 379).

Here then we bring to a close what we had to say on the second and most important particular which—as we earnestly submit—should be carefully secured in all Catholic higher education worthy the name: we mean the effective and vigorous inculcation of religious truths, both speculative and practical. We have argued that for Catholics to receive a higher education of which this should not be an integral part, would be an immeasurably greater calamity than for them to receive no higher education at all.

The third and last principle of Catholic higher education on which we would insist, is its bringing the student into as close contact as possible with his contemporary fellow-countrymen. This must by absolute necessity be done, unless Catholics are prepared to give up all idea of intellectually influencing the non-Catholic mind, and to aim at no other end than that of protecting their own children from perversion. A Catholic of this country, when he grows up, will have active dealings with men of the nineteenth, not of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and with Englishmen rather than with Italians, French, or Germans. But he cannot influence these—he cannot take up a position of intellectual equality with them—unless his culture has been similar to theirs. Every time and place has its own peculiarities; and those who are not able to appreciate those peculiarities, cannot leave their mark on the age. When S. Thomas, e. g., wrote his “*Summa*,” formal logic was the chief recognized means for discovering and ascertaining truth. Even had he been exceptionally gifted with such knowledge of criticism and history as is now common, his treatise would not have influenced his contemporaries had it prominently exhibited those accomplishments. On the other hand—invaluable as is the study of the “*Summa*” to a theologian—no one will say that Catholics intellectually trained on its exclusive model could properly play their part in modern society. We expressed this principle towards the beginning of our article. It is of less importance, we said, that the intellectual discipline of Catholics be in itself the very best attainable, than that it be similar in character to that elsewhere prevalent in England. Even if it were true—we think it most false—that physical science afforded a better intellectual discipline than classics

and mathematics, so long as Protestants are trained on the latter basis, it is important that Catholics should in that respect resemble them.

The principle which we are defending will be so readily admitted by all, that two brief illustrations will amply suffice. The present idea of *historical* study, e. g., is very far deeper and truer than that which prevailed a century ago. That study is now founded throughout on facts ascertained by strict and searching criticism; every contemporary authority is examined in order that those facts may be set forth in their picturesque fulness as they actually took place; and they are carefully compared and co-ordinated with each other, with a view to trustworthy scientific conclusions. It is by historical studies so conceived that the Faith is assailed: it is by historical studies so conceived that the Faith must be defended.

Our second illustration shall be from philosophy. In Italy, Belgium, and Germany, serious danger is to be dreaded from the error called ontologism: from that false, shallow, and sceptical system, which maintains that man cannot obtain the knowledge of necessary truth, unless God be presented directly to his mind as an object of thought. Of course Catholic students, in England no less than elsewhere, must be duly guarded against this and all other errors: we would only urge, that in this country the philosophical error to be *chiefly* dreaded is not ontologism, but another quite different. There are very few Englishmen, Catholic or Protestant, who hold that the mind thinks of God before it can think of anything else: but there are great numbers who maintain that there is no such thing as *necessary* truth at all, either thought of or existing. This is the fatal philosophical error of our time in England, and it is the fruitful parent of a large atheistic progeny. We venture to maintain—submitting our opinion with much deference to those whose office it is practically to decide—that there is no philosophical doctrine in which English students should be more carefully and elaborately trained, than in all which concerns necessary truth: the proofs that such truth exists; the full bearing and import of the term; the various further philosophical truths, a knowledge of which will result from our holding it; the absolute scepticism which must ensue from its denial.

Now, no Catholic philosophers whatever deny either the existence of necessary truth or man's power of knowing it; for those who deny this can be no Theists. Nor again can there be any Catholic philosophers who, if questioned, would deny the indispensable necessity of Catholics rightly appre-

hending all those doctrines which concern necessary truth.* But on the Continent of Europe they often write with the fear of ontologism before their eyes, as of the great threatening danger. Consequently they often lay by far their principal stress on proving the undoubted verity, that man's conviction of necessary truth does not arise from his direct thought of God. They are far more occupied, we say, with enlarging on this, than with explaining what *is* the true and sufficient basis of the above-named all-important conviction. In so writing, it is very possible that they judge rightly on the philosophical needs of their own respective countries. On this we can form no judgment. But we would earnestly submit, that here in England a different course is imperatively called for.

We have now said all which appeared essential, on the three principles which we desire to recommend. A good Catholic higher education, we have argued, (1) will duly cultivate and invigorate the various faculties; (2) will adequately imbue the students with Catholic truth, both as to religious doctrine, and as to things primarily secular; and (3) will specially perform the task of training its recipients to exercise intellectual influence on their non-Catholic fellow-countrymen. We are far from denying of course that there are other principles, of greater or less importance, to be carried in mind; but we think it is these three which bear prominently on the critical and cardinal questions of practice, which will certainly arise.

Here therefore we should naturally conclude; for our purpose has been, as we said at starting, to speak in our present article of principles and not of their application. But the "Month" has so many admirable remarks in the article which we have repeatedly quoted—and has generally indeed done so much service by drawing attention again and again to the great momentousness of the subject—that its practical recommendations will naturally and legitimately carry with them considerable weight. There is on this account greater danger, lest the particular plan which it has brought forward may find acceptance, for a brief space of time, with some of its readers. We are unwilling therefore to delay, even for a quarter, entering against that plan our earnest and emphatic protest. We well know of course that the writer has had no other motive, than that of making a suggestion

* It is sometimes thought by their opponents that upholders of the scholastic philosophy deny the existence of self-evident necessary truth. But on the contrary no writers can by possibility more expressly testify the existence of such truth than do Kluitgen in Germany, and Canon Walker in England.

which at least appears *practicable*, on a matter more surrounded with practical difficulties than perhaps any other of the time. But we confidently cherish the hope, that on maturer reflection he will himself see how serious is the peril, to which he would expose the highest Catholic interests. His proposal is to agitate for the admission of non-resident candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations, with the view of Catholic students thither resorting.

To discuss this proposal point by point and in its practical details, is a task which we must reserve for our future article ; but it will not be entirely out of place here, to exhibit what we consider the fundamental fallacy of its principle. The writer seems to forget, that on all the most critical and important matters which fall under the province of higher education, Catholics and non-Catholics are irreconcilably hostile ; are waging against each other internecine war. It does seem an extraordinary thought, to suggest that we constitute our enemies judges of our proficiency in the use of those arms, which we are learning to handle for the avowed purpose of mortally wounding the proposed judges themselves. They will be certainly very unwilling to confess, even in their own thoughts, that their deadly foe is equally skilled in the use of his weapon with their trusted defender.

Let us give an imaginary instance, as illustrating what we mean ; an instance which we consider entirely parallel. In those days when the war between Catholicity and Calvinism was at its highest, and in some country most preponderatingly Calvinistic, a Catholic suggests that Catholic theological students shall compete in theology with Calvinists before Calvinistic examiners. He assures his co-religionists that the examination turns entirely on the question of theological ability and information, not at all on that of theological *truth*. He dwells on the paucity of Catholics in the kingdom, and their consequent deficiency in means for adequate competition ; and entreats them to supply that defect by the method which he suggests. It is very certain that ecclesiastical authorities would turn a deaf ear on such a proposal : nor do we think it probable that they will be at all *more* favourably disposed to the present.

This is the objection of principle which occurs at the very first blush. As to details and particulars, we are confident that the more this plan is examined the more open it will be found to most serious exception ; we are confident that it can have no effect except that of inflicting most deadly injury on the very cause which its originator desires to promote. But on this we are to insist in our future article.

ART. V.—THE CHURCH AND NAPOLEON I.

L'Eglise Romaine et le Premier Empire 1800-1814. Par M. LE COMTE D'HAUSSONVILLE. 3 vols., 8vo. Paris. Lévy. 1868.

THE three volumes before us are a reprint of the part which has already appeared of a series of articles in the *Revue des deux Mondes*. We have still to expect the continuation, which will fill at least one, if not more additional volumes, and the three now published leave us (as is so often the case with the second volume of a novel) exactly in the most exciting crisis of the narrative. Still, although we feel an eagerness for the remainder of the work, which could hardly be much greater if the conclusion of the struggle it relates were not already known to all the world, we are not disposed to wait for it before introducing our readers to the portion which has already appeared. The fact is, that a very large part of the details of the narrative are new, not only to English but even to French readers. We must confess that we were quite unprepared to suspect the existence of so many hitherto unpublished sources of information as the diligence of M. D'Haussonville has discovered. Looking at the volumes of M. Thiers, as multitudinous and massive as they are eloquent and lively, and still more at the one and twenty vast tomes of the Napoleon correspondence, published by order of the present emperor, which contain the portion of his uncle's letters written before 1811, we supposed that diligence, fairness, skill, and judgment in working quarries in these great mountains of facts, was all that could be required of him who should give, in a separate form, the history of Napoleon's dealings with the Church. Such, however, was not the case. M. Thiers, although, as a matter of course, he relates what may be called the public and external events, apparently does not understand, and certainly does not state or explain, the principles and motives which, on the side of the Pope, were the real causes of these events. The Napoleon correspondence, if it were complete, would of course give all that could be desired on the side of the emperor. Unfortunately, it is not complete. What other documents are omitted intentionally or not, we cannot say. That those which throw most light upon the conduct of Napoleon towards the Pope have been omitted, not

because their importance was not appreciated, but expressly because they revealed facts which the authorities of the second Empire think it most prudent to conceal—M. D'Haussonville proves to demonstration. It appears that the charge of publishing the invaluable documents preserved in the different official registers of Paris and elsewhere, was committed, by Napoleon III., to a commission, at the head of which was placed his cousin, Prince Jerome Napoleon. This commission were to publish the documents entire, and M. D'Haussonville bears testimony to the fidelity with which they performed their task. But, after fifteen volumes had appeared, the old commission was cancelled and a new one issued. What change was made in the members of the commission we are not told. Prince Napoleon was still President. But a more important change was made. In the Preface to the sixteenth volume of the correspondence they declare that, in future, it will be their object to publish only those documents which present such a picture of Napoleon as the commissioners believe that he himself would have wished to have presented to posterity, if he could have survived to see the publication. Perhaps no man ever lived who would have wished that such a disclosure of his conduct and motives should be wholly complete and fair. However that may be, it is most certain that Napoleon I. was not that man. All the world knew before, what certainly no reader of the volumes before us could fail to learn if he had not already known it, that at every period of his life, whether in war or peace, falsehood of the grossest and most outrageous character, was the instrument which he used most freely, naturally, and spontaneously. In war, we have been told, all stratagems are allowed. This military maxim, it seems, had so completely occupied the whole soul of Napoleon I. that he applied it not merely to military affairs, but to all in which he took any part. It is truly surprising that although his vast genius enabled him to perceive, by a happy instinct, almost every other propriety of the exalted rank to which he had raised himself, yet never at any period of his greatness, not even when he was, and loved to call himself, Emperor, not of France, but of the West; when Kings and Queens, the representatives of the proudest dynasties, accounted themselves honoured by being allowed to follow him at the most deferential distance; never, even then, did he consider it beneath his dignity to practise, in his own person, the most humiliating frauds, and solemnly to utter in his own person falsehoods which, if he wished them to be told, he might at least have left to some subordinate agent. The sovereign who had the absolute command of such a tool as Fouché was clearly

under no necessity to take this portion at least of his dirty work into his own hands. Yet, immediately after the peace of Tilsit, when every European power, except England, was at his feet; and when he had attained a greatness quite without example since the reign of Charlemagne, we find Napoleon condescending to write a letter to his adopted son, Eugene Beauharnais, his viceroy in Italy, in which he attempted, by the most violent threats, to shake the resolution of Pius VII. This letter to the viceroy he was to copy; and to enclose it in another addressed in his own name to the Pope. But Napoleon would not trust him to compose it. He wrote every word of the letter from Eugene to the Pope, with his own hand. Eugene was only to copy and sign it. It began, "I inclose to your Holiness an extract from a long letter which I have received from my most honoured father and Sovereign at Dresden. Your Holiness will permit me to say, that the disputes raised at Rome are calculated to provoke a great Monarch, who is deeply penetrated with religious sentiments, and who feels the immense services which he has rendered to religion in France, in Italy, in Germany, in Poland, and in Saxony. He is well aware that the world regards him as the column of the Christian faith, and the enemies of religion as a Prince who has restored to the Catholic religion in Europe the supremacy she had lost." After some more language of this sort was to come the Emperor's letter to the Prince, and then Eugene, once more in his own name, was to write; "Holy Father, *this letter was not intended to be sent to the eyes of your Holiness!*" Napoleon ended the whole in his own name to his adopted son, "You will send this letter to the Pope, and write to me at Paris."

It is plain enough that Napoleon was the last man to scruple about giving a false impression of his conduct and motives, and that no rule could less conduce to historical truth than that of publishing only what he would wish to have been published had he still survived. But this applies specially to his correspondence with Pius VII. and his ministers. Upon this point we are not left to conjecture, for we find that* "Napoleon thought fit to cause a great number of papers relating to his dealings with the Holy See to be burned; no doubt because he considered them injurious to his reputation. This was executed at Rome by General Miollis, at Paris by the chief of the archives of the late office of Secretary of State. But authentic copies of these curious documents have escaped destruction." Of these copies large use is made in the

* Vol. ii, p. 298.

volumes before us, and page after page there are letters painting most graphically the scenes going on at Rome, and in particular the orders and wishes of Napoleon himself. But to almost every one of these extracts is a footnote: "Not included in the Napoleon correspondence."

Hence it is that to almost every one of the most curious events of which he gives us the details, M. D'Haussonville adds that it has been hitherto quite unknown in France. In many instances the facts most clearly proved by these documents are among those most exactly contrary to the positive statements of Napoleon in the reminiscences which he dictated to his companions in exile in St. Helena. As a striking example, we may mention his statement that "at no time were more than fifty-three priests under restraint (*retenus*), in consequence of the dispute with Rome, and in their case the restraint was exceedingly slight." Upon this assertion our author says:—

Following my constant custom, I undertake to make Napoleon refute himself, and that by his own letters, the authentic copies of which lie before me. True, they are not included in the official correspondence of Napoleon ; but I am sure that the persons who have not thought it expedient to publish them (no doubt because they exhibit the Emperor in a different light from that in which he would have wished to be represented to posterity) will feel it even less expedient to contradict them. When the Emperor put down this exact number of fifty-three priests, who were the only ecclesiastics "put under restraint" (*retenus*), in consequence of the dispute with Rome, he had no doubt forgotten (such things are easily forgotten) that, without counting any of those who may have been "*put under restraint*," in virtue of his general orders, he had, with his own hand, given orders to put under restraint, in Italy alone, a number infinitely greater. I suppose it was a similar failure of memory, less easily explained in that case, which induced the editors of the official correspondence to omit these orders, so numerous and so ruthless.

He then shows that in a single year Napoleon himself gave express orders by which, in the Roman States only, thirteen cardinals, nineteen bishops, and "a multitude of canons and grand vicars, the number of which it is difficult to ascertain," were sent from Rome to France, and placed under restraint, under the surveillance of the imperial police in different provincial towns, and, moreover, above two hundred priests were transported to Corsica. (Napoleon by no means considered the island where he was born a paradise.) The number arbitrarily arrested in France itself, and thrown without trial into different prisons, no one can now estimate. Of this last

practice also the author gives numerous examples from letters "not published in the correspondence of Napoleon I."

We have said enough to show that M. D'Haussonville is no indiscriminate admirer of all that was said and done by Napoleon I. The fact that his work has appeared in the "*Revue des deux Mondes*," that its publication has not been interrupted, and that he is now allowed to republish it in a separate form, is the strongest illustration of the immense difference between the present system, which places the press of France under the control of law, (although of law which in England would be accounted most oppressive,) and that which subjected it to "avertissements." We are very sure that a very few years ago no journal would have dared to publish this work. That such a work should have obtained any degree of popularity in France illustrates another fact hardly less important—how much the popularity of the name of Napoleon I. has been diminished (at least among the more educated classes) within the last few years. Under the restoration he came to be looked back upon only as the conqueror who had so often led the armies of France to victory.

All the suffering which in every country affects many classes after the close of a long war, and which was so severely felt in England in 1816, 1817, &c., was naturally laid to the score of the Bourbons. They were accused of having lowered France from the pinnacle of glory to which he had raised it. It was the name of Napoleon that carried the election of the present Emperor, first as President then as Emperor. As Frenchmen have become weary of a rule which they connect with that of Napoleon I., they have become more willing to examine how far his "glory" was a real benefit to France. We suspect this feeling has not to any very considerable degree spread among the peasantry; that it has become general in the higher classes we are sure.

If France at all resembles England, it is quite possible that this reaction against the blind idolatry of Napoleon which formerly prevailed, may, at least for a time, go farther than reason warrants. For, assuredly, however we may feel the deep moral degradation of his character, his genius will ever be more and more highly appreciated as we more minutely study his life. M. D'Haussonville is far from underrating it. His whole narrative brings Napoleon before us in the strongest relief, as a man able with almost equal ease to grasp every subject to which it was his interest to turn his attention; who detected with an unerring instinct the peculiar gifts and character of every man with whom he had any dealings, and saw with the eye of genius whom he could employ, and for what

purpose; and of whom it may be much doubted whether, in any one instance, he was mistaken. Until his head had been turned by a prosperity and glory such as, perhaps, no other man ever attained, he was, alike in every relation of war, politics, legislation, and diplomacy, as wary as he was daring. That he had to do with the weakest opponent never seems to have appeared to him a reason for neglecting any one precaution which could have been necessary against the strongest. When he had made up his mind to seize Rome, although the Pope was without any means of resistance, although he was himself distant from it by half a continent, and although he had brave, able, and trustworthy servants on the spot, he thought it necessary exactly to prescribe in writing all the most minute particulars of the combinations desirable for the purpose; to arrange exactly the number of men to be despatched from the north of Italy, and the number from Naples, the days on which they were to arrive at the different points, and how they were to combine. With characteristic disregard of truth and honour, he detailed the falsehoods to be communicated at different parts of the proceeding to the Government of the Holy Father, and gave especial orders that, as soon as his troops had entered Rome, supposing the people to submit in quiet, the French Minister was to give a ball, to which the chief ladies of Rome and the French officers were to be invited; and that meanwhile all measures were to be taken, by placing French soldiers in the post-office and every other public office, to accustom the Romans to see the administration of their city in the hands of the French. Should any resistance arise, it was at once and sternly to be put down by grape-shot. All this time he continued to assure the Pope's Government, first that his troops were merely passing through the States of the Church on their way to Naples, and were not to enter Rome; and when they had entered it, that they had come merely to seize some brigands, who were devastating the Neapolitan States, and who found refuge under the Pope's Government. Those who have read the similar complaints against the administration of Pius IX. which have been so loudly made by the Roman correspondents of London newspapers for the last few years, will not be surprised to hear, that when Rome had been occupied on this pretence, not so much as one person there was even charged with being a brigand. The pretence had served its purpose, and was quietly laid aside. In short, it is impossible to read M. D'Haussonville's narrative without feeling that, for the purpose of silently occupying Rome, the great Emperor thought it worth while to lavish all his genius and all his treachery, as

freely as when, nearly at the same time, he allured the royal family of Spain into his trap at Bourdeaux.

No doubt, the circumstances of the revolutionary era afforded him a matchless opportunity of action, but never was there a man whose success, and we may also say whose fall, was more wholly his own.

Almost every real mistake that he ever made may be traced to a moral, not an intellectual defect. There was one exception to the penetrating power with which his eagle eye penetrated and appreciated the character of all with whom he had to do. When he had to do with men to whom conscience and the fear and love of God were not mere specious words, but realities by which their lives were governed, his penetration failed him, for he was morally incapable of realizing the existence of such a character. No reader of the volumes before us can doubt that this moral incapacity was the one cause of every serious mistake into which he fell. In dealing, for instance, with Pius VII. and with Consalvi, he overreached himself: because he could not find it possible to believe that in their minds their own interests, however serious, so far from being the leading consideration, actually had no place at all when their duty to God and the Church was in question. It was only this incapacity to conceive of conscience as a real governing principle, which led him to commit himself to a contest with the Church, from which, when it had once begun, his pride and his interest alike forbade him to draw back. He had never imagined that he was bringing himself into collision with men who could not be moved either by munificent bribes or by tremendous threats; and that he should really be compelled either to give up that to which he had publicly committed himself, or else to push matters to the last extremities of violence and open tyranny. And thus he found himself involved unawares in a struggle, in which it was simply impossible that he should prevail, and yet in which he was afraid, as well as ashamed, to be defeated. It was this moral defect alone which blinded him to a danger, of which thousands of poor peasants in his dominions could have warned him. For they were conscious of what he, with all his genius, did not know,—the truth expressed by Pius IX. in words which have echoed through the world, *Non Possumus*, and which Pius VII. stated to the diplomatist, a real though unavowed agent of Napoleon, sent to sound him in his prison at Savona:—"When opinions are founded on the voice of conscience and the sense of duty, they become unalterable. Believe me, there is in this world no physical force

which can, in the long-run, contend with a moral force of this nature." Napoleon had hoped to find the purpose of the gentle, aged monk altered by long imprisonment and separation from his friends and counsellors. His agent, on bringing him back this answer, added that "he had found the Pope a little aged, but not unwell, calm, unruffled as ever, and without a tinge of bitterness in his remarks, even when speaking of the subjects which it was impossible that he should fail to feel most acutely." It is exactly against moral force such as this that physical force is utterly powerless.

This is, in truth, the one subject of the volumes before us. It is the history of a physical force utterly irresistible, breaking itself in the vain effort to overcome the force of conscience and the power of grace; that is, to conquer Him who lives in the Christian's heart. It divides itself naturally into two parts, separate in the main, although one sometimes runs into the other—Napoleon's relations to Rome and to the Catholics of France. His relations to Rome have the unity of an epic. They begin with the election of Pius VII. to the Chair of S. Peter in the conclave at Venice in the beginning of the year 1800, and end only with his own downfall. The present volumes, as we have said, continue the narrative only to January, 1811. Eleven years seem to a man who looks back after he has passed middle life but as a few days. But in those years were developed a series of events the most wonderful in modern history. When the history commences, the House of Austria, in full possession of the dignity and prestige of the Holy Roman Empire, was mistress of Italy, and in actual possession of the greater part of the States of the Church. Naples, virtually her vassal, held the remainder; and neither power made any secret of its resolution to keep permanently what it had got. The Austrian intrigues at the Conclave were aimed expressly at this object; and when, by a remarkable series of events, very well related by our author, the election fell, against the will of Austria, upon Pius VII., the resolution was at once shown to make him a mere tool of the Empire, and especially to refuse to give up the Legations. The whole position both of Austria and Naples towards the Pope was changed by one event—the Battle of Marengo. France, not Austria, became once more mistress of Italy; and for fourteen years it was from France, and France alone, that the Holy See had anything to fear. Napoleon's first measures were intended to gain the confidence of the Catholics of Italy, and they succeeded. He assured the clergy of the Milanese that when he had come into Italy two years before as a General under the Directory, he had been unable to adopt

a policy of his own—that as First Consul he was now master.

All the changes then made, chiefly in discipline, were opposed to my views and wishes. As the mere instrument of a government which cared nothing for the Catholic religion, I was then unable to prevent the disorders which it was bent on stirring up, cost what they might, with the view of overthrowing it. Now I have full powers. I have resolved to employ every instrument which seems to me calculated to give security and confidence to that religion. France has been educated by her sufferings. Her eyes are at length opened; she perceives that the Catholic religion is the only anchor which can keep her steady on the troubled waves, and save her from the tempest. She has invited it again to her bosom. In this good work I cannot conceal the fact that I have had a great share. I can assure you that the churches of France have been re-opened, that the Catholic religion is resuming its ancient dignity, and that the people look with reverence upon the consecrated pastors who are returning full of zeal to the midst of their abandoned flocks. As soon as I have an opportunity of communicating with the new Pope, I hope to have the happiness of removing every obstacle which could possibly stand in the way of the entire reconciliation of France with the Head of the Church. I shall be glad that the public should be informed, through the press, of the sentiments by which I am animated, that it may be known, not only in Italy and France, but in all Europe, what my dispositions are.

No wonder that Catholic Italy threw itself with delight into the arms of a young hero who, in the moment of his most brilliant triumph, reversed without delay thus publicly, the fatal policy on which France had been acting for more than eight years. Hitherto, wherever the French troops took possession, the clergy had been driven out and persecuted. Foreign nations had seen the most venerable of the French clergy seeking in exile a precarious maintenance from the charity of surrounding nations, and had heard from them that they were themselves but the remnant which had escaped the guillotine. What a consolation such words as these from the mouth of the man who, almost at the same moment, had made himself master of France, and France mistress of Italy! Nor had the Italian clergy any reason to doubt that Bonaparte was a sincere Catholic. He was of a family Italian, Catholic, and religious. It is difficult for us to divest ourselves of the memory of his subsequent actions sufficiently to judge of him as Italian Catholics in 1800 necessarily judged. They did not, like us, know even the past—for instance, that he had made a profession of belief in Islamism equally satisfactory to the ulemas of Egypt only the year before.

The next measure of the First Consul was to bring about the

"Concordat." M. D'Haussonville relates, very graphically, all the steps towards it—the negotiations, first at Rome, and afterwards at Paris. It was to his first negotiator at Rome, M. Cacault, that Napoleon gave the celebrated injunction, "Remember to treat the Pope as if he had two hundred thousand men at his command." Unfortunately, with him was joined another negotiator, a priest whose antecedents led men to trust him, for he had been among the most influential leaders of the royalist peasantry in La Vendée; but who was undeserving of their confidence. This is the same person who, being made Bishop of Orleans on the conclusion of the Concordat, distinguished himself by the basest subserviency to Napoleon, and whose disgrace, if we remember rightly, has been noted by the pen of the distinguished prelate who now sits in his seat. The unworthy conduct of this man, and of Cardinal Caprara, who was long Legate at Paris, no doubt contributed to confirm Napoleon in the fatal opinion that "every man has his price," and so to lead him into his worst errors. We cannot follow M. D'Haussonville through these negotiations. When Napoleon found that he did not get his own way, he threatened to invade the States of the Church, and found that the threat produced no effect. He then threatened to lead France into schism, and even to make it Protestant. In his calmer moments, disposed as he always was to reckon on his power, he felt that this exceeded it. "To his most trusted counsellor," he said that:—

It would be a folly to join himself to the constitutional bishops and priests. Their influence was gone. They could lend him no force; still, they do very well to threaten Consalvi with. To put himself at the head of a separate Church, to make himself Pope, for him a man of war in his sword and spurs, would be simply impossible. Would they have him make himself hated like Robespierre, or laughed at like Laréveillère Lepeaux? To make France Protestant! Easily said, no doubt. But everything cannot be done in France, say what they may; even he could do nothing except by going with real feelings. The Catholic was the ancient religion of the land. Half France at least would remain Catholic, and there would be no end of disputes and divisions. The people must have a religion, and that religion must be in the hands of the Government (Vol. i., p. 107).

Still, neither to the Pope nor his minister did he confess even so much as this, and it would be a serious responsibility to push him, by insisting upon anything which could lawfully be conceded, into a renewal of the persecution which had hardly ceased, or even into a schism like that of the constitutional clergy. A powerful Monarch, quite reckless of the welfare of souls, is, no doubt, always at a great advantage in

dealing with a Pontiff with whom the good of souls is a primary consideration.

One point upon which there was much difficulty, but which the Pope ultimately conceded, was whether the Concordat should declare Catholicism the religion of the State, or only that of the vast majority of the French people. At last, after long debates and many delays, the terms of the Concordat were settled, and Napoleon agreed to withdraw the articles in which he had embodied the Gallican doctrines. Nothing, therefore, remained except to sign : and a meeting was held for that purpose. It had been expressly declared that it was a mere formality, "which would hardly occupy a quarter of an hour." We need hardly tell, what all the world knows, how, at the moment when he was about to put his hand to the document as the representative of the Holy Father, Cardinal Consalvi discovered that Napoleon had attempted a fraud upon him, by substituting for the document to which he had agreed, another containing the obnoxious articles. We must refer to our author for the vivid description of scenes which followed, which are too long to be extracted here.

Napoleon throughout kept up the character of one who united with the highest genius the lowest and most paltry meanness and falsehood. It is universally known that when the Concordat was at last signed, he published it with the rejected articles added to it as if they had been agreed upon. At the same time he attempted another fraud, not so generally known, for, having always given Consalvi to understand that if the Concordat were concluded, he would have nothing to do with the schismatical clergy, except on condition of their making due submission to the Pope ; he had no sooner obtained the signature, than he caused one of his agents to mention to the legate, as a matter of course, that as many as possible of "both clergies" (*i. e.* the Catholic and the schismatical) would attend at the *Te Deum* sung for the conclusion at Notre Dame. At the same time he condescended to another trick of the same sort. There had been a dispute whether the legate should take an oath which had formally been required from legates *à latere* in France. The first consul had promised that it should not be required, and in fact it was not. But, to satisfy the Gallicans, a formal notice was officially inserted in the *Moniteur*, asserting that Cardinal Consalvi had taken the oath, which, for greater effect, was printed at full length.

The manner in which the difficulty about the constitutional clergy was got over, was also characteristic of Napoleon. There were two ecclesiastics wholly free from the taint of the

schism, and of unblemished reputation, upon whom, however, Napoleon, with his usual knowledge of character, felt sure that he might rely for any service, however unworthy. These were the Abbés Bernier and Pancemont. They were named by the First Consul for the sees of Orleans and Vannes. The legate, in the name of the Pope, gladly gave them canonical authority and episcopal consecration, and congratulated his Holiness upon the character of these appointments. The bishops who had compromised themselves in the constitutional schism, and whom the First Consul, against the wishes of the legate and against his own promises, had nominated to other sees, had of course been required "explicitly to confess their schism and to abjure their past errors." The bishops of Orleans and Vannes attested that they had made this declaration before themselves, but no sooner had the constitutional bishops obtained canonical investiture than they boasted that they had done nothing of the sort, and that they had even torn into a thousand scraps the letter which had been proposed for their signature in the name of the Holy Father. "Between such opposite assertions," asks our author, "which are we to trust?" Then, after adding that facts are now notorious against the uprightness of M. Bernier, but that nothing was ever alleged to the discredit of M. de Pancemont, he adds:—

In such a case there are, in fact, no positive proofs. Still it is with surprise and pain that, in searching among the contemporary documents for the means of forming my own judgment, I found, in the correspondence of Napoleon I., two letters which may perhaps throw an unexpected light upon the conduct of the two prelates. One is a request to M. de Talleyrand to give to the Abbé Bernier a sum of thirty thousand francs (£1,200) out of the secret service money, to assist him in negotiating suitably with the Legate; the other an order to Citizen Portalis to hold at the disposition of M. de Pancemont, Bishop of Vannes (without any publicity), the sum of fifty thousand francs (£2,000).

We have mentioned merely a few instances of the affair of the Concordat because they illustrate the character of Napoleon, who certainly was, of all great men in history, the most willing to descend to any littleness, any meanness, any falsehood, any treachery, if it seemed likely to accomplish his ends. The whole course of a matter complicated by many strange intrigues, and extending over many months, is related in a lucid narrative by our author. The publication of the Concordat was long delayed by Napoleon after it was formally signed, partly in consequence of the disputes to which we have alluded, partly for a reason highly characteristic of him.

No man ever thought more of what Englishmen would laugh at as theatrical effects. If he wished to publish a decree against British commerce, it was no mere coincidence which occasioned him to sign it in his head-quarters, at the palace of the King of Prussia, at Berlin; the decree regulating the Opera at Paris was dated from Moscow. In this case, he had set his heart upon publishing the Concordat on the anniversary of the *Coup d'État* by which he had placed himself at the head of the State—the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 9). As soon as this was gone by, instead of pressing the matter forward as he had done all along, he intentionally delayed it. His reason was, that he thought the next best thing would be to publish the Concordat at such a moment that the *Te Deum* at Notre Dame might be sung on Easter day. For that day, he caused the state carriages of the unfortunate Louis XVI., which had lain by in dust and neglect for ten years, to be regilt for his use. In the same spirit, he selected as preacher on the occasion, the Cardinal de Boisgelin, an exemplary prelate, but whom he no doubt selected because he had preached five and twenty years before in the same pulpit at the coronation of Louis XVI. What a deluge had swept over France since that day! But who shall say that in matters such as this, a man so keen-sighted, did not rightly estimate the effect to be produced upon the minds of the people whom he so thoroughly understood?

In the negotiations which went on while the publication of the Concordat was delayed, as well as in those which followed, it was the misfortune of the Holy See that the Legate at Paris, though by no means a hypocrite or indifferent to duty, was yet not to be trusted. This was Cardinal Caprara, a man of illustrious birth, and who had already been employed in high positions. Napoleon insisted on his being appointed to the office, practically refusing to receive any one else. Although he was not the man whom Pius VII. would have selected, no definite cause could be alleged for refusing him, and he was appointed. He retained the office until, after the extreme outrages of the Emperor upon the Holy See, the Pope recalled his powers, and appointed no successor. In that time it is not too much to say that, although there is no reason to suppose he intended to betray the cause of the Church, yet he conducted himself on numerous occasions rather as the minister of the Emperor than of the Pope. More than once he acted in direct disobedience to the positive commands and instructions of the Holy See, and at last so entirely lost the confidence of the Holy Father, that, instead of instructing him to say what he had too good reason to

believe would not be said, he used to send letters written in full, which his nuncio was only to sign and deliver. M. D'Haussonville finds that Caprara, on several occasions, allowed himself to be under pecuniary obligations to Napoleon.

The next affair of importance between Napoleon and the Holy Father was the coronation in Nôtre Dame. M. D'Haussonville tells excellently all the circumstances which led to this event—the Emperor's notion of the extreme importance of the religious sanction it would give his title, especially as tending to remove the ill-effects of the recent murder of the Duke d'Enghien; the consternation of Cardinal Caprara when first sounded upon it by Napoleon; his pressing importunities to the Holy Father not to refuse; the promises so made as to give the Pope to understand more than Napoleon had any intention of fulfilling; the Pope's enthusiastic reception by the French people, and the jealousy which it excited in the mind of Napoleon.

For all this, and much more, we must refer our readers to his pages. It is, however, important to notice that Napoleon's uncle, Cardinal Fesch, earnestly pressed Pius VII. to make the restitution of the Legations (still held by the French) and a compensation for Avignon and Carpentras a condition of his consent, and that the Pope (although hoping this from the Emperor's generosity) steadily refused to mix the temporal question with the spiritual points upon which he felt bound in conscience to insist. One of these was the form of the coronation oath which the Pope was to tender to the Emperor. As drawn up by the Emperor, it bound him to "respect and make others respect the laws of the Concordat." This the Pope refused, because it might be taken to include the "organic articles," which, though not really part of the Concordat, had been published as such by Napoleon. A still more important question arose upon the words "to respect and cause to be respected the liberty of worships [*la liberté des cultes*]." To this Cardinal Consalvi, in the name of the Pope, objected: "This implies an engagement, not to tolerate and allow, but to support and protect; and it extends, not only to the persons but to the things, that is to all worships [*à tous les cultes*]." But a Catholic cannot protect the error of false worships.* Caprara replies to this, that the terms of the oath meant nothing. But Consalvi rejoins:—

The formula is such as a Catholic ought not to take, and a Pope cannot

* Vol. i., p. 330.

authorise by his presence. It is of the essence of the Catholic religion to be intolerant. No one must be quieted with any hope that this difficulty about the oath in the Pope's presence may be evaded (*l'espoir de tourner cette difficulté*). Pius VII. will not be a party to it. He has declared to Cardinal Fesch that, if the attempt is made, he will not hesitate to rise from his seat the same instant, let what may come of it (Vol. i., p. 334).

One curious fact, the explanation of which has been hitherto unknown, and has been discovered by our author, is that while the newspapers of all Europe were filled with circumstantial descriptions of this remarkable scene, the *Moniteur* alone—so minute as to all that magnified the Emperor—gave no account of it. This was because Napoleon's act in putting the Imperial crown upon his own head instead of receiving it from the Holy Father, was a breach of an engagement expressly made upon this very point. Consalvi had pointed out that in every instance the Monarch had received the crown from the Prelate, from whom he received the anointing, and made it a condition of the Holy Father's coming that this custom should be observed. With his usual perfidy the Emperor gave and broke the promise. Pius declared that if any authorized report was published which showed that things had not been done as had been arranged beforehand, he would make a public protest stating the breach of engagement. To avoid this the *Moniteur* suppressed all report of the proceedings. Every act of Napoleon's life seems full of the same strange mixture of dignity and meanness.

Pius VII. returned to Rome—the fact is remarkable—so much fascinated by that wonderful power which Napoleon acquired over all who personally approached him, that no future events, no lapse of time, no outrages, no crimes, were ever able to destroy the affection with which the Holy Father regarded him. From that day began the series of those outrages and crimes which culminated in the prison at Savona, and the scenes at Fontainebleau. Every condition upon which he had insisted, every hope which had been held out to him, had been violated; but even to the last Pius seems to have found a difficulty in forcing himself to believe that Napoleon himself could be personally guilty of the perfidy and impiety which marked his public measures. Almost as soon as he had reached Rome, a question arose, in consequence of Napoleon's introducing into his Italian kingdom, in which the whole people were Catholics, the rules adopted in France. While Consalvi wrote in strong terms to the Legate, Pius VII. wrote (we may say affectionately) to Napoleon. He received an answer, accompanied by one to the French Minister of Rome (Cardinal Fesch), in

which he was directed to arrange with the Holy See modifications of the decree.* To this he replied :—

The proofs which your Majesty gives me of your attachment to religion and your opposition to the false spirit of philosophy of the age, have filled me with consolation. Everything which comes directly from your Majesty always shows the greatness and uprightness of your character. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the feelings to which you may be fully assured that my own most fully and most sincerely answer. Be equally convinced that, so far as I am concerned, I am guided by no policy. My only guides are the maxims of the Gospel and the laws of the Church. You may, therefore, be sure beforehand that I shall always proceed in perfect simplicity of heart, and with all possible spirit of conciliation and moderation.— (Vol. ii, p. 22.)

Well would it have been for Napoleon if he could have believed what the Holy Father here said in simple sincerity of heart, as to the motives of his own conduct; it would have saved him from his greatest and most fatal mistakes as well as crimes. But, as we have already said, this was exactly what the moral defect of his own character made impossible to him. That men should profess sentiments of exalted generosity, of noble self-sacrifice, of simple devotion to the cause of duty; this seemed to him perfectly natural. He felt, as strongly as any one else, that there are occasions on which such professions are highly becoming, just as it was fit that, on the day of his coronation, he should dress himself in sweeping robes of the richest crimson velvet spangled with golden bees. Such things were excellent in their place, and so were professions of high principle. In their place he used them himself, and approved of their use by others. What he could not imagine, what he never brought himself to believe was—that any man should really be guided by such principles in the practical business of life. As soon would he have thought of riding into a fierce and bloody battle in his coronation robes. And hence, he never really understood the conduct of the Holy See. Being sure that the reasons alleged for it could not possibly be true, he had to look about for others, and fixed upon some, not in themselves unlikely or irrational, but which quite misled him, because the real reason was that which he had begun by setting aside, without examination, as simply impossible. The first instance of this immediately followed. Jerome Bonaparte had married a Protestant lady in the United States. It was manifestly convenient that the marriage should be dissolved that he might take a wife

* The author adds, these modifications were never really made.

from one of the royal families of Catholic Germany. At once, and without doubt of a favourable result, the Emperor applied to the Pope. He felt sure that Pius could feel no objection, for it was evidently for the interest of the Church that the Emperor should be surrounded with Catholics rather than Protestants. The Holy Father replied, by a letter in his own hand, assuring him of his wish to declare the marriage null if he could, and explaining why, on the evidence as yet before him, he could not do so without violating the laws of God and the Church. He concluded:—

It is therefore out of my power in the present state of things to pronounce the marriage null. If I should usurp a power which I have not, I should render myself guilty of an abuse abominable before the judgment-seat of God; and your Majesty yourself, in your justice, would blame me for pronouncing a sentence opposite to the testimony of my conscience and to the invariable principles of the Church. Hence I confidently hope that your Majesty will feel certain that it is only by an absolute want of power that the desire I have always felt to second, as far as lies in me, all your designs, and particularly in a matter which so closely touches your august person, has in this instance been made inefficacious. And I entreat you to accept this sincere declaration as an evidence of my truly fatherly affection.

Every Catholic who has paid any attention to the subject well knows that the facts set forth by Pius VII. in this letter, and not disputed on the other side, made it, not merely inexpedient or unbecoming, but simply impossible, that he should, without monstrous wickedness, declare Jerome's marriage null and void.* His reply was merely an example of the *Non possumus*. This letter put Napoleon beside himself with rage. The Pope refuse to take, at his request, a step so obviously expedient and beneficial for all parties! What could be his motive? That which he alleged, of course, could have nothing to do with it. What had conscience and the "judgment-seat of God" to do with a practical matter such as this? Very good things, no doubt, to talk about on fitting occasions, but quite out of place now. The refusal, therefore,

* Prince Jerome Napoleon thought fit to publish in the *Revue des deux Mondes* a letter maintaining the view taken of this affair by Napoleon I., and going on to say that at a later period of his life Pius VII. himself, "whatever may have been the motives of his first resistance, did not persist in it." The proofs he gives of this are simply absurd. We direct the attention of our readers to the correspondence which they will find vol. ii., p. 409, *pièces Justificatives*, because it contains in M. D'Haussonville's answer to the Prince some exquisite specimens, peculiarly French, of keen "malice" under the forms of profound reverence, which will greatly amuse them, but which we have no room to extract.

must have been given to spite him ; and he had not far to go to find the motive. He knew that he had both robbed and cheated the Pope by keeping the "Legations." No doubt this refusal was the Pope's way of showing his anger at the wrong and the insult. Of course, taking this view of the matter, he was sure that he could easily overcome the resistance of so feeble an enemy by making him feel that, however reasonable his indignation might be, he would lose much more than he could possibly gain by indulging it.

From this point, then, began the contest between Napoleon and Pius VII. Almost at the same moment the policy of Napoleon took a turn which made him feel it important to have the practical control, not merely of the Legations (of which he still kept possession), but of the whole States of the Church. A few months before, his whole heart had been fixed upon the invasion of England (and he never varied from his policy of keeping, at all costs, on friendly terms with other powers while he was attacking any one) ; he therefore intended to keep things quiet on the Continent. The failure of his plan of invasion in the summer of 1805 determined him to attack Austria. In that war it was of great importance not to leave behind him any country in which England might raise the standard of opposition to him, and such a country he believed the States of the Church to be. True, the Sovereign Pontiff professed absolute neutrality ; but he had already shown—so judged Napoleon—by the affair of the divorce that he hated Napoleon, and would do him an injury if he could ; the Emperor therefore resolved to occupy Ancona, a harbour which in a war with Austria it would not do to leave in hostile hands. To a mild letter of remonstrance from the Holy Father he replied (waiting until after the stupendous victory of Austerlitz) by letters of studied insult addressed both to himself and to the French Minister at Rome (Cardinal Fesch). To the latter, after referring again to the affair of the divorce, he declared—

To the Pope I am Charlemagne ; because, like Charlemagne, I unite the crown of France to that of the Lombards, and because my empire extends to the boundaries of the East. I expect, therefore, that his conduct towards me should be regulated upon this principle. If good conduct is maintained, I shall not change the outward appearance of things ; if not, I shall reduce the Pope to be only Bishop of Rome. In truth, nothing can be so unreasonable as the Court of Rome (Vol. ii., p. 78).

Here, probably, Napoleon first gave an indication of the principle upon which he intended to act towards the temporal dominions of the Pope. A little later he expressed it more

and more plainly. In few words it was, that the Pope should nominally remain an independent Sovereign, both in war and peace, on condition of his becoming, in fact, a feudatory of the French Emperor. It is probable that his natural disposition would have led him to say nothing about these intentions, but silently to assume in detail the control of Rome, and to let the fact that he had become Sovereign of the Roman States break by degrees upon the minds both of the Pope and his subjects. But it was not open to him to adopt this plan, because it was necessary to his other plans to assume immediate authority. He was at war with England and Russia. It was convenient that the States of the Church should take his side in the war; he resolved, therefore, as he said in the letter we have just quoted, that there must be no delay, that the Pope must either at once join in the war, or be at once deprived of his territory. Six weeks later, February 22nd, 1806, he explained this, in plain words, to the Holy Father himself.

I share all your Holiness's distress, and can imagine your perplexity. You may avoid it all by going straight forward, and not entering into a political labyrinth, and into considerations for powers which, in a religious point of view, are heretical and out of the Church, and, in a political, are far removed from your States, unable either to protect or injure you. I shall not touch the independence of the Holy See. I shall even cause it to be repaid for whatever it may lose by the movements of my army. But the condition must be, that your Holiness must be to me, in matters temporal (*aura pour moi dans le temporel, les mêmes égards que je lui porte pour le spirituel*), what I am to you in matters spiritual; that you must cease to have any useless consideration for heretics, enemies of the Church, and for powers which are unable to do you any good. Your Holiness is Sovereign of Rome; but I am its Emperor. *All my enemies must be yours.* It is not fit that any agent of the King of Sardinia, any Englishman, Russian, or Swede, should reside at Rome, or in your States, or that any vessel of those powers should enter your ports (Vol. ii., p. 101).

The author remarks, "It was the Emperor's ordinary calculation, and ever afterwards his habit, when he wished to make a strong impression on any one, to assume towards him an attitude of complaint and a tone of profound irritation." The letter before us is an example of this, but we have not room for half of it. But he wrote the same day to his Minister at Rome—

You must demand the expulsion from the States of the Pope of all English, Russians, and Swedes, and all persons attached to the Court of the King of Sardinia. No vessel either Swedish, English, or Russian, must be allowed to enter the States of the Pope, or else I will confiscate them. I

do not intend the Court of Rome in future to take any part in politics. I will protect its States against all the world. It is useless that it should have so much consideration for the enemies of religion. Say that I am Charlemagne, the sword of the Church, their Emperor, and that I must be treated as such. I am making known my intentions to the Pope in a few words. If he does not keep to them, I shall reduce him to the same condition he was in before Charlemagne (Vol. ii., p. 105).

We grudge to the letters of Napoleon the space we are compelled to give them, because without having them before their eyes our readers could not realize to themselves the position of the Holy Father. Before answering these last letters, he called together the Sacred College, and asked the opinion of its members one by one, reserving his own till the last. The opinion was unanimous, with the single exception of one French Cardinal. The answer was then written.

March 21, 1806.

I owe it to God, to the Church, and to myself, to the attachment I profess towards your Majesty, to your own glory, which I have as much at heart as yourself, to speak freely and sincerely, as becomes the uprightness of my character and the duty of my ministry. I have had, and always shall have, the greatest consideration for your Majesty; but still I can neither lend myself to anything absolutely contrary to the obligations which inevitably result from my double character of Prince and Pontiff, nor hide the truths of which I am in my conscience intimately convinced, nor accede to demands directly inconsistent with the oath I have taken, before the face of the Almighty, and at His altar, to maintain untouched from age to age the charge of the patrimony of the Roman Church. . . . Your Majesty desires that I should expel from my States all Russians, English, and Swedes, and all the agents of the King of Sardinia; and that I should close my ports against the vessels of those three nations. That is to say, you demand that I, renouncing the peace I enjoy, should place myself, with regard to those powers, in a state of war and open hostility. Permit me to say, with perfect sincerity, that it is not with a view to my temporal interests, but by reason of duties most essential and inseparable from my character, that I find it impossible to accede to this demand. I, the Vicar of the Eternal Word, who is not the God of discord, but of concord and peace, who, according to the expression of the Apostle, came into the world to put an end to the enmities of the world, how could I possibly discard the precept of my Divine Master, and place myself in opposition to the mission to which He has called me? It is not my will but the will of God that lays down the duty of peace towards all, without distinction of Catholic or heretic, of those near or remote, of those from whom we can hope benefits or fear great evils. If, as your Majesty says, I ought not "to enter into the labyrinth of politics," from which, in fact, I have held, and shall always hold, myself aloof, how much more ought I to abstain from taking part in the evils of a war which has no cause except politics, in which no attack is made upon religion, and

in which there is even involved a Catholic power ! Nothing but the necessity of repelling a hostile aggression, or defending religion from peril, has afforded to my predecessors a legitimate motive for giving up the condition of peace. If, through human frailty, any one of them has not been subject to these maxims, his conduct, I declare openly, can never serve as an example to mine.

Then Pius VII. explained with the same gentleness and the same sound reason that to expel from his states the subjects of heretical Powers, who were at war with the Emperor, and to shut his ports against them, would be to provoke an inevitable interruption of the daily communications which existed between the Holy See and the Catholics who lived under the rule of these courts.

The irresistible force of human events has sometimes led to this fatal interruption of communication between the head of the Church and some of its most faithful members. The Church has then deeply grieved at the calamity. But if she became the cause herself, what would be the bitterness of her remorse, and how could she smother the inward voice of conscience which would eternally reproach her with so unpardonable a fault. The Catholics who live in heretical countries are, moreover, no small number. Can I abandon so many faithful souls, when I am required by the Gospel to do everything in order to seek one ? There are millions in the Russian empire ; there are millions upon millions in the regions subject to England. They enjoy the free exercise of their religion ; they are protected. What a responsibility to have led to the prohibition of religion in these lands, the ruin of holy missions, the stagnation of spiritual affairs ! An incalculable evil for religion and for Catholicism ; an evil for which I should have to accuse myself, and for which I should have to give a strict account before the judgment-seat of God ! (Vol. ii., p. 141).

The Emperor had complained of many serious evils resulting from dilatory proceedings at Rome. The Pope replies—

Your Majesty would have spared me the pain of your blame if you had considered that such affairs absolutely require mature counsel, and that it is impossible in discussing them to be as rapid as in temporal matters. This accusation your Majesty particularises by applying it to the ecclesiastical affairs of Germany. You say that for the sake of worldly interests, and the vain prerogatives of the tiara, souls are left to perish. I receive as from the hand of the Most High the humiliating bitterness of the reproach which your Majesty has thought fit to make to me. God and the world are my witnesses whether or not my conduct has been guided by worldly interests and vain prerogatives.

The Pope then explained that the ecclesiastical arrangements of Germany had been complicated, and their settlement delayed by the territorial changes which had resulted from Napoleon's wars. He continued—

Your Majesty lays down the principle that you are Emperor of Rome. I reply, with apostolic frankness, that the Pope, who became Sovereign of Rome so many centuries ago that no other sovereignty on earth can go back to a more remote point in history, does not acknowledge, and never has acknowledged, any power superior to himself in his own dominions. I will add that no Emperor has ever had the least right over Rome. Your Majesty is immensely great; you have been elected, crowned, consecrated, acknowledged, Emperor of the French, but not Emperor of Rome. There exists no Emperor of Rome; there can exist none unless the Sovereign Pontiff shall have been despoiled of the sovereign authority he exercises at Rome. We well know that there exists an Emperor of the Romans; but this is a title elective and merely honorary, acknowledged by all Europe, and by your Majesty yourself, as belonging to the Emperor of Germany, and cannot be borne by two Sovereigns at the same time. Your Majesty tells me that my relations towards yourself ought to be those which existed between my predecessors and Charlemagne. Charlemagne found Rome in the hands of the Popes. He acknowledged and confirmed without reserve their dominion, and augmented it by new donations; but never did he claim to exercise any supremacy over the Popes, even considered as mere temporal Princes. Never did he require from them any dependence or any subjection of any kind. . . . Finally, ten centuries have passed since the time of Charlemagne, which renders it useless to go back to a more ancient origin. I am compelled to point out to your Majesty that the principles you have advanced cannot be sustained. Still less is it possible that I should accept the consequences which you would draw from them. . . . I cannot admit the maxim by which your Majesty lays down that I ought to be towards you in matters temporal as your Majesty towards me in matters spiritual. The extent given to this proposition entirely alters the character and destroys the very essence of these two powers. Spiritual things, in fact, do not admit of simple relations [*simples égards*]; they come from [*relevant de*] a divine right. Their essence is superior and transcendent, and does not admit of any comparison with temporal objects. A Catholic Sovereign is such, solely because he professes to conform himself to the decisions of the visible head of the Church, and to acknowledge him as the master of truth [*maître de la vérité*] and sole Vicar of God upon earth. There can, therefore, be no identity, no equality between the spiritual relation of a Catholic Sovereign to the Chief of the Hierarchy, and the relations of one temporal Sovereign to another. . . . The second consequence which your Majesty desires to draw from these principles is to establish the point that your enemies must of necessity become my enemies also. This doctrine is absolutely contrary to the character of my divine mission, which knows no enmity even towards those who are unhappily separated from the centre of unity; and we could not subscribe to it without breaking the bond of common paternity which exists between the Sovereign Pontiffs and all Sovereigns who are within the bosom of the Church. For, according to your Majesty's very proposition, every time a Catholic power was at war, it would be my duty to treat it as an enemy (Vol. ii., p. 146).

Pius VII. then pointed out that Napoleon, who prided him-

self upon being "the avenger and defender of the Church," would be inconsistent with himself if he demanded the adoption of principles "through which my temporal independence so advantageous to my spiritual mission would in the end be entirely destroyed."

Among so many trials I have no support except the uprightness of my intentions, the confidence inspired into me by the justice of my cause, and, above all, the hope that your Majesty's filial affection will respond to my overflowing fatherly tenderness; but if I am disappointed, if the heart of your Majesty is not touched by my words, I shall suffer whatever may come with evangelical resignation. I shall submit to every kind of calamity, and accept it as coming from God; I shall encounter all the adversities of this life rather than make myself unworthy of my ministry by deviating from the line laid down by my conscience. . . . In conclusion, I will believe that you will not wholly forget that, at this moment, when I am at Rome a prey to so many and such terrible troubles, not one year has passed since I quitted Paris. . . . I give you with my whole heart my fatherly benediction (Vol. ii., p. 148).

We cannot but feel how much the force of this letter is weakened and lost by the fact that our readers cannot possibly have before their minds a just sense of what Napoleon really was when it was written. Never before had the power of a man been so widely extended and so absolute; for none even of the heathen Emperors of Rome, whose dominions were more extended, at any time held the actual strings by which all the resources and powers of the empire were set in motion so absolutely in his own hands. What is chiefly impressed upon us in reading the volumes of M. D'Haussonville (especially in connection with those of M. Thiers) is, that for many years no one, either within or without his dominions, had presumed to resist the will of Napoleon or to give a direct refusal even to his most unjust and most unreasonable demands. At Paris, the ambassadors of the most ancient, most powerful, and proudest royal and imperial houses of Europe trembled before him. When he took the field it was only because the most abject submission could not suffice to avert his dreadful wrath from those whom he thought it his interest to crush. He was wont to look around him upon the great powers of the Continent and consider, not which of them he could subdue, for he was confident that none could resist him, but which he should for the present spare. A little later he balanced in his own mind, in the same spirit, from which of those houses he should accept a successor to the divorced Josephine. In truth, for years past no one within the European Continent had ever presumed to oppose him. England, no doubt, was still out of

his reach, but he doubted not that if only he could get within arm's length of her he could break her in pieces, and meanwhile he boasted that he had shut her out of the world by his continental blockade. But that he should be defied, not in the frenzy of despair, but soberly and calmly, by an unarmed old man; that his orders should be not only disobeyed, but argued against and showed to be unreasonable,—it was beyond belief, beyond imagination. The letter of which we have given such copious extracts "filled him," says our author, "not with rage only but with indignation." And now began the death-struggle between the all-powerful Emperor and the unresisting Pontiff. His anger was increased by Cardinal Fesch, whose conscience would not allow him to go wholly against the Pope (a little later he refused to accept the Archbishopric of Paris when urged by the Emperor to take it without the authority of the Holy Father), but who hated Cardinal Consalvi to such a degree of madness as even to accuse him of having instigated a murder which had been committed at Rome, in order to throw the odium of it on the French. At last Consalvi had been compelled to resign. Fesch himself was recalled because work was to be done upon which Napoleon did not choose to employ his uncle. M. Alquier, his successor, warned the Emperor in very striking language (vol. ii., p. 303) that in matters which touched his conscience Pius was not influenced or controlled by any adviser, but took his own course. If Napoleon believed him, which may be doubted, he perhaps felt it too late to retreat now. Our space will not allow us to follow the different measures of aggression by which Napoleon laid his hands inch by inch upon the dominions of the Holy Father. It was highly characteristic that the execution of the final outrages, even when fully determined, was long delayed, and things remained as they were, because Napoleon was engaged in the difficult and somewhat alarming campaign which ended in the battle of Jena, and while he had before him the task of breaking the power of Prussia, he would not subject himself to any increase of his enemies by a new outrage, even on Pius VII. On the 31st of July, 1806, we have another letter of the Pope, addressed nominally to his nuncio at Paris, at that time an open partizan of the Emperor, for Napoleon (on pretexts characteristically false and little) had now refused to communicate with him directly, but evidently intended for the eye of the Emperor. We wish our space allowed us to give the whole of it.

I have earnestly commended myself to that God, of whom I, unworthy as I am, am Vicar on earth, and to S. Peter the Apostle, of whom I am the

successor, to obtain the light of which I have need, in order to give the answer you demand. Here is that answer, written with my own hand, as an additional proof of the importance I attach to matters of such weight, and how sincere and deep are the sentiments by which I am actuated, and which I am obliged to make known to you. My reasons for refusing to make the declaration demanded of me are too strong, too just, too powerful to make possible any change of opinion. They are founded not upon human considerations, as is imagined, but upon the most essential duties imposed upon me both by my character as the common father of the faithful, and by the nature of my ministry of peace. Admit that the English (as His Majesty tells you), will never believe that Rome suffered itself to be destroyed for their sake, and will never be grateful for it, that is not what I have to consider. I have thought only of my own duties, which lay me under the obligation of not causing any injury to religion by the interruption of communications between the head and the members of the Church, in any place where Catholics exist. This interruption I should myself provoke if I were to exercise acts of hostility against any one nation, and make myself a partner in a war against it. If the injuries caused to religion came from the acts of another, like that which may result from the measures which His Majesty may take in consequence of my refusal to agree to his demand, I shall grieve over them in bitterness of heart, and shall adore the judgments of God, who, for the secret designs of His Providence, allows them. But if, betraying my sacred character and the nature of my ministry, I should take part in a war which provoked resentments injurious to the Church, those evils would be my own act; and this it is that I cannot do. I cannot, in order to avoid the evils with which I am threatened, give occasion by my own fault to those evils to the Church which I have mentioned. Those with which I am threatened are not necessary evils, they depend solely on the will of His Majesty, who is free to make them actual or to avoid them. . . . His Majesty has told you that if Rome and the States of the Church are once in his hands, they will never come out of them. His Majesty may easily believe this, and persuade himself of it, but I reply frankly that if His Majesty has a right to be confident that power is on his side, I, for my part, know that above all monarchs there reigns a God, the avenger of justice and innocence, before whom every human power must bend. You tell me that the Emperor says to you that the affair has now become public, and that therefore he cannot go back. But I must crave His Majesty to consider that he can lose nothing of his greatness and magnanimity, when it is not before an earthly potentate, a rival of his power, that he gives way and bends, but before the representations and entreaties of a priest of Jesus Christ, his father and his friend. If this consideration does not avail to persuade him, I am bound to tell him with apostolic freedom that, if His Majesty is committed in honour before men, I am committed in conscience before God; that the head of the Church will never take part in war; that I assuredly will not be first to give to the Church and the world an example which none of my predecessors, during eighteen centuries, has given, that of uniting myself in a state of war progressive, indefinite, permanent, against any nation whatever; that I cannot accede to the federative system of the French Empire; that my dominions,

transmitted to me independent of all federation, must remain so by the nature of my apostolical ministry; and that if this independence is attacked, if the threats which are addressed to me are executed without any regard to my dignity and to the affection which binds me to His Majesty, then I shall see in that the signal of an open persecution, and shall appeal to the judgment of God. My course is irrevocable. Nothing can change it; neither threats, nor the execution of those threats. . . . These sentiments you may regard as my testament. I am ready, if necessary, to sign it with my blood, fortifying myself, if persecution breaks out, with those words of our Divine Master, "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice sake." Make known these sentiments to His Majesty in their fullest extent; I expressly command it. But at the same time tell the Emperor that he still has my affection, and that I have every wish to give him every proof of it which is in my power, and to continue to show myself his best friend; but what is demanded is out of my power to do. (Vol. ii. 320.)

This letter was indeed the Holy Father's last word. It reminds one of those of Moses when he appeared for the last time before Pharaoh, "Thou shalt see my face no more;" and of those more solemn words of his Lord and Master when, for the last time He left the Temple, "Ye shall see Me no more." It is true that the end was for some months delayed, not by scruples on the part of the Emperor, but by the war with Prussia. And then came the perfidious seizure of the city of Rome itself, of which we have already spoken. At that point our space compels us to close our account of the relations of the Holy Father with Napoleon, although the part of M. D'Haussonville's book already published carried them on for a year later. The seizure of Rome is the most natural conclusion of the first stage of those relations which was ended when Pius VII. was no longer, even nominally, in possession of his dominions. When the work is completed, we hope to return to it.

We must, however, notice that our author thinks the Holy Father was inconsistent, because at the last moment he consented to forbid the entry of English and Russian ships to his ports, after having declared it a point of conscience which he could not yield. It is strange that he does not see that things had then come to a point at which the one cause always assigned by Pius VII. for his refusal no longer applied. The French were in full possession of all his ports, especially Ancona and Civita Vecchia; the Customs' revenues were appropriated by them; his soldiers had been incorporated into the French army. It was therefore evident that his conceding this particular point could no longer be regarded by the English government as an act of war, because the French occupation had already excluded English ships. His concession, there-

fore, at that particular moment only confirmed what he had always said, that his refusal of it had been an act of duty, and not a mere point of worldly honour. When the duty no longer forbade, the concession was made. In confirmation of this it is to be observed, that in conceding this one point he still absolutely refused to join in the war or to submit his States to the federal authority of the French empire. The concession, therefore, had no effect, beyond proving the sincerity of the Pope's declaration, that he was anxious to concede all he could concede with a safe conscience.

But in truth the wishes of Napoleon had by this time greatly changed. Time had been when he had meant what he said, that he wished the Pope to continue at Rome a nominal sovereign if only he would exercise his sovereignty in that state of subordination to the French Emperor which he required from his brothers and other subordinate kings. But he wished this no longer. On the contrary, he was now eagerly looking for a pretext for removing him into France and establishing him there, in all splendour and state, as one of the great officers of the new Empire. His plan was to give him a revenue of £120,000 sterling per annum, magnificent palaces, &c.; he even went so far as to name Rheims as the place designed for his residence. This was part of his plan for making the Catholic Church as distinctly a tool in the hands of the French Emperor as the Russian schism actually is in the hands of the autocrat of the Russias. This is not the inference drawn by others as to his desires and wishes,—it was his own deliberate plan, sketched in letters at the time and fully drawn out in a note dictated by himself at St. Helena. It was, of course, inconsistent with the *quasi* independence of the Pope, and therefore it is plain in the latter communications between Rome and Paris that the Emperor's fear was lest the Pope should concede what he demanded. So strong was this fear, that in transmitting an ultimatum of almost inconceivable insolence, he expressly retained the right of adding to it, if accepted, any new demands; that it might be always in his power to force the Pope into a refusal which would give him an excuse for going to extremities.

It is impossible not to feel that, to human appearance, the Catholic Church was in greater danger in January, 1810, than at any former period. She had to face not a barbarian invasion like that of Attila, but a strongly-compacted empire; and what she had to fear from it was not a persecution like that of Nero, which was sure to purify and unite the Church by the same acts which gave to individual confessors a mar-

tyr's tortures and a martyr's crown; but a deliberate and well-devised system by which she was to be pampered, crippled, and enslaved. Against such a system she had to rely, humanly speaking, on the personal qualities of Pius VII., an old, mild, gentle, unresisting monk. All the world now knows that she prevailed; but, before the event, all the world believed her success to be hopeless. And, considering that the greatest danger of all was that of an election to the Papacy under the tyranny of Napoleon, it is impossible not to note the remarkable Providence by which the reign of Pius VII., which began at the moment when the victory of Marengo was about to make Napoleon absolute master of Italy, was continued until his empire and himself had passed away. It is with something like anxiety that one reads, even now, of the precautions taken by the tyrant to have the cardinals always absolutely in his power, that he might at any moment be ready to act in case of a vacancy.

What use Napoleon intended to make of the Catholic Church when he held her, as he already securely reckoned upon doing, as a tool in his hands, we may see by his actual conduct towards the clergy of France. These volumes are full of instances of the combination of a grinding tyranny which dictated the most minute details of the daily ministration, not merely of great prelates but of village curés, with falsehood and fraud so deliberate and so shameless, that even after all we know of Napoleon it is hardly credible.

Perhaps the most curious illustration of his dealings in ecclesiastical matters, hitherto unknown even in France, was the manner in which he contrived to impose a new catechism upon all the dioceses of France. All the world knows that it was professedly authorized by the Pope. It has been made a ground of complaint against Pius VII. (and apparently not without reason), that he should have deprived the Bishops of their discretion in this matter, for the benefit, not of the Church, but of the Emperor. It has now been shown that, in truth, he did exactly the reverse. All that passed is most graphically related by M. D'Haussonville. In the concordat as published by Napoleon it is declared, "There shall be only one liturgy and one catechism for all the churches of France." This, however, was one of his perfidious additions to the real Concordat. Our author skilfully brings in, into the midst of his account of Napoleon's strange interference about the catechism, extracts from two letters written just at the same time, which show how little he really cared about doctrine. He wrote to his sister Eliza, his Satrap at Lucca—

"My sister, require no oath of the priests. Nothing will come of that except new difficulties. Go straight on to suppress the convents."

A few days later he wrote :—

"The Pope's brief is nothing as long as it remains secret in your hands. Lose not an hour—not a minute—in annexing the property of the convents to the State. Do not trouble yourself about any dogma. Lay hands on the property of the monks, that is the really important matter, and let everything else take its chance." (Vol. ii., 254.)

It is curious to find the same man at the same moment so anxious about the exact doctrinal teaching of the children in every French parish. The Nuncio at Paris, Cardinal Caprara, a tool in his hands, wrote a letter, intended to draw a permission from Rome, for the use of a single catechism in all the parishes of France. Consalvi, "with his usual acuteness," suspected something behind, and answered :—

"The Holy See has always desired, aimed at uniformity in the manner of teaching and learning Christian doctrine. For this end, Pius V., after the decree of the Council of Trent, ordered that the Roman catechism for parish priests should be published, and Clement VII. that of Bellarmine for children. Yet their liberty of choice has never been taken from the bishops, and especially from those beyond the Alps, except so far as is defined by Benedict XIV., in the constitution *Etsi Minimum*, Chap. xvii. Therefore the Holy Father, following the example of his predecessors, will not interfere with the French bishops in their choice of the catechism which each of them may judge most suitable to the special circumstances of his own flock, provided that the wise directions of Benedict XIV. are observed. . . . Should the Government wish to give the preference to any one catechism, or perhaps to make a new one, and impose it by authority upon the use of the bishops, His Holiness would be unable not to regard that act as an insult to the whole body of the Episcopate. His Holiness would have it observed that the Divine Legislator has given the right of teaching only to his Apostles, and to the bishops, their successors, and *not to any others*. . . . It does not belong therefore to the secular power to choose or to prescribe to the bishops the catechism which it prefers. This belongs only to the judgment of the Church. . . . Should it come to your knowledge that any one has a plan for taking an advantage of the religion of the Emperor, and obtaining from him the authorisation and promulgation of a catechism of this sort, your Eminence will not hesitate to warn His Majesty upon the subject, and to say to him, in the name of His Holiness, to be on his guard against the authors of such counsels, and that the Holy Father is persuaded that in matters of doctrine certainly His Imperial Majesty has no thought of arrogating to himself a power which God has confided exclusively to the Church

and to the Vicar of Jesus Christ. . . . The Holy Father would feel the greatest repugnance to prescribe to the bishops of a whole nation the use of the same catechism in such a manner that the prelates could not vary from it according to the wants of their respective dioceses." (Vol. ii., 280.)

It is a remarkable proof of Consalvi's foresight that he should have suspected a trap so skilfully prepared for him. Never, probably, did he suspect what really happened. Caprara suppressed the letters, and falsely declared that "he had authority to approve the new catechism; and some days later (February 30, 1806) formally approved it in the name and by the authority of the Pope." Next appeared an official notice that a catechism "uniform and obligatory upon all the dioceses of France was about to be published immediately with the official approbation of the Cardinal Legate." When this *Moniteur* reached Rome, Consalvi wrote in the name of the Pope a second letter, expressing his doubts whether the announcement could be correct; but strictly requiring Caprara to take no step in the matter without referring it to Rome. This letter also Caprara suppressed, and it cannot be imagined that the Emperor did not well know all about these letters, but Caprara took care that he should have no official knowledge of them.

It soon appeared why so much trouble had been taken. The new catechism professed to be that of Bossuet, whose name suffices to throw any Frenchman into an ecstasy of admiration which deprives him of the use of his intellect. In the main it was so; but, in explaining the fourth commandment of God, Bossuet had taught that it requires us "to respect all superiors, pastors, kings, magistrates, and others."

"The Prince himself," says our author, who was none other than Louis XIV., "was familiarly mixed up with the crowd of 'superiors.' What was enough for Louis was far from satisfying to Napoleon. M. D'Haussonville shows that this part of the catechism was drawn up by himself and his minister. The duties of his subjects towards Napoleon fill three lessons. Napoleon at first wrote, 'Is submission to the government of France a dogma of the Church?' The answer was his own writing—"Yes, Scripture teaches that he who resists the Powers resists the order of God. Yes; the Church imposes upon us the most special duties towards the Government of France, the protection of religion and of the Church. She requires us to love and cherish it, and to be ready to make any sacrifice in its service." This was modified

at the suit of the theologians at Paris.* But as the catechism finally stood it declares—

“Christians owe to the princes by whom they are governed, and in particular we owe to Napoleon I., our Emperor, love, reverence, obedience, fidelity, military service, tributes, &c. &c.”

It then gives the special claim of Napoleon I., as

“raised up by God under circumstances of difficulty to re-establish public worship, and the religion of our fathers, and to be its Protector. By his profound and active wisdom he has restored and preserved public order. By his mighty arm he defends the State. By the consecration he has received from the Sovereign Pontiff, the Head of the Universal Church, he has become the Lord's anointed. Q. What must we think of those who fail in their duty towards our Emperor? A. According to the Apostle St. Paul, they resist the order established by God Himself, and make themselves worthy of eternal damnation.”

There is a good deal more, but this is enough. One other thing Napoleon wanted to alter in Bossuet's catechism—the declaration, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. This, however, our author says he gave up when it was pointed out to him that he had insisted on pronouncing eternal damnation against all who opposed his government, or who even had not sufficient love towards him. This argument *ad hominem*, says our author prevailed, “especially as it was only a question of pronouncing the damnation of some souls.” The fact is that Napoleon was enamoured of that style of argument. He was fond of calling together the clergy of a district and giving them a charge in a style of his own. To such an assembly at Breda (March 6, 1810) he delivered a long sermon, ending, “if you persist in your maxims, you will be wretched here below, and damned in the other world.” It was well that the latter part of the sentence was less in his power than the former. To the clergy of the Department of the Dyle he declared, “I won't have either the religion or the notions of the Gregory VII.s, the Bonifaces, the Juliuses, who wished to subject kingdoms and kings to their power, and excommunicated emperors to disturb the tranquillity of peoples. I believe, let people say what they may, that they are burning in hell for the disturbance they stirred up by their extravagant pretensions.”

* We must refer to our author for the circumstances which made it impossible for the Pope formally to denounce this catechism and expose the perfidy by which the sanction of it was obtained.

The mainspring of his government in matters ecclesiastical was perpetual imprisonment authorised by his simple *fiat* communicated in a letter to his Minister of Police. How many hundreds of country priests were left thus to die by inches in state prisons for years together, merely because some one had complained to the Emperor of a sermon delivered on some occasion, we have no means of estimating. The number must have been very large. Lord Shaftesbury's mouth must water when he thinks how the Ritualists would have fared under the great Emperor. First, he would have a check upon all appointments. To effect this he required that for all the high clerical offices a degree in the imperial university should be a *sine quâ non*, and this, as he writes to his Minister of Religion, "can be refused in the case of any man known to entertain notions ultramontane or dangerous to authority."* He writes to the same Minister to dictate subjects for Episcopal pastorals. It may suggest something to us to find him specially mentioning the wrongs of Ireland as a subject to be insisted upon. But he condescended lower than this. On one occasion, when no one as yet suspected that he was thinking of the divorce of Josephine, he was the guest of the Archbishop of Bordeaux. He was in high good humour and most munificent; even condescending to reprove the Archbishop for not allowing himself greater personal comforts. But the Grand Vicar and a chanoine ventured to state, in answer to some remark of the Emperor, the doctrine of the Church about divorce and the indissolubility of marriage. He was enraged, and had no sooner returned to Paris than he wrote to require the Archbishop to deprive them of their offices. To his Minister he wrote:—

"Make known my displeasure to M. Robert, priest at Bourges. He preached a very bad sermon on the 15th of August." Sometimes he addressed his Minister of the Interior, to require him to set right ecclesiastics who, in his opinion, erred from their duty. More commonly, however, the orders were given to his Commandant of Gendarmerie, or by preference to his Minister of Police, the Duke of Otranto (Fouché), whom he charges to watch attentively the manner in which the members of the French clergy conducted themselves. "The Abbé de Courcy," he writes to M. Lacépède, "does me great mischief. He is always corresponding with his parishioners [*à ses diocésains*]. I desire that that man be arrested and confined in a convent." But before long convents did not seem to him a place of retreat sufficiently secure. Some days later Napoleon, this time addressing Fouché, wrote, "It is important that you keep your eyes open upon the diocese of Poitiers. It is really shameful that you have not yet had the Abbé Stewens

* Vol. ii., p. 243.

arrested. They are asleep, for how else could a wretched priest have escaped" (June 30th, 1805). His Minister of Police had generally a more lucky hand, and then his master addressed compliments to him, even from the heart of Poland. "I see by your letter of the 12th that you have arrested a curé of la Vendée. You have done quite right. Keep him in prison." It is needless to say that these arrests were not preceded by any investigation or followed by any trial. In proportion to the difficulty of the relations to the Holy See their number became more considerable, and thus little by little, in France as in Italy, the prisons were peopled by a multitude of obscure priests. They were committed sometimes to the dungeon of Vincennes, sometimes to the Isles of Sainte Marguerite, to Fenestrella, to Ivree, and to all the places of confinement set apart for political offenders. In many cases there was nothing alleged against them except suspected opinions on matters of religious discipline, some thoughtless act (*propos* ?) or insignificant fault into which they had been imprudently led by an excess of Ultramontane zeal. Once imprisoned, these unfortunates became dangerous to release, for they would have been applauded and made much of as martyrs by the enthusiastic partizans of the Holy Father, who himself was confined as a prisoner at Savona. In prison, therefore, they were kept indefinitely. Of these poor priests, whose plebeian names have never figured in any history, every one either perished in the dungeons which the Emperor had assigned to them (if they were old men) or else never left them till after his fall. Many of them never had any means of guessing the particular reasons which led to their arrest (Vol. ii. p. 246).

We regret that our space forbids us to call attention to many details of extreme interest, especially with regard to the relations of the Emperor to the French clergy and laity.

NOTE.—We have been disappointed at not finding such clear information as we desired as to the grounds of the sentence of nullity passed upon the marriage of Josephine. The author says there are documents on this subject to which he has been refused access. They seem, although in this we may be mistaken, to have been made accessible to M. Thiers. One important fact he was the first to establish, viz., that a religious marriage between Napoleon and Josephine was celebrated by Cardinal Fesch the night before the Coronation at Notre Dame. The question is whether there were any real grounds for pronouncing that marriage null. The great fact to prove that there must have been such grounds is that M. Emery, a man far above suspicion, delivered his opinion against the validity of the marriage. His reasons he did not state. The author says that Napoleon was so inconceivably shameless as to desire that the sentence of nullity should be grounded upon his having withholden his consent. It is difficult to suppose that other grounds would not be found were all the documents accessible. They may have been connected with a subject at which the author only hints in reference to the marriage of Louis Bonaparte with Hortense Beauharnais, and with the anger of Louis when it was proposed that the eldest son of that marriage should be declared presumptive heir to the Emperor, which he refused to sanction, as it would give colour to reports already existing as to the birth of that child (Vol. p. 293).

ART. VI.—CHURCH MUSIC AND CHURCH CHOIRS.

Liturgical Rules for Organists, Singers, and Composers. A Manual compiled from Rubrical and authentic sources ; with Imprimatur of the Archbishop of Westminster. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1868.

Publications on Church Music. By CANON OAKELEY and Rev. JAMES NARY. 1868.

OUR last number contained the first portion of a paper in which we proposed to lay before our readers a compendious as well as practical view of the subject of Church Music and Church Choirs, with reference more especially to the present circumstances of the Catholic Church in our own country. Our object was to bring to a point some of the more important questions relating to the choral services of the Church, and, if possible, to find a common ground on which the divergent opinions of thoughtful writers amongst us might be reconciled. We should not have ventured upon an undertaking, confessedly so difficult, but for the appearance of the Manual of "*Liturgical Rules*," recently issued with the approbation of our own diocesan, which seemed to us to indicate, in no doubtful manner, that common ground which was required for the object in view.

In what has been already written we have briefly discussed the first part of our subject, viz., the various kinds of music proper to be used in Catholic worship ; and we have based our conclusions upon the "*Instructions*" to composers of music and to singers, promulgated by the Holy See, and contained in the Manual just alluded to. These instructions, as we have seen, refer to points which apply not only to one locality but to all parts of the Church and to all countries, and are found, moreover, to be in accordance with everything that has been said on the subject by the Supreme Pontiffs from the Council of Trent downwards ; not to speak of the voice of the great body of the Episcopate, whenever it has spoken, and the exhortations of canonized saints and holy men in all ages.

After speaking of the Church Chant, we traced briefly the progress of musical art in connection with the services of religion, and described the various styles which have successively flourished, ending with the school of Beethoven as representing the latest style of sacred composition. With this style (which in all important respects is also that of

Mendelssohn and other recent writers) it was implied that all future composers must start; in other words, that to be artists for our own day we must take up art where it is, not where it was at some given time in the past; and that, though we retain for use that which is really artistic in previous schools, yet we do not think of going back to them for our models of composition. On the other hand, it was equally implied that musicians of the present day are not to be absolutely tied to what they find already existing, any more than the composers of former days were bound to follow slavishly in the groove of those by whom they had been preceded. Still less are they to copy particular fashions and ways of setting words to music which happened to prevail at some former period (*e.g.* the days of the Vienna and Salzburg schools), and on which experience, and the improved taste of our own days, has passed an unfavourable verdict.

With this short recapitulation, which is also in part explanatory, we proceed to the second branch of our inquiry; viz., by *whom is the music to be sung?* or, in other words, what is to be the *matériel* of our choirs?

We have already expressed our concurrence in the view which Canon Oakeley has put forth on this subject, though for want of space we were unable to quote from his pages. We therefore invite the attention of our readers to the following extracts from the Postscript to the "*Few Words*," which it will be seen sums up the whole subject. The extract is long, but we do not see that we can abridge it without injury. We may remark in passing that no attempt at an answer has yet appeared from any quarter:—

I will conclude with a brief summary of the arguments by which, as it appears to me, the substitution of choristers for female singers is recommended.

1. It would serve to place our choirs upon a permanent basis. At present they are apt to be made up of persons who are not united by any other tie than proceeds from the accident of their being gathered together at the High Mass on Sundays and Feasts of Obligation, in order to execute the music of the Mass in a mere professional spirit. They are not necessarily even Catholics, and at any rate they feel no other interest in the church where they sing, than as it is the means of affording them a casual engagement. The consequence is, that they are not at hand to give effect to any of the week-day celebrations, which accordingly form too often a miserable contrast in the musical department to the High Mass of the Sunday. On the other hand, if a church be provided with a standing choir of boys, the means are always ready of celebrating the Benedictions and other occasional offices with a certain degree of propriety and effect. It will be seen that I am all along supposing the case of such a staff of boy singers as is the product of a

musical class in each parish. The elements of such a class may generally be found among the male children who are under parochial education, and nothing more is wanted towards creating it than a competent musical instructor, who will provide that there shall be a regular supply of younger boys to take the places of those who are superannuated.

2. The effect of educating boys for the service of the choir will be that of supplying facilities for obtaining male singers to take the lower parts as time goes on. Some of the best tenors and basses in our London Catholic choirs have been choristers in Catholic churches in their earlier years, and the great advantage which they enjoy over singers who have not had this preparation is, that they are thoroughly acquainted with the ecclesiastical portion of their work. They know how to pronounce the Latin correctly; they are not dismayed by the Plain Chant of the Introit, Offertory, or Communion, and there is at all events a better security for their proper deportment in church, than in the case of those who have been accustomed to regard music simply in the light of the theatre or the casino.

3. It is thus that the training of boys will have a tendency in the course of time to render our choirs exclusively Catholic. With our actual paucity of resources, this most desirable object is impracticable, or could be obtained only at a sacrifice which would be little less than fatal to the musical department of worship. But with choirs made up of well-instructed Catholic boys for the higher parts, and *quondam* Catholic boys for the lower, there would be no place left for the admission of non-Catholic intruders.

4. The employment of boys would secure that gravity, simplicity, and chasteness, in the execution of Church music, which are so apt to be sacrificed to mere effect in the hands of professional artists. I have more than once said, that it would have no tendency to exclude from our choirs the use of varied and artistic music; but it is my own very strong opinion, founded on long experience, that it is not such music in itself which gives a secular air to the work of the choir, but the manner in which it is executed. . . . There is something about the voice of boys which is pre-eminently suited to the true idea of Christian praise, whereas it is exceedingly difficult for singers of the other sex, especially when accustomed to professional exhibitions, to tone down their mode of execution to the ecclesiastical standard. It will be said, I know, that male singers who have passed the age of boyhood are liable to the same serious defect. This I do not deny; but it is a great point to have even one-half of a choir free from it; while, if I be right in supposing, that by the substitution of boys for females in the treble parts, the whole choir would be gradually purified and catholicised, there would be a remote tendency in such a change to give a more ecclesiastical character to the musical service in general.

I come lastly to that which is, after all, the chief argument for the exclusion of females from our choirs; that their admission is opposed to the spirit and most approved practice of the Church. It has no precedent in any Catholic country in the world, and has grown up in our own and a few others under sectarian influences. Even the Established Church, which has suffered so largely from those influences, has in this instance steadily resisted them. In its cathedrals, which are the relics and witnesses of the ancient ecclesias-

ical tradition, none but exclusively male choirs have ever existed or been even imagined. Nor did I ever hear of women taking part in the service of the Anglican Church, except in the fashionable London chapels, which are certainly the last places to which one should resort for an authority in ecclesiastical matters. In the churches popularly called ritualistic, the employment of boys in the musical portion of the service is quite universal, and every accession which that great movement may bring to ourselves will be an accession of testimony and influence in favour of the same practice. More than this, I understand from those who are old enough to remember the earlier days of some of our London Catholic churches, that female singers were then entirely unknown. Now it would indeed be lamentable, if when we are making so much progress in other ways towards our rightful position, we were, so far as the conduct of Divine Worship is concerned, to recede from the standard of our forefathers. Together with the name of "chapels," which it may be hoped we are in the way to renounce once for all, let us divest ourselves of all that smacks of the chapel and dissenting system; the pews, the pew-openers, the female sacristans, and the female choristers. One of the principal lessons taught us by our great Cardinal, was the duty of asserting in all judicious ways the dignity of our true position; and this we can do only by ridding ourselves of sectarian habits, down even to the very fringes of our garment, and associating ourselves in spirit, and in that which forms so especial a test of the ecclesiastical spirit, the external worship of the Church, with the most approved practice of Catholic countries.

There is one argument for the introduction of females into the musical portion of worship, which strives to bear us down by the force of a religious sentiment. It is said in effect, "God has given women a voice, why then may they not use it in singing His praise in the Church?" It might be sufficient to answer, that the Church, from the days of St. Paul, has ruled that Divine Worship is not the proper department of female ministrations. But if we must take a lower ground, it is surely enough to remark, that the same argument would justify every orator in becoming a preacher. Doubtless all gifts should be employed to the glory of the Giver; but in what modes, and under what conditions, is a further question not settled by the mere terms of that most unanswerable proposition. There are many ways, even religious, in which females may employ their musical powers and accomplishments to that end. They can delight their families and friends by singing sacred music in the domestic or social circle; they can join as private members of a congregation in the chants and hymns of the Church. What they may not do—according to the tradition and general practice of the Church—is to take any official part in the act of Divine worship. The deviations from this rule, which have been partially allowed in some countries, whether in deference to local circumstances, or from other causes, which always carry weight with a power so wise and so indulgent as that of the Holy See, cannot reasonably be pleaded against the tenor of the rubrics and the precedent of all parts of the Church in which her action is unfettered by non-Catholic influences.

To which we add the following from the "Few Words:"—

Not only in Rome, but in countries which retain certain national pecu-

liarities in the sacred administrations of the Church, such as France and Belgium, the practice of employing females in the musical department of divine worship is, I believe, unknown. It is almost entirely confined to those countries, such as Great Britain, parts of Germany, and the United States of America, in which Protestantism prevails and produces a certain impression on the outward aspect even of the Church herself. . . . It is hardly necessary to observe, that the admission of females into the church choir is absolutely fatal to the retention of the proper cathedral type of worship, while in parish churches, it is sometimes productive of obvious evils, and even in the best regulated administrations is adverse to the spirit which should animate every part of divine worship, and especially one so intimately connected with its dignified celebration as that of the choir. . . . Without a regular provision for elementary instruction in church music, we can never hope to place our choirs upon a permanent footing, nor to have matters conducted in an ecclesiastical way. Male singers trained by ourselves, would be able, not only to sing church music, but to understand the church offices, which is a distinct and most important qualification for an ecclesiastical choir, nowise guaranteed by a mere professional acquaintance with the art. What idea has a London vocalist, how accomplished soever, of singing the Introits, Offertories, and Communions of the Mass to the proper tone? Yet these, by a prescription of the Holy See, are to be sung in the choir as well as said by the celebrant. In these, and many other ways, the want of an ecclesiastical training in the choir will be brought home to every Catholic mind.

If we add to the above (1) the Synodical decree of the English Provincial Synod that "boys should be taught music in schools in order that females may be excluded from the choirs," (2) the decree of a recent Synod of Utrecht, which has been approved by the Holy See,* and lastly, the fact that our "Manual" does not in any way recognise the presence of females as officiators in choirs, we shall have said all that is necessary in the way of argument and authority.

* "In the same way as the object of Church Music is quite frustrated when it is of such a character as only to gratify the ears with vain pleasures, so, too, the dignity of divine worship is not preserved, unless the singers also are such as to beseech the Church. Women's voices are not admitted by ecclesiastical usage into the choir of singers, since the rules of divine worship and the dignity of ecclesiastical music evidently require their exclusion. For in the same way as they are withheld from all share in the ministry of the Holy Liturgy, so also everything effeminate ought to be quite excluded from Church singing; and hence the presence of women in an Ecclesiastical Choir is opposed to the very sense of the faithful. Therefore, we decree and order that women be altogether excluded from the choir of singers, unless in the Churches or Chapels of Nuns. And if hereafter, in violation of this injunction of this Provincial Synod, women be employed in any Church as singers or organists, let the Rectors of those Churches be aware that they will have to render a most strict account to the Ordinary for such an infraction of the law." Syn. Prov. Ultrajectan. Tit 5. cap. 6.

What seems to be wanted now is that Catholics should move unitedly and zealously in the matter; and if this is done, we have good hope that the day is not far distant, when we shall see all Catholic schools taught music systematically as part of the school system, and so on a par at least with the schools of other communities in this branch of education, as they certainly are in all others. This, as has been already said, will enable all our young people to assist in the congregational parts of the Church offices, and in the psalms, hymns, and litanies of our popular services;—while it will secure the training of the more musically-gifted boys as singers in our choirs. In the one case the boys, when grown up, will be prepared to join in the musical parts of the services of the “Holy Family” and other popular devotions—besides adding their voices in the Vesper psalms, hymns, &c.; and in the other, those who are especially trained for the choir, will not only act as soprano singers while their treble voice lasts, but will, as Canon Oakeley observes, become men-singers, and so supply in a really satisfactory manner the wants of our choirs as to adult singers, at present, perhaps, one of our greatest difficulties,* since we have in a great majority of cases to fall back upon the services of Protestants. It will probably surprise some of our readers to learn that in this important matter of school instruction in music we have actually retrograded within the last twenty years. In proof of this we quote the following from the Report of the Poor School Committee’s Proceedings for 1849–50; the documents are far too important to be abridged.

The Vicars Apostolic, in the letter which their Lordships were pleased to address to the committee after their synodical meeting at Easter last, observed:—“The bishops particularly recommend to the attention of the committee the importance of devoting some portion of their funds to the promoting of several objects of general importance. The cultivation of music, for instance, is one which they especially recommend as of great importance, particularly as from the report given them of the success of the services of Mr. Crowe, they think these services should be secured to the Catholic schools, whether by his teaching in them, or by the publication of his works.” Several of their lordships, and in particular the Right Rev. Bishop Wiseman and the Right Rev. Bishop Ullathorne, had previously condescended, as will be remembered, to write most interesting letters in recommendation of the study of vocal music. The committee, obedient to the

* We have no need, we presume, to defend ourselves from the charge of wishing to drive out females summarily from our choirs, a course which Canon Oakeley also justly deprecates. The change will no doubt take time, though if set about earnestly it need not take so long as is sometimes supposed.

wishes of the bishops, made arrangements with Mr. Crowe to secure his services for a year in twelve Catholic schools, which, by each adding a small payment to the committee's grant, have obtained the advantage of a good singing master upon easy terms. Mr. Crowe has under his care the schools of St. John's Wood, Chelsea, Hammersmith, Somers Town, Fulham, and Woolwich, and his services are much valued. The children take great interest in this part of their studies, and subscribers would derive pleasure from hearing their hearty and accurate performances. It has not escaped the notice of the committee that the engagement of a separate master to teach singing in a school, however useful in the absence of a more complete alternative, is an arrangement which, from its expense and other reasons, can never become general or permanent. They look forward to the time when ability to read music, to teach singing, and to play the organ, *will be reckoned among the ordinary qualifications of a Catholic schoolmaster.* This result can be produced only through the agency of normal schools. But meantime the means at hand may be employed to introduce the study and to lead the popular taste and interests in the desired direction.

As a result of this we have the two following reports from the music teacher addressed to the secretary :—

April 9th, 1850.

At the close of the first six months of the introduction of vocal music into the schools under the countenance of Bishop Wiseman, and the auspices of the Catholic Poor School Committee, it seems proper to address a few lines to you, in the shape of report, as to the commencement, progress, &c. of the undertaking. Accordingly I transmit the enclosed as a first or infantile statement, which I hope may be better developed as we proceed, and have more material upon which such a statement may be constructed. It will doubtless be gratifying to you to know that, at this early stage, there are now good fruits being produced from the three schools which had the advantage and happiness of commencing by means of the kind patronage of our beloved Bishop. These were commenced experimentally and without the aid of books. From these schools alone are taken about twenty boys for the choral service of the church, who are now receiving about £50 annually for their musical services. (More are employed who are not paid). A field is thus opened for their exertions ; our choirs will of necessity become better and more economically constructed, and the boys thus derive aid in their social advancement. Several of these choristers have already obtained situations in business of a more advanced grade than is usually the lot of poor-school children, and have been chosen (other points of character being equal) on account of their musical attainments. I may, perhaps, mention one who is now in the service of a music-printer, receiving satisfactory wages, and whose master dispenses with the usual premium required (from £30 to £50, I am informed), on account of the musical knowledge and aptitude of the boy. The pupils thus readily appreciate, and with gratitude, the gift that is being conferred upon them in the cultivation of that which, besides being recreative, is attended with advantages which they could not otherwise possess.

Nov. 26th, 1850.

I have much pleasure in placing before you the enclosed report of the second half-year's state of the schools with respect to the cultivation of vocal music; for, although there are a few cases which present themselves unfavourably, yet even from these information and some degree of satisfaction may be derived; for it now appears evident that, in every instance where the master or mistress practises regularly, and books are provided, the school advances well, and, in some instances, even without the direct aid of the master, where the pupil-teachers are apt The scholars are now receiving a higher amount of pecuniary recompense for their musical labours than before, and this with advantage to all parties. Another has been taken into the employ of a music-printer, who speaks highly of his abilities. Repeated instances occur of the parents of the pupils coming to express their gratitude for the benefits they have derived from the musical instruction of their children. This, again, is made apparent in the happy faces and new clothing of the children, of which I am a constant witness. Two little choristers were a short time ago examined, and afterwards offered 10s. per week each, with other inducements, to sing at "a respectable evening concert"; the parents, however, taking advice, declined the offer. The mother came to inform me of their decision, and to return thanks for the benefits her children were receiving by means of their musical education. I find *the boys much attached to the Church service*: they will make great exertions, and endure privations, rather than be absent when their services are required.

It should be added that the proceedings of the musical teacher were superintended by a council of clergy and laity nominated by the Bishop, at the head of which were the late Canon O'Neal and the then Vicar-General, Dr. Whitty. The promising nature of the movement is sufficiently shown by the above documents. Another proof was a meeting of school children held at S. George's, where a number of sacred pieces were sung, in unison and in parts, with very considerable taste and accuracy. It is also worthy of notice that though what was done was little more than a sowing of the seed, yet some of the results may even now be traced, as some boys who were then taught, are at this time to be found acting as organists or singers in Catholic churches.

Accidental circumstances put a period to the labours of the music-master, and the difficulty of finding a proper successor, and consequent breaking up of the council,—owing partly to the illness of the late Cardinal, who had been the soul and life of the whole movement—left the schools without the means of continuing what had been begun.*

* We have said that we have retrograded during the last twenty years; we may also add that as a consequence we are behind other communities, almost all of whom have been regularly working on in this direction. We cannot but take the opportunity of noticing here the remarkable success

We may add, in passing, Cannon Oakeley's remark that it is believed to be not so very long since boys were ousted from some of the Catholic choirs where females are now employed. The history of these changes would be a curious and interesting one, but this is not the place for it.

It is easy to see how immensely improved might have been our position had the work begun by the Bishops and the Poor-School Committee been continued to the present time; and we own that many priests, as well as school teachers, look back with regret to its cessation. The plan, too, of having a master to go from school to school is so feasible and so economical that we cannot doubt it will receive, if it has not already received, the consideration of our present Archbishop; who in his letter to Canon Oakeley evinces so lively an interest in the subject, and who has already done so much for the schools, and for the young of his diocese.*

And now it may be interesting to compare the state of our schools, as regards musical proficiency, not with other schools of the present day, but with those of our forefathers in the old days of Catholic England. Thus writes the accomplished author of "*Christian Schools and Scholars*." The passage is so interesting that we make no apology for giving it entire.

"But the fact is that, in one respect, the rude, ignorant peasantry of the Middle Ages were a great deal more learned than the pupils of our modern schools. In a certain sort of way, every child was rendered familiar with the language of the Church. From infancy they were taught to recite their prayers, the antiphons, and many parts of the ritual of the Church, in Latin, and to understand the meaning of what they learnt; and hence they became familiar with a great number of Latin words, so that a Latin discourse would sound far less strange in their ears than in those of a more educated audience of the same class in the present day. In many cases, indeed, the children who were taught in the priest's, or parochial school, learnt grammar, that is, the Latin language; but all were required to learn the Church chant, and a

which has attended the labours of the "*Tonic Sol-Fa Association*," and which we think clearly proves the superiority of that plan of musical instruction, *i.e.* the principle of the one scale (which is quite irrespective of the peculiar mode of printing adopted by the Society). We too might by this time have had our 5,000 children ready to take part in an annual festival.

* We are far, of course, from wishing to exclude secular music from our schools. The part songs and other pieces at present in use are excellent in their way (though too often confined to the girls' school), and we think that the practice of such would always be desirable as a means of innocent recreation. Indeed we do not think that any mission would be complete without its choral society. But there is no reason why a higher aim should not also be included, and the singing-class be made to contribute, as it easily might, to the beauty and fulness of the services in church.

considerable number of Latin prayers, and hymns, and psalms.* This point of poor-school education deserves more than a passing notice. Its result was, that the lower classes were able thoroughly to understand and heartily to take part in the rites and offices of Holy Church. The faith rooted itself in their hearts with a tenacity which was not easily destroyed, even by penal laws, because they imbibed it from its fountain source—the Church herself. She taught her children out of her own ritual, and by her own voice, and made them believers after a different fashion from those much more highly educated Catholics of the same class who, in our day, often grow up almost as much strangers to the liturgical language of the Church as the mass of unbelievers outside the fold. Can there be any incongruity more grievous than to enter a Catholic school, rich in every appliance of education, and to find that in spite of the time, money, and method lavished on its support, its pupils are unable to understand and recite the Church offices, and are untrained to take part in Church Psalmody? The language of the Church has, therefore, in a very literal sense, become a dead language to them, and it is from other and far inferior sources that they derive their religious instruction. Thus they are ignorant of a large branch of school education, in which the children of a ruder and darker age were thoroughly trained; no doubt, on the other hand, they know a great many things of which children in the Middle Ages were altogether ignorant, and the question is simply to determine which method of instruction has most practical utility in it. Without dogmatising on this point, we may be permitted to regret that through any defect in the system of our parochial schools, Catholic congregations should in our own days be deprived of the solemn and thorough celebrations of those sacred offices which in themselves comprise a body of unequalled religious instruction; and that in an age which makes so much of the theory of education, we should have to confess our inability to teach our children to pray and sing the prayers of the Church, as the children of Catholic peasants prayed and sang them six hundred years ago. The English schools of that

* We subjoin a few more passages from the same author: S. Godric is said to have learned (in a poor school at Durham) many things of which he was before ignorant, “by hearing, reading, and *chanting* them.” In the parochial schools, even from S. Dunstan’s time, children of the lower orders were taught grammar and *Church Music*. Schools of greater or less pretensions were attached to most parish churches, and the scholars assembled in the parish. Thus, in 1300, we read of children being taught to *sing* and read in the parish of S. Martin’s, Norwich. At Stoke-by-Clare there was, besides the extensive college, a school in which boys were taught “grammar, *singing*, and good manners.” To which answer the pictures in Chaucer of the schools in which children were taught:

That is to say, to singe and to rede,
As small children do in their childhede.

Again :

As he sate in the scole at his primere,
He Alma Redemption heard sing, &c.

The whole habits of education and devotion, in fact, had a liturgical element which, we fear to our detriment, is now lacking.

period enjoyed the benefit of no other inspection than that of the parish priest and the archdeacon, 'the eye of the bishop' as he was called; and if their pupils knew little about 'monocotyledons,' the 'crustacea,' or grammatical analysis, they were able to recite their Alma Redemptoris and their Dixit Dominus with hearty, intelligent devotion. They knew the order of the Church service, and could sing its psalms and antiphons in the language of the Church, and to her ancient tones; and so they did not, through their ignorance, oblige their pastors to lay aside, as obsolete, the use of that office so truly called Divine, in order to substitute in its place English hymns and devotions from any less inspired source."*

Mr. Nary "heartily sympathizes with Canon Oakeley in wishing that female singers should be excluded from the choirs," but he thinks that this would necessitate the exclusion of much of the figured music for which the Canon pleads; since, if it is to be done at all, it should be done full justice to, and this he thinks can only be by the employment of female voices.†

We are inclined to think, however, that Mr. Nary has really exaggerated the difficulty. It is certain that there is very much modern music that may be sung with effect by boys, and as to what cannot—this is the very kind which Canon Oakeley himself implies should not be admitted. We here again revert to our "Manual," and we believe that if music is selected according to its rules there will be no difficulty. We think, too, that Mr. Nary has rather confused the matter when he endeavours to prove that women's voices need not give a secular air to the performance of Church Music, because in an evening service more than half the people who join in the

* We have retained the last few lines of this extract, though not necessary for our purpose, in order to correct a misapprehension. Those who promote English hymns and devotions among the people do not, as is here implied, desire to put aside thereby the divine office. The movement in favour of vernacular devotions is promoted by many clergy and laity, anxious to attach the young and the common people to the Church and its services, and they think it desirable that *both* the regular offices and the vernacular should be used for this purpose, according as circumstances may require. And as to the matter of the English devotions used, they are principally the Hymns of the Church translated, or others of like character; selections from the Psalter; and Prayers from the "Raccolta." We will not pursue, however, at present the question of popular devotions, as we hope it may form the subject of a paper in a future number of this REVIEW.

† One point is sometimes overlooked, viz., the *paucity of really good female singers*. We cannot often afford to hire real *artistes*; and better the honest, blunt, if not always refined, way in which boys sing, than the mincing affectation of some third or fourth-rate lady singer, who in most cases cannot even pronounce the words. And surely nothing can possibly exceed the unpleasantness, to use a very mild word, of the *passé* female voice, such as we not unfrequently hear it in many of our choirs.

Benediction Music are females. The question is not as to all joining in congregational singing, but as to *females being the leaders and officiators in the choir of singers properly so called*. This remark, we may say in passing, applies not only to the case of professional singers, but to the too common practice of setting up girls of the middle or lower classes to act as *cantors*, sing solo parts in Litanies, Magnificats, &c. Here, not to speak of the moral danger to these persons themselves, from the show and conceit which are apt to be engendered in minds of that class,—a danger which experience has unhappily proved to be a very real one,—we shall have in time the same jealousies and quarrels that exist in more aristocratic choirs, and which are far less likely to exist among boys. If girls must be employed, *let it be a rule that several sing together*. But the cantor's or alternate parts we should think could always be taken in the sanctuary.

We have heard of easy Masses being sung with very good effect by a choir of select school children, both boys and girls, in a side chapel near the altar. This, in default of anything better, there could be no objection to; but boys must not be excluded; nor must they or the girls be sent into a gallery.

To return. We agree with Canon Oakeley that, even in a gallery, boys' voices have very much the advantage of women's in point of religious effect; though the gain would be very much greater were they in their proper place in the body of the church. And here a caution should be added: the employment of boys' voices, though it will be far less offensive, yet can never do away altogether with the unpleasant effect of music otherwise objectionable. Indeed, we have heard of most painful attempts at operatic airs, bravura passages, solo "O Salutaris," &c., by a single boy put up to exhibit himself on some great occasion. But these things, we trust, are passing away.

Before concluding this part of our subject, it may be of use if we say a few words on two points, on which some persons who grant all that we have said, may yet apprehend a practical difficulty under existing circumstances. We allude (1) to the finding of a sufficient supply of boys for choir purposes, and (2) to the keeping them out of moral danger when we have inducted them, so to say, into their office; for the idea of merely hiring a boy instead of a female singer, and taking no further care of him, we do not for a moment entertain.

First then as to the supply of boys. This point has been almost anticipated in what we have already said on the partially successful attempt made twenty years ago. This, if

it had been persevered in, would no doubt have rendered the present discussion unnecessary. But if, as is unfortunately the case, we have to begin *de novo*, we certainly begin under more favourable circumstances. With the vast improvements which have taken place in our missions and schools since the period referred to, we cannot doubt that in a very few years, a proper system of musical tuition being supposed, our churches will be furnished with an abundant supply of well-trained *enfants de chœur*.

We may remark here that long habit seems to have had a tendency to make us distrust our own resources. The custom of employing female professionals had become a thing so taken for granted that few thought of turning their attention to the school, and hence one constantly meets with instances where considerable resources exist in the way of boy-material, but which are allowed to run to waste, simply from no one having thought of turning them to account. One writer tells us of a Catholic church in a large town in the country, with a good congregation, and a superior school, but where the boys simply occupy their side aisle in the church, and never open their mouths. A few of the girls, he says, occasionally sing in an organ gallery, but evidently without proper musical instruction. In the same town, moreover, is a High Church place of worship, carried on by voluntary support, and where there is a school of a similar kind to that of the Catholic mission, the boys indeed if anything being hardly so respectable. Here the incumbent has a class of boys who have been so well drilled that they can sing the Magnificat and sundry metrical hymns in church every evening with very good effect. Another informant, writing from a populous town, speaks of a spacious church, to which is attached a very fine boys' school, and one which stands high in the inspector's report. Here there is, or was, a Saturday evening's Benediction, at which the boys of the upper school attend. The look of these youths as they pass by and fill the aisle is beautiful; but when the rite begins, to the visitor's surprise not a single voice is heard.

We have quoted the above as being evidently samples of a like state of things in hundreds of other places, and as showing the great improbability of a want of material throughout the country. Of course some localities will be more favourably circumstanced than others. The midland and northern counties will probably furnish better and more abundant material than the southern. It is surprising, as to the former, what results follow from careful training. It may be mentioned, as an instance of Lancashire, that a very promising

tenor, who lately sang at a concert at Liverpool, was originally a boy who sang in the streets. This, of course, is an exceptional case, but it is so far to our point. Then there are the well-known choral singers of Bradford and elsewhere.

One more remark may be added. Strangers have often noticed the row of boys in surplices lining the altar at Vespers and Benediction, and have expressed great surprise that their presence should be little more than ornamental, and that they never on any occasion open their mouths; while perhaps some bold, strong-voiced girls stand up outside the sanctuary to sing the solo parts in the litanies, &c. One writer, we observe, has called these boys, not inaptly, the row of "dummies"; and, without saying that no boy who cannot sing should be allowed to enter the sanctuary, one may safely suggest that the two things might more often be combined than they are.

Turning now to the second point, the moral guidance of the choir boy, our readers are aware that we have always considered this subject as one of the greatest moment. We said not long since, "Besides the musical training of our youth, it is of the highest importance that moral training and supervision should go hand in hand with it. Rather we would say that without this the other will be of questionable value. With regard to the young persons to whom we have alluded as taking part in the service with the general congregation, they will of course be subject to such general supervision and guidance as may be afforded by the charitable institutions of their parish and the influence of those above them, but as regards those who may be chosen as choristers, we consider that a very special care should be exercised over them, and we do so in the confidence that it will be amply repaid. Experience has justified the expectation that out of such a care and training the character of many a good Catholic layman would be formed; and surely, at the present time, when the want of a Catholic middle class is increasingly felt, such a result would be of peculiar value. Nay, we do not doubt that in many cases, if due care were taken, even higher vocations would be elicited."

We take this opportunity of repeating the same caution, but we must add that we have no *fear*; and we believe that if due care be taken, and the various means resorted to which experience shows us are needed for the guidance of the young at so critical an age, we need have no doubt as to the result. Canon Oakeley very well remarks, as a reason for his unswerving faith in the result of his undertaking to provide a choir of boys, that it was not likely that what the Church

desired, and in behalf of which our own prelates had made a precise decree, could be a thing unattainable ; so we may say we cannot think that what the bishops have ordered to be done can be beyond the power of the clergy, assisted by the laity, to carry out in such a way as shall not damage the souls of the young whom it is desired they should train for the service of the choir. Failures have occurred, as is natural ; failures may occur again ; and it will always be a matter for consideration how far the experience of the past can be made to bear upon the future, so as to avoid dangers not before so well foreseen.* In fact, wherever we turn, not only in this department, but in every other, there are pitfalls. We allow, *e.g.*, a dance at a school feast, and some girl will imbibe thereby a taste for dances in general, and will propose perhaps to her mistress to give her an evening a week out for the purpose (a fact of recent occurrence). Again, we have a dramatic entertainment ; a taste for the low theatres may thus be engendered in some ; and to gratify this taste a boy has been known to steal his master's money. Even our general high-class education, unless something systematic is done to guide our young people who leave school, will be an equally dangerous gift, and the only result of learning to read will, in many cases, be that the youth takes for his literary pabulum the weekly number of the "Lives of the Highwaymen," or the "Popular Novelist ;" eventually, perhaps, much worse things.

Yet in none of these cases do we give up the use of a practice because of its possible abuse. Against such abuse we believe that the principles and practices of our holy faith duly implanted, with such appliances of other kinds as easily suggest themselves, will be by God's blessing, in the great majority of instances, an effectual barrier. A great protection, too, in the matter specially before us, will be found in

* It may be worth adding that one of the chief things that used to be supposed to tempt a choir boy from his home on an evening is in gradual process of disappearance, owing to the changes which have taken place in public taste, and the kind of musical entertainments which have become so widely popular. The style of the "Oxford" and "Canterbury" Halls, with their operatic music, &c., involves the employment of female voices, and the old-fashioned vocal chorus in which boys used to take a part barely holds its ground. In the respectable places where it still exists, the boys are not ill cared for, either physically or morally, and those of a less reputable kind it is not difficult to keep clear of. Of course, upon our idea of moral guidance and supervision, the former even would not be thought of ; but in the absence of this, and supposing boys to be allowed to do as they like, the danger would not be greater, if so great, as if they were left on the streets, or among the low theatres of the metropolis.

the feeling of responsibility for the performance of a sacred office which even boys may be made to feel, and which they will feel, if those above them, and who have the charge of them, show that they view the work of the choir in this light. The performance will then be begun in the spirit of the "Aperi, Domine of the office," a spirit far different from that engendered by the scramble into a gallery, where it is difficult even to keep up the idea that the singers are in the church at all. As we have before remarked, "if we are to save ourselves from disappointment with our choristers, we must make up our mind to give them all the sacred associations which our ecclesiastical system provides us with." It is well known that in the cathedrals and parish churches of France the *maitrise* or choir-school is an object of special care. A youthful band of some twelve or fourteen *enfants de choeur*, enjoying a holiday excursion in company with the clergy and other parishioners, a sight one may easily come across in a French town on a summer's day, gives us a glimpse of the paternal way in which such things may be managed. And here, too, we may cite the testimony of an English parish priest, who has had much experience in the care of singing boys. He expresses his belief that the fears sometimes entertained on this subject are more imaginary than real, and that, with a sound religious and moral training, and a good set of rules carefully acted on, he has never found any difficulty worth speaking of in the management of his choir.

We may add, as confirmatory of these remarks, that even in bodies external to us, but who follow closely in externals many Catholic practices, this way of dealing with choir-boys has been found effectual. Means are adopted from the beginning to mark their employment in this church as a sacred thing. On the whole, we have no reason to fear. Let us not doubt our own strength; to do so is as fatal an error on the one side as a tempting of Providence would be on the other, and since we have a clear line of duty to follow, let us believe that if we do it aright we shall not be disappointed in the result.

III.

Where should the singers be located? is the next point to be considered.

We take the liberty of quoting on this subject the few words we said on this subject in our January number:—

"We think that the good effect to be derived from this change in the material of our choirs will hardly be realized unless we at the same time alter

the *locale* of the singers. In this respect we have been equally out of harmony with ecclesiastical tradition and practice; and if we are to save ourselves from disappointment with our choristers, we must make up our minds to give them the advantage of all the sacred associations which that system provides. In other words, we must substitute a proper choral arrangement in connection with the Sanctuary for that now prevailing, and with which so many abuses are unhappily connected. There need, we think, be no practical difficulty about this, and we would suggest it as a matter worthy of serious consideration by our clergy and Catholic architects who are about to build or restore churches. The time is surely gone by for the stereotyped plan of an east-end with an altar under a large window, flanked by a smaller altar on either side, involving besides other inconveniences the impossibility of making any provision for the proper choral arrangements. Several instances might be adduced of churches recently erected in which the beautiful and convenient feature of side altars has been introduced, thus allowing the choir to occupy their proper place,—the organ of course being placed at the side, and ample space being still left for the Sanctuary proper. We should say that even in cases where boys cannot be at once procured for the choir it is very unadvisable to plan a building in such a way as to preclude a proper arrangement afterwards. Even a mixed choir can be accommodated *pro tempore* at the side of the chancel and contiguous to the organ; a plan, by the bye, which would go far towards securing that decorum among the singers, which the clergy find it quite impossible to enforce when they are placed at so great a distance as a west-end gallery."

Since these lines were written, we have reason to believe that more general attention has been drawn to this important point, and that the substance of the above remarks has met with a very general response in several influential quarters. Mr. Nary seems to admit that a church should, if possible, be "in possession of a choir connected with the sanctuary";—though we wish he had said so more distinctly;—and Canon Oakeley, as we see in the note to his Letter, thinks that in the "construction of all new churches, a provision for a choir near the sanctuary should be made indispensable." Our Manual clearly implies the same, and in one of its instructions even "*forbids galleries over the doors of churches,*" in order, as it says, "to prevent persons listening to the music with their backs to the altar" (p. 28). It is also forbidden to the conductor of the choir to have his back to the altar or to the people, when leading (*ibid.*). If a *tribune* is necessary for the singers, in default of their normal position in the choir (p. 12), such tribune is to be "*not far removed from the sanctuary*" (p. 13); or again, it is to be "*at the sides of the altar*" (p. 28).

These plans can of course be easily carried out in new churches; and it is well known that our Catholic architects are quite prepared to do so, without additional expence to the

building, and with the preservation of the same conveniences as to sanctuary, altars, sacristy, &c., as at present; or rather we may say with some additional advantage in point of arrangement. In larger churches, besides the choir seats properly so-called (in front of the sanctuary, but of course not hiding the altar), there might be a space adjoining the chancel and the organ, in which additional singers could, if necessary, be placed, and in which also orchestral performers could be conveniently located; and it is only in large town churches where such performers would be employed. Even with regard to churches already built, it would not in general be difficult to arrange a constructional chancel; or, if this is impossible, a tribune, or enclosed space, might be provided, near the sanctuary of course, and with the organ adjoining.

The question of the orchestra in church, we may here add, is rather a controverted one. The last "instruction" in the "Manual" states that "the use of instrumental music is in a simple state of toleration;" and by the synod of Utrecht it is expressly ordered that permission must in each case be asked; all which seems to show that orchestral accompaniments are to be used with caution, and only in circumstances where it is clear that no evil will result. Canon Oakeley has advanced strong reasons in the case of his own church for their retention, and we own to having often heard them there with peculiar pleasure. But his is just a case of that exceptional kind which seems almost to prove the contrary rule. Abstractedly, too, it is probable that most musical people would prefer a variety in the way of performance—that is, sometimes orchestra, sometimes organ, sometimes voice alone—just as is the case in secular music, where every kind has its place, and pleases in its turn. But granting the use of the orchestra, it appears still that a gallery over the door is generally to be considered inexpedient, clashing as it does with the instructions in the Manual. And, as we have seen above, another arrangement can without much difficulty be made.

To return: the effect of the arrangement we have described would be to impart an ecclesiastical character to the whole service, as well as to get rid of the abuses which are found to be inseparable from a number of persons assembled in a curtained enclosure in a distant part of the church, and so withdrawn from the observation and surveillance of the clergy. Architecture, too, would generally gain; for at present it is not unusual to find an expensive window with handsome tracery in the tower, or over the door of the church, completely destroyed, as an architectural feature, by an organ placed in front of it. When, as in many country churches,

the organ is small, it looks even worse, and what might be made an ornamental feature near the altar, becomes, when placed upstairs, a positive eyesore. Nor is the case mended when, as is sometimes the case, the window is left open to view, and a structure raised in one corner to contain the organ and singers. It is worth adding that on the plan described much smaller organs than those in general use would suffice, and thus a saving probably of £400 or £500 to the Church. We hear of organs being built at the present day on a scale out of all proportion with the churches in which they are placed; while too frequently a very inferior degree of attention is paid to that for which, after all, the organ is only the accompaniment.

It must be remembered, too, that a gallery near the ceiling of the church is generally a bad place both for organ and singers. Much of the effect is lost, and what there is will be found, especially as to the voices, to be much coarser and harder than when the waves of sound have a freer space. It may also be suggested that the cause of congregational singing at Vespers, &c., would be advanced by the plan proposed, since experience shows that people follow and join more readily and heartily when they see the singers and organ before them, and as it were in the midst of them.

As the question of congregational singing has been mooted, and as the subject is becoming one of increasing importance and interest, we propose to devote our remaining space to its consideration. It is probable that we have ourselves partly been the cause of this subject being brought into prominence in Mr. Nary's and Canon Oakeley's pamphlets, by our taking for granted that the proposals of the latter, though mainly directed to the training of select singers for the choir, were also meant to extend, to the youth of our schools generally, the advantage of musical tuition, though of course of a less scientific kind. He had expressly spoken of females joining, as part of the congregation, in the chants and hymns of the Church, and we did not suppose he intended this privilege to be confined to one sex only,—more especially as the other has temptations to contend with, against which an attraction of this kind would be of the greatest value as a counterbalance. The main subject of our remarks no doubt, as of Canon Oakeley's, was that of choir service. But as the question of large bodies of persons singing at Mass, and other offices of the Church, has been started, it will be well to consider it; and for this purpose we begin as before by quoting our two authors.

Mr. Nary first adduces arguments and authorities to prove that the congregation at large are entitled to join in singing the offices of the Church—the Mass included. We admit the force of much that he has said, and would have no objection to it with this condition, that there be a place found in his system for what the Church, as we have already seen, recognizes—the use of “figured music,” as well as a distinct provision for trained choirs, who, when there is congregational singing, may be able to lead and direct it: which indeed is the most fitting plan.

Mr. Nary proceeds as follows :—

It is only plain chant, or music simple as plain chant, that will ever really revive congregational singing. “Another and rather obvious argument in favour of the simpler music is,” says the accomplished essayist in the old DUBLIN REVIEW, “the opportunity which it gives for embracing the greatest number in the direct act of choral worship.” Shall we ever see the day when the simple chant of the Church shall be taught in all schools, along with the way of making the sign of the Cross, or the manner of assisting at Mass? Shall we live to see the day when, on entering a Catholic church during service time, we shall be struck, not with the damping spectacle of a congregation partly composed of unbelievers in the act of enjoying the pleasure of a Sunday concert, while the remainder, with closed books in their lap, or by their side, wait patiently or impatiently till the prolonged and a hundred times repeated *Amen* of the Gloria or the Creed deign to come to an end, but with the refreshing sight of an unmixed body of true worshippers, learned and ignorant, high and low, rich and poor, unostentatiously led by a select choir, engaged in heartily singing the praises of Him in Whose house they are assembled? To so consoling and truly Catholic a state of things should all our reforms tend; for it will only be when it is established that we shall be able to taste the sweetness, as well as delight in the beauty and feel the grandeur of that congregational singing which so many desire, but which is incompatible with an encouragement in churches of the music of Don Giovanni, Fidelio, Lodoiska, Il Barbiere, and Faust.

Then the writer would here use an argument which certainly ought to have no little weight with some of his suffering brethren, be they of those who have long sustained the struggle, or of those who are only just beginning to face, with feelings of wonder, that terrible enemy, concerning the nature of which the college lectures, most unfairly, left them entirely in the dark. The congregational singing of plain chant, or of music simple as plain chant, is the destruction of the tyranny of the choir. For though, in the performance of congregational plain chant, a choir is needed to lead the people, such a choir is a very different thing from the choir which now sheds gloom over the priestly life. The hired professionals or the amateur singers, down to the boy choristers, so fully conscious of your absolute need of them, may all be dispensed with. Plain chant is written for the compass of voice common to the generality of mankind. When once a good execution of it had been established among the congregation, no difficulty could be experienced in

securing the requisite number of voices to make a choir. If any became dissatisfied, their places would immediately be filled up with more disinterested candidates. As, in plain chant, there is no scope for brilliant display, no undue prominence for any one, there would be but few, if any, temptations to vanity, no bitter preferences, no wounded feelings, in short, none of those sad accompaniments of a modern English Catholic Church choir. In the writer's opinion, a priest, whose great grievance in life is his choir, deserves little sympathy if he refuses to take any notice of a remedy which would set both his conscience and his heart at rest.

Let us now hear Canon Oakeley:—

. . . . The spirit of song is contagious, and thus it is undeniably true that the arrangements I have ventured to advocate do actually bear, indirectly, upon what is called "congregational" singing. At the same time, I should not be candid did I not avow my impression that the Mass itself is not the proper department of popular vocalism. I delight in the many-voiced responses to the Litanies; I prefer (as a rule) to all others, those Benediction hymns in which all the people can join, and am quite prepared to believe that the Plain Chant *Te Deum*, sung by a multitude of enthusiastic worshippers, would be a religious treat of a very high order. But I am not disposed, as at present minded, to acquiesce in the view that the choral portions of the Mass are intended to be sung by the people. I think that the Mass is most properly regarded as an act in which the people are to share, in the way of attention and meditation rather than of direct and personal participation, and hence it is that I am favourable to such music as aids those mental operations, though I am as far as possible from denying that the Plain Chant, properly executed, may be such. Moreover, I am not prepossessed in favour of the practice by my own experience. Perhaps I have been unfortunate in the instances which have come before me, but I must say that they have not converted me to it. I once heard a Plain Chant Mass thus executed in France, and a real execution it was, as far as the music was concerned. The Plain Chant undoubtedly requires, for its due effect, a great number of voices; but I humbly conceive that they should be the voices of select persons who have also got ears, not of a multitude of excellent people, some screaming, others grunting, others mispronouncing the Latin, others singing out of time, others out of tune, and the whole together resulting in a concert, but certainly not of sweet sounds. If a certain number of persons in the body of the worshippers could be trained to join in with the choir, the effect would, no doubt, be excellent and most impressive; but if once we give out that the music of the Mass is meant to be what is called "congregational," we shall run the risk of having the music marred by unmusical intruders.

The above are certainly very fair statements of what can be said *pro* and *con*. We can easily imagine a priest, without adopting entirely Mr. Nary's line as to the exclusion of figured music, yet to a certain extent acting upon the views he has enunciated, and preferring on the whole a system of congre-

gational music to the hired services of a small number of singers. Especially would this be the case when the alternative was a choir of men and women of the usual kind, displaying all the tricks of their profession, and disgusting the more tasteful of the congregation by the "hundred times repeated (or rather bellowed out) Amens," of which Mr. Nary speaks, and of which all of us have had but too much experience. More still if the effect of the congregational singing were to make his church services more attractive and more numerous than before, and (if we may whisper so mundane a consideration) his offertories more productive;—for such, if we are rightly informed, has really been the case in more places than one. Another consideration, in favour of the principle at least, is to be found in the very common practice of congregational singing at Mass in the Catholic churches on the Continent; not, however, to the exclusion of choir singing, but combined with it. In France for instance, and also throughout Germany, it is almost the normal thing; and not only so, but the bishops, almost without exception, have of late years exhorted the clergy and people to cultivate still more the Plain Chant, in order that the offices of the Church may be celebrated with a still fuller body of voice, and with still greater beauty and accuracy; though it is to be remarked that they do not therefore reject the use of harmonised music, and certainly not the system of trained choirs. Indeed, as we know, a choir of men and boys in their proper place in the church is a *sine quâ non* in every French church, old or new, large or small. The late Bishop of Langres led the way in a pastoral on the subject of remarkable clearness and force:—

"The Song of the Church," says he, "does not attain the end desired unless a number of voices unite to sing it. It is, therefore, one of the cares of our ministry to spread the knowledge and practice of it among the faithful, and particularly the young people. We therefore formally express our desire that lessons be regularly given by all the schoolmasters of our diocese to the children entrusted to their care, and that in the course of the week the prayers of the following Sunday be studied and practised by all together with hearty application. Thus, children will come to contract a love for the divine offices, as they acquire the taste for and the knowledge and freedom of the holy melodies of the Church; and when a few generations should have been thus formed, and the most intelligent part of the population shall have contracted the happy custom of taking a vocal share in the public worship, a natural attraction would ally itself to the motives of faith, to attract people to the house of God; and it would become almost impossible that the public services of such a parish should be ignored, as they too often are by the men. Who shall grant us to see the day when the services of our Church shall no longer consist of a few solitary voices; but of the voices of the whole

Christian assembly, joining together in the same confession of faith, the same acclamations of love, the same expressions of prayer? . . . Far from thinking that in occupying ourselves with this subject we derogate from the dignity of our ministry, we consider ourselves to be performing an imperious duty, and providing for an urgent necessity."

It can hardly be denied that to accustom the people to join in the music has a wonderful tendency to strengthen their attachment to the Church and her offices; and perhaps this is one of the strongest arguments in favour of congregations joining in the singing, and supplies a reason that would hold good even when to a highly refined musical ear the performance might be of a mediocre or even repulsive kind. Thus much at least seems tolerably certain, that in the present day choir performances must be largely supplemented by the popular element if we are to keep our hold upon the people generally, especially the young. And what is true of our own people will apply to those external to us; for nothing is more likely to attract and impress the casual attendant at Catholic services than the heartiness and fulness with which they are rendered.*

With regard to Canon Oakeley's objections, they seem to a considerable extent to rest on his own experience: that is, we take

* Striking instances have been related of the advantages of accustoming the people at large to the music of the Mass, by which they retain a remembrance and love for it after a lapse of years. One instance was given some time ago in a letter from a French missionary, who came upon some converts in the wilds of America, who had long been deprived of all the privileges of the Church, but who remembered and could sing the Credo in the chant which they had been taught years before. Another was that of some sailors who, when Mass was to be celebrated on deck, offered to sing the whole through to the Church Chant—and did so from memory. To which may be added the words of the Bishop of Langres, speaking of the tradition of the Church Chant among the French people, "My dear friends and brethren, we have ourselves never seen precisely those sweet days of faith, but in our early youth we seem to have caught, as it were, their last twilight: we well remember that the sounds which first caught our ear were the sweet melodies of the Liturgy, and during that reign of terror when they were banished from our churches we bless God on recollecting the evenings when we were allowed to sing with the family the mysteries of that faith, at one time in the language of the Church, at another in the tongue of our ancestors." How like S. Jerome, when he says of the people of his day:—"Wherever you turn, the labourer at his plough sings an alleluia; the reaper sweating under his work refreshes himself with a psalm; the vinedresser in his vineyard will sing a passage from the Psalmist."

To which may be appropriately added the old but still fresh words of S. Augustine, on congregational psalmody: "What better employment there can be for a congregation of people met together, what more beneficial to themselves, or more holy and well pleasing to God, I am wholly unable to conceive."

it, not from what he has himself attempted, but what he has heard elsewhere. That the performance of the High Mass in France is too often, as he says, a "real execution," cannot unhappily be denied, and an unfortunate thing it is. Still we must remember that there are places of which report speaks very differently; and in all the evil is capable of remedy. It would be unfair, therefore, to condemn congregational singing altogether because it is sometimes bad, unless we could show that it must always necessarily be so. What is wanted in France, and on the Continent generally, is the *improvement of the singing*. The introduction, too, of even a small mixture of harmonised music with the unison chant, such *e.g.* as an occasional motett at the Offertory or Benediction, would be another means of awakening the people to a sense of the beautiful; and they would by degrees be shamed out of their present musical indifference. We are bound to say that in several churches in Paris, where the staple is the Church Chant, such a mixture has actually been introduced, and with the best effect.

And yet the way in which Vespers are sung in most French cathedrals by a body of people old and young,—school children even,—with Christian Brothers and Sisters of Charity at their head, and each with his or her "*Paroissien*," is very striking—and with all its simplicity and the mingling of a cracky or tuneless voice here and there, by no means wanting in impressiveness. And even in the High Mass it is a choice, on the one hand, between the rude singing of a French country town, such *e.g.* as Tréport or St. Valery (and imagination can hardly picture its rudeness); and on the other, those frightful attempts on our own side of the Channel to "execute" the Masses of Haydn and Mozart; setting aside altogether the question as to the sort of people who usually perform the latter.

Canon Oakeley speaks of organists abroad, who, because denied the use of figured music, take their revenge by introducing the lightest kind of organ playing. We believe the state of organ music in many parts of the Continent, especially in Italy (as for example in Florence), is about as bad as it can be.* But this arises from several causes. 1. The notorious decay of, and indifference to, sacred art among all classes. 2. The ignorance among organists of real organ playing;—of what befits the character of the instrument, and of the use to

* "Sound musical taste," says a recent writer, "is gaining ground everywhere but in Italy. As to the musical services in the churches, at one time it is a *Chaconne*; at another, some part of the Office, accompanied by music, in the style of a farce."

be made of it in church. 3. The miserable way in which the Church offices are performed, which deprives them of their due respect in the eyes of the people, and throws the organist upon some objectionable way of relieving the tedium of the service. In many cathedral churches it is no better; hence the little regard the people have for the divine offices. Is this to be wondered at? In how many places are the cathedral services sung by the officiators in the spirit of the Council of Trent, where it enjoins "*that they shall reverently, distinctly, and devoutly praise the name of God in hymns and canticles in the choir appointed for psalmody?*" Of course this duty remains the same whether the people assist or not;—for the service is equally a sacrifice of praise to God; still, wherever the choral offices of the Church are properly performed, they will always appeal to the affections of a goodly number of the faithful around; while to the wayfarer they are a real refreshment and solace, when he happens to enter some ancient minster at the hour of Mass or prayer.* It seems to us therefore that it is not so much the church chant *per se* at which people and organists so often revolt, as the corrupt and careless form in which it is performed. Should we experience this feeling *e.g.* at the services in the Benedictine Church at Belmont? or would the organist there be under a like temptation to vary the performance by polkas or waltzes?

We may here remark, that the system which commonly prevails in continental churches of omitting in choir performance the alternate clauses or verses of the text, and supplying their place by organ interludes (or *versets* as they are called), may probably be one occasion of the abuses alluded to, especially where the organist happens to be devoid of taste, or is intent only on showing his own dexterity. We may also remark here, how great an injury is caused to the chant itself, and how much the interest of the worshipper is diminished by this practice. In the Roman "*Salve Regina*"

* The following remarks by a thoughtful French writer seem to show that the infrequent celebration of the Divine Office is felt to be an evil:—"Quand on voit la piété se refroidir en tant d'endroits, il est naturel de craindre qu'on ne l'envoque le bon Dieu avec autant de ferveur, que le feu sacré ne languisse dans son sanctuaire. C'est le moment de se demander si les adorateurs ne seraient devenus plus froids en devenant plus rares, si le silence des temples n'a pas amené le sommeil des âmes."

("Le Saint Office considéré au point de vue de la Piété." Par un Directeur du Séminaire de St. Sulpice, 1847.)

for instance, it will at once be seen how completely the beauty and symmetry of the piece is destroyed by the omission of half its clauses, and the consequent breaking up of the chant. Instead of a continuous melody, one part naturally leading to another, we are treated to a series of "*disiecta membra*." It is bad enough where the organ interludes are of a suitable kind; but where, as is too often the case, they are made to furnish an opportunity merely for the display of the powers of the organ, little or no regard being had to the character of the melody, the practice becomes unendurable. The same may be said of many Kyries, Glorias, &c. Of course the evil is less, as regards the music, in the case of the hymns and canticles, where the same melody is repeated; but even here the omission of half (sometimes even more than half) the verses has a most disappointing effect. The interludes in question were probably intended as a kind of ornament to certain parts of the Office, and as a way of marking them off from other parts, such as the Hymn and Magnificat at Vespers, as distinguished from the Psalms; the Gloria, Sanctus, &c. of the Mass, as distinguished from the Introit and Gradual, &c.; but we think it clear that with proper management, all needful adornment can be given, without any omission whatever. By the employment of different kinds of voices, and a different kind of accompaniment, or again by vocal harmony in part, the alternate clauses may be varied to any extent that may be desired. And with regard to the hymn and canticles, there could be no objection to inserting short interludes between each verse. All the words would thus be sung, and the interludes would then serve very well, both as a rest for the voices, and as an additional ornament. Indeed, in the case of the Magnificat, when, e. g., there is a procession to another altar, it would be very desirable to lengthen it out in this way rather than adopt the awkward expedient of filling up the whole time in the middle or at the end. The truth is, however, that among our friends on the Continent, the choral arrangements require in many points careful revision and readjustment. We allude to such points as these:—the relations between the organist and choir; the proper kind of accompaniment for each part of the Office; the cultivation and employment of the various kinds of voice; a proper mixture of harmonised music; the respective uses of the choir organ and the great organ (the former being too frequently at present an inefficient and inefficiently handled instrument, while the latter is little more than an opportunity for an organist's show-off) the best means

of interesting the people in the choral services of the Church ; and many other particulars that might be mentioned.*

The above, we are aware, is somewhat of a digression ; but the points may be new to some of our readers, and it is often both interesting and useful to compare our ways of doing things with the practices of other Catholic countries.

To return, then ; the other idea of having the Mass sung by a trained choir, and with artistic music, to which the faithful may listen, is, (provided the music be of the right kind,) perfectly legitimate ; and it must be left to circumstances and discretion to decide in each case which plan should be adopted, or whether both should have their place. If in some of our larger town congregations we could follow the continental plan of having two Masses with music, say at nine and eleven (abroad the hours are usually eight and ten), there would be an opportunity of trying the congregational plan at the earlier one.†

We venture another suggestion, which may be taken for what it is worth : might it not be practicable and advisable sometimes to turn what is called the Children's Mass into a congregational one ? The children would not be ousted, for they would then simply become the leaders of the people's singing. This would probably be one way of attaching the people *as they grow up* to the services of the Church ; for when school children only are employed to sing (and this, of course, very much as a matter of school routine), it generally happens that as soon as they leave school all their interest in it ceases. The present plan, we believe, in the "Children's Mass," is to have a series of English hymns sung almost continuously from beginning to end. Many thoughtful persons have questioned whether,—carried to the extent it is, and with

* It is gratifying to know that in several French dioceses (*e.g.* Rouen), various improvements of the kind suggested are already in progress.

† Canon Oakeley thinks "the Mass is most properly regarded as an act in which the people share" in the way of attention and meditation, rather than of direct and personal participation, and that therefore he is not disposed "to acquiesce in the view that the choral portions of the Mass are intended to be sung by the people." It does not appear, however, that joining in the *choral* parts of the Mass *need* prevent the attitude of meditation here desired ; on the contrary, it might in many cases secure a degree of attention otherwise too often absent. It has, moreover, an immense amount of authority in its favour. Of course perfect liberty is left to individuals to assist at Mass in the way which most edifies them ; and this will be sometimes in joining the singing, sometimes in listening and meditating ;—as indeed will be the case also in those services such as Benediction, &c., where Canon Oakeley himself,—in accordance, we may remark, with the instructions in the "Ritus" for Benediction,—prefers that the people should join in the singing.

hymns of so miscellaneous a character,—this plan is likely to bring up the young in a way calculated to teach them afterwards to hear Mass well. Be this as it may, the taking up the whole time in singing hymns by the children, of which the older people who hear Mass at the same time know nothing, is often found very distracting to the latter, whereas on the plan suggested the wants of both would be met. The congregation would all join in the choral parts of the Mass, and the children might still have their hymns before and after it.

We deprecate strongly with Canon Oakeley the rushing unprepared into a congregational Mass, the result of which would in all probability be the disgust which he describes; and this all the more, that the ears of the present generation are generally more musically trained and more accustomed to sweet sounds than was the case some years ago, or is the case still with the majority of French congregations. We might certainly begin with "a certain number in the body of the worshippers," and with careful supervision there is no doubt that in time, as Canon Oakeley says, a very excellent and impressive effect might be produced. We need not exaggerate the difficulty, nor should we forget that in this country musical education among all classes has arrived at a high pitch, and that what was impossible at one time may be perfectly possible now. We understand that among other religious bodies, the fulness and precision with which whole congregations are taught to join in their services (and these, as a whole, not really more simple than our own) is quite remarkable. It only needs the re-establishment of the system of musical instruction in our schools, of which we have before spoken (which would only, after all, be in accordance with the *bene legere, bene construere, bene cantare* of old times), to bring us up to the same level, and enable our people to join heartily in our own services, which are, of course, of a far more beautiful and impressive character.*

* We have all heard of the astonishing effect produced by simple melodies sung by a large body of voices. Not to speak of the recent Centenary at Rome, which may be thought an exceptional case, there are many instances of the same kind, though on a smaller scale, such as the *Te Deum*, Hymns, &c., at Notre Dame de Paris, sung by 5,000 voices; and again, the *Miserere*, or *De profundis*, at Notre Dame des Victoires, sung by a mass of people, words and all, from memory. It is also well known, that when performances of the *Requiem Mass*, *Stabat Mater*, *Lauda Sion*, &c., have taken place, both in the unison melody sung by a large number of voices, and in figured music by a body of the best performers, the former has carried off the palm, even in the opinion of professional musicians. And as to unison singing, too often despised, the greatest musicians, down to the present day, have largely employed it, and have by its means produced some of their grandest effects. We may

There is one sentence in Mr. Nary's remarks which strikes us as deserving notice in a practical point of view. He says, "Plain Chant, or *music as simple as Plain Chant.*" It has, no doubt, also occurred to others, that in order to have congregational singing, we need not absolutely confine ourselves to one set of melodies; and seeing that the old chant depends so much for its effect upon a large number of voices, especially of male voices, it might often be desirable, in commencing with the young, to make use of a lighter and easier style of music, in which there should be a good deal of change and variety in the melody, as well as in the organ harmonies. In these days of varied and effective organ accompaniments, much might be done in this way.

With regard to the practicability of teaching the Church chant to our people, and especially to the young, we have the opinion of the author of "Christian Schools and Scholars" before quoted to the following effect, an opinion which would appear to be founded upon personal experience:—"If this suggestion to teach Latin and the Church chant be deemed preposterous on the ground of its difficulty, we would simply beg objectors to try the experiment before passing judgment. A very short experience will prove, that with ordinary perseverance nothing is easier than to make a class of boys recite fluently and chant correctly from notes the Vespers and Compline, or the Gloria and Credo, and other portions of the Mass, and we may add that nothing seems more acceptable to the people themselves. Possibly, in a congregation thus trained, there might be fewer complaints of children behaving badly in church: when children understand and take part in what is going on, they do not behave amiss."

We should hope that the experience of this writer would encourage others to make the attempt to teach the children of the parochial school, or at least a portion of them, in the way here suggested.

We think that in most, if not all schools, a certain number of boys will be found of sufficient respectability, good behaviour, and intelligence, to render it worth while to bestow upon them a somewhat higher kind of education; and this might well include an elementary knowledge of Latin, and of

add that the hearty singing even of a few hundred voices will have an excellent effect. Witness, for instance, the Holy Family, and other evening services, at S. Mary's, Chelsea; where the zeal of the clergy and the skill of the organist have combined to produce a most successful result. Similar examples may be found, we believe, at St. Anne's Spitalfields, and St. Joseph's, Kingsland.

some modern language, such as French. A plan of this kind would go directly to improve and elevate a certain number at least of our male population, and would probably enable many a young man to attain a better position in life than he or his parents could otherwise have hoped for. Some would thus be qualified to become assistants in bookselling, or printing, or mercantile establishments; or in such trades as chemists, &c., where some knowledge of languages is often of itself a passport to employment; others might become teachers; the more musical again might turn out organists; and some might even show themselves hopeful candidates for an education for the priesthood. In all such cases, it is easy to see the importance of laying such a foundation, and of giving with it also such a musical instruction as would both supply our young people with a pleasing recreation, and enable them to assist intelligently in the public services of the Church. The extra cost need not be great; indeed where, as in some of our parochial schools, an upper class is formed—distinct in a great measure from the ordinary poor-school—parents are often found not only willing, but glad to pay such a higher sum as suffices to meet the additional expense.

Nor it appears to us is this subject important only as regards the middle and lower classes. It has been observed with much truth of those "who have to do with the education of the young, in whatever class of life"; that "the omission of the musico-liturgical element seems an unaccountable oversight, more especially in this day when a double current may be noticed by the most superficial observer; first in the direction of general musical cultivation, and secondly in that of a revived taste for Catholic ritual. Of both these tendencies it will surely be our highest wisdom to avail ourselves." *

Complaints are sometimes made of the little interest shown by the more educated classes among us in the higher departments of literature, and it is a question how far this may not be due to an inadequate acquaintance with the beauties of the Church offices, and, as a consequence, a comparative lack of the imaginative and poetic element in the character. We throw out this idea, though the scope of our present inquiry does not admit of our pursuing it.

The remark of the author above quoted, as to the behaviour of children in church, is, we should think, well worth attending to. If young people are to attend Vespers, it seems at

* *Catholic Opinion*, Oct. 17. We are glad to have an opportunity of bearing testimony to the valuable services rendered by this periodical, not only on the above subject, but on many other important topics of the day.

least desirable that they should know what is being sung, even if they do not actually join. Children at the school age cannot be expected to keep up a spiritual meditation for any lengthened period, and the time of Vespers would therefore, unless intelligently employed, be apt to become one of idleness and *ennui*, as, indeed, we sometimes witness. Our nuns and teachers could with very little trouble do the same for the children here as the Sisters of Charity and Christian Brothers do in France; and it must be remembered that Vespers and Compline, with their oft-recurring Psalms, when once taught, will not readily be forgotten.

We do not here enter upon the question as to how far it is desirable to introduce Vespers in a congregation consisting chiefly of the less educated class; but if it is to be done, it should be done thoroughly, not in a maimed and incomplete manner. Under the notion of making the performance easier a practice prevails in some places of invariably singing the Sunday Vesper office; in other places only the Vespers of the Blessed Virgin. But surely this is to incur all the trouble of getting up, and accustoming the people to a Church office, and then to throw away its chief advantage—the beautiful adaptation to different days and feasts. If one office can be learned, all can. Let us suppose a class of boys to be taught Vespers. We begin with the Sunday Psalms and Magnificat, then we go on to the Vespers B. V. M., next to those of Confessor and Bishop. After this all others are easy, and the peculiarities of the coming festival have only to be prepared for beforehand.* While the Psalms and Hymns are being learned, the Antiphons will of course be in abeyance as far as the singers are concerned, and will be sung simply by the Priest and assistants. After this they will be easily taught to the boys, since they will be found to consist of melodies easy in themselves, and often repeated. Last of all will follow the teaching of the people to sing in alternate verses.

There is another mode of reconciling, or rather combining, the two departments of Choir and Congregational singing, which is worth mentioning in this place, and which we believe has been tried with complete success. This is by adopting the plan of *alternate* performance. Suppose, *e.g.*, the Psalms, Hymns, Magnificat, &c., are sung thus—one verse by the boys in the choir, the other verse by the men of the choir, joined by the whole congregation; or, again, the choir

* Such is the plan generally adopted in the diocese of Rouen, as we find by a popular office-book, prepared by authority of the Archbishop, and used in the schools.

in two divisions, and the congregation, also divided, might sing alternately. The former plan, however, gives more security, as the voices of the choir-men are of great use in guiding the congregation. So, too, where unison music is adopted for the Mass, the same mode of alternating the clauses may be adopted. In fact, a skilful choir-master, aided by a tasteful accompanist, can easily devise many agreeable and varied ways of performing even the simplest music, so as to produce an effect little, if at all, less attractive than the more pretentious class of figured music, and certainly far preferable to that music indifferently done.

We have been obliged to occupy two articles in the task which we originally proposed. The subject indeed is an extensive one, and we are aware how inadequately at last we have been able to treat it. Indeed many points, which we have been able to do little more than allude to, would each furnish materials for a separate paper. This necessity of compression has doubtless, too, given a somewhat dry and uninteresting character to our remarks. We trust, however, that we have at least been able to furnish some practical suggestions, which may prove worthy of consideration by our musical readers, and which may tend to promote unity of feeling and action among those who are labouring in the important field we have traversed. We may add that we have been careful not so much to express individual opinions, as to follow the guidance of a *consensus* of wise and thoughtful persons who have made these subjects their study. Above all, we have striven to ascertain the mind of the Church on the various points under discussion. And if it be true, as one of the greatest of Popes* has said, that "*there is no greater sign of the neglect of religion than the careless performance of the offices of the Church,*" we shall have done some service if we have in any way helped to bring about a musical celebration of these offices in a manner befitting their high and sacred character, and in a way suited to the wants of the Church in our own time and country.

We concluded our October article concerning this subject, by expressing our agreement with Canon Oakeley's letter in the "*Month*," which appeared in the same number. It is only fair therefore on the present occasion to quote the following satisfactory explanation which appeared in the November number of that periodical:—

* Benedict XIV.

Having said thus much with regard to the attacks which our notice of September has elicited, we may be allowed to add a few words of simple explanation on a far more important point. Our readers will readily believe that our remarks were written under the impression that the practical question—as to the possibility of attaining success in the training of school-boys to perform our present Church music—was perfectly open, and had not been ruled one way or the other by any ecclesiastical authority. Under that impression alone could we have ventured to enter on the discussion; and even under that impression we did so with reluctance, and only with the hope of drawing attention to considerations which appeared to us to have been neglected by former writers. Our readers may also be aware that, in the course of last spring, his Grace the Archbishop of Westminster wrote a short letter to one of those who had taken part in the discussion, in which he warmly approved of the line of argument adopted, and the suggestions made, by that writer. We feel bound to say, that, although some passages of the Archbishop's letter were present to our mind at the time of writing, still we did not remember that his Grace had added to the expression of his opinion, that any sudden change in the choirs of our churches would be unadvisable, the further intimation of a very strong desire to see female singers excluded. "The tradition of the Church," his Grace remarked, "excluding women from choirs is so universal and inflexible that it is not easy to understand how it should have been so widely forgotten in this country. I can only conceive that the confusion of all things under the penal laws, the shattered and informal state of the Church in England after its emancipation,—our poverty—not only of money—but of culture to do better, and finally, the force of custom in rendering us insensible to many anomalies, have been the real causes of our ever admitting, and of our so long passively tolerating, so visible a deviation from the tradition and mind of the Church." His Grace adds, "A sudden order to remove women singers, while as yet we have no boys trained to take their place, would be inconvenient and inconsiderate. I have not thought it right to issue any such order. But all that I can effect by the strongest expression of desire and persuasion, I shall endeavour to effect." Again, "A little time and care will rear in every school a sufficient number of boys; and I trust that we shall before long have a proper and efficient choir in every church." These words of the Archbishop's are more than enough to make us regret having unintentionally—and, indeed, with a directly contrary intention—put ourselves, so far, in opposition to an authority to which we are always glad to bow with perfect and hearty obedience.

We conclude our contribution to the discussion by remarking, that as we have ventured to justify, against what seemed to us undutiful attacks, the tolerance which the Church has hitherto practised in the matter in question, so we are the last to deny the clear obligation of the decree of the Synod of Oscott, or to desire to see the slightest delay in its execution when that delay cannot be justified by grave inconvenience.

ART. VII.—THE ORTHODOXY OF POPE HONORIUS.

The Condemnation of Pope Honorius. By P. LE PAGE RENOUF. London : Longmans.

Pope Honorius before the Tribunal of Reason and History. By the Rev. PAUL BOTTALLA, S.J. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT has sometimes been said that this or that book fulfils the end of its existence, by eliciting some complete and unanswerable reply, and then subsiding into oblivion. We account this to be the case with Mr. Renouf's assault on the orthodoxy of Pope Honorius. After F. Bottalla's answer, nothing more, we think remains to be said. Never was anything more complete and exhaustive. Mr. Renouf's incidental statements indeed, concerning infallibility, are avowedly reserved by F. Bottalla for his future volume on that general subject; but we do not think that there is one single remark made by Mr. Renouf against Honorius's orthodoxy, which is not directly met in the pamphlet before us. It is the more likely to be final, because the author fully accepts as genuine existing documents (p. 141), and his argument therefore in no respect depends on uncertain questions of criticism and philology. For ourselves, we have already once brought the case of Honorius before our readers; viz. last July, soon after the appearance of Mr. Renouf's pamphlet. In reviewing however F. Bottalla's labours, we will avoid, as far as possible, all repetition of what we have already said, and make our second article supplementary to our first.

In regard to Honorius's connection with Monothelism, there are two distinct questions to be considered: first, did he teach heresy or error *ex cathedrâ*? and secondly, was he himself polluted by any taint of heresy? It is only the first of these two questions which concerns Ultramontanes as such. They only allege, that no Pope is permitted by the Holy Spirit to teach heresy or error *ex cathedrâ*; and even were it true therefore that Honorius was a heretic, his heresy would not in itself even *tend* to disprove their doctrine. But in fact no assertion can be made more monstrously and more demonstratively false, than that Honorius had so much as the faintest leaning to Monothelism. And as it is a very important fact indeed that no Pope has hitherto fallen into heresy, no treatment of the Honorius controversy will content

a true Catholic, which does not vindicate that Pope's personal orthodoxy. Moreover, there are the claims of reverence and gratitude due to an illustrious Pontiff; claims peculiarly imperative, as F. Bottalla well points out (p. 138), on the Catholics of England. To Honorius's "paternal endeavours" indeed (p. 140), "after Gregory the Great, England is indebted for its conversion to Christianity."*

In the first place however we will consider the more vital question of the two; viz., whether Honorius taught heresy or error *ex cathedrâ*. Mr. Renouf indeed has so inextricably mixed up the two different issues, that we must ourselves look through his pages, for the purpose of discovering which arguments are intended for one and which for the other.

Mr. Renouf's first proposition then is, that Honorius taught Monothelism *ex cathedrâ*. And his first argument for this proposition is taken from the condemnatory sentence of various Popes and Councils. This argument is so wild, that we really think the author would not have alleged it, had he seen clearly in his mind the distinction between the two above-mentioned issues. Whoever reads carefully the language on which Mr. Renouf relies, even as he himself adduces it, will be irresistibly convinced that no such notion even occurred to the imagination either of Popes or Councils, as that of Honorius having taught Monothelism *ex cathedrâ*. Even as to the Eastern bishops of the Sixth Council, the strongest view which could possibly be taken of their unfavourableness to Honorius would be, that they declared him a heretic in the same sense in which they so declared Sergius, Cyrus, and the rest. But such censure is in a totally heterogeneous sphere, from any which would condemn him of having taught heresy *ex cathedrâ*.

F. Bottalla adduces a reply on this head which—though no reply is needed to such an argument as Mr. Renouf's—yet is not only conclusive in itself, but has a far wider range of importance than the particular controversy before us. If any inquirer desires to know the true relation which exists between Pope and Council, the one source of information which would most readily occur to him must be their respective demeanour when a Council assembles. No single instance can be named, in which any Pope has so spoken to a Council,

* The various triumphs of Honorius's Pontificate are well recounted by F. Bottalla's reviewer in the "Tablet" of Nov. 28. He speaks of Honorius's "successful exertions to make England Catholic, and Rome more than ever a city of perfect beauty"; and mentions also that the same Pope, "had brought to a happy conclusion the seventy years' schism of the Three Chapters in the churches of Istria, and another which had lasted so long in Scotland and Ireland concerning the time of celebrating Easter."

as to imply that its decision could add anything whatever to the irreformableness of a Pontifical judgment already pronounced. In many cases indeed, the Pope *begins* by laying down the law, enunciating the necessary decision, and requiring the assembled bishops to confirm it. Whenever this claim is put forth, you never find them protest against it as a tyranny or usurpation; on the contrary, they invariably take it as a matter of course. The Sixth Council affords a conspicuous instance of this. Pope S. Agatho, in addressing the bishops,

sets before them the formula of Catholic faith, which is the formula of the Apostolic Magisterium of the Roman See; and he informs them they must believe and confess it, and, on the other hand, condemn and reject every dogma contrary to it. Should they refuse to submit to this rule of faith, they would be in error, in schism, and reprobation. But he could not impose a formula of faith to be believed and confessed, unless his Magisterium was universally acknowledged as infallible. Therefore he *repeatedly insists on that capital point of doctrine*. He declares that the Roman See *has never erred, and that it never shall err*. He confirms and explains his assertion, by referring to the promises of Christ, to the example of all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and of the Œcumenical Synods themselves, which *had always received from Rome the paradigm of the doctrine they were to define*.—(pp. 89, 90.)

And now let us see how the assembled Fathers received his two Letters. Did they lift up their voice in protest against the fundamental doctrine of infallibility, which Agatho attributed to his See, and which he rested on the promises of Christ Himself? Was objection raised to the magisterial tone of the letters addressed to an Œcumenical Council? That large and influential assembly of bishops not only found nothing to censure in the letters of the Pope, but it received them as a whole and in all their parts as if they had been written by S. Peter, or rather by God Himself. The Fathers testified to their admitting the infallible and divine authority of the Letters, in the eighth session, as well as in the Synodical Letter addressed to Agatho; and in the *Prophonetic Letter sent to the Emperor they regarded them as a rule of faith*. No sooner did a suspicion arise that four bishops and two monks refused to adhere to them, than the Council ordered them to give an explanation of their faith in writing and on oath. They submitted, and solemnly affirmed that they accepted without reserve all the heads of doctrine contained in the Letters. Again Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, was, by sentence of the Council, deposed from his dignity and expelled from the Synod, because he refused to adhere to the letters of Agatho.—(pp. 90-92.)

Mr. Renouf at all events is not ignorant of logic. He will not maintain, on reflection, that the bishops first took for granted the infallibility of *all* Popes in *all* their ex cathedrâ decrees, and then proceeded to condemn of heresy one particular ex cathedrâ decree of one particular Pope.

Ultramontanes indeed generally allege, that all good Catholics at that time believed, more or less explicitly and consistently, in Papal infallibility. To this common allegation Mr. Renouf makes a reply, which is worth noticing, because it indicates another serious error into which he has fallen. He fancies that the Church teaches nothing as of *faith*, except that which she may have expressly *defined*. In his well-known Munich Brief, Pius IX. thus reproves this error:—"Even if the question concerned," he says, "that subjection of intellect which is to be yielded in an act of *divine faith*, yet such subjection ought not to have been limited to those things which have been hitherto defined by express decrees of Œcumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but extended to those things also which are delivered as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed through the world." Now the dogma that Christ has a human will and a human principle of operation, was taught by the Church as of faith from the very first. Yet Mr. Renouf argues that S. Sophronius and S. Maximus did not believe Papal infallibility, because they would not express their readiness to abandon that dogma at the Pope's bidding. F. Bottalla's remarks on this are so admirably expressed and so practically important, that we will give the whole passage:—

There are two kinds of cases in which doctrines may be said to be defined by the Pope. One regards doctrines which are not contained in a clear manner in the universal magisterium of the Church, and which are disputed on both sides; as was for several centuries the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, with many others. The second concerns doctrines clearly revealed and universally believed as dogmas of faith, although they have never been defined explicitly and under anathema by the authentic magisterium. Such was the doctrine of the Consubstantiality of the Divine Word, and generally all the doctrines concerning the Incarnation.* Now, the denial of a doctrine of the first class, before its infallible definition, does not constitute a sin of heresy: and if either of the two rival schools seek the supreme judgment of the Pope upon the question, it must be prepared to submit to that judgment, and be ready to reject the doctrine till then defended, and even to embrace the contrary teaching were it proposed by the Pope *ex cathedra*. But it is not so with doctrines of the other kind. A doctrine universally believed in the Church is infallibly *de fide*; the consent of the Church being equivalent to a formal and explicit definition. Therefore the Arians, the Nestorians, and the Eutychians were generally looked upon by the Catholics as heretics,

* It will be seen that F. Bottalla here draws the same distinction which we drew in our last number (p. 547), in reference to a certain argument urged against Mr. Liddon.

even before any infallible sentence had been pronounced against them. In such cases, when a definition is required either from the Pope or from an Ecumenical Council, the request is made *not properly for the instruction of the orthodox* as to what they should believe in the matter, but only to *crush and destroy error* with the overwhelming authority of a supreme judgment. As to Catholics, those who, from ignorance or prejudice, have been led into error, are bound to wait for the infallible decree, and must hold themselves in readiness to submit unreservedly to the same; but others, who are fully acquainted with the teaching of the Church, must be steady in their adhesion to it, while expecting that infallible decision which will finally confirm their faith. For the divine truth proposed in a decree of faith cannot possibly differ from the divine truth believed in the Universal Church. Consequently in such cases, when Catholics, already in possession of the Catholic truth, apply to the Pope or a General Council for a definition necessary to ensure the triumph of the Faith over heresy, they should not harbour in their heart the smallest doubt concerning the doctrine laid before the Apostolic See. Much less should they say, as Mr. Renouf would have them do, that they will change their opinion if the Pope decides the other way!—(pp. 42, 43.)

We are still engaged with Mr. Renouf's first proposition, that Honorius taught heresy or error *ex cathedrâ*. We pass to his second argument for this proposition. It is plain, he considers, from intrinsic evidence and contemporary circumstances, (1) that the Pope's Letters to Sergius express Monothelism; and (2) that the doctrine of those Letters was imposed on the Church by their writer, in his capacity of Universal Teacher. There are hardly any facts in history more certain, than are the contradictories of these two allegations. It will be more convenient however if we defer to the later part of our article our argument against the former. Here therefore we will only maintain—which is amply sufficient for the issue now before us—that Honorius's Letters to Sergius were not put forth *ex cathedrâ* at all. This particular part of the subject has been so exhausted by previous writers such as Orsi and Mazzarelli, that very little is left for F. Bottalla (as very little was left for ourselves in July) except to repeat their arguments. This however he does with great force and perspicuity. Thus first as to the *extrinsic* proof that Honorius was not speaking as Universal Teacher:—

According to the discipline and practice of the Church in ancient times, which was preserved for many centuries, there are some solemnities which were ordinarily observed when dogmatic constitutions were despatched by Roman Pontiffs. They were previously read and examined in the synod of the bishops of Italy, with whom the prelates of neighbouring provinces were sometimes associated; or in the assembly of the clergy of the Roman Church. Again, they were sent to the patriarchs, or even to the primates and metropolitans, that they might be everywhere known and obeyed. Finally, the

signatures of all the bishops were often required to those papal constitutions, to show their submission and adhesion to them. We do not now mean to spend time in demonstrating these points of ancient ecclesiastical discipline; they will be found proved beyond all question in the learned works of Constant, Thomassin, and Cardinal Orsi. It must be distinctly understood that we do not maintain the absolute necessity of the above-mentioned characters, as if no Papal utterance of that age could be *ex cathedrâ* if any one of these marks were wanting; but we maintain affirmatively, that Papal utterances bearing all these characters were to be regarded as certainly issued *ex cathedrâ*; and negatively, that no Papal decree could be considered at that time as *ex cathedrâ*, if wanting in all and each of those characters.—(pp. 18, 19.)

Secondly, as to the *intrinsic* proof that the Letters to Sergius were not *ex cathedrâ*. On this point it seems to us that our author speaks more consistently and intelligibly, than most of his predecessors. For these, in their desire to rid themselves of responsibility for such utterances as Honorius's, have often laid down tests of an *ex cathedrâ* Act, which in their obvious sense would equally exclude S. Leo's Dogmatic Letter and many other such documents. Nowhere have we seen the thing better expressed than by F. Bottalla:—

In order that a Papal utterance may have the character of a teaching *ex cathedrâ*, it is requisite first, not only that it should treat of a question of faith, but that it should *propose a doctrine to be believed or condemned*; secondly, that the Pope should show the intention of teaching as Pope, and of enforcing his doctrinal decrees on the Universal Church. If either of these two qualities be wanting, the letter cannot be said to contain any teaching *ex cathedrâ*. This is what all Catholics, without exception, admit as necessary and essential to an infallible document issued by Papal authority.—(p. 18.)

But what *doctrine* can Mr. Renouf even allege, as having been proposed in either of Honorius's Letters? Why, the Pontiff declared again and again that he intended to define no doctrine at all; but, on the contrary, as F. Bottalla well expresses it (p. 31), to "quiet the controversy by an economy of silence." In July we drew out this argument at length (pp. 213, 4), and shall here therefore say no more on the subject.

Mr. Renouf indeed argues (p. 20) that S. Sophronius had expressly applied for an *ex cathedrâ* judgment, and that Honorius's first Letter was a *reply* to that application. Now even if he had applied for such a judgment, it would be monstrous to infer from that circumstance that the Pontiff thought fit to give one. But F. Bottalla conclusively shows (pp. 36-41) that Mr. Renouf has confused two totally different embassies,

sent by S. Sophronius to Rome; and that the one sent through Stephen of Dora, to which Mr. Renouf refers, did not reach Rome until after Honorius's death. Indeed, F. Bottalla (p. 40) retorts S. Sophronius's authority against Mr. Renouf. For it was *after* Honorius's first Letter to Sergius had been received, that S. Sophronius solemnly declared that "the foundations of orthodox doctrine rest on the Apostolic See." Most certainly then he did not think that Honorius's response had committed the Apostolic See to any unorthodox doctrine.

Through the whole range of controversy then there can hardly be found a more certain fact, than that which by itself abundantly suffices for the Ultramontane argument: we mean the fact, that Honorius did not teach heresy or error *ex cathedrâ*. But in real truth there is no shadow of pretext for alleging, that he was personally infected with the heretical leaven at all. We are here to examine Mr. Renouf's arguments against this position; while in the course of doing so, we trust to show that the position itself is absolutely impregnable.

We will first consider the only one of these arguments, which possesses even any colourable or superficial plausibility; viz. that derived from the language of the Sixth Council, and again of the Eighth. Now Mr. Renouf is arguing, not of course against Gallicans, but against Ultramontanes; and Ultramontanes hold that no doctrinal decree of a Council is infallible, except so far as, and in the sense wherein, a Pope may confirm it. It is interesting doubtless, as a point of history, to consider what the bishops assembled at Constantinople intended to declare; but the only inquiry of doctrinal importance is, which of their decrees received Pontifical confirmation and in what sense.

We will begin with the otiose historical question. What did the bishops intend to declare? As we said in our former article, we think it more probable that in some of their statements they intended to accuse Honorius of heresy. F. Bottalla adopts a conclusion less discreditable to them. "No one of them," he considers (p. 97), "believed that the Pope held the impious doctrines which were execrated." "In the decree" of the 13th Session "Honorius was not condemned for any heretical tenet" (p. 107). Still he thinks (*ib.*) that there was "a Greek faction in the Sixth Synod, which it was impossible to keep in thorough control;" and which not improbably "contrived to vent all its bitterness against Honorius in the final synodical exclamations:" though he denies that this faction prevailed in the previous decrees. Nay even as to the decrees, he recognizes and "strongly denounces" "the exaggeration

and bitterness of expression" which they display (p. 108): due, as he thinks, "to a strong faction which exercised its influence in that Council and *carried the day*." It is with great diffidence that on any question of ecclesiastical history, however comparatively insignificant, we differ from F. Bottalla; but we still think the other view more probable. We think it more probable, that the majority of bishops intended, in their decrees no less than in their acclamations, to declare Honorius heretical; though they were careful to insert no such expression in their definition. This latter of course they did not attempt; for they well knew how hopeless it would be to expect Pontifical confirmation of any such sentence.

We will not however argue this little point with F. Bottalla. Nor indeed should we have referred again to the question at all, were it not for the great importance of making perfectly clear to Mr. Renouf and his sympathizers, that it is one of no controversial importance whatever, and one freely debated among Ultramontanes themselves.

There is nothing then about the Sixth Council which concerns our argument, except S. Leo's confirmation thereof. Now S. Leo II.'s infallible judgment contained two different portions: he confirmed a certain declaration of the Council, and he added a certain elucidation of his own. What was that declaration of the Council? Exclusively the *definition*. F. Bottalla proves this with irrefragable cogency from p. 108 to p. 110. In addition to the testimonies for this conclusion which we cited in July (pp. 219, 220), he mentions that the bishops themselves, in petitioning the Emperor to acquaint the patriarchal sees with what had been done, requested him only to send to those sees an authentic copy of the *definition*.

It has sometimes been urged indeed, that S. Leo, by not expressing any *disapproval* of the Acts when he received them, implied assent to every single portion of their contents. We cannot for a moment acquiesce in such reasoning. We have more than once had occasion to comment on the inexpressibly difficult task, which in each successive century devolves on the Holy Father. He must not permit anything which shall compromise the Truth; yet, on the other hand, he must so defend the Truth, that there may be the smallest possible dissension among Catholics, and that unstable minds may be exposed to the smallest possible temptation towards rebellion and schism. It was in this critical and most anxious navigation between Scylla and Charybdis, that Honorius himself made the one mistake of his otherwise illustrious Pontificate. And the ties between East and West were even looser in the time of S.

Leo II. than they had been in those of his predecessor. One only question have men any right to ask. Did S. Leo speak with sufficient explicitness in his official Letter, to make clear in what sense he consented to Honorius's anathematization? This he certainly did. It would have been wrong to say less; but under then circumstances it would probably have also been wrong to say one iota more.

What is said then concerning Honorius in the definition strictly so called? Nothing which implies ever so remotely that Honorius held, or tended to hold, the Monothelite heresy. "The devil," it is declared, "had found suitable instruments for his design" of promoting Monothelism, and Honorius was one of them. But even had its wording been doubtful, S. Leo's own statement is the one decisive and authentic authority, as to the sense in which Catholics are to receive that definition. Now S. Leo not only does not class Honorius with the heretics, but draws the most express distinction between him and them: as F. Bottalla points out in pp. 110-113. He anathematizes "the inventors of the new error;" and also Honorius, who "permitted" the immaculate to be "defiled."*

And the meaning of these words he still more clearly explained in his Letter to the Spanish bishops, where he says that Honorius's offence was his having fostered the heresy by neglect, instead of repressing it at the outset. Indeed, as we argued in July (p. 221), S. Leo's language not only does not condemn Honorius of heresy: it emphatically

* "Τῷ βεβήλῳ προδοσίᾳ μανθῆναι τὴν ἀσπίδον παρεχώρησε." F. Bottalla translates this "permitted the immaculate to be polluted by profane betrayal;" so that "profane betrayal" shall be ascribed, not to Honorius, but to the Monothelites. We quite agree with him (p. 112) that "the Greek text easily and without the slightest strain yields" this sense, and that in every respect this sense is preferable to the other. And in a letter to the "Tablet" of December 12, he adduces a strong confirmation of his view from S. Leo's context: for the very word "betrayal" suggests a remembrance of what S. Leo had said just before; viz., that certain successive patriarchs of Constantinople had been "ὑποκαθιστάς" "traitors lying in ambush." At the same time the importance of F. Bottalla's amendment rather consists, we think, in greatly softening the tone of S. Leo's language about Honorius, than in affecting its substance. We are obliged to say this in self-defence, because in our former article we acquiesced in the other interpretation. Whichever of the two be taken, our argument in the text equally proves, that S. Leo's words are conclusive for his belief in Honorius's perfect orthodoxy. And when the divinely appointed guardian of the Faith culpably permits the growth of deadly heresy, it seems to us quite intelligible that such neglect should be characterized as a "profane betrayal" of his duty. At the same time of Bottalla has quite convinced us that S. Leo did not apply the phrase to Honorius's conduct.

acquits him of that charge. Let us take a parallel case. A mutiny arises in some regiment, and the Colonel is accused before a Court Martial of being concerned in it. The Court pronounces that Captains A and B, Lieutenants C, D, and E, &c. &c., were concerned in the mutiny; nay, and that the Colonel himself did not, as was his duty, detect it at its beginning and promptly put it down; but on the contrary, by his neglect fostered its growth, and permitted the loyalty of the regiment to be stained. No one of common sense would understand their verdict otherwise, than as condemning the Colonel indeed of very culpable neglect, but acquitting him of all sympathy with the mutiny. Had Honorius been himself disposed to Monothelism, his *neglect*—instead of being a calamity—would have been the best thing for the Church which under circumstances could happen.

Now lastly, how much is involved in the sentence of anathema passed upon Honorius by S. Leo II. ? F. Bottalla is careful to answer this question:—

It implies nothing but that his name was to be erased from the diptychs, and his likeness from the pictures in the churches; because it was customary, especially from the beginning of the seventh century, for the names of all orthodox Bishops to be inserted in the diptychs, and their portraits exposed in the churches. Now Anastasius relates that, after the sentence of the Sixth Synod, the names of Sergius, Cyrus, Paul, Pyrrhus, and Peter were expunged from the diptychs, and the pictures of them destroyed; but he does not say anything of the name of Honorius having been erased, or of his images being removed from the churches or effaced. His name undeniably is found in the Oriental diptychs, and we still have the laudatory notices which accompanied his name. All things tend to corroborate the view, that the severe sentence pronounced by the Sixth Synod against that Pope was tempered in its execution, because he had not been condemned for heresy.—(pp. 135, 6.)

In regard to the Eighth Council, we spoke of its definition in July (pp. 222, 3). Over and above what we there said, we would refer our readers to F. Bottalla's excellent remarks in pp. 132-4. But we must not go a second time over the same ground.

To sum up. Mr. Renouf maintains that Honorius was condemned as a Monothelite heretic. We rather incline to think, that the majority of the bishops of the Sixth Council did consider and declare him heretical. But their *definition*, at all events, contains no trace of this, and S. Leo II. only confirmed their definition. Moreover, in the very act of confirming this definition, he pronounced expressly, or at least by most manifest and undeniable implication, his predecessor's

innocence of heresy. He anathematized Honorius, not for heresy, but for what may be called misprision of heresy.

We are encountering Mr. Renouf's second proposition; viz., that Honorius was personally imbued with Monothelism. And we have now considered what, as we observed, is the only argument of his, which possesses even superficial plausibility. He also, however, infers Honorius's unorthodoxy, from the whole series of events which elapsed, between the writing of that Pontiff's Letters and the Sixth Council. This part of his argument we totally omitted to consider in July; but F. Bottalla gives it a crushing reply in every particular.

Mr. Renouf then argues (1) that Sergius regarded the Pope as assenting to his own Monothelite doctrine. But F. Bottalla answers (p. 33), that if the heretical patriarch had really so thought, it is most unaccountable why he gave the Pontifical Letters no publicity. Yet he "was anxious rather to withdraw them from view and bury them in the archives of the Church of Constantinople; where they were found in their Latin autograph, accompanied by a Greek version, at the time of the Sixth Council. Pyrrhus also, the successor of Sergius, does not appear to have published them; but only to have put in circulation a small extract from the first of them, which admitted of being misconstrued in an heretical meaning" (pp. 33, 4).

Then (2) great stress has been laid by orthodox writers on three distinct and independent contemporary witnesses of Honorius's orthodoxy: Abbot John, Pope John IV., and S. Maximus. Mr. Renouf replies (p. 15) that their evidence is "really that of one man, and that one an interested and mendacious witness:" or, as he puts it more amiably in a letter to the "*Westminster Gazette*," that Abbot John was "an interested liar." F. Bottalla pays Mr. Renouf off in his own coin; and tells him roundly that his "passage is one tissue of impudent assertion, suppression of truth, and blundering error." Let us look at the facts.

Abbot John was Honorius's secretary; and in that capacity wrote the very Letter which has been chiefly called into question. He testifies that it denied the existence in Christ, not of a human will, but of two distinct and contrary human wills. Mr. Renouf replies to him in effect, what Dr. Johnson on one occasion said outright: "Sir, you lie, and you know you lie." And this to one who, as F. Bottalla points out (p. 62), was declared by S. Maximus "a most holy man"!

Abbot John spoke from personal knowledge; while Pope John and S. Maximus argue from the contents themselves of the Letter. But all three distinctly and independently

witness the tradition of Honorius's orthodoxy, which prevailed in their time; and (as F. Bottalla observes in p. 65) "each of them pledged his own credit in the defence of Honorius which they put forward." Again, Mr. Renouf speaks (p. 15) as though S. Maximus said nothing in the Pontiff's behalf, beyond appealing to Abbot John's testimony; whereas F. Bottalla mentions (pp. 62, 3) that in his epistle to Marinus the Saint fully examines Honorius's Letter, and argues for its orthodoxy from its own internal evidence. Nay in that epistle (Bottalla, p. 73) "he represents Honorius as not only unstained with Monothelism, but also as one of the most zealous Pontiffs who resisted that heresy."

Mr. Renouf thus argues (3): "the fact that Pope Martin I. and the Lateran Council heard Honorius quoted in a dogmatic letter as an authority for Monothelism without any contradiction being offered, is a sure sign that his cause was no longer held to be defensible" (p. 17). But (Bottalla, p. 75) that very Pope, on opening that very Council, declared that his predecessors had most constantly resisted Monothelism. It is the oddest possible reasoning, to argue from his *silence* on one occasion, that he had *spoken* mendaciously on another. Two further replies are also given by F. Bottalla. It was not only Honorius's Letter, he urges, which the Fathers heard alleged for heresy without contradiction. They "heard without any contradiction the names of S. Gregory, S. Cyril, S. Athanasius, and the rest, quoted as authorities for Monothelism; and yet no one believes this to be a sure sign that the cause of these holy Doctors was no longer held to be defensible" (p. 78). But in truth Honorius's heterodoxy was by implication denied throughout the Lateran Council.

In the course of the Council itself many Libelli were read, all concerning the Monothelite controversy. . . . *In all these Libelli and Synodical Letters the Roman See is spoken of as the foundation of faith, as the teacher of truth, as the centre of Catholic doctrine:* in all of them the four patriarchs are unanimously denounced, together with other partisans and promoters of the new heresy. *But we find no allusion, direct or indirect, to Pope Honorius.* This omission cannot be explained, except by supposing that no one considered the doctrine of Honorius deserving of such denunciation. We must not, then, follow Mr. Renouf in believing that at the time of the Lateran Council the cause of Honorius was held to be no longer defensible; on the contrary, it was then considered that no plausible ground could be found for any charge of heresy against him.—(pp. 79, 80.)

Mr. Renouf (4) speaks disparagingly (p. 15) on "the *negative* testimony of Pope Agatho." But we showed in our

former article (p. 218) that S. Agatho's "testimony" was by no means "negative;" that he characterized Honorius as a man "thoroughly instructed in the Lord's doctrine."

Mr. Renouf's statement (5) will have been observed, that so early as S. Martin I.'s time Honorius's cause was no longer considered at Rome to be defensible. In p. 13 he speaks more distinctly. "His own Church first defended him, then maintained an ominous silence about him, and finally joined in his condemnation." F. Bottalla (p. 74) cites Dr. Döllinger's parallel assertion, that Honorius was "abandoned by all" at Rome, because of his Monothelism. But how is all this consistent, asks F. Bottalla, with the epigraph engraven on his sepulchre, in which he was described as a worthy successor to S. Gregory, both in doctrine and virtue? How is it consistent with the undeviating testimony of Honorius's successors, from John IV. to S. Agatho?

Nor is there indeed any appearance whatever—but much the contrary—that any predecessor of S. Leo II. considered Honorius to have injured the orthodox cause by his unwise discipline of silence. We ascribed this change of Roman view, in our former article (p. 222), to the information from the East which S. Leo must have received on return of the Legates. At the same time we need hardly say, that S. Leo's solemn judgment on a dogmatical fact must be humbly accepted as infallibly true; and that no Catholic, since that judgment, has been at liberty to doubt the existence of this one drawback, from the merits of a Pontificate otherwise so glorious.

We now come finally to what must be considered at last the one most satisfactory appeal on this issue; viz., the actual content of Honorius's Letters. This question we expressly deferred in our former article (p. 224) to a future occasion; and by discussing it, we answer the only further argument of Mr. Renouf's which remains to be considered.

F. Bottalla has expressed in a few pages (7-16) with such masterly clearness and completeness the Monothelite tenet, that nothing remains for us so far, except briefly to place his view in our own way before our readers. Among all the ramifications of Eutychianism, Monothelism seems on its surface the least unintelligible. It was the fundamental notion of Eutyches, that Christ's two natures are blended and mixed up together by their union in God the Son; but when the question was asked him what is the "tertium quid" which results from this intermixture, he was baffled. Now Monothelism gives an intelligible account of itself; and it has

moreover the advantage of retaining the Catholic phraseology, on Christ's existence "*in two natures.*" We hope we shall not be thought irreverent if, for the sake of illustrating this Monothelite doctrine, we avail ourselves of a well-known Eastern story. Its hero shall be its narrator:—

"I was endowed by this beneficent genius with a singular power of deserting my own body when I pleased, and shooting my soul into the body of any dead animal I might meet. My first experience of this power was with the body of a magnificent stag, which had just died from breathless exhaustion in running. Immediately its body—now my body—rose into life, and I gazed with complacency on the beautiful form reflected in a neighbouring brook. Soon however the hunter's horn sounded at a distance. My cervine nature at once experienced a keen emotion of deadly fear, while my human nature at the same moment experienced an emotion of wonder at that fear. Speedily however my reason told me that danger was near at hand; and my feet, set in motion by command of my will, carried me off at a speed to me astonishing, till they placed me in a safe spot."

Here appears on the surface a true case of one person in two natures. The narrator says, "*I experienced at once a cervine emotion of fear, and a human emotion of wonder at that fear.*" We cannot be surprised, in the parallel case, that Monothelites sincerely believed themselves to hold the dogma of "*two natures.*" But a little consideration of the fable will show that (without speaking of the human nature) the cervine nature at all events was not possessed in its integrity, but on the contrary was destitute of its principal element. There was no cervine *principle of operation*. The immediate cause, which set in motion the narrator's cervine legs, was his *human will*. The fable therefore affords a true analogy to the Monothelite tenet. According to that tenet, there is in Christ no human principle of action, no human will; but all things done by the sacred humanity are caused immediately by command of the divine will.

Now it would carry us much too far, if we attempted to give any sufficient account of the frightful results which issue logically from Monothelism. But it is important, even for our present purpose, to touch the matter superficially; and we will briefly indicate therefore two of these results.

Firstly there is no more vital dogma of the Faith, we need not say, than that the acts and words of Jesus Christ are the acts and words of God the Son; and not in any proper sense the acts and words of God the Father, or God the Holy Ghost. This vital dogma is utterly overthrown by Monothelism. Let

us explain this statement ; and let us begin with contemplating His words.

Now we ask this preliminary question :—To what person are those words truly ascribed, which are uttered by human organs ? Of course to that person who has power over those organs, and who commands them to articulate those words. Read F. Surin's most interesting narrative about the Ursulines of Loudun. Some evil spirit possesses a certain nun, and compels her mouth to utter frightful blasphemies. *Whose* words are these blasphemies ? The nun's ? No one would dream of saying so ; they are the words of the evil spirit.

Consider then our Blessed Lord pronouncing, e.g., the Sermon on the Mount. Whose are those blessed words ? They are the words of Him who commands our Lord's vocal organs to articulate them. But according to the Monothelites, this command is issued by no will except the divine ; and every act of the divine will is common of course to the Three Divine Persons. According to Monothelism then, it is the Father no less truly and primarily than the Son, Who says, "Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit" ; "Not My will, but Thine be done" ; "The Father is greater than I" ; &c., &c. If Christian dogma really resulted in such an issue as this, it would of course be self-contradictory and self-condemned. And what we have said on Christ's words, applies with equal force to His acts.

Then, secondly, Jesus Christ came on earth, as for other reasons, so also very prominently for this ; that by practising human virtue, He "might leave us an example for us to follow His steps." We shall see subsequently the stress laid by Honorius on this doctrine. But human virtue consists exclusively in due regulation of the human will ; above all, in its absolute and unreserved submission to the divine will. The Monothelites then in effect denied that He gave us any example of human virtue whatever.

Our direct purpose, in mentioning these two results of the heresy, is to make clear the precise and most unmistakable distinction between Monothelism and orthodoxy. But we have been far from unwilling incidentally to show, that this distinction is no minute and subtle splitting of hairs—as misbelievers and indifferentists love to declare—but on the contrary among the deepest and widest distinctions which can possibly be imagined ; that the Monothelite heresy subverts Christianity from its very foundation.

Whoever would see a fuller explanation of the Monothelite tenet, and an exposition of its historical relations with Euty-chianism, cannot do better (as we have already said) than

study carefully F. Bottalla's most instructive pages. For ourselves we thus briefly sum up. Catholics and Monothelites agree that Christ possesses, not only human sensations of the body, but human emotions of the soul. They differ, in that Monothelites will not ascribe to him any human *will*, any human *principle of operation*; whereas Catholics say that His human nature is in itself operative, its operative principle being His human will.

To our mind it is one of the most instructive facts in the world, as showing the absolute blindness which prejudice can superinduce, that persons have been found, who can read Honorius's Letters and suspect them of any the remotest tendency to Monothelism. We have no hesitation in saying, that they demonstrate him to have held the orthodox dogma as clearly and explicitly, as it was held by S. Sophronius, S. Maximus, S. Martin I., S. Agatho, or S. Leo II. We cannot of course say that he *expressed* that dogma quite so clearly as did those Saints; simply because he knew nothing about Monothelism, and did not therefore express orthodoxy with a direct view to the contradiction of that heresy. But even in the way of *expression*, we must maintain that his Letters are fully as complete and distinct as the renowned exposition of S. Leo I.; and indeed, as will presently appear, somewhat more so. So completely is this the case, that if other circumstances permitted one to consider the doctrinal portion of his Letters as having been put forth *ex cathedrâ*, there would be nothing in their *doctrine* to invest this supposition with any kind of improbability.

The Monothelite issue assumed different forms, as the controversy advanced through successive stages. At first the question asked was, "Are there in Christ two operations, or is there only one?": but latterly the question rather was, "Are there in Him two *wills*, or is there only one?" It is quite immaterial however, which of these questions you ask: for on both, Honorius's answer on the orthodox side is as clear as noonday light. We begin with the first. Did Honorius hold that there is in Christ a human principle of operation? In other words, did he hold that Christ's human nature—His human soul—is *operative*? Or, on the contrary, did he hold (with the Monothelites) that it is purely passive? We should be glad to see how Dr. Döllinger or Mr. Renouf could give a more simply unmistakable answer to this question, than does Honorius in his second Letter. "We ought to confess," he says, "two natures in Christ . . . *operating and principles of action*:" "*ἐνεργούσας καὶ πρακτικὰς*": "operantes atque operatrices." Again. "Let us preach," he says, "the two

natures *each operating its own proper acts:*" "τὰς δύο φύσεις ἐνεργοῦσας τὰ ἴδια:" "duas naturas propria operantes."*

So much on the human operation. But put the issue in its other shape. Did he hold that in Christ there is a human will? Turn to his first Letter. "We profess," he says, "one will of our Lord Jesus Christ: because plainly our *nature* was assumed by the Godhead, not the *sin* in it; that is, our nature as it was created before sin existed, not that which was corrupted after the transgression." The question to be here asked is most simple, and admits but of one possible reply. Is Honorius speaking in these words of Christ's divine or human will? Mr. Renouf makes the astounding remark (p. 16) that "the context of this passage" proves its reference to the *divine* will. Can he be in his senses? Does he think, or did Honorius think, that Adam before the fall was a plant? a vegetable? at the utmost a brute? Was not Adam created in possession of a *will*? That which he was happy in *not* possessing, was a second will at variance with the first. Now Honorius's distinct argument is this:—"Since Christ assumed that human nature which existed before the fall, He has only one will, and not two." Yet Mr. Renouf will have it, and Dr. Döllinger will have it, that the will of which the Pontiff speaks is the divine. When should we have heard the last of it, if some unlucky Ultramontane had talked such nonsense? Judging indeed from his pamphlet, we cannot ascribe to Mr. Renouf any high order of ability; and we are confident that Dr. Döllinger's intellectual power has been egregiously overrated: but still neither of the two is an idiot. How can we account for so stupid a blunder, unless we ascribe it to the blinding force of prejudice?

Mr. Renouf, in desperation we suppose, attempts this argument:—"If Honorius believed that the real question at issue" concerned two human and contrary wills, "he ought

* There is a little misprint,—"operantis instead of operantes,"—in F. Bottalla's citation of this passage (p. 52), which would much lessen the force of his argument if it were not observed.

Mr. Renouf (p. 22) cites, almost entire, the fragment of Honorius's second Letter from which these two quotations are derived; and yet *omits* the former quotation, merely substituting marks of omission. This is pointed out by F. Bottalla. In our former article we mentioned (p. 214, note) that he ends his quotation in the midst of a sentence; and that if he had inserted the two remaining lines, the complete fallaciousness of his argument would have been manifested. In October we had to complain (p. 450) that in quoting two sentences, as from S. Jerome, to prove the fall of S. Liberius, he omitted from one of them three words, which would have shown the sentences to be in flagrant mutual contradiction. All this is incredibly unfair.

to have condemned Sophronius for manifestly heretical doctrine" (p. 16). Never was there a more suicidal piece of reasoning. It is Mr. Renouf's very contention, that Honorius thoroughly agreed with Sergius; and Ultramontanes on their side (F. Bottalla is an instance) always admit, that he did thoroughly coincide with what he *understood* to be Sergius's mind. Did Sergius then represent S. Sophronius and himself as having been at issue, on the question of two human wills in Christ? It was not possible he could have ventured on such a calumny; which must at once indeed have aroused the Pope's suspicion, and overthrown Sergius's whole iniquitous design. The most cursory perusal of that Patriarch's letter will show, that he represented S. Sophronius and himself as absolutely united on every point of dogma, and as only having differed for a time (though not still differing) on the advisableness of a certain expression. In what Sergius said about two human and contrary wills, he was adducing an argument against the advisableness of the phrase "two operations." Such a phrase, he said, scandalizes many; (1) because it has not been used hitherto by Christian teachers, and (2) because a misunderstanding of it leads men to preach the impious tenet, of two human and contrary wills in the Incarnate God. Since Sergius then had expressly said that the phrase "two operations" was leading men to this impious doctrine, what could be more natural, than that the Pope should occupy a considerable portion of his Letter in denouncing the said doctrine?

In fact Honorius, thoroughly and explicitly versed though he was in Catholic dogma, had not the slightest or most rudimental knowledge of the Monothelite heresy, nor any suspicion whatever of Sergius's real drift. And we are thus able to understand the fault, for which he was afterwards anathematized. It was twofold. Sergius's letter was most carefully worded indeed, still it contained one or two expressions which were indubitably Monothelistic;* yet these did not awaken the Pontiff's suspicion. Then secondly, even if Sergius had avoided every the slightest indication of his heresy, it was still Honorius's duty, not to take Sergius's statement of the case for granted, but to investigate through trustworthy persons the true theological phenomena of the East. He

* For instance: "As our *body* is ordered and directed by our intellectual and rational soul, so also, in the case of our Lord Christ, His whole human composition was always . . . moved by God (*θεοκίνητον*)." "The divine nature truly operates the salvation of all, through the body *which clothes it* (*τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν σώματος*), so that [His death] is the suffering indeed of the *flesh*, but the operation of God (*τοῦ δὲ Θεοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*)." F. Bottalla gives an excellent analysis of Sergius's letter in pp. 50, 51.

failed to perform this duty, and by his failure brought down on the Church a heavy calamity.

But it will be more satisfactory and will greatly strengthen our case, if we proceed to give an analysis of the Pope's two Letters; and if we print them in extenso at the end of our article, that our readers may be the better able to judge on the correctness of our analysis. We will but premise, that they do not exist in the original Latin; but only in a Greek translation, and in a Latin translation of that translation. If therefore there is found in them occasional awkwardness or obscurity of expression, there is no reason whatever for thence inferring, that such awkwardness or obscurity is attributable to Honorius himself.

He begins his first Letter by praising Sergius warmly for vetoing a new theological term, "which might scandalize the more simple;" and he continues by declaring the dogma of the Incarnation, in terms which remind one forcibly of S. Leo's Dogmatic Letter. We must not however fail to point out that this exposition contains one clause, which is more express in the assertion of Duothelism than is any portion of S. Leo's. He speaks of Jesus Christ as "operating divine acts *through the mediation of the sacred humanity*," "*ἐνεργούντα τὰ θεία μεσσιτενούσης τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος*." These words cannot be explained at all satisfactorily, except by the Catholic dogma of two wills. The one illustration of Christ's *divine* acts, given both by S. Leo and by Honorius, is the working of miracles: Honorius therefore declares that Christ wrought miracles, "through the mediation of the sacred humanity." What sense could a Monothelite possibly affix to this phrase? He must say, we suppose, that it refers merely to that utterance of Christ's human organs, which in each case preceded a miracle: to His words, e.g., "Lazarus come forth," or "I will, be thou clean." Now firstly, this is a most meagre explanation of so strong and emphatic a phrase. But secondly and more importantly, in various cases there was *no* vocal utterance immediately preceding a miracle: as, e.g., when the ten lepers were cleansed on their way to the priest; or when S. Peter found a coin in the fish's mouth; or when our Lord miraculously multiplied bread. No explanation in the least satisfactory can be given of the Pope's teaching, except that which Catholic theology supplies; viz., that in each case Christ's human will echoed, if we may so express ourselves, the command of His divine will, and was the immediate agent of the miracle.

In his second paragraph Honorius inveighs against that detestable tenet of two human and contrary wills in Christ, which

he understood from Sergius to have been originated among some Easterns by the phrase "two operations." He prefaces his denunciation, by declaring that the Hypostatic Union took place, "the differences of each nature marvellously remaining" unchanged: language which, taken by itself, it is difficult or impossible to reconcile with a notion, that Christ's human nature had lost its operating principle by the union. Because of this ineffable conjunction between the two natures, he adds, on one hand God is said to have suffered; while on the other hand the sacred humanity (of which Honorius has already affirmed once, and presently affirms again, that it was assumed by Christ from the Most Holy Virgin) is said to have come down from heaven *with the divine nature*. *For which reason*, he adds, we profess that Christ's will is but one; because manifestly He took "that human nature which was created before the existence of sin." His argument is as follows. This common saying, that the sacred humanity came down from heaven, shows by itself that the humanity assumed was not that of Adam *fallen*, but of Adam *innocent*. It is true, as he goes on to say in his next sentences, that the Word was made *flesh*, and that the word "flesh" sometimes means in Scripture "the carnal mind:" as in three instances which he gives. But the word is *also* used in Scripture, he points out, to express "human nature" in general; and of this too he gives three instances. He then repeats emphatically, that in Christ there was no law of the members warring against the law of the spirit.

Here let us pause to consider this paragraph as far as it has gone; since some of Honorius's accusers have marvellously thought that it tells on their side. And firstly, as to the very phrase "one will." Let it be remembered, that the polemical phrase at issue in *Honorius's time* between Catholics and Monothelites did not speak of "one *will*" but "one *operation*." On the other hand, the phrase "one will" had been in use for centuries among the orthodox, in that very sense in which we maintain Honorius to have used it; viz., as expressing the absolute harmony between Christ's divine and human wills.*

* Thus F. Schneeman quotes a passage from S. Chrysostom's comment on John vi. 38, in which the Saint says that Christ willed what the Father willed; and that therefore there was not one will of the Father and another of Christ, but "manifestly *one will*." A still stronger passage has been shown the present writer by a friend, from S. Athanasius's treatise against Apollinaris, c. 2, s. 10. This passage indeed, in its particular *mode* of expressing a denial that in Christ there was any carnal will, would really appear on the surface to admit a Monothelistic interpretation, which most certainly no line of Honorius's Letters has the remotest appearance of admitting. Yet else-

That Honorius therefore should have so used the phrase, is just what might have been expected.

Next, as the argument of the paragraph. Honorius begins by declaring Christ's human nature to be so intimately united with His divine, that the former is commonly said to have come down from heaven with the latter. What inference does he draw from this premiss? "That the sacred humanity had no will," say his accusers: "that it had no *carnal* will," say his defenders. "In Christ there was but one will," says the Monothelite, "because all His human acts were immediately commanded by the divine will." "In Christ was perfect unity of will" says the orthodox believer, "because He took the will of Adam innocent." This latter statement involves of course a direct contradiction to the former; and it is Honorius's statement. "Therefore," says the Pontiff, "His will is one; for He took Adam's nature as it was before the fall." "It is true," Honorius proceeds, "that the Word was made *flesh*: but this last expression must not be understood as signifying the carnal will." This was the one thing in the Pontiff's mind, that Christ had no *carnal* will. It is really plain enough for a child to see, that the very notion of Christ having no human will *at all*, had never occurred to Honorius (as men say) in his very dreams. And to expound his words as asserting that heretical tenet, shows either that the expositor has not fairly given his mind to the matter, or else that he is utterly blinded by passion or prejudice.

Honorius next proceeds to notice the argument for two contrary wills, raised from such sayings of our Lord as "*non quod volo, sed quod Tu vis*;" and the like. As to these passages he says, "*Οὐκ εἰσι ταῦτα διαφόρου θελήματος, ἀλλὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τῆς προσληθείσης.*" Here again his opponents try to make great controversial capital out of his sentence. But their interpretation of it is so simply monstrous, that we can imagine no excuse for them, except the undoubted fact that the sentence does not absolutely exhibit on the very surface its true explanation. Before we enter on its exposition, it will perhaps be more satisfactory if we make a short but (we trust) not uninteresting digression. We will consider then how Catholic theologians interpret those sayings of our Lord, to which Honorius refers. No one perhaps has explained the matter more fully and precisely, than Lugo.

We shall be able to set forth the Catholic doctrine more

where (de Incarnatione contra Arianos, c. 21) S. Athanasius says expressly that in Christ there are two wills.

clearly, if we avoid, in the first instance, that complication which arises from Christ's unity of Person, and take our illustration from the Immaculate Mother of God: for she was no less absolutely exempted than her Son from all combat between flesh and spirit. Take any one suffering then inflicted on her by God: e. g. His first announcement to her, that her Son was to die in anguish on the Cross.* She was totally exempt from concupiscence; and there was therefore no emotion, however transient, of discontent or repugnance: still there was the keenest emotion of what we may call resigned sorrow. An act of the will would at once be elicited, in harmony with this emotion; and this act of the will may best be analyzed as a hypothetical act. "If this were not God's will, I should wish it otherwise." There was no shadow of sin or imperfection in such an act; nothing inconsistent with the most spotless sanctity: it was united throughout with the most unreserved and intense submission to God's will.

Let us now apply this to our Blessed Lord. And let us take His words, as reported by S. Matthew. "Pater, si possibile est, transeat a Me calix iste; veruntamen non sicut Ego volo, sed sicut Tu." He experienced the keenest emotion of sorrow which was ever experienced on earth. "Tristis est anima Mea usque ad mortem;" that is, as Lugo explains, His anguish would have destroyed life, except for a miracle: and it issued in the previously unknown prodigy of a bloody sweat. This emotion of resigned sorrow was accompanied, according to the laws of human nature, by a corresponding act of the will; which, as in the preceding case, may be thus analyzed: "If this were not Thy will, I should wish it otherwise." Finally He *expressed* this act of the will, by praying God that if it were possible—that is, if it were consistent with God's supreme decision—the cup might pass from Him. That this hypothetical act was accompanied all through by the most unreserved submission to God's will, is distinctly and emphatically expressed by the words, "Non sicut Ego volo, sed sicut Tu." Dr. Döllinger indeed, who dares to accuse Honorius of heresy, is himself guilty of a deplorable lapse from orthodoxy, and speaks as follows:—"A *passing wish came over Him*," says Dr. Döllinger, "that if it were possible the chalice of agony might pass from Him . . . but the next instant the clear *returning* consciousness of the irrevocable counsel of God *triumphed* in Him" ("First Age of Chris-

* We prescind here of course from the wholly irrelevant question, whether, before the Incarnation, she knew that the Messiah would be crucified.

tianity," Mr. Oxenham's translation, vol. i. p. 54). That our Blessed Lord forgot for an "instant" "the irrevocable counsel of God" concerning His death, and that afterwards the "returning" consciousness of that counsel "triumphed" in His soul—these are statements which can only excite the amazement and horror of orthodox believers.

Now the question which Honorius seems to have asked himself is this:—Why are such expressions of Christ recorded, seeing that they may lead unstable souls into the monstrous error, of ascribing to Him two contrary wills? He replies thus:—"Οὐκ εἰσι ταῦτα διαφόρου θελήματος," "these are no indications of a will at variance with the divine."* "'Αλλὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τῆς προσληθείσης": "but they indicate an *οἰκονόμια*," an "exhibition for our instruction," of the assumed humanity: i.e. they are recorded, for the purpose of impressing on us the vital truth, that Christ has really a human will. And so the next sentence explains the former:—"For these things were said *for our sake*, to whom He has given an example that we should follow His footsteps; teaching His disciples—teacher as He is of godliness—that we should not follow our own will, but each should prefer in all things the will of the Lord." In other words, by submitting so unreservedly His human will to the divine, He set us an example of our also submitting ours: but He could not set us this example, unless He made it unmistakably manifest that He *had* a human will. The purpose therefore of these expressions having been recorded, was to make unmistakably manifest this essential doctrine.

It is simply impossible to devise any interpretation of the two sentences, substantially different from this most emphatically Duothelistic interpretation. The accusers of Honorius must translate the words as meaning, that Christ so spoke for the purpose of impressing on us a *false* notion of His assumed humanity. Let any patristic scholar be consulted whether, as a mere matter of language, the word *οἰκονόμια* can bear any such sense: meanwhile for ourselves let us consider the thing as a matter of doctrine. Honorius, says Mr. Renouf, accounts such words of our Blessed Lord as "economical expressions used for our sakes" (p. 16). What does he mean by "for our sakes"? "For the sake of producing in us a *true*" or a "*false* impression"? If he gives the former answer, he admits at once the perfect orthodoxy of

* As a mere matter of language, the word "*διαφόρου*" must signify "at variance," not simply "different in entity." The latter would be "*ἄλλου*" or "*ἑτέρου*."

Honorius; which it is his very purpose to deny. If he gives the latter answer, what is the view which he ascribes to Honorius? This; that God the Son used language, which in every sense was totally mendacious, for the express purpose of deceiving His creatures into the acceptance of false doctrine. So unimaginable are the absurdities, into which prejudice may draw a man not naturally stupid.

It will be asked however, if Honorius was thus orthodox, why he objected to the phrase "two wills." If he did object to that phrase, our preceding remarks show it to be demonstratively certain, that such objection did not arise from his failing to hold Duothelism most explicitly. His objection must have arisen from his thinking, either that the novel phrase would foster the notion of two contrary wills; or else that it would at least be disliked by many orthodox persons, from dread of such being its tendency. But we know of no reason whatever for supposing that he did object to the phrase. Certain it is that he *stated* no objection to it, not having been consulted about it at all. The phrase submitted to his judgment was not "two wills," but "two operations."

Of this latter phrase, it is indubitable that he expressed the gravest disapproval. Now, even if we were totally unable to account for this, our controversial position would not be affected. He says no doubt expressly, that the phrase "two operations" is most undesirable and mischievous; but he says no less expressly, as has been seen, that Christ's human nature is "operative and a principle of action," and that it "operates those works which appertain to it." It is really not more certain that Honorius wrote his second Letter at all, than it is that He held firmly a principle of operation in Christ's human nature. Our position then would be quite impregnable, even if we could make it no stronger than this: if we had merely to say, that Honorius most certainly believed in Christ's human principle of operation; though for reasons, at this distance of time undiscoverable, he objected to the phrase "two operations."

It so happens however, that F. Bottalla has made a most important remark (pp. 52, 53), which throws a flood of new light over the whole subject. Petavius had already pointed out the different senses of the word "*ἐνέργεια*" ("De Incarnatione," l. 8, c. 1). This word, says F. Bottalla, was used in one sense by Sergius, and in a totally different sense by Honorius. The Greeks of the time commonly used it as signifying "a principle of operation;" but Honorius understood it as synonymous with "*ἐνέργημα*," the "effect and external action" itself. This sense, as F. Bottalla points out,

was not unknown to the Greeks of the sixth century; for where Honorius quotes the word "*ἐνεργημάτων*" from S. Paul, the Greek translator of his Letter gives the word "*ἐνεργειῶν*." And that in point of fact Honorius understood the word in this sense, is manifest, not only from this very quotation of S. Paul, but also from the circumstance that this simple hypothesis removes all difficulty and obscurity from his Letters. It is not that, on any imaginable supposition, any sentence of those Letters presents the most superficial resemblance to Monothelism; but that there are various portions of them, to which, on any supposition except F. Bottalla's, one cannot very easily affix any definite meaning at all.

When therefore Honorius heard of the phrase "*δὸ ἐνέργειαι*" being ascribed to Christ, he understood that those who so spoke ascribed to Him two, and two only, *classes of actions*. And he judged this on the one hand to be an artificial and unmeaning form of speech; while on the other hand it tended (so he thought) to encourage alike the Nestorian heresy of two operating *Persons*, and the no less detestable error of two human contrary wills. This being assumed, we take up his first Letter at the precise point where we left it, and proceed with its analysis.

Let us leave to heretics, he says, the phrases proper to heretics: "*τοῖς . . . αἰρετικοῖς τὰ οἰκεία καταλιμπάνοντες*." [Let us leave, that is, the phrase "one operation" to Eutychians, and "two operations" to Nestorians.] And if any one [e.g., Sophronius] has used one of these expressions as his means for imbuing simple folk with Christian doctrine, let us not confuse the invention of an individual with the Church's definition. Scripture is express in saying that Christ is the One Operator of both divine and human actions; but whether, because of there being divine and human actions, it is right to talk of "two operations," is a question which we may leave to the grammarians. [Whether or no however it be grammatically appropriate, on theological grounds we had very far better avoid either of the two phrases.] What we find in Scripture is, not that Christ and His Spirit put forth *one* operation or *two*, but that He works *in many ways*. So S. Paul says that there are diversities of operations, but the same Operator. If then the Spirit Who proceeds from Christ works multiformly in Christians, how much more does Christ work multiformly and ineffably His various works in the flesh, with the participation and co-operation of both His natures. "*Πολύτροπος καὶ ἀφράστως . . . τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ἐκάτερως φύσεως αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν*." We ought then to speak as Scripture speaks; and avoid new-fangled phrases, which may be most

seriously misunderstood. It is a far greater calamity that the simple should be led astray, than that idle speculators should be indignant at our want of philosophical completeness: nor shall any one by vain philosophy seduce the disciples of the fishermen.

Of Honorius's second Letter, two fragments alone are extant, which were read in the Council. Of these the first denounces it as "altogether frivolous (*πάνν μάταιον*)" to say that Christ is either of one or of two operations. Now most certainly no Christian of the time, were he Catholic or Monothelite, who understood by *ἐνέργεια* a "principle of operation," could say by possibility that the question was a frivolous one. It is obvious then that Honorius must have understood the word in some different sense altogether; and assuming F. Bottalla's hypothesis as to the Pontiff's meaning, nothing can be more just than the Pontiff's comment. As to the second fragment, its drift is now so superabundantly evident, that it would be merely wearisome to take it point by point.

We repeat then, that no more orthodox Pontiff than Honorius ever sat on S. Peter's throne. In fulfilling however his office as guardian of the Faith, he made one serious lapse, from which his memory has severely suffered. Yet Catholics must not on that account cease to remember his various claims to their gratitude and reverence. S. Leo II. cannot have intended this by his anathema; because (as F. Bottalla points out) he left Honorius's name in the diptychs, and his pictures in the churches.

We cannot better conclude, than by briefly characterizing and contrasting the two writers on whom we have commented throughout. As to Mr. Renouf, it would be an extravagant compliment to call him a Gallican; for, as we pointed out in our former article (p. 204), he more than insinuates that the *Ecclesia Docens* herself does not possess the gift of infallibility. We believe there is no theologian, who would qualify this tenet with a lighter censure than that of "heretical." We may sum up then Mr. Renouf's controversial character, with a certain epigrammatic completeness but really without a particle of exaggeration, by saying that his arguments are pitiable, his arrogance intolerable, and his doctrine heretical.

F. Bottalla has accomplished a very great work indeed; and it is a great pleasure to think that, in these critical and anxious times, the orthodox cause has at its service so learned and effective a champion. Now, for the first time, full justice has been done to the strength of Honorius's cause. That Pontiff's first apologists of recent times placed themselves in

a false position, by denying the authenticity of the documents. On the other hand, later writers (as we implied just now) have underrated the strength of the case, which can be made for him after every necessary admission of facts; and for this reason have spoken of him in too subdued and apologetic a tone. From the position in which F. Bottalla has now placed the controversy, we are very confident that no future critic will be able to dislodge it.

The Latin translation of the Greek translation of Honorius's first Letter runs as follows :—

Scripta fraternitatis vestræ suscepimus, per quæ contentiones quasdam et novas vocum questiones cognovimus introductas per Sophronium quemdam, tunc monachum nunc vero (ex auditu) episcopum Hierosolymitanæ urbis constitutum, adversus fratrem nostrum Cyrum Alexandriæ antistitem, unam operationem Domini nostri Jesu Christi conversis ex hæresi prædicantem. Qui denique ad vestram fraternitatem Sophronius veniens, querelamque hujusmodi deponens, multiformiter eruditus, petiit de his quæ a vobis fuerat instructus paginalibus sibi syllabis reserari : quarum literarum ad eundem Sophronium directarum suscipientes exemplar, et intuentes satis provide circumspecteque fraternitatem vestram scripsisse, laudamus novitatem vocabuli auferentem, quod posset scandalum simplicibus generare. Nos enim in quo percipimus oportet ambulare. Enimvero duce Deo pervenimus usque ad mensuram rectæ Fidei, quam Apostoli veritatis scripturarum sanctarum funiculo extenderunt, confitentes Dominum Jesum Christum Mediatorem Dei et hominum operatum divina mediâ humanitate verbo Deo naturaliter unitâ, Eundemque operatum humana ineffabiliter atque singulariter assumptâ carne discrete, inconfuse, atque inconvertibiliter plena divinitate : et Qui coruscavit in carne plenâ divinis miraculis, Ipse est et carneus effectus plene Deus et homo : passiones et opprobria patitur Unus Mediator Dei et hominum in utrisque naturis : Verbum caro factum, et habitavit in nobis : Ipse Filius hominis de cælo descendens : Unus atque Idem, sicut scriptum est, crucifixus Dominus majestatis : dum constet divinitatem nullas posse perpeti humanas passiones : et non de cælo, sed de sanctâ est assumpta caro Dei genitrice : (nam per se Veritas in evangelio ita inquit : "Nullus ascendit in cælum, nisi Qui de cælo descendit, Filius hominis qui est in cælo :") profecto nos instruens, quod divinitati unita est caro passibilis ineffabiliter atque singulariter, ut discrete atque inconfuse sic indivise videretur conjungi.

Ut nimirum stupendâ mente mirabiliter manentibus utrarumque naturarum differentiis cognoscatur uniri. Cui Apostolus concinens, ad Corinthios ait : "Sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos, sapientiam vero non hujus sæculi, neque principum hujus sæculi, qui destruuntur, sed loquimur Dei sapientiam in mysterio absconditam, quam predestinavit Deus ante sæcula in gloriam nostram ; quam nemo principum hujus sæculi cognovit : si enim cognovissent,

nunquam Dominum majestatis crucifixissent." Dum profecto divinitas nec crucifigi potuit, nec passiones humanas experiri vel perpeti, sed propter ineffabilem conjunctionem hamanae divinæque naturæ, idcirco et ubique Deus dicitur pati et humanitas ex cœlo cum divinitate descendisse. Unde et unam voluntatem fatemur domini nostri Jesu Christi : quia profecto a divinitate assumpta est nostra natura, non culpa : illa profecto quæ ante peccatum creata est, non quæ post prævaricationem vitiatæ. Christus enim Dominus, in similitudine carnis peccati veniens, peccatum mundi abstulit, et de plenitudine Ejus omnes accepimus : et formam servi suscipiens, habitu inventus est ut homo : quia sine peccato conceptus de Spiritu sancto, etiam absque peccato est partus de sanctâ et immaculatâ virgine Dei genitrice, nullum experiens contagium vitiatæ naturæ. Carnis enim vocabulum duobus modis sacris eloquiis boni malique cognovimus nominari. Sicut scriptum est : "Non permanebit Spiritus meus in hominibus istis, quia caro sunt." Et Apostolus : "Caro, et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt." Et rursum : "Mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. Et video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meæ, et captivum me trahentem in legem peccati quæ est in membris meis." Et alia multa hujusmodi in malo absolute solent intelligi vel vocari. In bono autem ita, Isaiâ prophetâ dicente : "Veniet omnis caro in Hierusalem, et adorabunt in conspectu Meo." Et Job : "In carne meâ videbo Deum." Et alii ; "Videbit omnis caro salutem Dei." Et alia diversa. Non est itaque assumpta, sicut præfati sumus, a Salvatore vitiatæ natura quæ repugnaret legi mentis Ejus, sed "venit quærere et salvare quod perierat," id est, vitiatam humani generis naturam. Nam lex alia in membris aut voluntas diversa non fuit vel contraria Salvatori, quia super legem natus est humanæ conditionis. Et si quidem scriptum est : "Non veni facere voluntatem Meam, sed Ejus qui misit Me, Patris." : et : "Non quod ego volo, sed quod Tu vis Pater." : et alia hujusmodi : non sunt hæc diversæ voluntatis, sed dispensationis humanitatis assumptæ. Ista enim propter nos dicta sunt, quibus dedit exemplum ut sequamur vestigia ejus, pius magister discipulos imbuens, ut non suam unusquisque nostrum, sed potius Domini in omnibus præferat voluntatem. Viâ igitur regiâ incedentes, et dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum venatorum laqueos circumpositos evitantes, ne ad lapidem pedem nostrum offendamus, Idumæis, id est terrenis atque hæreticis, propria relinquentes, nec vestigio quidem pedis sensus nostri terram, id est, pravam eorum doctrinam, omnimodo atterentes, ut ad id quo tendimus, hoc est ad fines patrios, pervenire possimus, ducum nostrorum semitâ gradientes. Et si forte quidam balbutientes, ut ita dicam, nisi sunt proferentes exponere, formantes se in specimen nutritorum, ut possent mentes imbuere auditorum, non oportet ad dogmata hæc ecclesiastica retorquere, quæ neque synodales apices super hoc examinantes, neque auctoritates canonicæ visæ sunt explanasse, ut unam vel duas energias aliquis præsumat Christi Dei prædicare, quas neque evangelicæ vel apostolicæ literæ, neque synodalis examinatio super his habita, visæ sunt terminasse : nisi fortassis, sicut præfati sumus, quidam aliqua balbutiendo docuerunt, condescendentes ad informandas mentes atque intelligentias parvulorum, quæ ad ecclesiastica dogmata trahi non debent ; quæ unusquisque, in sensu suo abundans, videtur secundum propriam

sententiam explicare. Nam quia Dominus Jesus Christus, Filius ac Verbum Dei, per Quem facta sunt omnia, Ipse sit Unus Operator divinitatis atque humanitatis, plenæ sunt sacræ literæ luculentius demonstrantes. Utrum autem, propter opera divinitatis et humanitatis, una an geminæ operationes debeant derivatæ dici vel intelligi, ad nos ista pertinere non debent; relinquentes ea grammaticis, qui solent parvulis exquisita derivando nomina venditare. Nos enim non unam operationem vel duas Dominum Jesum Christum Ejusque Sanctum Spiritum sacris literis percepimus, sed multiformiter cognovimus operatum. Scriptum est enim: "Si quis Spiritum Christi non habet, hic Ejus non est." Et alibi: "Nemo potest dicere, dominus Jesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto. Divisiones vero gratiarum sunt, Idem autem Spiritus: et divisiones ministrationum sunt, Idem autem Dominus: et divisiones operationum sunt, Idem vero Deus, Qui operatur omnia in omnibus." Si enim divisiones operationum sunt multæ, et has omnes Deus in membris omnibus pleni corporis operatur, quanto magis Capiti nostro Christo domino hæc possunt plenissime coaptari? ut caput et corpus unum sit perfectum, "ut profecto occurrat," sicut scriptum est, "in virum perfectum, in mensuram ætatis plenitudinis Christi." Si enim in aliis, id est in membris Suis, Spiritus Christi multiformiter operatur, in Quo vivunt, moventur, et sunt: quanto magis per Semetipsum, Mediatorem Dei et hominum, plene ac perfecte multisque modis et ineffabilibus confiteri nos communionem utriusque naturæ condecet operatum? Et nos quidem secundum sanctiones divinatorum eloquiorum oportet sapere vel spirare; illa videlicet refutantes, quæ quidem novæ voces noscuntur sanctis Dei ecclesiis scandala generare: ne parvuli aut duarum operationum vocabulo offensi, sectantes Nestorianos nos vesana sapere arbitrentur: aut certe, si rursus unam operationem Domini nostri Jesu Christi fatendam esse censuerimus, stultam Eutychianistarum attonitis auribus dementiam fateri putemur: præcavescentes, ne quorum inania arma combusta sunt, eorum cineres redivivos ignes flammivomarum denuo renovent quæstionum; simpliciter atque veraciter confitentes Dominum Jesum Christum Unum Operatorem divinæ atque humanæ naturæ, electius arbitantes, ut vani naturarum ponderatores: otiose negotiantes et turgidi adversus nos insonent vocibus ranarum philosophi, quam ut simplices et humiles spiritu populi Christiani possint remanere jejuni. Nullus enim decipiet per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam discipulos piscatorum, eorum doctrinam sequentes; omnia enim argumenta scopulosa disputationis callidæ atque fluctivaga in eorum retia sunt collisa. Hæc nobiscum fraternitas vestra prædicet, sicut et nos ea vobiscum unanimiter prædicamus; hortantes vos, ut unius vel geminæ novæ vocis inductum operationis vocabulum aufugientes, Unum nobiscum Dominum Jesum Christum Filium Dei vivi, Deum verissimum, in duabus naturis operatum divinitus atque humanitus, fide orthodoxâ et unitate catholica prædicetis.—Deus te inculumem custodiat dilectissime atque sanctissime frater.

The two extant fragments of his second Letter run as follows, in the Latin translation of their Greek translation:—

Nec non et Cyro fratri nostro Alexandriæ civitatis præsuli, quatenus

novæ adinventionis unius vel duarum operationum vocabulo refutato, claro Dei ecclesiarum præconio nebulosarum concertationum caligines offundi non debeant vel aspergi; ut profecto unius vel geminæ operationis vocabulum noviter introductum ex prædicatione fidei eximatur. Nam qui hæc dicunt, quid aliud nisi juxta unius vel geminæ naturæ Christi Dei vocabulum, ita et operationem unam vel geminam suspicantur? Super quod clara sunt divina testimonia. Unius autem operationis vel duarum esse vel fuisse Mediatorem Dei et hominum Dominum Jesum Christum, sentire et promovere satis ineptum est.

Et quidem, quantum ad instruendam notitiam ambigentium, sanctissimæ fraternitati vestræ per eam insinuandam prævidimus. Ceterum quantum ad dogma ecclesiasticum pertinet quod tenere vel prædicare debemus, propter simplicitatem hominum et amputandas inextricabiles quæstionum ambages, sicut superius diximus, non unam vel duas operationes in Mediatore Dei et hominum definire; sed utrasque naturas, in uno Christo unitate naturali copulatas, cum alterius communione operantes atque operatrices confiteri debemus: et divinam quidem, quæ Dei sunt operantem; et humanam, quæ carnis sunt exequentem: non divise, neque confuse, aut convertibiliter, Dei naturam in hominem et humanam in Deum conversam edocentes; sed naturarum differentias integras confitentes: Unus enim atque Idem est humilis et sublimis: æqualis Patri et minor Patre: Ipse ante tempora, natus in tempore est: per Quem facta sunt sæcula, factus in sæculo est: et Qui legem dedit, factus sub lege est, ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret: Ipse crucifixus, Ipse chirographum quod erat contra nos evacuans in cruce, de potestatibus et principatibus triumphavit. Auferentes ergo, sicut diximus, scandalum novellæ adinventionis, non nos oportet unam vel duas operationes definientes prædicare; sed pro unâ, quam quidam dicunt, operatione, oportet nos unum Operatorem Christum Dominum in utrisque naturis veridice confiteri: et pro duabus operationibus, ablato geminæ operationis vocabulo, ipsas potius duas naturas, id est, divinitatis et carnis assumptæ, in unâ Personâ Unigeniti Dei Patris, inconfuse, indivise, atque inconvertibiliter nobiscum prædicare propria operantes. Et hoc quidem beatissimæ fraternitati vestræ insinuandum prævidimus, quatenus unius confessionis propositum unanimatati vestræ sanctitatis monstremus, ut profecto in uno spiritu anhelantes, pari fidei documento conspiremus. Scribentes etiam communibus fratribus Cyro et Sophronio antistitibus, ne novæ vocis, id est, unius, vel geminæ operationis, vocabulo insistere vel immorari videantur: sed abrasâ hujusmodi novæ vocis appellatione, Unum Christum dominum nobiscum in utrisque naturis divina vel humana prædicent operantem. Quamquam hos, quos ad nos prædictus frater et coepiscopus noster Sophronius misit, instruximus, ne duarum operationum vocabulum deinceps prædicare innitatur; quod instantissime promiserunt prædictum virum esse facturum, si etiam Cyrus frater et coepiscopus noster ab unius operationis vocabulo discesserit.

ART. VIII.—IRELAND AND THE NEW MINISTRY.

Speeches of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., delivered at Warrington, Ormskirk, Liverpool, Southport, Newton, Leigh, and Wigan, in October, 1868. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

THE crisis which for four years we have desired and predicted has at last arrived. In 1865, when Lord Palmerston as Prime Minister had just assured the House of Commons that emigration to America was the real and only cure for the ills of Ireland, and when Sir Robert Peel, who was Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant, had lately declared that his noble chief and he were determined to stand or fall with the Irish Church Establishment, we ventured to say that there was "wanted a Policy for Ireland."* "Ireland," we said, "wants on the part of British statesmen a policy; and still more, on the part of the British Parliament, good will to assist and give efficacy to that policy." For we continued, "the animus of Parliament (of the majority of Parliament, taking both Houses together, we mean of course), in considering the affairs of Ireland, is even still, three generations after the Union, that of one nation dealing with another nation; dealing with it not perhaps exactly as an enemy, but as an obstacle, a nuisance, a reproach, a cause of continual incomprehensible annoyance, and occasional serious danger, an opposite 'moral essence' to itself, with different instincts and habits, which it is impossible to gratify and not even easy to apprehend." We ventured to hope that Parliament would not always act, "where Irish interests are concerned, only under the influence of alarm;" but we also feared, though the Government of that time did not recognize the very existence of Fenianism, that we were "approaching a period of such ignominious arguments again." Having stated in general outline our views of what a policy for Ireland ought to be, we said, looking some little way beyond the régime of Lord Palmerston, that it ought to be "possible to persuade one of the coming statesmen of the next ten years, Mr. Gladstone if not Mr. Disraeli, that it is his interest, and in a sense his necessity to have a clear and comprehensive policy for Ireland." What we ventured to hope has happened exactly

* DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1865, Art. VI.—"Wanted a Policy for Ireland."

as we wished it would. Mr. Gladstone has succeeded Mr. Disraeli as Prime Minister on the specific issue of the policy of the government of Ireland. Irish policy is the principal object which engages the minds of English statesmen. And owing especially to the ardour, energy, and devotion with which Mr. Gladstone has declared and sustained his policy, the inertness and prejudice of Parliament has been in a great measure overcome; and the country has elected a new House of Commons pledged, as its first task, to the sustainment of a just and a complete policy for Ireland.

In the course of the events which have led to this great result, the position of the Irish Catholics, and to a great extent that of all the Catholics of the United Kingdom, in regard to political parties, has considerably changed. Our ideal of their proper attitude in Parliament under such a Government as that of Lord Palmerston was, as we often stated, that commonly defined by the words Independent Opposition. We are bound now to take clear note of the fact that when Independent Opposition was first promulgated as a general principle of public action by the Irish Catholic Hierarchy, in conjunction with the principal political leaders of the Irish Catholics, and was very largely accepted by the Irish constituencies at the general election of 1852—that it was not a factious, indiscriminate, and endless opposition to all governments that was contemplated, but one directed to certain definite ends, in themselves a legitimate and not unreasonably remote object of party combination—and that it was specifically defined that the party then formed should act in independent opposition to all such governments as had not made religious equality in Ireland, and a just settlement of the law of landlord and tenant cabinet questions. It is a simple matter of fact that Mr. Gladstone has done this, and something more. He has not only made these questions cabinet questions—he has given them the first place in the plans of his Ministry; he has stated the order in which he intends to proceed with them; and he has gone to the country, and taken the verdict of a general election upon one principal and specific issue, the policy to be pursued in the government of Ireland. It was a great risk, considering the exasperated condition of English feeling, after the rescue at Manchester and the explosion at Clerkenwell—considering also the previously divided and insubordinate condition of the Liberal party. It was attended by personal mortifications, very keenly felt; for having first lost his seat for Oxford University, in consequence of his opinions touching the Irish Church, he, at the last election, lost his seat for

his native county through the same cause. But the cause, nevertheless, triumphed through its greatness, its justice, and the genius and zeal which were given to its advocacy; and Mr. Gladstone is, in consequence, Prime Minister, with a majority strictly pledged to support his policy, the like of which no English minister has had since Mr. Pitt.

This is a period of such rapid changes in our political system, that to speak of the Irish policy of Lord Palmerston seems nearly as much out of place as it would be to speak of the Irish policy of Lord North; and when we refer to the formation of the party of Independent Opposition, we seem to be dealing with some half-forgotten chapter in the archæology of Irish agitation. But it is important to revert to this remote period of sixteen or seventeen years ago, at the present moment, for several reasons. One of these is, that the party of Independent Opposition, having been strangely subverted, and ultimately reduced almost to nonentity, the popular forces which it had controlled and directed, fell a prey to Fenianism. In precise proportion as the one waned the other waxed strong. This was not the only result. Throughout Ireland there followed, on the part of powerful sections of the Catholic clergy and laity, an apathy in regard to politics, a distrust in the faith of public men, which still exists, and which it is very difficult to dispel. Towards Mr. Gladstone, and in some degree towards Mr. Bright, there is a growing feeling of grateful and enthusiastic devotion. The words are strong, but the Irish are an intense people. At the same time it may, without offence, be said, that enthusiastic devotion is not the kind of feeling which was likely to be excited in the country of Grattan and O'Connell, by those who were the local liberal leaders at the moment when Mr. Gladstone introduced his famous resolutions. Those right honourable, honourable, and (in a large proportion) learned gentlemen showed no special anxiety indeed when the Irish Reform Bill was before the House, to increase the electoral power of the country, so as to enhance the force of its verdict; and gladly consented to pass whatever Lord Mayo proposed, in order to preserve Portarlington the smallest borough in the empire, but the only place in Ireland where the late Attorney General, Mr. Lawson, had the chance of getting a seat. Such things have their effect, even when it is not very loudly testified. Accordingly, the balance between the two parties was actually less disturbed at the Irish elections than at the English, the Welsh, or the Scotch. It is evident that the popular force of the Irish nation, long disorganised, has not, as yet, rallied. It will, we believe, soon steadily, if not very rapidly or vehemently, re-assert itself. To the many high-

mind and influential men with whom it rests to quicken public action in the country—who have held aloof so long from politics which they believed had only personal or factious objects—it is fit and salutary to say that the triumph of to-day is, in a very decided sense, the triumph of their principles; and that by a concurrence of causes, but with a general conviction of its wisdom and justice, the great object for which they organized the Independent Party of 1852 has been achieved, in the construction of a Cabinet pledged to establish religious equality in Ireland, and to give to the Irish tenantry their just rights.

A level of very respectable mediocrity is said to be characteristic of the new members of the new Parliament, so far as has been yet ascertained; and the tendency in Ireland for some time, owing to the very causes we have just indicated, has been towards a lower and coarser stamp of intellect and character in popular candidates for the House of Commons. Among the Irish members in the last Parliament there was a certain proportion of men who studied political questions without considering their mere party effect, and there were a few of more than ordinary abilities. But remembering the scandalous shuffle by which the Irish Reform Bill was passed, and contrasting it with the fine fight made by the Scotch members on their Bill—remembering the fact that in the debate on the Irish Church question, there was not an Irish Catholic who could be named on the same plane with Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bright, Mr. Lowe, Mr. Bernal Osborne, or Mr. Roebuck, it may be doubted whether Ireland ever was more wretchedly represented, in point of political talent and purpose. Thirty years ago, O'Connell and Shiel would have known how to sustain the honour of the country in such a debate; nor, had it occurred in 1853, would Lucas, Duffy, Moore, have been unequal to the task. But after the exhaustive and powerful speech of Mr. Maguire, early in last session, we know of nothing contributed to the debates by the Irish members on the great question of the day, which can be very readily remembered. The dissolution has since enabled two Catholic constituencies to deprive themselves of the services of two members of Parliament who were peculiarly qualified to be useful to Catholic interests in the many difficult discussions which are now imminent. Sir George Bowyer has a knowledge of Canon and Civil Law, of the great questions concerning the relations between Church and State, of the English as well as the Roman law with regard to ecclesiastical establishments—rare, if not unique, among Catholic public men. Sir Joseph McKenna has such a thorough knowledge

of the material state of the country, and of its financial conditions and capacity, that he could hardly fail to have taken a useful part in the consideration of those weighty details of disestablishment and disendowment in which the House will soon have to engage. The defeat of two such men is no advantage to Catholic interests. On the other hand, hearing that Mr. Moore, after a seclusion of upwards of ten years from public life, has been again elected for Mayo County, one is reminded of Curran's words when, from the Newry hustings, he spoke of Plunket's election, in 1812 :—"He goes like Gylippus, whom the Spartans sent alone as a reinforcement to their distressed ally ; Gylippus, in whom were concentrated all the energies and all the talents of his country." This election alone would save the honour of Ireland. A man of strong convictions, of unflinching courage, who knows his country perfectly well, and Parliament not less well, Mr. Moore is, besides, a speaker of masterly vigour and scholarly style. The tradition of the great Irish tribunes still lives in his racy, brilliant, and finished eloquence.

In constructing his Government, Mr. Gladstone evidently kept in view its primary purpose. He insisted that Mr. Bright should take office. He gave the Irish Secretary, Mr. Fortescue, a seat in the Cabinet. He liberally recognized Mr. Lowe's reconciliation with his party, achieved by his great speech on the Irish Establishment, by giving him his own former office, the second in importance of the Government. In every degree of State, from the Lord Chancellorship down, the Irish policy of the Cabinet seemed to be the Premier's first consideration. In Ireland he had the good fortune to inaugurate his Government by making an appointment, which it is no exaggeration to describe as the most popular appointment that an English minister ever made in connection with the administration of that country. He was enabled by the act which we owe to Sir Colman O'Loughlen's zeal and tact, to offer the woolsack to a Roman Catholic ; and he selected in Judge O'Hagan one whose blameless fame, whose eminent abilities, and whose thorough knowledge of the country, made his selection the pledge of a new era in its government. It was reported that Mr. Gladstone was even anxious to have placed a Roman Catholic in the Cabinet ; and it is to be hoped that Mr. Monsell, the only Irish Catholic who has claims adequate to such a rank, may, ere long, be promoted from his present secondary rank.

The attitude of the Catholics of Ireland throughout the great constitutional crisis to which a desire to do justice to them has led, is, we may fairly say, much to their honour.

They have shown no unworthy temper. There has been far less religious rancour manifested in the Irish elections, as a whole, than in the English. Even at Belfast, where a contested election at such a time might have been expected to produce scenes of violence and confusion, the Orangemen and the Catholics to some extent fraternized; the Orange candidate, Mr. Johnson, being, at all events, not more hostile to Mr. Gladstone than to Mr. Disraeli, and perhaps even in some degree open to conviction on the subject of disestablishment,—being besides the hero of the Ulster tenantry rather than the Ulster landlords. The attitude of the Irish Protestants, on the other hand, is astounding to one who knows the temper of that haughty and militant community. Every English journal is daily discussing what is to be done with them—how far disestablishment is to go, and where disendowment is to stop—whether they are to be allowed to continue to believe in the Thirty-nine Articles, or to be converted into a new sort of Presbyterian sect by Act of Parliament. And lo! they make no sign, they utter no significant word; they are as still as “the corpse on the dissecting-table.” Having so long looked up to England as the shrine of their faith and the buckler of their power—having so long regarded themselves as the garrison of English authority and the missionaries of English religion in Ireland—they can hardly believe that it is England which levels this awful blow at what they regard as the very ark of the covenant between the two countries. They feel simply stunned. They cannot realize, they do not seem to care, more or less, what is to happen. When their Primate hints to the House of Lords that they will all turn Papists, or at least Fenians, there is no one to utter the old loyal wrath of the race. And no one either to say, Why not? The questions which at present engage public opinion in England concerning the process of disestablishment do not appear to interest them. Yet surely they are questions vital to the conscience of a community with a real zeal for its religion. It seems to be assumed at present by leading organs of English opinion, that not merely can an Act of Parliament disestablish and disendow, but that it can compel the Irish Protestant to renounce his belief in the Queen as Head of the Church, and inflict upon him a sort of imitation of the Presbyterian General Assembly as a Church government instead. After all, the Irish Protestant is an Episcopalian, and he is not in the same position as the Scotch Episcopalian, because in Scotland the Queen claims to be Head of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, and she cannot claim to be the Head of two different Churches in the same kingdom at the same precise time. But this is not the

case in Ireland, where the Queen has never even claimed to be considered as Head of the Catholic Church, and where the ruling difference in law, in government, in all the relations of life, has been specifically marked for ages by the never absent consideration that the King was the head of the one religion, and the Pope was the head of the other. The Irish Protestant will still retain many of the outward and visible signs, which convey to the mass of the people the sense of his supremacy. He will retain the cathedrals consecrated in Catholic ages to the shrines of Irish saints, and in every parish the church built with public money, the freehold manse and glebe. As yet the Ecclesiastical Titles Act does not affect his Bishop's title, as yet not merely the Queen, but the Queen's Viceroy, must profess his faith. His Primate leads the Roll of Precedence; his Bishops sit in the Privy Council. As yet the great University of the country only tolerates those who utter the Roman creed. He retains for a time many of the advantages of a State Church, while he acquires those of a Free Church. But this would not be religious equality in Ireland, and it is religious equality in Ireland that Mr. Gladstone stands pledged to accomplish. Therefore, however the question of the Royal Supremacy as an article of faith may be dealt with—and the Irish Protestants alone know, and have not yet declared what they really believe or are prepared to believe on that point,—the Catholics of Ireland have a right to protest against the setting up of any new form of Church Establishment or Church Government for Ireland by Act of Parliament. At present, it is well to remember the Catholic Church has no legal sanction for any of its acts, except marriage between its own members, in Ireland; and before it can be said to be placed on a level of equality even with the disestablished Protestant Church, there is a considerable fabric of bad law that will have to come down.

As to the great question of all, the disposition of the Funds that will result from the disendowment of the Establishment, we have had only one opinion from the moment that the Irish bishops declared they would have none of them. It has been suggested that the fund resulting shall be applied to the liquidation of the poor-rates. But the landlord is at present obliged to pay half the poor-rates. It is conceived that he will be permitted to commute the payment of the tithe rent-charge, on the liberal terms which may be presumed from a Parliament not yet void of his class. If the sum so accumulated be applied to the liquidation of the other great charge on his land, then the landlord will be in reality the one person

benefited, enormously benefited, by the result; and according to the custom of his class, he will testify his pleasure by raising his rent in order to recoup himself for the temporary pressure caused by the charge of commuting his tithe. This perhaps will not be quite the best way to bring home the advantages of disestablishment to the hearts and hearths of the people. It has been suggested that the fund should be applied to educational purposes. The present fund, and the funds properly available for that purpose, supposing religious equality to be established in Ireland, are, if properly employed and economized, ample. Ireland draws no more than her fair proportion from the Consolidated Fund for primary education. The revenues of Trinity College, of the Queen's Colleges, of the Royal Schools, of a number of special educational foundations for the benefit of Protestants, in which the State participated, will, we presume, lose their exclusive character; and we would fain hope be fairly divided on the denominational basis. Again, it seems to us that it would be impossible to use the Establishment fund in founding hospitals. Ireland has more hospitals, in proportion to its population, and a better organized system of medical relief for the poor, than England has, than any country perhaps in Europe has. Besides, this again would be to pay off the poor-rates. Amid so many striking suggestions, why has no one propounded the captivating idea that the whole country should be thorough-drained and planted, so that there should not be the sign of a bog left on its surface, and the balmy, sunny, bird-and-flower-abounding climate of the days of Ossian be restored? This would be some benefit to the people, whose benefit it seems to be so awfully hard to insure by law,—they whose long, low cry of anguish has been heard far abroad in all the lands of man until it has at last called down judgment on one of the great iniquities of their state—

“A doleful song,

Steaming up a lamentation, and an ancient tale of wrong,
Like a tale of little meaning, tho' the words are strong;
Chanted from an ill-used race of men that cleave the soil,
Sow the seed, and reap the harvest with enduring toil,
Till they perish and they suffer.”

It is for them that we would plead in this great settlement, the pure, patient, long-oppressed, the brave and gentle people of Ireland—who have not a characteristic fault that is not due to the cruel insecurity of their lot; who love justice as no other

people under the sun love it ; who, in all that removes the condition of the Catholics of Ireland from their state under the penal laws, have always fought the battle, and never sought the spoil. It is possible, it is easy, it is easier than anything else to lower the alien Church, and plant the peasant in his own soil at the same stroke. Give the landlord the tithe rent-charge with one hand ; but with the other, abolish at once and for ever, tenancy at will as a base tenure, contrary to the spirit of the law of England, and incompatible at once with the proper practice of the industry of agriculture and with the personal liberty of the subject of a free state.

Notices of Books.

Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis II. Acta et Decreta. Baltimore : excudebat
JOANNES MURPHY.

WE have received this very interesting volume, through the courtesy of Archbishop Spalding; and we ought perhaps to take some blame on ourselves, for not immediately noticing it in detail. But the whole circumstances, present condition, and past history of the Catholic Church in America, are so profoundly interesting both to English and also to Irish Catholics, that we have thought it better to delay, until we could devote an article to the entire subject. Meanwhile we heartily recommend a perusal of these Acts, to those who would appreciate the very important position now occupied by the Church in the United States, and the use which she is likely to make there of that position.

Some able articles have recently appeared in the *Tablet*, on the same general subject; but with particular reference to the general confidence reposed in American Catholics, by their fellow-countrymen of all denominations, as *instructors of youth*.

We may add, that the American translation of M. Darras's invaluable Church history, brought out under the patronage of the illustrious Archbishop of Baltimore, contains a most full and interesting appendix on "the Catholic Church in the United States." That Church "now counts," we are told, "seven archbishoprics, thirty-six bishoprics, and four apostolic vicariates." The names, subscribed to the Acts, are those of seven archbishops, thirty-seven bishops, and four others.

Daily Meditations. By his Eminence the late CARDINAL WISEMAN.
Dublin: James Duffy, 15, Wellington Quay.

THE name of its author renders any recommendation on our part of this volume superfluous. "It consists," says the Archbishop's preface "of meditations written by his Eminence the late Cardinal Wiseman in early life, when he entered upon his first responsible office, as Rector of the English College in Rome. They were intended to form the habit of mental prayer in the youth committed to his charge, and to infuse into the rising priesthood of England a spirit of personal

piety. In them we still recognize the voice we knew so well. Some will yet remember the days, sweet to memory, when these meditations were read in the venerable College, and will welcome them as a memorial of one to whom, under God, they owe perhaps the vocation which is their highest blessing."

The reader cannot, we think, fail to be struck with the exceeding simplicity and plain earnestness of these early productions of a mind so full and an imagination so exuberant as distinguished our great Cardinal even in sickness and old age. We select the following passages, from meditations on the divine mysteries nearest to his heart, and the prevalent devotion to which, in England, is so largely due to his words and example: the love of Jesus in the blessed Eucharist, and Mary's maternal relation to all the souls redeemed by her Divine Son:—

"Greater love than this no man hath, that a man should lay down his life for his friends. Although a mere man can have no demonstration of love to give beyond this, we may truly say that the God-man has found a degree of charity and a demonstration of it that goes much further. For, not content with having laid down His life for us, He has given us Himself to be our food, and to be most intimately united to us. Had He only died for us, immense, nay, infinite as the blessing and the favour would have been, there would have been an imperfection necessarily in the mode of applying to us individually the benefits of His passion. For had our affections alone been left to perform this important work, it must have contracted all their imperfections, and must have been coldly and languidly done. He willed, therefore, to employ an instrument, a channel for the transmission of His mercy equal, as it were, to the mercy itself. What could this be but Himself, who formed the very essence of the other? Such, then, was His institution of the Blessed Eucharist, wherein He gave Himself again to us, that the love exhibited by His death may not, through our misery be in vain. This, therefore, is a repetition of the immense charity and affection shown forth in His passion and bitter death. Reflect, further, how the tendency of all love is to procure the closest intimacy and familiarity between the persons who love; they would were their love perfect, deprive themselves, in a manner, of their individuality, and have but one soul, one heart. But the love of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament has carried love far beyond this imaginary point. For as nothing can be considered so thoroughly incorporated with us as the food and nourishment which we take, inasmuch as it actually becomes a part of ourselves, so Jesus took this form of communication with us, becoming our spiritual food, but received under species material and palpable. But then, as He is the far nobler, the mightier, the more energizing of the two, it follows that instead of His being incorporated with us, we, in a manner, are rather incorporated with Him, so as to become, according to the expression of the fathers, '*concorporei*,' having a common body with Him. What can be conceived beyond this manifestation of love? Still, to appreciate it further, if, on our part, the union be a most dignified and sublime one, what is it on His? He comes, then, into a frail earthen vessel, a mere tabernacle of perishable clay, into the body of this death, into a heart full of vanity, pride, folly, and dissipation. He comes into a body defiled with a thousand iniquities, and unworthy of the smallest visitation of His mercy; a body that shortly will become the food of worms. Here is love, indeed, and what love! to overcome His natural repugnance to so much that is

corrupt and odious in His sight, that He may satisfy His affection for us."

"The Church of God has always believed that when Jesus upon the cross recommended John to his dear mother, as her son, it was not merely that disciple individually, but every one of us whom He had in view. For certain it is that, from the earliest times, Mary has been considered not only as the mother of Christ, but also the mother of all those that love Him—the mother of all the faithful. If she is said in Scripture to have laid up and preserved in her heart those first words of her son's ministry, when found at twelve years of age in the Temple, can we imagine she did less for His last dying words, His legacy on the Cross? . . . But Jesus did not content Himself with procuring to us this adoption with this single address to His mother. He took care again and again to call us His brethren, and to treat us as such, so that it should seem but natural that we should have the same mother. For before His Passion He was content to call His disciples friends. '*Jam non dicam vos servos. . . . vos amici mei estis.*' But immediately after His blessed passion, He calls them His brethren, '*Nuntiate fratribus meis.*' (Mat. xxviii. 10; John xx. 17.) Now, although the primary and inestimable right obtained by us through this acknowledgment, is that of being called and being sons of God, through the adoption *above* the cross, yet does it not less secure to us all other rights of fraternity with us, and, among the greatest, the adoption which was made of us *beneath* the cross, in the heart of Mary. And as Jesus has a Father in heaven but no Mother, and chose similarly to have a mother on earth but no father, so that we may be like Him in all things, having given us His Father to be ours, though he be from us in nature most disjoined, He could not withhold from us the same Mother, who is of our flesh and blood, and whose tenderness and love for His brethren must be so great. Nay, how could the kind and benevolent heart of Mary have brooked that her parental interests should alone have been excluded from the circumstances and conditions of our obtaining His brotherhood?"

We add a most interesting testimony from the *Tablet*, of Dec. 12, evidently written by an intimate friend of the Cardinal. It is very far more significant in his case than it would be in almost any other, because he was so singularly devoid of all religious ostentation and pretence. He was indeed careless to a fault about giving what is called "edification;" and was indeed too indifferent to the good opinion of others, considering how greatly it forwards the Church's influence that the excellence of her princes should be duly appreciated.

"Dr. Wiseman was but a youth when he became Rector of the English College in Rome. His first religious instinct was to educate his students to a spirit of piety. He burned himself with zeal for the conversion of England; and though in a singular manner his charity was enlarged to such an extent as to make him long for the conversion of heathen nations, and to determine to establish in England a college for this very purpose, yet his chief mission was to England; and this was unmistakably indicated to him by the Vicar of our Lord, in making him Rector of the English College in the Via de Monserrato. How often it happens that God enlarges the heart in His own Divine way and by His secret influences, only in order the more effectively to concentrate the strength of a heart that has expanded under large and generous influences upon that particular field of work which his Vicar points out! We have known

more than one instance of this Divine training. And so it happened with Dr. Wiseman that his special mission was to England; and he set about it as soon as he became Rector, by preparing the souls no less than the minds, of the future English priesthood for the work before them. *In meditatione med exardescit ignis.* This is the motto of the saints. This he illustrated as soon as he assumed the responsibility of Rector. Every morning he himself rose before 4 o'clock, and spent an hour in a meditation, which he wrote, and then had read to the students when they came down to the chapel at 5.30 a.m. Those who fed upon this food morning after morning will not have forgotten its savour even now, though the maturity of life, or even old age, may have overtaken them. We well remember the Cardinal's retreats to students and to the clergy, and certain of his sermons on the Passion and Life of our Lord. They were drawn chiefly from these very 'Meditations,' which, he more than once told the writer of these lines, were the 'stock-in-trade' which he had laid up for life in the tranquillity and stillness of those early mornings in the Collegio Inglese, before his struggles with the world had begun, before even the streets of Rome were awakened to their daily life. No doubt the Cardinal's retreats, and those more spiritual sermons to which we refer, did not earn for him, while yet alive, the reputation which welcomed him to the learned societies before whom he used to delight to lecture. This was natural; for they were not submitted to a critical audience, nor did they become the theme of public journals. They were addressed to persons who came to be edified in the sense of being built up; they were the action of the priest or the bishop direct upon the soul. They belonged to the inner life and to the mysteries of grace; and therefore they lay hidden from the world and from public comment. We may add, that they were the least laboured, the most spontaneous, and therefore the most effective, of his public discourses. But there was a certain coyness, or rather, we should say, a certain simple humility in the Cardinal, which used to lead him to throw a veil over his more intimate acquaintance with the interior life of the soul. He passed among those who did not know him as a somewhat worldly, difficult, and unspiritual man. But there was an interior life within, which he kept strictly private—*secretum meum mihi*. To give only one instance. We had occasion once to speak to him upon the subject of ejaculatory prayer, and the sanctification of the daily routine or turmoil, whichever it may be, of life. 'Well,' he said, 'I'll give you my prayer. I have used it for over thirty years, and I may say it is scarcely ever out of my thoughts when I am at work. When engaged upon anything anxious, or even pausing in a letter, the words came up to me again and again. Here they are: I'll write them down for you, and you may try them: *Deus meus, Deus meus, nihil sum sed Tuus sum*. They help me through everything.' We narrate this little fact, not only for what it is worth in itself, and because it alone is a true picture of that deeper life of the Cardinal which remains as yet unknown, but because it may serve as a key to the soul which consecrated to meditation so many hours of life. Indeed, if it were necessary to examine the Cardinal's fitness to treat of the spiritual life, it would be enough to produce the testimony of the late General of the Jesuits, Father Roothan, who said of Dr. Wiseman's preface to an English edition of the 'Spiritual Exercises,' that he knew of no preface which had entered more scientifically into them."

A small part however of the preceding account was corrected by the following letter, which appeared in the next number of the *Tablet*:—

"SIR,—I hope the reviewer of Cardinal Wiseman's 'Meditations' will

allow me to modify some of the statements made by him; as his notice will probably be copied into other publications, and will be supposed, if left unaltered, to be as accurate as it is in other respects admirable.

"The Cardinal began to write his 'Meditations' after the retreat, which was given in the English College by the zealous and eloquent F. Massa, S.J., in November, 1837, and therefore, nine years after his promotion to the rectorship of the College. The notice represents him as rising at four, meditating for an hour, then writing out the meditation of the day, and giving it to the students to read at 5.30. The meditations were usually written in the course of the day or evening, and it was not until he had composed the meditations of a part of the year and laid them by for a considerable time, that the students discovered their existence, and induced him to allow them to be read in the chapel.

"Although some of the meditations were much longer than others, they were always written on four sides of a quarto sheet, and I trust the original sheets are still preserved by some of his many attached friends.

"T. G."

Essay on First Principles. By Very Rev. Canon WALKER. London: Longmans.

Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists. By Rev. C. MEYNELL, D.D. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT is our strong conviction, that Canon Walker and Dr. Meynell are by no means at such great mutual variance, as Dr. Meynell at least considers. We go quite as far as the latter in his abhorrence (p. 33) "of the godless psychologism which prevails in this country;" waiving, of course, his use of this particular word "psychologism": but we are confident that Canon Walker abhors it also. We have said indeed frankly, in our article on higher education, that we think it very important in England to lay much greater stress on the whole doctrine which concerns necessary truth, than various Catholic philosophers on the Continent have done. But Dr. Meynell himself states (p. 4) that all Catholics *recognize* "the objective character of necessary truth"; and the question therefore concerns, not the doctrine itself, but the stress laid on it.

However, these philosophical discussions are becoming of such great importance—particularly in their bearing on Catholic higher education—that we cannot feel we should do justice to them, by giving merely a notice of these two pamphlets. We hope therefore in our next number to give an article on "first truths," which shall consider in detail the various questions now raised. Here we will merely say, that we consider our two authors to have done very important service in promoting the requisite discussion.

In the same connection, we recommend our philosophical readers to study two notes, added by F. Dalgairns to the third edition of his work on "Holy Communion," which will be found respectively at pp. 410 and 415. In p. 416 however, there is a very absurd typographical mistake. The author points out, as does Canon Walker, that the schoolmen inculcate "the existence of intuitive," *i.e.* "non-inferential ideas." Instead of "non-inferential," the perplexed and perplexing printer has given "*even* inferential."

A Word for Scientific Theology. By JAMES MARTINEAU. London: Williams & Norgate.

The Limits of Philosophical Inquiry. By WILLIAM Lord Archbishop of York. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas.

The Conscience. By F. D. MAURICE. London: MacMillan.

IN our article on Catholic higher education, we have referred to the pre-dominantly and indeed almost exclusively atheistic tendency of all vigorous philosophical schools of thought, among non-Catholic Englishmen of the day. Various indications however have reached us of a reaction setting in; and we need hardly say how heartily all Catholic thinkers must sympathize with that reaction.

The three works named at the head of our notice—Mr. Maurice's a volume, the other two pamphlets—are very valuable, were it only in this point of view. Curiously enough, that one of the three—Mr. Martineau's—which is philosophically the most satisfactory, is theologically the most anti-Catholic: for the author occupies a large portion of his address, on one hand in defending mixed education, and on the other hand in assailing the inspiration of Scripture. But we will not shrink from saying, that we consider him among the very deepest and most accurate thinkers of our time on matters philosophical; and we heartily wish he would put together—partly from his previous writings—a connected treatise on the whole subject.

Archbishop Thompson's address exhibits throughout much ability, and indeed some originality. We consider indeed that both his pamphlet and Mr. Martineau's might be studied with great advantage by Catholic professors of philosophy, who will know how to discriminate the sound from the unsound. We should say indeed that Dr. Thompson is more cowed than Mr. Martineau permits himself to be, by the atheistic aggressiveness of contemporary English philosophy; and in three different places—the whole pamphlet containing only 27 pages—he goes out of his way to exhibit this timidity. "The evidence for" "God and freedom and duty and immortality" "is less clear," he says (pp. 23-4), "and the research more difficult, than for the facts of" physical "science." But then, he adds, we should "estimate knowledge not by its clearness but by the value of its objects." The "kind of inquiry" which issues in a knowledge "of God and freedom and duty and immortality is obscure and difficult" (p. 10), whereas physical inquiry is "easy and precise." Nay, the former at last (p. 26) cannot be accounted "certain knowledge."

Mr. Maurice's volume not only is not scientific, but hardly even professes to be so; and this, though it consists of lectures delivered from the Cambridge Chair of casuistry and moral philosophy. But we think a large number of his incidental remarks not valuable only but profound; and we greatly regret therefore, that he has not given himself the trouble—if indeed he possesses the power—of working them into a scientific whole. In particular we prize the stress laid by him on the Moral Faculty; which, in common with the great majority of English Protestants, he calls the "conscience," and which gives its title to his whole course. Philosophical controversy is im-

minent against the Mill and Bain dynasty, unless irreligion and necessitarianism are to have it all their own way. And among the intellectual weapons available against that dynasty, we believe none will be found more effective and serviceable—perhaps none so much so—than that based on the undeniable existence in man, and the intrinsic character, of the Moral Faculty.

We cannot better conclude our notice, than by extracting the very powerful conclusion of Mr. Martineau's address.

"To decide whether duty is a refinement of interest and sympathy, or speaks with a distinct voice of its own, and whether compunction is a reflected image of the public anger or an indigenous notice of violated obligation, we must discriminate, by the most rigorous tests, the primitive material from the fabricated structure of our moral life. Whilst we hear all the religious phenomena explained away, on the one hand, as a tissue of artificial associations, spreading over the face of things a veil of illusion which is destined to dissolve like the ghosts already gone;—and claimed, on the other hand, as the expression of native insight into things as they are, given us by the necessary postulates of reason and conscience;—is it not evident that the last controversy is already passing on to the psychological field; and that on the self-interpretation of human nature depends the continued recognition of the Divine? Were it possible that the analyses of Thought and Will *now prevalent in the schools* should prove final, and that nothing should be found behind the current Logic of science, we should be living in the last age of Theology, and it would scarcely need another step for its self-knowledge to overbalance into self-extinction. Since, however, our 'modern thought' *does not solve, but only despair of*, the haunting problems of 'Metaphysics,' since again it makes no provision for any primary truths, but makes all our mental stores alike derivative,—and that from sensible experiences common to us with the brutes,—it may be surmised that intellectual curiosity may yet rise in discontent and reclaim its natural range; that the device will not permanently succeed, of *shutting up vast chambers of human thought and labelling them 'empty,'* and that the relation between our phenomenal knowledge and what lies beyond it may be reconstrued, and lifted into a real relation, neither inscrutable nor insignificant. If so, there is a future still for philosophical theology; and the death with which, from the time of Epicurus to that of Comte, it has been so often threatened by the expositors of natural laws and molecular hypotheses, will yet be postponed. 'Modern thought' is strong; but ancient truths are stronger: and with the vigour of eternal youth they will re-assert their moral power, as the inexhaustible springs of noble and reverent action, and vindicate their intellectual place, as the *immoveable bases of any satisfying philosophy.*"

The Freedom of the Will stated afresh. By E. M. LLOYD.
London: Longmans.

MR. LLOYD has forwarded us a copy of this pamphlet, as presenting much similarity to our own remarks on Free Will in controversy with the Duke of Argyll. Mr. Lloyd thinks (p. 10) as we do, that the Duke is no less simply necessitarian than Mr. Mill himself; that he has "sung a song of triumph as the champion of Free Will, while leaving all the spoils in the hands of the enemy." But otherwise Mr. Lloyd's treatment of the great question is rather supplementary than confirmatory of ours. We did not

profess to argue for Free Will, but only to maintain that no result ensues from that doctrine at variance with any law of phenomenal sequence which can even be alleged as having received scientific proof. Mr. Lloyd, on the contrary (p. 51), waives that particular point which we treated, and employs himself mainly on a vigorous philosophical argument for the doctrine itself.

We cannot gather from the pamphlet what are its author's religious opinions. He assumes Theism all through. On the other hand, his concluding sentence expresses the greatest general confidence in Mr. Mill's guidance; in another place (p. 18) he speaks of Christianity and Stoicism as "the two main fountain-heads of modern morality," and implies that neither "can be spared in man's education"; and he begins with saying (p. 3), that "the cause of human liberty has perhaps as much to fear from its theological patrons as from its scientific assailants."

But whatever Mr. Lloyd's religious or irreligious opinions, we are not acquainted with any reply to Mill and Bain nearly so complete and satisfactory as this; and we hope to make great use of it in an article on Free Will, before many quarters shall have elapsed. Mr. Mill does not seem to have known of the pamphlet; for he makes no reply to it in the third edition of his work on Sir W. Hamilton, which contains a general answer to his critics. It must be admitted indeed, that one of Mr. Lloyd's arguments, and one on which he lays some stress, having been urged by another opponent of Mr. Mill's, has received from that gentleman a more or less successful answer (Lloyd, p. 13; Mill, p. 568). But on the substance of the controversy, we consider Mr. Lloyd triumphantly victorious.

His statement is excellent as to what would be man's condition if his will were not free. On such an hypothesis we should be "mere *spectators* at best" of our own moral condition (p. 2); we could do no more than "*take cognizance* of the thoughts and feelings which our organization and our inconsistencies *determine*" (p. 24). A. would have no more control over his own moral character, than he has over B's.

Nothing can be more intelligible than Mr. Mill's proposition; and it is indeed a great benefit to the cause of truth, that its ablest English opponent is so singularly clear and straightforward a thinker. A motive, he says (Lloyd, p. 15), "is proportioned" in strength "to the pleasantness *as conceived by us* of the thing desired, or the painfulness of the thing shunned." And this being understood, he lays down that at any given moment the will with infallible certainty follows its strongest motive. Here is a most definite statement, with which an opponent can fairly grapple on the ground of consciousness and experience: and Mr. Lloyd, in fact, grapples with it crushingly. We cannot too strongly recommend to our Catholic philosophical readers his whole argument from p. 15 to p. 21.

Mr. Lloyd is of course under great philosophical disadvantage, from not being a Catholic. We do not in this refer so much to his use of the word "will" and his language about the "ego;" though no Catholic could follow him in these respects. Nor again of course do we refer to his silence on the doctrine of grace; because, in a controversy against non-Catholics on the philosophical platform, even from a Catholic, theology would be out of place. But there are various facts known to pious Catholics which, as being matters

of *experience*, fall legitimately within the province of philosophy. We will give one or two instances.

The author quotes (p. 7) a pointedly expressed saying of Theodore Parker's. "It seems as if man were tied by two fetters—the one of historic circumstance, the other of his physical organization—fastened at opposite points: but the cord is elastic, and may be lengthened by use, or shortened by abuse and neglect." Nor can it fairly be doubted that at any given moment there are certain limits, within which alone the will has full moral power of action. But those limits in the direction of good are far less narrow, than any one supposes, who is unacquainted with the singular power possessed by *prayer*. Let the mind be thrown (if we may so express ourselves) into an attitude of prayer, and every Catholic priest well knows the extraordinary—it may almost be said the miraculous—power it obtains of resisting evil solicitations. As a mere matter of philosophical reasoning (we may observe, by the way) this repeatedly observed phenomenon necessarily must either be a very wonderful and anomalous psychological fact, or else must prove that the will is preternaturally assisted towards good.

Then secondly, Mr. Lloyd implies, unless we misunderstand him (see, e. g., p. 17), that the cases are comparatively rare in a man's life when he puts forth *effort* in the direction of good against lower solicitations. But the Catholic who tries to live in the presence of God, is very frequently indeed through the day occupied in this very effort. He is labouring to fix his thoughts on God, against the opposite solicitation of surrounding objects and interests.

Thirdly however, our author (p. 28), considers such "*effort*" to be far more commonly painful than good Catholics will admit it to be. Of course there are particular seasons, of violent temptation e. g. to mortal sin;—or again of aridity and the like in the case of the more saintly—; which would not only bear out Mr. Lloyd's description, but a great deal more. But, as a general rule, the interior Christian's effort at fixing his thoughts on God is accompanied by predominant sweetness and great sensible devotion. Indeed we believe there is one very remarkable fact fully borne out by experience. We believe it not unfrequently happens, that at the very moment when a man not alone speculatively knows, but practically realises, that his present state of feeling is actually much happier at the moment than that to which he is solicited, he is obliged nevertheless to put forth considerable effort if he would successfully resist such solicitation. This fact has always seemed to us among the strongest indications of human nature being corrupt.

In conclusion, we heartily hope that Mr. Lloyd's admirably clear and excellent principles on this fundamental question may be a means of gradually drawing him to sounder views on other cognate matters also; that he may see as clearly through Mr. Mill's fallacies on social liberty, as he now sees through the same writer's fallacies on liberty of the will. Who knows but that in due time our author may himself have sympathy with those "*theological aims*" which now so greatly repel him?

Why Men do not Believe. By L. J. LAFORET, Rector of the Catholic University of Louvain. London: Philp.

THE subject treated in this work is both speculatively and practically of great and growing importance; and useful service has been done by its translation into English. "Even in this country," says the translator (p. v.) "which owes so much to the conservative common-sense instincts of the English mind, there prevails scepticism and unbelief not only in the exclusive claims of this or that form of positive and dogmatic Christianity, but in any supernatural communication whatever of God to man." Indeed, we believe that this description might have been carried much further. We believe Mgr. Laforet's statement (p. ix.) to be not less borne out in England than in his own country; viz., that it is not "the denial of Christianity" alone which now contends against the Faith, but "of a personal and living God."

It is hardly possible then to exaggerate the desirableness, that Catholics shall fully appreciate the causes of this disease, in order that they may learn to apply a remedy thereto; and Mgr. Laforet, we may add, has exhibited at once the best possible spirit, and also much acuteness of remark. Closely connected with his question is another, on which the *Pall Mall Gazette* has recently published some remarks not less shallow than anti-Christian; we mean the profound evil accruing to many Catholics from unreserved intercourse with Protestants, or unreserved familiarity with Protestant literature. We are not without hope, that we may be able before long to give an article, which shall treat both these questions with a special view to the circumstances of England. The present volume will be of great assistance to us in such an enterprise.

The author makes an observation in page 137, which seems to us of peculiar importance. The objects revealed to *faith* are not evident in *themselves*; and theologians are in the habit of explaining, by this consideration, the circumstance that men are found to reject those objects of belief. It is thus implied and taken for granted, often it is expressly said, that *intrinsic* evidence of a truth *necessitates* the intellect to its reception "evidentia cogit intellectum." But our author will not accept this statement. "Is not the existence of God evident?" he asks. And yet "thinking" men are to be found who "totally deny it." "What is more evident than the freedom and immortality of the soul? And yet these truths meet with contradiction, and obstinate contradiction."

We are a little surprised that Mgr. Laforet does not assign a more prominent place to *worldliness*, among the causes of infidelity. We are confident there is none *more* powerful, and we doubt whether there is any other so much so. God and the world form most opposite judgments on the worth of human conduct. To those who follow the latter in its view—if they are sufficiently profound thinkers to understand clearly what they are about—both Christianity and any genuine and reasonable Theism present so grotesque and incredible an appearance, that it is practically

impossible for such persons, so long as their moral standard remains unchanged, to accept such a religion as true.

We unhesitatingly recommend this volume to the study of those who are interested in the intellectual phenomena of the time.

The Communion of Saints ; or, the Catholic Doctrine concerning our Relation to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, and the Saints. By WILLIAM LOCKHART, B.A., Oxon. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

Secession or Schism. By WILLIAM LOCKHART, B.A., Oxon. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

FATHER LOCKHART is certainly an admirable controversialist ; he does such justice to his opponents' good qualities, is so fair to their arguments, and at the same time so well versed in his own religion.

The first of the above-named pamphlets appeared several years ago ; and it is now republished with a new preface, to meet the present position of Anglicans. We have been much struck with the union of orthodoxy and moderation which F. Lockhart exhibits, in dealing with the alleged excesses of Catholic language concerning our Blessed Lady, on which Dr. Pusey has laid so much stress. F. Lockhart holds (p. vi.) that there are no "expressions in all those alleged from S. Liguori or S. Bernardine which a Catholic would misunderstand." He adds however that "the phrases are calculated to convey false impressions to Protestant Englishmen, who are usually untheological and matter of fact. . . . Italian Catholics, speaking to pious Italian Catholics, would be understood by them according to the whole tradition of Catholic faith in which they had been taught from their mother's knee ; but the same words translated into English, and read by English Protestants whose early training had not been tinged by the same accurate theology and living tradition, would most likely be misunderstood." Such misunderstanding arises "partly because English Protestants are so matter-of-fact as not to make allowance for the language of hyperbole ; and often so untheological, as not to have any clear intuition of the mystery of the Divine condescension in the Incarnation, of the union of the Godhead and Manhood in One Divine Person, of the relation of the great Mother of God to 'the Living God, who has purchased us to Himself by his own Blood,' and of the mystery of human exaltation, by which the redeemed and she who is the first and best of the redeemed, 'are seated in Heavenly places with Christ,' on that throne which He shares with His Eternal Father." In fact, F. Lockhart holds that it is English Protestants, and not foreign Catholics, who are to blame in the matter. Nay, he even considers that such is F. Newman's meaning, in a very well-known page of the letter to Dr. Pusey.

The real question at issue, adds our author (p. ix.), is whether extreme Anglicans "really mean that they are ready to accept the definition of the Council of Trent, that 'the Saints reigning with Christ intercede for us and it is good for us to invoke them.' Are they prepared to use the 'Hail Mary, the 'Salve Regina,' the litany of the Saints and of the Blessed Virgin, the

prayers from the popular authorized Manual, the Roman Raccolta?" We may add, are they prepared to abstain from *censuring* those who dearly love the Marian language of S. Alphonsus and of Grignon de Montfort? "If so," we heartily add with F. Lockhart, "there is nothing on this point between us."

F. Lockhart's reply to Dr. Neale loses in effect, from the incredible weakness of that divine's position; still as Dr. Neale has a name among his co-religionists, it was well worth F. Lockhart's while to answer him. Dr. Neale actually "takes for granted" that the Anglican society "is allowed by Catholics to be a true Church" (p. 3). Certainly we agree with Dr. Neale, that men cannot, without mortal sin, leave a true branch of the Catholic Church. But then, as F. Lockhart amusingly observes (p. 6), this question is unpractical; for no one who accounted the Anglican denomination a true branch of the Church, could be received by any priest, or by the Pope himself, into Catholic communion.

Dr. Neale has had the boldness to say (p. 21) that converts from Anglicanism "almost without exception. . . lead lives of more than worldly ease; give themselves up to novels, cigars, wine-parties (?); to morning lounging on the sofa, and the evening at the opera." How is one decently to characterize such language? F. Lockhart reminds his reader of the very numerous converts who have become priests. We hope however that not *quite* all *lay* converts devote *quite* their whole lives to lounging, smoking, and wine-bibbing.

La Condamnation de Galilée. Par l'Abbé D. BOUX.

Arras : Rousseau-Leroy.

WE have long been hoping to resume the question of Galileo; on which much has been written, especially in France, since our article of October 1865. But we see no immediate hope of having an opportunity for this; and we will therefore delay no longer to bring before our readers' notice Abbé Bouix's most valuable pamphlet. This pamphlet indeed, it may be said, contains all the ecclesiastical literature of the subject, and is therefore of much utility and importance. We will state briefly, under three heads, the conclusion at which we arrived in our article; and we will consider the facts adduced by our author, in their relation thereto.

Firstly then, we stated as certain, not merely that the condemnation of Galileo was not a Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* Act, but that no contemporary Catholic imagined it so to be. In corroboration of this, we may cite Descartes's letters (Bouix, p. 21) written only six months afterwards. He thought Galileo's scientific arguments very strong (an opinion in which we believe he was quite mistaken); but declared that if the Church had condemned Heliocentrism, nothing should induce him to hold it. He proceeds to say that the condemning decree had issued primarily from the Congregations, and that he had not heard of its receiving confirmation from a Pope or Council. In like manner Caramuel (Bouix, p. 25), another contemporary of Galileo's, who himself considered Heliocentrism heretical as being con-

trary to Scripture, nevertheless took for granted, as certain on all hands, that no Pope had *ex cathedrâ* so declared it.

Secondly, we maintained that the decree was no doctrinal mistake at all, in any proper sense of those words ; but on the contrary, that it afforded true doctrinal guidance to contemporary Catholics, as expressing the conclusion legitimately deducible from all then cognizable data. Abbé Bouix does not go quite so far as this ; but we confess that his objections have failed to convince us. He shows very plainly (p. 60)—what we ourselves also confidently urged—how complete a mistake it is to say, that Galileo was merely condemned for professing to prove his theory from Scripture. His theory was itself condemned, as *contrary* to Scripture : and very justly, under then circumstances. It was indubitably contrary both to the one obvious, and the one then traditional, *sense* of Scripture ; and (as was repeatedly urged at the time by Galileo's opponents) nothing but complete scientific proof could have justified Catholics in giving the words of Scripture a figurative interpretation. F. Fabri, S.J., a strong anti-Galilean, is quoted by our author (pp. 30, 31) as expressly saying, that if a scientific demonstration of Copernicanism were ever discovered, the Church would not hesitate to sanction a figurative interpretation of Scripture ; but adding, that he for one did not at all expect such a demonstration *could* be given. It is now indeed admitted by all, that Galileo's opponents were perfectly right in demurring to his alleged proofs, and that those proofs were utterly insufficient : some even think, that the said proofs were so weak as to be almost worthless. Galileo's scientific achievements were undoubtedly very considerable indeed ; but his reasonings for Copernicanism are rather discreditable than otherwise to his scientific character.

Abbé Bouix urges indeed (p. 57), that Nicholas of Cusa, Copernicus, and others, had been permitted to maintain Heliocentricism. As to the former however, there is no reason whatever for supposing that his (at the time) eccentric and isolated opinion was ever brought at all under the notice of ecclesiastical authority. And as to Copernicus, he declared most expressly in his preface that he spoke of Heliocentricism as a pure hypothesis ; the imagination of which was useful for the calculation of planetary orbits, but which "need not be true or even probable," i. e., resting on any solid ground whatever. De Morgan adds that every one of Copernicus's followers down to Galileo, with one single exception, understood and followed him in the same sense.

We believe then, that Paul V. and the Roman Congregations did very important service to the Church and to religion, by checking Galileo's reckless and anti-Catholic career.

Thirdly, we expressed an opinion that contemporary Catholics were under a real obligation of yielding interior assent to the congregational decree ; though of course not that absolute and unreserved assent, which is due to an infallible judgment. We illustrated the nature of the assent, by referring to a youth of fourteen years old, instructed by his father whose character he has every reason for respecting, in the facts and principles of history. He accepts the whole instruction with unqualified assent ; nor does the very thought of its being erroneous in any one particular so much as enter his

mind: and yet he knows that it is not infallible. Abbé Bouix speaks here and there, as though no interior assent could be due to a fallible decree; but we think he can hardly have given the matter deliberate consideration.

Abbé Bouix has conferred signal services on the Church, and is among the most learned, orthodox, and universally respected of theologians. He has added another conspicuous good work in the present important pamphlet. All who are interested in the Galileo question, should read it in close connection with M. de l'Épinois's contribution on the same subject, in the 5th livraison of the *Revue des Sciences Historiques*. This latter paper was noticed by us in October, 1867, p. 535.

Revue Catholique, November, 1868. Louvain: Verbeist.

WE understand from the *Tablet* that this excellently principled periodical is to assume a larger and more important shape; and we are heartily glad to hear it. At present we would merely draw our readers' attention to part of a very important letter, addressed by Card. Caterini, Prefect of the Congregation of the Council of Trent, to the bishop of a certain canon, who had refused to accept the Church's doctrine on the moral necessity of the Pope's temporal dominion. The whole letter is well worthy of attentive perusal, the more so as the *Revue* mentions that it received the Holy Father's approbation; but our immediate concern is with one particular paragraph. The italics are our own.

"In favour of this dominion are to be found not only *Allocutions and Encyclicals* of Holy Fathers, but letters also from almost all the bishops of the Catholic world. What could be more easy for him, on seeing all these documents, than to reason thus? 'The Roman Pontiff and the bishops, or in other words the entire Catholic Church, teaches me this: why should I not listen to her voice? If I listen not to the Church, I shall without any doubt incur the tremendous anathema declared in Scripture, 'If he listens not to the Church, let him be to thee as a publican and a heathen.' When the Pope speaks, who is the *Universal Teacher* and vicegerent of Jesus Christ, who would dare to resist and refuse to 'bring his intellect into captivity,' even though one might not understand the whole bearing of his language nor the motives of his directions [prescriptions]? It is true that in the present matter there is no question of an article which appertains directly to the Faith; but is that sufficient ground for refusing due submission to the voice of the Supreme Pastor? Who does not know that, besides what are strictly called articles of faith, there are others also which concern the Faith; and that there are also moral precepts; as that, for instance, which forbids theft?" (p. 652).

The Cardinal Prefect therefore places the Catholic's obligation of accepting the Church's doctrine concerning the Pope's civil sovereignty, on the very same level with his obligation of accepting her doctrine on the sinfulness of theft.

The *Revue Catholique* itself speaks in a similar sense.

"But the question of the suitableness and necessity of this temporal dominion is a question of doctrine the solution of which appertains to the Church. It is true that she has not defined this doctrine as appertaining directly to the Faith, as a dogma properly so called. Still that is no sufficient ground that we can

dispense ourselves from adhering to her decisions. It is not only what are strictly called articles of faith which we are bound to admit. *The Church is also infallible* when she *defines* a doctrine declaring that this doctrine* has relation to the general good of religion, to her rights or her discipline, even though otherwise her decision might appear to have, or might really have, *no direct connection with a dogma of faith or rule of morals*. Now this is what she has done as to the civil Princedom of the Holy See.

Pensées de M. Louis Veuillot, recueillies de tous ses Ouvrages.
Par l'Abbé CHARBONNEL.

WE have not yet seen this volume ; but we hasten to reprint, from the *Westminster Gazette* of Dec. 19, a translation of Mgr. Mercurelli's letter expressing the Holy Father's warm approval of it.

"Our Most Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., has observed with great satisfaction that you have occupied yourself with disposing in order, and giving to the world, a new arrangement of the ideas of the illustrious writer, M. Louis Veuillot, on the Church, religion, and ethics, and other subjects relating to religious and civil society, particularly history, and the pernicious errors which abound in the world in our day.

"Within the limits of a moderate volume you have succeeded in affording a splendid specimen of the talent and piety of your author. Those whose occupations preclude them from studying all his numerous works, have the advantage in your work of finding themselves provided, without the trouble of searching them out, with the solid arguments M. Veuillot has so frequently furnished, both for sustaining belief and for refuting the sophisms and pretensions of unbelievers ; and no less for exposing the fallacy of the opinions, with which it is now sought to undermine the religious foundations of society.

"Our Holy Father congratulates you therefore on your useful undertaking, and in token of his approval and paternal goodwill towards you, sends his Apostolic Benediction.

"And for my part, after thus fulfilling my instructions concerning you, I hasten to offer you the hearty expression of my esteem and regard, as well as good wishes for the success of your work, praying our Lord to grant you His favour."

It is well known that M. Veuillot is the leading opponent (in the press) of French "liberal Catholicism." And it is those very works of his, singled out by Pius IX. for approbation, concerning "religious and civil society" and "the opinions with which it is now sought to undermine the religious foundations of society," wherein he has principally assailed that unsound and Anti-Catholic system.

We think it is comparatively very seldom, that the Holy Father expresses praise so unreserved of any publication, as he has done of the present ; and again as he expressed of M. de Beaulieu's reply to M. de Montalembert's doctrine, about a "free Church in a free state."

* The words omitted are (1), "or when she imposes a law ;" (2), "or law." We do not quite apprehend their meaning ; for no one maintains that every law enacted by the Church is infallibly expedient.

The *Month* for November, 1868. London : Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

THE "Month" is a periodical of very different stamp indeed from the "Home and Foreign Review," or the "Chronicle"; and its judgment has justly great weight with the Catholic body. It has rendered much service; but for that very reason it has the power of doing serious mischief by any inaccurate or unguarded statement. It was on this account, that we felt under an obligation in our last number of drawing the Editor's attention to a very singular proposition indeed, which appeared in his August issue: "the Church does not assume, and never has assumed, any power to discern and proclaim truths altogether unknown to the Church of the Apostles."

The Editor now confirms our previous strong impression, that he never intended to sanction this proposition in its obvious and grammatical sense. So understood indeed, it is not only false, but most unsound and mischievous. A small knot of extreme theologians have adopted it, for the purpose of denying the Church's infallibility in her minor censures; in the "Unigenitus," the "Auctorem Fidei," the condemnation of Fénelon: while the Jansenists maintained it very prominently, as their defence for not submitting to the Church's judgment on a dogmatical fact. The Editor of the "Month" has, of course, no kind of sympathy with such a tenet; and even under ordinary circumstances we should expect he would have been grateful to us for giving him the opportunity of explanation. But in the present state of things,—this very question having been of late so fully and prominently discussed and so much stress laid on it,—we really think that his words would have been widely considered as a pointed declaration on what he himself accounts the unorthodox side. And this the rather, because he has hitherto felt it his duty, for reasons which he has now assigned, to give no opinion on the recent controversy. He now expresses, as we anticipated he would, a distinct judgment (p. 517) that "the Church speaks infallibly," not only on dogmatical facts, but also on "what are called 'deducible' and 'protective' truths." We are very happy indeed to accept the penalty of what we may call a severe scolding at his hands, as the price we pay for the advantage derived to orthodoxy from his distinct profession of doctrine.

We cannot assent to any of his various criticisms, either on our notice of October, or on our previous course of conduct. But we will rather take some opportunity of indirectly replying to them, than do any thing which could be understood as assuming an antagonistic attitude towards his periodical.

He says indeed, in effect, that our criticism of his notice was malevolent.* We are a little surprised at his thinking this. We have gone out of our way

* We understand this charge to be conveyed in the following sentence:—"The critic in one place, where he speaks of the possible malevolence of others, has been so careless as to change the word 'altogether' into the word 'generally'" (p. 517).

As we have had to recite this sentence, we may as well rectify our contemporary's misapprehension. We did not at all misquote him. Our meaning

on various occasions to express our sense of the services rendered by him to the Church; nor, before our last number, have we ever said one word expressing even difference of opinion, much less disparagement. Even in the notice on which he is remarking, we speak of the "excellent service he has done" by his various "comments on Anglican orders," and proceed to enlarge on the great merit of his last article on the subject. We assure him that nothing can be further from our wish than any disunion between him and ourselves. We regard him as a fellow labourer, not an opponent. The "Month" and the "Dublin Review" are engaged in the same cause, and pursuing the same ends. That there should be occasional differences of judgment between the two is natural, indeed inevitable; but these differences concern not ends, but means. It shall not be our fault, if the good cause suffers by dissension arising between its upholders.

National Tendencies and the Duty of Catholics. By HERBERT VAUGHAN, D.D. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS pamphlet cannot properly be made by us a matter of comment, as it is but a reprint of an article in our number for July, 1868. F. Vaughan prefaces the re-issue by this introduction.

"The following pages are reprinted and given to the public in a cheap form, not because they claim any literary merit—far from it—but because they treat of the two subjects which are the most vital to the English people: our Educational and Religious National Tendencies.

"With regard to POPULAR EDUCATION, I wish to lay before the Catholic public a consideration on the importance of *at once* setting to work to form 'District Poor School Committees.'

"And, with regard to the purely RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, I am glad of an opportunity to call attention to the fact that, since this article was written, a 'Catholic Truth Society' has actually been established, and is on the eve of opening its central dépôt, for the sale and distribution of popular fly-sheets, papers, and pamphlets, at No. 27, Wellington-street, Strand, W.C.

"Lastly, while so much nonsense has been talked about women and their rights, it is worth while to suggest whether their highest and noblest mission is not direct co-operation with Our Lord and His Apostles in moulding the masses to Christianity, and drawing them to eternal life.

"It is Our Lord Himself who, through His Church, in which His Divine Spirit is abiding, freed and frees, raised and raises women to their proper position in the world. Through His Church He has been their Educator and Protector, and through His Church He organizes them to minister to all the spiritual and corporal needs of society, in every age, with the same Divine wisdom and mercy, as He established, for woman as well as for man, that indissoluble sacramental bond, which men nowadays annul and repudiate by Act of Parliament."

was simply this. We had no right to assume that the Apostles knew *none* of those "deducible" and "protective" truths which the Church has from time to time infallibly determined since their death: but it seemed safe to say that those truths were "*generally*"—i.e. that *most* of them were—"unknown"—i.e. *altogether* unknown—to the Apostles. To have added the word "*altogether*," instead of impairing in any way our argument, would but have exhibited it more clearly.

A Chapter of Autobiography. By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
London: Murray.

THIS pamphlet is calculated greatly to raise Mr. Gladstone's character in the estimation of those who (like ourselves) can feel no respect for a public man, except so far as he brings his religious convictions to bear intimately on his political conduct. There were various indications, which led some to fear that Mr. Gladstone had broken with his past life altogether, and had plunged unreservedly into the vortex of secular party politics. It is delightful then to find so accomplished a statesman keeping up so heartily his theological interests, and holding as firmly as ever to the great principle, that promotion of a people's religious welfare is at least one prominent end to be pursued by its civil rulers. Some Protestant politicians may be led to press forward Irish disestablishment, by their detestable wish to sever politics from religion; but Mr. Gladstone's reasons for the measure which he has originated, are reasons with which, so far as they go, the best-instructed Catholic will heartily concur.

"In every function of life, and in every combination with his fellow-creatures, for whatever purpose, the duties of man are limited only by his powers. It is easy to separate, in the case of a Gas Company or a Chess Club, the primary end for which it exists, from everything extraneous to that end. It is not so easy in the case of the State or of the family. If the primary end of the State is to protect life and property, so the *primary end of the family is to propagate the race*. But around these ends there cluster, in both cases, a group of moral purposes, variable indeed with varying circumstances, but yet *inhering in the relation*, and not external or merely incidental to it. *The action of man in the State is moral, as truly as it is in the individual sphere*; although it be limited by the fact that, as he is combined with others whose views and wills may differ from his own, the sphere of the common operations must be limited, first, to the things in which all are agreed; secondly, to the things in which, though they may not be agreed, yet equity points out, and the public sense acknowledges, that the whole should be bound by the sense of the majority.

"I can hardly believe that even those, including as they do so many men both upright and able, who now contend on principle for the separation of the Church from the State, are so determined to exalt their theorem to the place of an universal truth, that they ask us to condemn the whole of that process, by which, as the Gospel spread itself through the civilized world, Christianity became incorporated with the action of civil authority, and with the framework of public law" (pp. 58, 59).

The admirable illustration drawn, in this extract, from the "primary end of the family," is one which we have never before seen introduced into controversies about Church and State; though it is so singularly apposite and cogent, that one wonders how it can hitherto have been passed over.

It was Lord Macaulay's shallow and even preposterous doctrine, that a government may occasionally indeed give a lift to the spiritual welfare of its subjects; but only so far as such little incidental excursions from its province shall not interfere with the slightest temporal benefit. This theory, says Mr. Gladstone,

"may be comprised in three words: Government is police. All other functions, except those of police proper, are the accidents of its existence.

As if a man should say to his friend when in the country, 'I am going up to town; can I take anything for you?' So the State, while busy about protecting life and property, will allow its officer of police to perform any useful office for the community, to instruct a wayfarer as to his road, or tell the passer-by what o'clock it is, provided it does not interfere with his watching the pickpocket, or laying the strong hand upon the assassin" (p. 57).

On the other hand, how inadequate have been even the highest Tractarian theories on Church and State, is signally manifested in other passages of this pamphlet. The very notion that in matters which have a religious bearing God has subjected State to Church, and not the reverse,—has never apparently occurred to Mr. Gladstone, even as an hypothesis. Witness the following:—

"As long as the Church at large, or the Church within the limits of the nation, is substantially one, I do not see why the religious care of the subject, through a body properly constituted for the purpose, should cease to be a function of the State, with the whole action and life of which it has, throughout Europe, been so long and so closely associated. As long as the State holds, by descent, by the intellectual superiority of the governing classes, and by the good will of the people, a position of original and underived authority, there is no absolute impropriety, but the reverse, in its commending to the nation the greatest of all boons" (p. 60).

Again in p. 14 the author implies that, where Church and State are in their normal condition, the latter is not simply to accept dogma from the former, but, on the contrary, is itself to "take cognizance of religious truth and error."

Still, as we have said, the general principles of this autobiography, on the connection between religion and politics, are in the highest degree honourable to one who is playing so prominent a part in the political world; and the more so, as he cannot expect that they will increase his influence with his own party. They are in fact precisely identical with those very principles which he has been accused of deserting, the principles expressed in his excellent work on "The State in its Relations with the Church."

Vast numbers of critics have described as the one distinguishing characteristic of that work—many as its distinguishing paradox—its author's allegation that the State has a conscience. What a marvellous criticism! To say that the State has *not* a conscience, is to say that the State in its corporate capacity is not bound by the moral law: and is this then the doctrine upheld by Mr. Gladstone's censors? As he most truly observe, (p. 14), "the controversy lies not in the *existence* of a conscience in the State," but "in the *extent of its range*."

But if Mr. Gladstone's principles on the State's duty towards religion are the same now which they were in his youth, how are we to account for his singular practical change about the Irish Establishment? Three chief reasons are assigned by him for this change.

1. In his youth he extravagantly overrated the doctrinal unity, the doctrinal stability, the predominance, the influence, of the Anglican denomination (pp. 50–56). Little did he dream, e. g., that in ten or twelve years,

"at least a moiety of the most gifted sons whom Oxford had reared for the service of the Church of England, would be hurling at her head the hottest bolts of the Vatican: that, with their deviation on the one side, there would arise a not less convulsive rationalistic movement on the other; and that the natural consequences would be developed in endless contention and

estrangement, and in suspicions worse than either, because even less accessible, and even more intractable. Since that time, the Church of England may be said to have bled at every pore" (pp. 54, 55).

2. In England the Government has come rather "to be the organ of the deliberate and ascertained will of the community, expressed through legal channels" (p. 60), than a power governing that community: and consequently it is less at liberty to inculcate on the people its own religious convictions. This change from the old state of things was no doubt in progress when Mr. Gladstone wrote his work, but he had not duly observed it. He evidently sympathizes with the change far more cordially than we can pretend to do. Indeed he professes political Liberalism, and we are very far from professing it.

3. But even had the Anglican denomination been far more influential than it is in England, and had the relations between English governors and governed remained as they were, what possible right had England to thrust its heretical Establishment upon Catholic Ireland? What superiority of nature and cultivation do the English possess over the Irish, which can offer any pretext for the former governing the latter on the very principles on which they govern the Hindoos in India and the negroes in Jamaica? What more shameful abuse can there be, than that Ireland should be ruled, not according to Irish, but according to English ideas? We have been a good deal surprised at not finding such topics enforced in the present pamphlet; but Mr. Gladstone's recent electioneering speeches abound with reiterations of this important truth.

We do not ourselves see any objection whatever in *principle*, though Mr. Gladstone (p. 22) apparently sees one, to the State pecuniarily assisting different religious bodies at the same time. But the evils of such an arrangement between England and Ireland would be frightful. Assistance of this kind would be unintermittingly made a plea for the most tyrannical State interference with the Church's discipline, nay, with her doctrine. In fact, Dean Stanley and other prominent advocates of the project base their proposal on this very ground; they avow their wish of using State agency, to repress the growth of what they call "Ultramontaniam" in Ireland. There is no plan against which the whole Irish Catholic body, bishops, priests, and people, are more resolutely determined, than against any imaginable offer of State subsidy to the parish priests.

In p. 33 Mr. Gladstone speaks admirably on "the burning shame and hideous scandal of those penal laws" in Ireland "which perhaps for the first time in the history of Christendom, if not of man, aimed at persecuting men out of one religion, but not at persecuting them into another."

In taking leave of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet, we may express our sincere trust that Catholic Irishmen, while they follow their Protestant leader in his onslaught on the detestable Irish Establishment, will not fall below that leader in those politico-religious principles, which they shall profess as their rule of action. We sincerely trust that the Holy Father's reiterated and emphatic protests against the severance of politics from religion, will not meet with a less harmonious response from any of his own spiritual children, than they meet with from one who is still alas! a stranger to the true fold.

Is there not a Cause? By REV. M. MACCOLL, M.A. London: Longmans.

WE frankly admit that Mr. MacColl has taken us completely by surprise, in the extraordinary vigour and freshness of this pamphlet. It is plain he is incomparably better fitted to deal with these semi-political questions, than with theology and philosophy. Indeed, in the present pamphlet itself, he seems bent on making this evident; for in p. 102, he lugs in, by the head and shoulders, a little theological episode, in which his remarks are as curiously feeble as they are curiously *mal-à-propos*. He is also led incidentally to theologize on the State's legitimate power, and he certainly goes extraordinary lengths:—

“It belongs (he says) to the essence of the State that it should possess *supreme and unlimited power* over all its component members in respect both to *their persons and properties*; and the State itself is the sole judge how far it is just to exercise its undoubted right. Moreover, in a free country, the State is, in idea, *incapable of acting wrongfully* towards its members, because the governing power is supposed to represent the collective wisdom of the nation.”

But the pamphlet, as a whole, seems to us the very best we have seen on Irish Disestablishment; and we only regret that it does not give a table of contents. Ireland, such is our author's view and, such is our own, has been treated with shameful injustice by England, from the time of Henry II.; still, matters were tending to harmony and amalgamation, when the hateful Reformation came in to blight the fair prospect (pp. 3, 4). Mr. Gathorne Hardy indeed says, that it is the Irish mind which has been poisoned against England, and his party cheers the disgraceful statement. Such a suggestion almost drives the author (p. 6) to despair of ever seeing the Irish question settled peaceably. He takes indeed high ground:—

“I maintain (he says) that England has no right whatever to decree the union with Ireland ‘inseparable for ever’ unless she is prepared to grant the remedy which Ireland is willing to accept in lieu of separation. We see this clearly enough in the case of foreign countries. Venetia was ceded to Italy with the acclamation of England. The two Houses of Parliament in 1863 gave their moral support to Poland in the agony of its struggle to shake off the Muscovite yoke. England hailed with satisfaction the downfall of the Bourbon dynasty in Southern Italy, and would rejoice to see Rome become the capital of a united Italy. . . . And yet we feel surprised and indignant, and think our national honour outraged, if some foreign journalist or orator ventures to express sympathy with the wrongs of Ireland. I repeat, we have to show cause why the Union should be ‘inseparable for ever;’ and no cause can be shown so long as England persists in refusing what Ireland has been alternately praying and fighting for all these weary years. No country has the indefeasible right, which Lord Stanley contends for, of keeping another country tied to it for ever, and at the same time refusing the reasonable terms which the subject country offers to accept as the condition of the Union.”

“I will go so far as to say that the Irish people *ought not to be loyal to England* while they are thus affronted and outraged in the tenderest and holiest feelings of the human heart.”

This is the language of common sense and common justice. Let the English settle the Establishment question and the land question in an Irish sense, or else let them cease from their hypocritical pretence of sympathy with oppressed nationalities.

Our author discusses excellently (pp. 193—199) the objection to Disestablishment, which is founded on the rights of property. Such an objection, at all events, comes with the worst possible grace from Lord Derby, who proposes a new division of the spoil among Protestants. For such a statesman to talk about the rights of property being involved is much the same thing, says Mr. MacColl, as though he were to say that the rights of property would be violated indeed by Knowsley being *confiscated*, but not violated by its division among all the members of the Stanley family.

To the amazement of all reasonable men, the obsolete argument has been disinterred about the Coronation Oath, and it is admirably answered by Mr. MacColl, from p. 53 to p. 62. Among other things, he exposes the absurdity of imagining that this oath was enacted by the nation, not to fetter *the monarch's* action, but to fetter *its own*;—to prevent itself from repairing, during any given reign, what it may have discovered to be an injustice. Even if the oath *did* involve this however, what then? Suppose a robber solemnly swears that for ten years he will make no restitution of his plunder, do the Tories say that he would offend God by breaking such an oath?

Fresh ramifications of this disestablishment question are sure to spring up; and we hope Mr. MacColl will not be wanting to the occasions as they arise.

The Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur O'Leary. By the Rev. M. B. BUCKLEY, Roman Catholic Curate, SS. Peter and Paul's, Cork. Duffy: Dublin and London.

FATHER O'LEARY was a very able, a very eminent, and, on the whole, we may say, with certain reservations, a very good man. These islands had certainly no greater or more conspicuous figure among the Catholics of his time. Lady Morgan calls him "the Catholic Swift." All the great Irishmen of those days—Yelverton, Curran, Grattan, Burke—were his attached personal friends. The "Monks of the Screw" admitted him to the exceptional privileges of honorary membership. The "Irish Brigade" of the Volunteers conferred on him the dignity of honorary chaplain, and received him, when he attended the Convention of November, 1783, with a full salute from the entire guard. He was no less esteemed in England, not only by his fellow-Catholics, but by Protestants of the greatest worth and eminence. John Wesley, whom he had controversially thrashed, was desirous to meet him, and pleased when they had met. John Howard, the prison reformer, was proud to be his friend. He was a welcome guest in the very first society, and his intimacy with the Prince of Wales (afterwards George IV.) gave some colour to the rumour, however false, that it was he who had performed the marriage ceremony between His Royal

Higness and Mrs. Fitzherbert. Two men of his country, his faith, and his profession, finding in the combined disadvantages of being priests and Irishmen insurmountable obstacles to the worldly ambition which they were unable to control, renounced their faith and their vows, and became respectively Dean of Killala and Bishop of Meath. But, even in this world, they did not receive the reward of O'Leary; who, a plain "Popish friar" to the last, attained much higher social eminence and much wider public influence than either Kirwan or O'Beirne.

Such a man could not be quite forgotten amongst us, even though he had wanted the *rate sacro*. But in an age when a bulky and closely-printed catalogue appears every year, as a necessary record of the distinguished merits of these who are pleased to consider themselves the "Men of the Time," the men of another time can hardly hold their own. We cannot withhold, then, our general approval from the object Mr. Buckley had in view, when he undertook to write the life of Father O'Leary. It is true the worthy Franciscan had already found a biographer, and not a bad one either, in the Rev. T. R. England (the "Father Tom" of *Proul's* "Town of Passage"), brother of the celebrated Bishop of Charleston. Mr. England's work, however, has long been out of print; and, though there are not very many new facts that we can perceive in Mr. Buckley's, his right to produce an original work on the subject is indisputable. The plan of his volume is novel and not convenient. We could imagine him bringing out a new and complete, or, if not complete, a select edition of O'Leary's writings. To this an introductory memoir might have been appropriately prefixed. But not less than half, we should say, of this volume consists of extracts from the writings—very copious extracts, necessarily—which break up the continuity and flow of the narrative in a way that is rather disagreeable. We hope it will not be tedious to our readers if, taking the principal facts of O'Leary's history substantially as Mr. Buckley gives them, we present them in a concise and summary form.

Arthur O'Leary was born, in 1729, near Dunmanway, in the county of Cork. His humble parents gave him, illegally, the limited amount of education which it was possible for him to receive in the wilds of Munster from proscribed Catholic teachers; and, at the age of eighteen, aspiring to the priesthood, he went to France, where, at S. Malo's, he entered the convent of the Capuchins and, in due time, received ordination. If his profession had been other than the religious, the pursuit of it under such difficulties would probably have made him disaffected towards the laws and authorities in despite of which it had to be reached. Between 1756 and 1763 many British prisoners of war were in custody at S. Malo's. Even then the British "line" was largely (though against the law) composed of Irish soldiers, and the prisoners at S. Malo's were, for the most part, Irish Catholics.* Their countryman, O'Leary, was appointed to minister to their spiritual wants, and they never forgot the zeal and charity with which he

* The regiments to which they belonged had been raised by Lord Chesterfield to fight against Charles Edward.

served them. To his influence it was owing that the efforts of the Duc de Choiseul to make them desert the English service for the French—in other words, the service of cruel Protestant taskmasters for that of kind Catholic hosts—were unavailing. In 1771, he came to Cork, being then forty-two years old. Twenty-seven years before, Lord Chesterfield (finding, as he said, that the only “dangerous Papists” in the kingdom were two young ladies, named Devereux, whom he had seen at Castle balls—finding, also, that the endeavours of the poor Catholics to worship God in secret, in crazy lofts and garrets, were attended with serious accidents to life and limb) had removed the interdict upon Catholic worship previously enforced. O’Leary’s first work in Cork was to help in the erection of a chapel, known for many years as the “Little Friary,” and celebrated also as the scene of Father Mathew’s early labours. Here his style of preaching soon attracted attention, and drew to hear him persons of every religious denomination. He had not been long in Cork when he was induced to take up his pen in defence of religious truth against the attacks of a sceptical Scotchman, named Blair, who practised as a physician in that city. Blair had produced a book entitled “Thoughts on Nature and Religion,” in which, with some amount of literary cleverness, he brought together a number of the current objections of French philosophers against the truth of Christianity, and supplemented them with some peculiar theories of his own. Weak and ridiculous in many respects as this production was, it made a great sensation in Cork. “Cork,” says Mr. Buckley, “was not then the Athens of Ireland.” We are not aware that it is even now; but, Athens or Thebes, there were not a few sinners in the place, young and old, whom Dr. Blair’s book encouraged in their evil habits and armed with a show of reasoning against received doctrine and morality. The clergy took the alarm. A member of the Establishment (as it was thought), not being strong in logic or theology, assailed the work in scurrilous rhyme, but soon found that he was not such an auxiliary or such a champion as the time required. An Anabaptist minister made the matter still worse, for “his production was even more sceptical than that which he pretended to answer.” At last O’Leary was urged to enter the field, but, though ready enough for the encounter, there was an obstacle in the way, in the danger to which his position as a priest and a religious exposed him if he published anything at all. It was only after having obtained the sanction of Dr. Mann, the Protestant bishop of the diocese, that he ventured to take up his pen, and produced in a series of four letters a defence of our Lord’s divinity, and of the immortality of the soul.

Those letters, from which he gives but a few extracts, seem to Mr. Buckley unsuited to the taste of the present day. He objects, somewhat hypercritically and unjustly, as we think, to the “scholastic style of the argumentation,” of which, with all of them before us, we can discover but few traces. On the contrary, we know no work of that period of which the style is easier or more elegant, rising often into a high and impressive eloquence; pointed often by a telling epigram; though, no doubt, occasionally characterized, if not disfigured, by an unseasonable burst of humour, apparently irrepressible, and thoroughly Irish. Even this may be excused on the ground that ridicule was the best weapon, after all, to employ against such an

antagonist, and that O'Leary unquestionably succeeded in raising a hearty laugh at his expense. We advert thus particularly to this point here, because there are other passages of O'Leary's writings to which we shall refer before we have done, which we think Mr. Buckley might have more judiciously left out.

Whatever may be thought of the literary merit of this first publication of O'Leary's, its practical effect was conclusive. If it did not satisfy Mr. Blair that his soul was immortal, it proved, at least, the mortality of his body, for it killed him. He probably little expected to find the truth of the Voltairean maxim, *le ridicule tue*, exemplified in his own person. The next occasion on which Father O'Leary took up his pen was in vindication of the Test Oath, — a form in which Catholics were graciously permitted to "testify their allegiance" to the Crown, by virtue of an Act of the Irish Parliament passed in 1774. This is not the place for discussing the points at issue between those ecclesiastics who, like Archbishop Butler, of Cashel, unreservedly approved the oath, and those who, like Bishop Burke, of Ossory, strongly condemned it. There was also a third party, which, with Archbishop Carpenter, of Dublin, took a middle course. The first party was that with which O'Leary sided. And we will only say that his ultra-Gallican restrictions of the Papal authority, his flings at Bellarmine as a "bigoted divine, bristling with barbarous Latin," his flippant query whether "an Irish Catholic must starve because an Italian wrote nonsense in bad Latin two hundred years ago;" his implied if not avowed sympathy with all the contumacious, schismatical, and heretical sovereigns who had resisted the authority of the Holy See, — all these things were of no effect at all in disposing parliaments, or ministers, or monarchs towards Catholic emancipation. Yorktown and Valmy were far more efficient in that work in his own time than anything he said and did, or could say and do. Some allowance, however, has to be made for his French education, and for the formation of his theological and political opinions under the influence of a school which most unwarrantably extended the limits of the civil power, and gave Cæsar a good deal more than his due.

A few years after, in 1779, he wrote a short and simple, but forcible "Address to the Common People," with reference to an apprehended French invasion.

In 1780, John Wesley, wishing to strengthen the hands of Lord George Gordon, published some letters on the Catholic question. "With persecution," said Wesley, "I have nothing to do; I persecute no man for his religious principles." But he added in the same breath, "I insist upon it that no Government, not Roman Catholic, ought to tolerate men of the Roman Catholic persuasion." He sought to justify this singular position by imputing to Catholics, on the assumed authority of the Council of Constance, the doctrine that no faith was to be kept with heretics. O'Leary hastened to join issue with him, and pointed out very clearly that the conduct of the Council in the case of Huss did not justify the imputation. He appealed to the practical evidence afforded by the existing condition of the Irish Catholics, who might easily be perjuring themselves (which, according to Wesley, they were sure to do) have escaped the operation of the Penal Laws and come at once into the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens.

Arguing that "every church claims to herself the power of inflicting spiritual punishments independent of the civil magistrate," he adduced, with comical effect, a case in which Wesley himself had inflicted a punishment of the kind upon a certain Mrs. Williamson, of Georgia, for the peculiar offence of having given her hand in preference to Mr. Williamson, a layman, "at a time when the clergyman intended to light Hymen's torch with a spark of grace." For this Wesley refused her the Lord's Supper, and was thereupon cited before the magistrates. His defence was that his act "being a matter purely ecclesiastic, he could not acknowledge their power to interrogate him upon it."* The whole controversy was conducted on O'Leary's side with great force of reasoning and an overflow of the raciest humour, but, we are sorry to add, in a spirit inconsistent with even the most moderate respect for the authority and independence of the Holy See. Soon after this he wrote his famous Essay on Toleration; which Mr. Buckley reprints in full, and introduces with expressions of unqualified praise. It would be an ungracious task (which we are not at present able or willing to impose on ourselves) to point out the passages in this essay to which exception should be taken on theological grounds. We will only say that they are not few and, while there are some things in the essay with which we agree, there are other propositions from which we are bound most emphatically to dissent.

We should here add that, like so many others who have advocated "liberty of conscience" as a *principle*, Father O'Leary seems to have been infected in no slight degree with the poison of *indifferentism*. At the same time, in the case of similar writers, it is often very difficult to know whether this or that passage expresses their permanent and habitual conviction, or only an opinion which at the moment of writing they persuade themselves that they hold.

There can be no doubt, however, that it was this publication which raised O'Leary to the height of popularity and influence on which he stood for many years. Besides the honours paid him by the "Monks of the Screw" and the Volunteers, to which we have already referred, the English Catholic Committee had a hundred copies of the work printed at their own expense, which they presented in his name to several of the most distinguished men of the day. The Government of the day were eager to avail themselves of the aid of so powerful a pen, and employed an envoy to engage O'Leary's services in furtherance of some measures which they had just brought forward in Parliament. But these overtures were indignantly rejected. He did not refuse, however, the offer of an unconditional pension from the Crown of £150 a year, in acknowledgement of the services which he was admitted to have already rendered the State. A change of ministry prevented this arrangement from coming into effect.

We cannot linger upon some minor discussions in which he was engaged; in a successful effort to hinder a weak design of suppressing the religious orders then existing in Ireland, and in defending the character of his brother Franciscan, Clement XIV., against the accusations of Father

* This passage is not given by Mr. Buckley.

Carroll, S.J., afterwards the first Catholic bishop in the United States. He took an influential part in suppressing a very remarkable conspiracy in which the peasantry of parts of the south of Ireland had united at the instigation of "Captain Right," the object of which was not only to obtain the redress of political grievances and a mitigation of the oppressive form in which tithes were levied, but also to define and limit the offerings made to the Catholic clergy on certain occasions. In the confusion of ideas caused by the agitation of these questions, numbers of the common people, supposing that external conformity to the religion of the State would exempt them from the punishment to which their acts of violence had rendered them liable, and also authorize them to bear the arms with which the hands of their Protestant neighbours were strengthened, were to be seen, Sunday after Sunday, flocking to public worship in the Protestant churches, and were to be heard modifying the ordinances of the English Book of Common Prayer by an energetic recitation of the Rosary in Irish. In connection with these proceedings, as well as on account of some writings in which Dr. Woodward, the Protestant Bishop of Cloyne, endeavoured to excite public odium against the Catholic clergy, O'Leary vigorously attacked that prelate; and with such effect that his lordship was brought in a short time not only to do justice to his opponent, but also to counsel his clergy to maintain a cordial intercourse with the Roman Catholic clergy of their respective parishes, and to vie with them in promoting "piety, good morals, and public order and charity."

Soon afterwards, in 1789, Father O'Leary left Ireland, and came upon the London mission. He was at first one of the chaplains of the Spanish embassy, in which position Dr. Hussey, afterwards Bishop of Waterford, was one of his colleagues. Subsequently, when what is now well known as S. Patrick's, in Sutton-street, Soho, was converted from an assembly-room into a place of Catholic worship under his auspices, he was appointed to it by Bishop Douglas, and made it the centre of his missionary duties until shortly before his death, when failing health compelled him to relinquish labour. His reputation as a speaker and a writer being by this time well established, his sermons were generally heard by crowded audiences, which always included a number of Protestants. We have been told by one of the seniors of the London clergy, who had himself heard it from O'Leary's contemporaries, that he had a great objection to give up his place in the pulpit to others; "because," he shrewdly said, "if they preach better than I do, the people will afterwards have less satisfaction in hearing me; and if they don't preach as well, I shall not be thanked for having brought them." Special mention is made of a sermon preached by him in behalf of the French refugees whom the Revolution had driven in crowds to England, and of a panegyric on Pius VI., preached at the Requiem High Mass celebrated at S. Patrick's for the repose of that Pontiff's soul on the 16th of November, 1799; in presence of Monsignor (afterwards Cardinal) Erskine, Dillon, Archbishop of Narbonne, and a large number of the English nobility and exiled French aristocracy. It does not seem to us that his style improved with years. It was easier, and even, so to speak, more English, when he was fresh from France than it became after he had long enjoyed the society

and conversation of the best speakers and writers of his day. We account for this by the supposition that his earlier style must have been formed on better models than his later. Whatever his success in the pulpit, his success in society was immeasurably greater. An "easy humour, blossoming like the thousand flowers of spring," a wit ever ready and keen, but never bitter,—these were the charming qualities, united to the treasures of a well-stored mind, which the great and the gifted could appreciate, and which made him welcome to all. Mr. Buckley condescends to reproduce (though under protest) some of his best recorded sayings. Having himself enjoyed the rare and enviable opportunities of hearing "by chance, at dinner-parties, better things said than have ever been published," Mr. Buckley is unable to discover any "reason why the witticisms of remarkable men should be made subjects of special commemoration."

O'Leary's last work, which appeared in 1800, an "Address to the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal," touches again upon some of the points treated by him in his letters to Wesley and his Essay on Toleration. In it he expresses his approval of the Union, as a measure calculated in his opinion to heal the wounds of his country, and bring her people under the operation of just and equal laws. In connection with this opinion, we may briefly refer to the subject of his pension, upon which some obscurity still rests. About the time when he left Ireland to live permanently in London, he was offered by the Government a pension (fixed ultimately at £200 a year) ostensibly as a recognition of his services to the cause of law and order. It seems probable that the condition of his residence out of Ireland was attached to its enjoyment, as well as the condition of his ceasing to write on public questions. It was therefore neither more nor less than an official "muzzle." It was paid for a few years, and then the payment suddenly ceased; possibly because he declined to earn it by writing up the Government measures. Again, just before his death, the Government becoming aware that he was not hostile to the Union, were prevailed upon to renew the pension and pay up its arrears. With this amount O'Leary bought an annuity, but he died before the first quarter became due. Whatever the conditions of the original grant, or of its renewal, it troubled him in his latter days, and he was heard to lament "that he had betrayed his country." The only conceivable reason for this remorse was the refusal of the Government to emancipate the Catholics of Ireland—a measure which they had held out as a bait to induce their leaders to accept the Union.

About the end of 1801, O'Leary was ordered to the South of France for the benefit of his health. He crossed the Channel and proceeded a short distance through the country, but the change from the France he had known in other days so shocked and distressed him that he could go no further. The vessel in which he made his homeward voyage was unable, through stress of weather, to reach Dover, and was driven to Ramsgate. With sufferings much aggravated by sea-sickness, he had barely strength to travel to London; and he died, almost suddenly, but after having received extreme unction, on the 8th of January, 1802. He is buried in the churchyard of Old St. Pancras, where his tomb has been barely spared by the Midland Railway Company, not having the fear of Shakspeare's curse before their

eyes. The tomb was erected by his friend, Lord Moira, and is disfigured by an inelegant and ungrammatical inscription.

We fear Mr. Buckley will have been a little spoilt by the favourable, not to say flattering, notices of his work which have appeared in several critical journals of high authority. Even the sour *Saturday Review* smiles upon him; is enchanted with his liberality; thinks Father O'Leary "happy in his biographer"; and bears very lightly upon some minor blemishes, which it charitably puts down to "carelessness." We should not have escaped its keen animadversion had we written—"The calumnies against Catholicity which he refuted are needed to-day in the eternal interests of truth." But we entertain still more serious apprehensions as to the consequences which the circulation of this work, likely to be wide, may have, in diffusing errors with which the minds of many Catholics in these islands are still tainted. We cannot forget that, upon some important public occasions, some distinguished "Athenians" have given expression in Cork to sentiments of opposition to the authority of Rome, out of harmony (we are glad to think) with the prevailing belief of English and Irish Catholics, but which had their sanction, if not their source, in such writings as those which Mr. Buckley has republished. As an editor, we regret that his judgment has not taught him better *reprobare malum et eligere bonum*. He has been warned by "good theological critics" that he was venturing on dangerous ground. He guards himself by a general disclaimer from the suspicion of sharing in Father O'Leary's "inaccuracies." Nevertheless, the *Saturday Review* has only too much reason when it says that "it is pretty clear that his own sympathies go heartily with those of O'Leary." The *Saturday Review* thinks it "a healthy sign that the life and writings of such a man should be just now put forward as a model by an Irish Roman Catholic priest." We have no fault to find with O'Leary's life. With his writings, the case is otherwise; and it would be a sad thing if any Catholic should consider them, in point of doctrine, "a model." Mr. Buckley affirms that "no passage of his writings, as such, has ever been condemned by ecclesiastical authority." This is a mere evasion. If several propositions advanced by him have not been condemned *as his*, they have been condemned as some one else's. But we cannot take Mr. Buckley as a safe guide upon these points. He gives us a passage from O'Leary's letters to Wesley, in which, Mr. Buckley says, "the limits of the Pope's power are justly defined." Here is the just definition:—

"Catholic subjects know that, if God must have his own, Cæsar must have his due. In his quality of Pontiff, they are ready to kiss the Pope's feet; but if he assumes the title of conqueror, they are ready to bind his hands. The very ecclesiastical benefices, which are more in the spiritual line, are not at his disposal. When England had more to dread from him than now, a Catholic parliament passed the statute of *premunire*: the bishops and mitred abbots preferred their own temporal interest to that of the Pope, and reserved the benefices to themselves and the clergy under their jurisdiction. Charity begins at home; and I do not believe any Catholic so divested of it as to prefer fifty pounds a year under the Pope's government to a hundred pounds a year under that of a Protestant king. Queen Mary, so devoted to the Pope's cause, both on account of her religion and the justice done to her mother, still would not concede her temporal rights, nor those of her subjects,

in compliment to his spiritual power. After the reconciliation of her kingdom to the Apostolic See, a statute was passed enacting that the Pope's bulls, briefs, &c., should be merely confined to spirituals, without interfering with the independence of her kingdom or the rights of her subjects. The history of Europe proclaims aloud that the Roman Catholics are not passive engines in the hands of Popes, and that they confine his power within the narrow limits of his spiritual province. They have often taken his cities, and opposed Paul's sword to Peter's keys, and silenced the thunders of the Vatican with the noise of the cannon. They knew that Peter was a fisherman when kings swayed the sceptre, and that the subsequent grandeur of his successors could never authorize them to alter the primitive institution that commands subjects to obey their rulers and give Cæsar his due" (pp. 127, 128).

Ohe, jam satis est! If this book should reach a second edition, it would be a delicate and proper attention, we think, on Mr. Buckley's part, to dedicate it to King Victor Emmanuel.

The Life of Marie Eustelle-Harpain, the Sempstress of Saint-Pallais, called the "Angel of the Eucharist." London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

OUR January number of the year 1864 contains (pp. 30-2) a notice of the book, from which Mr. Thompson has compiled the second volume of his very valuable *Library of Religious Biography*.

The life of Marie-Eustelle Harpain possesses a special value and interest, apart from its extraordinary natural and supernatural beauty, from the fact that to her example and to the effect of her writings is attributed in great measure the wonderful revival of devotion to the Blessed Sacrament in France, and consequently throughout Western Christendom. A marvellous effect to be produced by a village girl, whose short life of eight-and-twenty years was divided between labour for her daily bread, deeds of active charity to her neighbour, and lonely watchings before the Tabernacle; where she realized so intensely the Presence of her Beloved, that at times she hardly seemed to long for the sight of His unveiled face in heaven.

The instrument had been fitted by the Master's hand for the work which it was to perform. Hers, says the author of the life before us, "was a simple, uneventful life; but a life that is sublime in its very simplicity: a life with one dominant, one all-absorbing passion—the love and worship of our Incarnate God in His most Holy and most Divine Sacrament."

"Marie-Eustelle loved much and prayed much: this is sufficient to make a Saint.

"When such a one is laid in the ground, be it in the obscurest nook of earth, then it is that the life which is now ended, and which, it would seem, has but to undergo the lot of other humble lives—to be forgotten—begins to act upon the world. Many Saints have worked wonderful effects during their mortal lives, yet all, perhaps, have accomplished more after their departure to glory. So, in their measure, may it be with all God's favoured children: in more than one sense, 'their works follow them.' Of Eustelle may this be said with peculiar truth. While on earth she was ever mingling lamentations of her own powerlessness to do aught for the glory of her Lord

with the rapturous expressions of her love ; but the imperishable words in which she breathed it forth were afterwards to fly like winged seeds over the globe, and produce an abundant harvest, of which, it may be, only the first fruits have yet been garnered. 'When God would move the world,' says Eustelle's biographer, in whose steps we have humbly followed, and with whose words we cannot do better than conclude, 'He rests his lever here below upon the Saints. Under whatever form this character may appear—whether it be clothed in rags like Benedict Labré, or girt with the sword, like Auguste Marceau, whether it exercise the sacred ministry like Muard or Vianney, or ply the needle like Marie-Eustelle Harpain, a Saint is the continuation of Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ is ever a Saviour, whether in the Tabernacle where He hides Himself, or in heaven where He reigns.'

Mr. Thompson has adopted a plan which is, we think, excellent, of giving the substance of foreign books instead of mere translations of them. Lives thus written will be generally far freer and more life-like, and consequently more attractive, than translations. If we have any objection to make to the style of the two already published, it would be that the narrative is perhaps too flowery. The history of saints and saintly persons can hardly be too simply written.

The Life and Administration of Robert Banks, second Earl of Liverpool, K.G., late First Lord of the Treasury. Compiled from original documents. By CHARLES DUKE YONGE, Regius Professor of History and English Literature in the Queen's College, Belfast, and author of "The History of the British Navy," "The History of France under the Bourbons," &c. &c. London : Macmillan & Co.

IT is our purpose, when the forthcoming volume of the "Wellington Correspondence" shall be published, to devote an article to the consideration of Mr. Yonge's book, taken in connection with the Duke's "Correspondence," which will be of the utmost value, as enabling us to form a correct judgment of the history of the Catholic question as it affected the various Cabinets of George IV.

Mr. Yonge rates Lord Liverpool very highly indeed, perhaps too highly. as a statesman, for he seeks to place him on a level with the Pitts ; but he places beyond dispute the fact that Lord Liverpool was a really great man, High genius he had not ; but he certainly possessed that which comes not only next, but very near it—the faculty of succeeding without it. He maintained his post of Prime Minister for an almost unprecedented period, in times of great difficulty, and somehow or other he contrived to carry England with success through a great, dangerous, and difficult war. He had a troublesome Cabinet to deal with ; the mere array of names, which includes Wellington, Eldon, Huskisson, Canning, Castlereagh, and Peel, is formidable ; and he managed it as he managed the war—somehow. Added to these achievements, the guidance and control of such a man as George IV., first as regent and then as king, and the conduct of the scandalous episode of the unfortunate Caroline of Brunswick's brief

and disastrous connection with England—out of which he also got without individual disgrace,—it must be admitted that Lord Liverpool's political biographer has some solid material for the construction of his temple of fame.

Much of the correspondence contained in these volumes is curious and interesting, and that portion which relates to the course pursued towards the unhappy Princess of Wales is peculiarly so. Her royal highness's own letters form a strange contrast, both in style and spelling, to the formal documents prepared on her behalf. And the persistence with which Lord Liverpool endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to induce the king to behave with decency when all difficulties were solved by Caroline's death, is proved, to his credit, by the memoranda given in these pages. The correspondence on this lamentable subject, on the slave-trade, and Lord Liverpool's long-sighted views concerning Holland and Belgium, form large items of the collateral interest in Mr. Yonge's useful and important work.

The Kiss of Peace ; or, England and Rome at one on the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. An Essay in two parts ; together with a sequel or answer to criticisms on the same. By GERARD FRANCIS COBB, M.A. London : Hayes.

THIS is a book that might make a strong man cry till his heart broke. How came it to be written and then published is simply a mystery, for the author has knowledge that is hardly ever possessed by any person outside the Church, and he writes in a spirit that attracts, and at the same time perplexes, all who are in the possession of that which he cannot possibly have, remaining where he is. Mr. Cobb has studied, and with the most marvellous success, the Catholic doctrine ; not as a controversialist, but in a tender and earnest spirit, anxious to learn, and more anxious, we think, to practise what he might learn. If he is to be considered a controversialist, his controversy is with his own friends, for he disputes not with Rome but with England. With him it is apparently a first principle that Rome is right and England wrong, whenever it differs—and it almost always does differ—from Rome.

This said, there is another view to be taken of the book, and a very distressing one it is. Mr. Cobb, with a full knowledge of the great importance of the doctrine he discusses, is dwelling in a community where this doctrine is scouted, and among people who ridicule and deny it. He is compelled to call men his brethren who utterly disbelieve what he holds, and who hold themselves what he knows to be most grievous heresies. More than all this, he admits that the Anglican community, to which he unhappily belongs, not only tolerates those who contradict him, but also teaches so imperfectly—if it teaches at all—what he holds, that long and elaborate expositions are necessary to bring his views into apparent harmony with the notorious definitions he acknowledges as binding on him.

Mr. Cobb has undertaken to prove that on the doctrine of the most holy Eucharist, Rome and the Anglican sect are at one ! That there is no difference between them, that there never was any, and that the popular notion on the subject is a popular delusion !

Of course a proposition of this sort takes people by surprise, but that need not be a difficulty. The fact is plain enough; Mr. Cobb seriously and earnestly, and with all his might, contends for the admission of the doctrine of Transubstantiation among the received opinions of Anglicans. All he admits against himself is that the doctrine is not clearly taught, that is his one difficulty; this being allowed him, he maintains that the reformers of his religion never consciously rejected the Roman doctrine of the Eucharist, or if they did so, it was by mistake, because they did not clearly understand what it was, but they did not reject it. He has persuaded himself that what the reformers meant to deny when they said that "the sacramental bread and wine remain still in their very natural substances" was a change in the accidents. He insists on it that they confounded "substance" with "accidents," and that, therefore, the change of substance is not denied. The conclusion is that when the reformers used the word "Transubstantiation," they really meant "transaccidentation." Here are his words:—

"Now as one of my objects in this second part is to show that by the word 'Transubstantiation,' the English Church really means 'transaccidental tion,' I must first explain what is meant by the word 'accidents' and what by the word 'substance'" (p. 56).

The explanation of the two words is correct enough, and so we need not pursue that subject further. We have then to deal with a statement which Mr. Cobb, we believe, is the first to make, and to him is due the whole credit of it. It may also be admitted that if his postulate be allowed him, he has proved his case, so far as he understands the doctrine; but we are not quite sure that he has really mastered the Roman doctrine on the Eucharist, though he has approached nearer to it than any other person within our knowledge in the communion to which he unhappily belongs.

Before going further, we may as well show that there are grounds for suspicion that Mr. Cobb has not clearly seen what the doctrine of the Church is. He thus quotes the Council of Trent:—

"It has ever been believed by God's Church that directly after consecration the true Body of our Lord and His true Blood are present together with the Soul and Divinity under the form of bread and wine."

We need not quote further; but the commentary on this which Mr. Cobb makes is one of the most startling possible in his mouth, who professes to hold the doctrine of the Council. It is almost beyond belief. Here are his words:—

"Now have we, I ask, in the whole range of our Liturgy, Articles, and Catechism any more emphatic declaration of a wholly supernatural, transcendental, celestial Presence, or any more emphatic disclaimer of a natural, sensible, corporeal Presence than this?" (p. 107).

The italics are ours, not Mr. Cobb's.

The word sensible is a mistake, we suppose; but when Mr. Cobb calls upon his readers to admit that the Council of Trent disclaimed the Corporeal Presence when it teaches that the Body of Christ is present under the form

of Bread, he takes us, in one sense, by surprise. But the explanation, how ever, is not far to seek. It is a confusion of the fact with the mode, and that once effected, the mistake was natural enough.

We now proceed to consider the method used by Mr. Cobb to harmonize heresy with the Faith. The first assumption is that the word Transubstantiation is used in the Anglican religion in a different sense from that which the word usually bears. The second is that the Catechism is the ultimate test and the key to the meaning of the Articles and other documents in force among Anglicans. In the Catechism, which is much later than the other documents, are these words : we prefer to deal with the second method first.

"The Body and Blood of Christ, which are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper."

Mr. Cobb insists on taking the words "verily and indeed taken and received" as a proof that the doctrine of the Real Presence is maintained and as explanatory of other phrases which even he admits to be at least ambiguous. But the words most assuredly cannot cover all he wants them to cover. The previous question in the Catechism is this :—

"What is the outward part or sign of the Lord's supper ?

Answer. Bread and wine, which the Lord hath commanded to be received."

Then comes the question : "What is the inward part or *thing signified* ?" To which the answer is, "The Body and Blood," as we have just given it.

Now it is perfectly plain here that the bread and wine spoken of are bread and wine after the so-called consecration of the Anglican minister, for they are not part of the Sacrament at all till the Sacrament is wrought. Yet after that operation they are only bread and wine, whereas no Catholic would speak of bread and wine after the consecration of the priest. To remove all doubt and ambiguity, the author of the Catechism goes on and says, "Which the Lord hath commanded to be received," it being perfectly certain that our Lord never commanded us to receive bread and wine.

This is not all. The next question is :—

"What are the benefits whereof we are partakers thereby ?

Answer. The strengthening and refreshing of our souls by the Body and Blood of Christ, as our bodies are by the bread and wine."

Bread and wine again. Mr. Cobb, we are sure, would not have written such an answer as this, and we very much doubt whether, on further reflection, he will say that the author of the Catechism or any one that teaches or learns it, understands only the accidents of taste, colour, and smell by the words "bread and wine." And yet that is the interpretation which his theory compels him to put upon these unambiguous words. The Catechism says nothing that Cranmer, who denies the Real Presence, did not say ; in fact, Cranmer and the Catechism speak alike, for these are the words of the former :—"As the bread is outwardly eaten indeed in the Lord's Supper, so is the very body of Christ inwardly by faith eaten ; indeed, of all them that come thereto in such sort as they ought to do, which eating nourisheth them

unto everlasting life.”—(Cranmer’s Works, Parker Society, i. p. 17.) Again. “He is effectually present, and effectually worketh, not in the bread and wine, but in the godly receivers of them, to whom He giveth His own flesh spiritually to feed upon, and His own blood to quench their great inward thirst” (*Ibid.*, p. 35).

Anglicans say their Sacraments consist of two parts, the outward sign and the thing signified, not the thing contained.

The words, “verily and indeed taken and received,” applied to the Body and Blood, are to be regarded, according to Mr. Cobb, as explaining all ambiguous expressions, and filling up all that are defective and inexact; but there is nothing to hinder any one from combining them with the statement in the Articles thus:—“verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord’s Supper . . . only after an heavenly and spiritual manner.” The Articles and the Catechism are perfectly consistent one with another, and there is no necessity for any explanation. The whole statement of the Articles is as follows:—

“The Body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten in the Supper only after an heavenly and spiritual manner. And the mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith.”

Nothing can be plainer. The “faithful” of the Catechism, according to the phraseology of the Article, are those who have “faith”; for as faith is the means whereby the reception takes place, it is obvious that without faith there is no reception. Mr. Cobb will have the word faithful to mean “fideles” in the Catholic sense, and labours to show that in the Anglican rite there is a change wrought in the creatures of bread and wine by the ministers of that rite, and that the change is permanent, and not transient, to subserve a certain purpose. It is necessary for him to hold this, for it was felt by the more consistent Reformers and their successors that the act of kneeling at an Anglican Communion was something that might have been better undone, and therefore in what he calls the “black rubric,” lest the act should be “misconstrued and depraved, it is hereby declared that thereby no adoration is intended or ought to be done either unto the Sacramental bread or wine there bodily received, or unto any Corporal Presence of Christ’s natural flesh and blood. For the Sacramental bread and wine remain still in their very natural substances, and therefore may not be adored—for that were idolatry, to be abhorred of all faithful Christians—and the natural Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here, it being against the truth of Christ’s natural Body to be at one time in more places than one.”

The meaning of this declaration according to Mr. Cobb is not the obvious meaning which it has always had. These are his words:—

“Now, what I want to prove is that in the one case the words, ‘very natural substances’ really mean ‘very natural properties,’ i.e., ‘accidents’” (p. 115.)

It comes then to this. An Anglican minister consecrates his Eucharist, the substance of the bread and of the wine is changed while the accidents

remain ; that is, only the "very natural properties" remain : but how is it that the words bread and wine are retained, when, on the supposition of a change, there is no bread left ? Mr. Cobb believes in the real presence of our Lord under the species ; but, how can he refrain from adoration ? How can he say that the adoration would be idolatry ? If the substance of the bread and wine be changed, and nothing remain but the "natural properties," and, if he believes that our Lord is there, why does he not confess his Presence by the outward and natural act of adoration ?

If it be replied that adoration is refused to the "bread and wine," that is to the "accidents," which remain, nothing further need be said ; and we must be content with observing that nobody ever thought of adoring the accidents. But the words "Sacramental bread and wine," must mean the bread and wine after the consecration,—supposing a consecration to have taken place ;—for they are not sacramental before that act is complete, and the whole phrase puts this beyond all doubt, seeing that the words are "Sacramental bread and wine there bodily received," that is, to use the Catholic language, the consecrated Host. Now the "black rubric," says that no adoration "ought to be done" either to the Host, "or unto any corporal presence of Christ's natural Flesh and Blood." The reason given for this refusal to worship is that the "bread and wine remain still in their very natural substances," and that "the natural Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here."

All is plain enough, for a Sacrament is only a sign, according to the Anglicans—"an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us,"—consisting of two parts, "the outward visible sign and the inward spiritual grace." * Now, if Mr. Cobb can show that by the word "inward," is meant "in the sacrament," and not exclusively in the receiver of the sacrament, he will be able to maintain in some degree the conclusions he has arrived at ; but we do not believe he can, and we are persuaded that he will find very few to agree with him. Of another Catechism, but which in this matter agrees with the Catechism which Mr. Cobb relies on, Cranmer says to the Bishop of Winchester :—

"In that Catechism I teach not, as you do, that the Body and Blood of Christ is contained in the Sacrament being reserved, but that in the ministration thereof we receive the Body and Blood of Christ : whereunto if it may please you to add or understand this word 'spiritually,' then is the doctrine of my Catechism sound and good in all men's ears, which know the true doctrine of the Sacraments" (Parker Society Ed., p. 227).

This is the Anglican doctrine most assuredly. The Sacrament is a sign, containing nothing ; it is a means and a help, but it is nothing more. The definition of a sacrament or description of it, as a sign and a thing signified, not a thing contained, is clearly fatal to Mr. Cobb's opinion ; and the writers of the articles, assuming the old Anglican definition to be correct, say that transubstantiation overthroweth the nature of a sacrament ; that is, the sacra-

* How many parts are there in a Sacrament ? *Ans.* Two : the outward visible sign, and the inward spiritual grace.

ment, because our Lord is present himself, does more than signify, it contains.

The Anglican doctrine admits of the presence of our Lord in the Sacrament, but not as we Catholics understand the words "presence" and "sacrament." The Reformers mean by the Sacrament the ministration of it, the whole action, not the Host; and in the Sacrament so understood they admit a presence of our Lord, but they deny that He is present in the hands of the priest before the reception of the Host by the communicant: further still, they mean by presence not what we do; and the controversy is usually without profit, because the words are used in different senses.

Cranmer's views are, of course, scouted by Mr. Cobb; but Cranmer knew his own mind, and the meaning of the words he used when he set up the Anglican rite. His opinions are perfectly consistent with the articles and other writings of authority in the Anglican community, and none other can be harmonized with them. Here are more of his words:—

"The bread is a figure and sacrament of Christ's body. And yet as He giveth the bread to be eaten with our mouths, so giveth He His very Body to be eaten with our faith. And therefore, I say, that Christ giveth Himself truly to be eaten, chewed, and digested; but all is spiritually with faith, not with mouth." (*Ibid.*, p. 15).

"In the true ministration of the Sacrament Christ is present spiritually, and so spiritually eaten of them that be godly and spiritual" (*Ibid.*, p. 203). That is, by "the faithful in the Lord's Supper."

Mr. Cobb in defending his notion has to maintain—we now return to his first assumption—that the true doctrine of the Catholic Church was either not known or known imperfectly in England for a century before the rise of Cranmer. That apostate, therefore, in denying the doctrine of the Eucharist was not denying the true doctrine, but the imperfect and inaccurate views of it current in the country? As this notion concerning Cranmer is, we believe, new and is most certainly altogether unfounded, we shall let Mr. Cobb speak for it himself:—

"Cranmer, although using technical language, and often employing it too in quasi scientific arguments, really knew nothing of the meaning of that language, as defined by the schoolmen" (p. 206).

"That Presence [the Real Presence] never presented Itself to his mind in Its true sense, as authoritatively taught; neither when put before him by another did he shew himself in the least degree *en rapport* with the language and ideas on which it is dogmatically based and constructed. And we cannot, therefore, wonder at his protesting against that which he *thought* was the Roman doctrine of the Real Presence. . . . Cranmer did *not* consciously reject the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence, though he certainly did not accept it" (pp. 210, 211).

"Though I am not prepared, therefore, to say that the Reformers accepted Roman doctrine, I am fully persuaded that it was not *that* which they rejected" (Note, p. 212).

"The *possibility* of our 'Real Objective Presence,' and of the Latin 'transubstantiation,' never seem to have consciously presented itself to him at all, and so he cannot be said to have rejected *that*" (Note, p. 385).

In these extracts the words printed in italics are so printed by Mr. Cobb,

and we have carefully abstained from giving greater prominence to his words than he has given to them himself. But he has a difficulty to remove before we can even take so singular a notion into account at all. What is this? Cranmer was educated as a Catholic, and was known to be a learned man, though with heretical views, when he was discovered by Henry VIII. He had lived many years at Cambridge, though not blameless in his life; he must have known the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, and he also must have said Mass. He had sat under learned professors, had learned philosophy, and must have mastered the terms of it, for he must have disputed in the schools before he took his several degrees. Could such a man, heretic though he was for many years, before the schism, be ignorant of the doctrine which he once held, but which he was gradually giving up? Mr. Cobb thinks he could not have used the arguments he did, if he ever knew the doctrine he was combating; but the answer is ready, that men are not scrupulous about their arguments if a popular or erroneous one will answer their immediate purpose, and it was easier for Cranmer, as it was for Wicliffe before him, to employ ribaldry rather than serious reasons, for both of them felt that serious reasoning was out of the question. The wretched apostate himself confesses in plain terms that he knew what he was saying and doing:—

“I acknowledge that not many years passed, I was yet in darkness concerning this matter, being brought up in scholastic and Romish doctrine, whereunto I gave too much credit” (Works, p. 241).

Now, did Cranmer know the Roman doctrine? Mr. Cobb says he did not; and we are compelled to say that Cranmer spoke as if he did know it. He wrote a book on the subject, and he wrote it too in English, and was thereby obliged to translate the scholastic terminology and employ English words as the equivalents of the Latin. Here are his words in his reply to the Bishop of Winchester:—

“First, the Papists say that in the Supper of the Lord, after the words of consecration—as they call it—there is none other substance remaining but the substance of Christ’s flesh and blood, so that there remaineth neither bread to be eaten nor wine to be drunken. And although there be the colour of bread and wine, the savour, the smell, the bigness, the fashion and all other—as they call them—accidents, or qualities and quantities of bread and wine, yet, say they, there is no very bread nor wine, but they be turned into the flesh and blood of Christ. And this conversion they call ‘Transubstantiation,’ that is to say, ‘turning of one substance into another’” (Works of Cranmer, i. p. 45).

We do not think it possible for any one to doubt for a moment that Cranmer had a clear knowledge of the Catholic doctrine; the man was a deliberate heretic, he knew the truth and rejected it. He did not confound “substance” with “accident,” for he goes on, and speaking of the accidents he uses these words:—

“There is sweetness without anything sweet; softness without any soft thing; breaking, without anything broken; division, without anything divided; and so other qualities and quantities, without anything to receive

them. And this doctrine they teach as a necessary article of our faith. But it is not the doctrine of Christ, but the subtle invention of anti-Christ" (*Ibid.*).

We appeal to Mr. Cobb himself. Can he maintain seriously that Cranmer meant Transaccidentation when he used the word Transubstantiation? It is perfectly incredible that the Reformers who gave up their breviaries and their missals did not know what they were doing, or that they used the well-known words of the Church in a sense in which the Church had never used them.

Mr. Cobb says that the "possibility" of the "Latin 'transubstantiatio' never seems to have "consciously presented itself" to Cranmer; but we find Cranmer writing on the subject in these terms:—

"As for the great power and omnipotency of God, it is no place here to dispute what God can do, but what He doth. I know that He can do what He will, both in heaven and in earth, and no man is able to resist His will. But the question here is of His will, not of His power" (Cranmer's Works, i. p. 15).

Cranmer certainly knew the doctrine of the Church, rejected it deliberately, and devised expressions whereby heresy might be taught, and the truth effectually suppressed. He knew how near he could approach the truth without reaching it, and was aware of the whole terminology in which the Catholic doctrine was clothed. He admitted that our Lord was "spiritually present," and then denied that he was "after a spiritual manner present" (*Ibid.*, p. 123).

The conclusion to which we come, and we do not think Mr. Cobb can be surprised at it, is this: Cranmer knew what Transubstantiation means as well as anybody else, and was also perfectly aware of the meaning of Transaccidentation. Here are his words:—

"For seeing that this place speaketh of consecrated bread, answer me to this whether the substance or accidents be consecrated! And if you say the accidents, then, forasmuch as consecration by your doctrine is conversion, it must follow that the accidents of bread be converted, and not the substance; and so should you call it Transaccidentation and not Transubstantiation" (*Ibid.*, p. 327).

Mr. Cobb has left one part of the question untouched. He maintains a "Real Objective Presence," but he has not produced a single syllable from the formulæ of his community which can be explained as meaning that our Lord is present under the species. He has found nothing, and nothing can be found, that goes beyond the Zuinglian notion which Cranmer has most correctly summed up as the whole teaching of Anglicanism, in the following words:—

"And yet in the Lord's Supper rightly used, is Christ's body exhibited indeed spiritually, and so really, if you take really to signify only a spiritual and not a corporal and carnal exhibition. But this real and spiritual exhibition is to the receivers of the Sacrament, and not to the bread and wine. (*Ibid.*, p. 123).

Mr. Cobb has written a very ingenious book, and we are very sorry that he should be entangled in the snares of heresy. He shows a better spirit than is done by many a controversialist, and we commend him earnestly to the prayers of our readers; for why should he be lost who has come so near to the mouth of the harbour? He has not set himself down to criticise the Church, he finds no fault with the faultless one, and against his own friends he defends the daily and common teaching of the Church, and refuses to accept the too prevalent notion current among his co-religionists that the popular teaching of the priesthood varies from the recorded definitions of doctrine.

Some Remarks upon the Dean of Westminster's "Characteristics of the Papacy." By REV. ALEXIUS MILLS. London: Lane, 310, Strand.

HARDLY any writer is so provoking to a Catholic as Dean Stanley. He regards Catholicity with profound aversion in all its aspects, theological, social, political. If he ever praises any Catholics at all, it is exclusively those who are prominent among their co-religionists in disloyalty to the Holy See; and these the Dean praises on that very account, for their "candour," "independence," "dispassionateness." Yet this bitter and prejudiced anti-Catholic partisan assumes the airs of philosophical impartiality; he is not, forsooth, as Mr. Whalley or the *Record*; he is raised above the stormy atmosphere of controversy.

We think therefore that Mr. Mills's indignant tone is thoroughly well deserved by its object, though we may perhaps doubt its expediency. We are not acquainted with the two papers of Dean Stanley which he criticises, and most certainly we shall not go out of our way to get a sight of them; but judging from an *ex parte* statement, Mr. Mills's refutation seems completely crushing. We will mention two instances which amusingly illustrate two of the Dean's peculiarities: viz., (1) the great carelessness with which he accepts anti-Catholic facts, and (2) the fantastic inferences which he draws from facts which are undoubted. Thus (1) he states (Mills, p. 23) that the Holy Father receives communion in a sitting posture; the purest romance. And (2) the well-known usage, that the Papal choir sings without organ accompaniment, is ludicrously wrought up by the Dean (Mills, p. 33) as an imputation of the Pope being "*on this point a Presbyterian*." "For," quoth the Dean, "at Glasgow the organ would be regarded as a blast from the Seven Hills." Presbyterians think that the organ is specially characteristic of Rome; and the Pontiff shows his agreement with them on this head, by *excluding* the organ from the highest ecclesiastical functions in Rome!

We have read with great interest Mr. Mills's expositions of Catholic doctrine (pp. 13, 14) on certain "questions which Catholics discuss among themselves, and which have been so singularly misunderstood by the Dean;" though what the Dean's special misunderstandings are, we know not. Mr. Mills expresses his firm conviction that the Pope is infallible when speaking *ex cathedra*: and that he often speaks *ex cathedra*, not only within the

strict sphere of theology, but on matters also of "philosophy, political economy, physical science, art, history, and literature," which have a real bearing on religious truth and the welfare of souls. We are firmly convinced that any Catholic, who in these days occupies himself actively with intellectual speculation, and who does not most unreservedly submit his judgment to the Church's on all such questions, incurs a real danger of apostasy.

Keighly Hall, and other Tales. By E. KING. London: R. Washbourne.

KEIGHLEY HALL is a book of unpretending little tales, apparently intended for children; who, being most merciful critics, will appreciate the interesting incidents in the stories, without perceiving their defects. These tales are written in a most zealously Catholic strain; but, as in too many Catholic books of the kind, the very zeal of their author prompts a continual display, or rather boast, of our holy religion, which would be injudicious if intended for any but juvenile readers. Many of the lower classes indeed, whose minds from want of education greatly resemble those of children in several respects, may derive not only amusement, but profit and instruction from the very faults of which we complain; for the continual trumpeting of the Catholic Faith which chiefly distinguishes these stories will tend to give them an exalted idea of their religion. But looking at the book with a critical eye, we cannot see why, in the first tale, the little heroine, a child of eleven years, is to be ignorant of the name of Jesus because she is a Protestant; nor do we think the wholesale conversions with which the story ends either natural or likely. But the whole plot of this tale is so ludicrously improbable, that perhaps it is absurd to point out any special circumstance as being strange. The same spirit pervades the rest of the book. Protestants are only brought in for almost instantaneous conversion; and Catholic doctrines are no sooner explained, than they carry conviction within a wondrously short space of time to all whom the writer will recognize as other than knaves or fools.

Let us trust that, as the Catholic religion spreads, its tenets may be taken more for granted in English Catholic books; that while the sincerely religious spirit which animates the volume before us may ever pervade their contents, the various particulars of Catholicism may be made less affectedly prominent; and that greater attempts may be made to appreciate fairly non-Catholic religionists.

The Church's Creed or the Crown's Creed? By EDMUND S. FFOULKES. London: Hayes.

IN April, 1865 (p. 558), we gave some extracts from a work of Mr. Ffoulkes's which, in their obvious sense, affirmed (1) that the Papal supremacy was not instituted by God, but on the contrary is at variance with His highest designs; and (2) that the visible Church is not

now corporately united. In our next number we inserted a letter from him (pp. 140-142), disavowing the latter heresy, but leaving the former untouched. He now however unquestionably holds, what he then disavowed. "There are Churches," he says (p. 43), "forming part of the Catholic Church, which are, and have been for ages, out of communion with" the Holy "See": nay, with the blundering and ignorant recklessness which is his characteristic, he declares that this has long been "the formal teaching of the Popes." He further adds (p. 2), that the Church in communion with Rome is not to his mind certainly infallible in any sense whatever.* All these are not merely *heresies*, i.e., contradictory to what the Church teaches as integral portions of the Faith; but they are *fundamental* heresies, i.e., they subvert the very ecclesiastical *foundation* of the faith. Mr. Ffoulkes adds (p. 66), that the Church has no power of imposing on the laity any definitions of faith beyond the Nicene Creed. And for his own part indeed, he professes one particular heresy, viz., that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son; for the definition of certain Ecumenical Councils "makes" him "deny by implication all that the clause" "Filioque" "asserts" (p. 19).

It is important to point out all this distinctly; because this pamphlet, while intrinsically worthless, derives a certain extrinsic influence over the mind of Tractarians, from the circumstance that they regard it as written by a "Roman Catholic." Mr. Ffoulkes is just as much and just as little a "Roman Catholic" in creed, as Dr. Pusey or Mr. Liddon.

We did not receive the pamphlet till within a week of Christmas; and it is impossible therefore to attempt any complete criticism of it in our present number. But we will make some remarks on its main arguments.

Mr. Ffoulkes maintains then, that the Church had no power—he does not merely say of adding "Filioque" to the Symbol—but even of declaring the dogma thereby expressed to be *de fide*. For this he gives two reasons: one as old as the hills, the other invented by himself. The former of these is based on the well-known seventh canon of Ephesus, which forbids persons from bringing forward any *πίστις ἑτέρα πρὸς τὴν οὐνοθεῖσαν* at Nicæa, and from proposing such a *πίστις* to converts from any misbelief or heresy. Various arguments have for many centuries been drawn from this canon by anti-Roman controversialists. The most extravagant of all, which Mr. Ffoulkes has embraced to its full extent alleges that the supreme authority of the Church was itself estopped by this decree, from ever putting forth any further definition of faith whatever on any imaginable subject. Let us look at this allegation.

Now firstly there is the obvious fact, to which F. Perrone and others have drawn attention, that this canon refers to the Nicene Creed strictly so called, and without its Constantinopolitan additions. Mr. Ffoulkes distinctly admits this (p. 13), on the very irrefragable ground that the

* "I was never required to profess" 'belief in her infallibility "on entering her communion, and perhaps might never have entered it if I had been."

larger Creed had not been spoken of in that Council at all. It follows therefore that, according to Mr. Ffoulkes, the Ephesine canon prohibited every bishop (for bishops are mentioned in it expressly) from proposing to any convert the Constantinopolitan (*i.e.*, what is now called the Nicene) Creed. Now it is the Constantinopolitan Creed, and not the original Nicene, which declares that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. According to Mr. Ffoulkes therefore, during the interval between Ephesus and Chalcedon, it was not only unlawful to teach converts as *de fide* that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, but equally unlawful to teach them as *de fide* the Constantinopolitan definition that He proceeds from the Father.

It is absolutely certain therefore, that Mr. Ffoulkes has entirely misapprehended the meaning of the Ephesine canon, and that his argument resting on that canon falls to the ground.*

But his ridiculous absurdities by no means end here. He proceeds to argue (p. 13) that this canon, though only disciplinary as enacted at Ephesus, became doctrinal as enacted at Chalcedon. Our readers will ask with amazement, how the very same canon, expressed substantially in the very same words, can have a disciplinary meaning in one Council and a doctrinal one in another. But nothing should amaze them from Mr. Ffoulkes. His reason is, that it stands among the Acts of Chalcedon in a different *position*, from that where it stands among the Acts of Ephesus! Consequently those very words, which at Ephesus were merely disciplinary—which merely (according to Mr. Ffoulkes) forbade any further definition of faith to be proposed till the Church should otherwise determine—constituted at Chalcedon a doctrinal decree of the most overwhelming significance. This originally disciplinary decree, we say, became (by the mere change of its location) an irreformable and infallible doctrinal declaration, imposed on the belief of all Catholics: a declaration, that under no future circumstances while the world lasted could a new definition of faith be possibly expedient. Evidently, in comparison with such a momentous declaration as this, the mere condemnation of Eutyches would sink into nothing; the one event of Chalcedon, overshadowing all others, would be the infallible declaration, that no further definitions of faith could be lawfully issued. Yet so little was the Church conscious of having put forth this unparalleled announcement, that so soon as fresh heretics arose, she proceeded, as a matter of course, to condemn them by fresh definitions of faith. And to no one throughout Christendom, orthodox or heretic,† did

* It is indubitable to our mind, that what the Ephesine canon forbade was the proposing any definition *at variance* with the Nicene Creed. We will give our reasons for this opinion in our next number. Meanwhile we refer to Cardinal Julian's most unanswerable argument, as recorded in the Greek Acts of Florence under the eleventh session.

† It so happens, in curious contrast with Mr. Ffoulkes's theory, that Eutyches and his friends did appeal to the Ephesine canon in arrest of judgment; whereas we believe we are correct in saying that no Monothelite, *e.g.*, is recorded as having thought of appealing to the parallel canon of Chalcedon.

the objection occur, during e.g., the whole Monothelite controversy, that the Church had abdicated at Chalcedon her right of infallibly defining at all.

We feel the ignominy of having to notice the author's childish babble. But we are told on good authority that, however just an estimate is placed by Catholics on Mr. Ffoulkes's ability, there are persons external to the Church whom his writings influence.

Mr. Ffoulkes's second reason for condemning the "Filioque" is peculiar to himself; and, we venture to prophesy, is likely to continue so. The Constantinopolitan Creed, says the Council of Chalcedon, "teaches forth the perfect doctrine concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." The word "*ἐκδιδάσκει*," "teaches forth," our author preposterously translates, for his controversial purpose, "teaches explicitly." And then he asks, "How can *explicit* teaching, which is *perfect*, admit of any further explanation," such as the "Filioque"? (p. 19). St. Paul had declared to the Ephesian presbyters "the whole counsel of God (Acts xx. 27). Consequently, in Mr. Ffoulkes's view, no question could be asked concerning any portion of God's counsel, to which St. Paul's oral communications would not have furnished these presbyters with a complete and satisfactory answer.

Nothing can be more absurd than our author's allegation, that the Creed, if it include the "Filioque," is "the Crown's Creed," and not the "Church's." Good Catholics accept it because the *Ecclesia Docens* teaches it, and for no other reason whatever. In all the questions raised on the matter from first to last, between Rome and other churches of the West, there was no reference whatever to dogma; no doubt on any side, either that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, or that all Catholics are under a strict obligation of so believing. The points at issue were exclusively these: (1) the addition of the words "Filioque" to the Nicene Symbol, and (2) the chanting of the Symbol in any shape during Mass. The facts, in brief, are as follows:—

There was no difficulty among most of the ancient heretics, about the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. Those who denied the Divinity of our Lord, were ready to confess, and did confess, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; because they regarded both as inferior to, or creations of, the Father. After the Nicene definition, the next trouble arose from those who denied that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. They were met by inserting in the Creed the words, "proceeds from the Father;" there being no necessity then of adding "and the Son," because that truth was admitted. The difficulty was, to get the heretics to admit the Divinity of the Holy Ghost.

In Spain, on the death of Leogild the Arian who had so cruelly persecuted the bishops and others who persevered in the Faith, his son Reccared became king, and also a convert; indeed, his father had repented before his death. Reccared placed himself in the hands of that great confessor, S. Leander, Bishop of Seville; and applied himself to the conversion of his Gothic subjects. He was successful in his work; and then invited all the Catholic Bishops to Toledo, or summoned them, if anybody likes that

phrase better ; where he and the Queen made a public profession of the Catholic Faith, and gave up into the hands of the Council that profession signed with their names. The bishops accepted it with joy ; and then delegated one of their brethren to receive the Arian bishops, who seem to have been in waiting. The Arians were examined ; and upon renouncing their heresy and making profession of the true Faith, were received into the Church. Reccared, and the Queen, and the Gothic bishops, all professed their belief in the words we use at this day : saying of the Holy Ghost that He proceeds from the Father and the Son. If those Goths had merely said of the Holy Ghost that He proceeds from the Father, without the "Filioque," it is possible that the orthodox bishops might have suspected the sincerity of their conversion : because the omission of the "Filioque" might sound as if the Goths still denied the equality of the Son with the Father.

Now Mr. Ffoulkes says that S. Leander and the other prelates, as well as the converted Goths, did wrong in thus interpolating the Nicene creed. He does not blame the prelates perhaps so much as the king. Indeed, he cares very little about the bishops ; and accordingly we are told that the "original introduction (of the 'Filioque') was due to a king named Reccared, of a barbarous and till then heretical race, who, A.D. 589, in the act of abjuring Arianism, promulgated the Creed in question ignorantly or wilfully with this addition, at the head of the bishops of his dominions, many of them neophytes from Arianism like himself" (p. 6).

The Spanish Goths came from the East, and knew the customs of the Eastern Church ; one of which, chanting the Symbol in the Mass, they introduced into Spain. But while doing this, they had before them the decrees of the General Councils ; and particularly the decree of the Council of Chalcedon, which, according to Mr. Ffoulkes, forbids the insertion of the "Filioque" in the Creed. Well, the two Saints, Euphemius and Leander, with their brethren and even the converted Goths, could not or did not see that decree in the light in which Mr. Ffoulkes would have men see it. Mr. Ffoulkes does not contemplate it as possible, that they could have been quite right, and that he may be quite wrong.

From Spain the custom of chanting the Symbol in the Mass crept into France and Germany, and into the Royal Chapel of Charlemagne. The French and German bishops obtained leave from the Pope as to the chanting, but said nothing at first about the addition of the word "Filioque." There was no difficulty about the doctrine ; and there was therefore no hesitation about expressing what everybody believed, and what the Church had undeviatingly taught. And because of this we are told by Mr. Ffoulkes that the Creed of the Church is the Creed of the Crown !

Another fact is the persistency of Charlemagne in retaining the word in the Symbol, after its insertion was disapproved of at Rome. The history of the matter is this : Some Greeks in Jerusalem censured certain Latin monks, because the latter chanted the Symbol like King Reccared. The Latin monks immediately repaired to the Pope for his direction, and excused themselves by alleging the fact that they had

heard it so sung in the chapel of the Emperor. The Pope, knowing well the nature of the Oriental and Greek mind—so jealous as to the slightest change in ancient usage—wished to stop the evil by returning to the old form of the Symbol; but the French bishops were wedded to their chant, and no change was made in their dioceses. Charlemagne supported them, and the Pope's wishes were not respected; nor did the Pontiff think it wise to press the thing further.

It is not very clear when the Credo was first chanted in Rome in the Mass; nor when it was that the "Filioque" was inserted therein. But this is certain (1) that no Catholic bishop whosoever ever thought it unlawful for the Pope to insert it; and (2) that the controversy was never at that time understood to turn on any point of dogma whatever, but exclusively on the lawfulness and propriety of inserting the two words in the Symbol. That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, was accepted alike by Pope and bishops as indisputably a part of the Catholic Faith.

So much on Mr. Ffoulkes's main argument. We must postpone for another quarter any further elucidation of these facts; as well as our comment on his individual statements, and on the general spirit which pervades all. Mr. Ffoulkes's intellectual self-confidence approaches to a monomania; and is the more remarkable (perhaps however the *less* remarkable) because in intellectual power he is decidedly below the average of ordinary educated men. At the same time we are bound to do him this justice, that his works are singularly and most honourably free from all bitterness, and from all imputation of unworthy motives. We cannot indeed but feel far more kindly disposed to him, than we do to several others, who err far less seriously than he does against Catholic doctrine; and we cherish moreover a hope, that the slenderness of his abilities may justly be held responsible in part for his various heresies. It would give us the sincerest pleasure to hear of his being converted to the Catholic Faith; though no one feels more deeply than we do, that if one may judge from appearances, an almost miraculous intervention of grace would be required for his genuine conversion.

The Lives of the principal Benedictine Writers of the Congregation of S. Maur; with an Historical Introduction. By CHARLES M'CARTHY.
London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1868.

THE labours of the great Maurist historians, critics, and editors are better known than their lives. Yet their lives cannot help being matters of interest to those who read their names on the title-pages of their ponderous folios. As a body, these Benedictines contribute a bright and wonderful page to a period of the history of France that can boast of very few bright pages. The congregation of S. Maur was approved by Gregory XV. in 1620, and lasted till it was overwhelmed in the wreck of the great Revolution. Its list of great men commences almost with its commencement. Dom Luke d'Achery, the compiler of the famous "Spicilegium," and the master of Mabilion, came to reside at S. Germain

des Près in 1633. The superior of the house at the time was Dom Tardieu, the director of M. Olier. As the prompter and promoter of learning and study, Dom Tardieu may claim to be a founder of S. Maur, as he may claim to be a founder of S. Sulpice. Mabillon received the habit in 1653, and died on the feast of S. John the Evangelist, 1707. Before he died, Gerberon, Garet, Constant, Martianay, Montfaucon, Ruinart, and De S. Marthe, had already given to the world volume after volume of the "Benedictine" editions of the Fathers; and after his death the work went on with undiminished vigour into the middle of the eighteenth century, one of the last great works being the famous "Origen" of the two De la Rue. Besides these treasures of patrology, the world has to thank these monks, and chiefly Mabillon and Montfaucon, for a whole library of annals, histories, and collections, in which they put beyond the reach of danger the best of the treasures of every collection in France, the Low Countries, and Italy. It is sufficient to mention the *Acta Sanctorum*, and the *Annales Ordinis S. Benedicti*, *L'Antiquité expliquée*, and the *Gallia Christiana*. There was surely something providential in the appearance of such a body of workers among the dusty treasures of royal, monastic, and municipal libraries just before that deluge came which was to destroy kings, monks, and civil institutions as ruthlessly as the literary treasures they guarded.

The royal abbey of S. Denis, and the more than royal abbey of S. Germain des Prés, were the head-quarters of work in the Maurist Congregation. The libraries of the capital, including, not least, their own splendid collections, necessarily made Paris the central point. But the reformed monasteries in the provinces were not behindhand in labour, science, and piety. S. Remi, at Rheims, contributed not a few famous names; Edmond Martène there wrote his celebrated Commentary on the Rule; whilst Calmet, a better known name, wrote his "Commentary on the Scripture," amid the regular and peaceful duties of a monk at Munster, in Lorraine. In addition to all their labours in preserving the past, the Maurist monks took a vigorous share in the controversies of the day. Some of these occasional tractates are too well known to need particular mention; but during the 150 years the Congregation flourished, the writing of small angry books was the recognized way to wage a literary war; and the little books of the Maurists were quite as plentiful, and, except in the case of the really great men, perhaps quite as angry as any which issued from Paris, Lyons, or Amsterdam. Jansenism was a fruitful mother of troubles to the generations that knew the Maurists. Some of them were not as clear about Jansenism as they ought to have been; but, indirectly, they did more to kill it than any other body of men. One mainstay of Jansenism was a pretended respect for the Fathers, and one of its great weapons was to wrest them and misquote them. The new Benedictine editions of the great Fathers put a genuine text within the reach of every scholar, and their magnificent annotations educated the world in the true way of handling it. Another feature of their day was the infidelity of Spinoza and Voltaire; and it may be recalled that Dom Lami, of S. Denis, the Benedictine philoso-

pher, was one of the few who considered it worth while to refute Spinoza, whilst Calmet seems to have as nearly converted Voltaire as ever Voltaire was converted. The chief names of these great scholars are as celebrated for their piety as for their learning. The lives of Mabillon, Montfaucon, d'Achery, Martène, and Calmet, are quite models of sanctified studiousness, such as we read of in venerable Bede, in Walafrid Strabo, or in Rabanus Maurus.

Mr. M'Carthy prefaces what he has to say about these great men with a short notice of monasticism in general, of S. Benedict, of his Rule, and the history of his Order. Many readers will be struck with the collection of extracts which he has put together (pp. 53 to 65), showing the opinions of various eminent modern writers about the monks. The passages quoted from Adam Smith, Mill, and Wordsworth will probably be new to many.

The lives which he gives are those of Mabillon, Montfaucon, d'Achery, Lami, de S. Marthe, Rainurt, and Calmet. As the lives of such men are chiefly their literary works, M. M'Carthy has done well in giving his readers a very full account of all they have written. There are many incidents of strong and touching interest in these lives. The meeting of Mabillon and de Rancé, after their controversy, is one of them. So is the picture of Mabillon at Clairvaux, working at the *Annales* in his old age, and praying every day a long time at the tomb of S. Bernard for strength and life to finish them.

To the multitude of fairly read people, who know nothing accurate about S. Benedict, or the Benedictines, or the Maurists, we heartily recommend this little volume. They will find it full of interesting matter, of a kind that will make them carry out the praiseworthy aim of the author, and go to fuller sources to learn more. The present generation should know about the Maurists as well as about the court of Louis XIV.; about Mabillon, as well as about Bossuet, Calbert, and Le Tellier, his contemporaries and friends; about S. Germain des Prés, as well as about Versailles. It was only the other day that the tomb of Augustine Calmet was discovered in his own abbey church of Senones, in Lorraine. And there are yet living English Benedictines who remember an expatriated Maurist monk, Dom Leveaux, as a member of the community of S. Gregory the Great, at Downside. He is said to have known Montfaucon. At any rate, he laboured in the Paris libraries at the *Gallia Christiana* with Montfaucon's contemporaries. His learning, his zeal for monastic observance, and his personal asceticism, are well remembered to this day. He laboured from morning till night, and the fruits of his labours were apparent in huge piles of MSS. which have unfortunately not been preserved, but which have since been anxiously inquired for on behalf of the French Government. It is probable that they may have contained a fresh instalment of the *Gallia Christiana*. Dom Leveaux finished his life as a hermit, at Senlis, near Compiègne, where he lived on alms and, like a true hermit, attended the parish church on Sundays, in the capacity of subdeacon. He seems to have died about 1820.

The Voyage and Travaille of Sir John Manndevice, Kt.; which treateth of the way to Hierusalem; and of Marvayles of Inde, with other Llandes and Countryes. Reprinted from the edition of A.D. 1725. With an Introduction, additional Notes, and Glossary. By J. O. HALLIVELL, Esq., F.S.A., F.R.A.S. London: F. S. Ellis, King Street, Covent Garden.

THIS new and perfect edition of the extraordinary book of Sir John Manndevice, the ancestor of the literature of travel, and the most gigantic specimen of credulity, if not of mendacity, in existence, is quite an *article de luxe*. The text is taken from the Cotton Manuscript, as given in the edition of 1725, and the Introduction contains a history of the book, from its first appearance at the end of the 14th century, as a small folio, written in double columns on vellum, to its appearance in 1480, in the French language, and in folio shape, splendidly printed in double columns, but without place or name of printer. "Nothing can exceed," says the editor, "the beautiful condition of this exemplar." The present edition is published from a manuscript 300 years old, and collated with seven MSS., some nearly as old as the author's own time, and four old printed editions. It agrees with the Latin and French MSS., and appears to be the genuine work of the author, who says that he translated it out of Latin into French, and out of French into English; whereas all other printed editions are so curtailed and transposed as to be made thereby other books. The editor claims more respect for Sir John Manndevice's strange work than it has generally received, and makes an ingenious apology for his having "drawn" so lavishly as he has been accused of doing "on his imagination for his facts." He wrote according to the ignorance of the times he lived in, took monsters from Pliny, miracles from legends, and strange stories out of romances. The falsities in his history are occasioned by other authors, at that time accounted true, and the fault of the historian that he did not name his authors. When he tells the most improbable stories, he prefaces them with "This says," or "Men say, but I have not sene it," and he owns the book is partly made up of hearsay. "The enthusiasm of a zealous Roman Catholic" is rather an amusing reason to assign for a traveller's believing such tales as that of the griffins, the golden hills, and the one-footed men, whose one foot is large enough to shelter them from the sun, considering he wrote in the 14th century, when learning was mostly in the hands of "zealous Roman Catholics" *par excellence*. The book is very curious and interesting, if only because it teaches us how our countrymen talked in those times, and shows from what chaotic confusion the art of printing reduced spelling to a system. In this book we find the same word spelled differently several times within a few pages, indeed within a few lines. The quaint style, the simple statement of the most incredible absurdities, the childlike wonder, the unconscious courage, and the true reverence and

piety which not all the author's extravagance can make grotesque, give the wonderful old book a charm to which few will be insensible; when the first difficulty of the ancient language is overcome, they find it easy to follow the meaning. As a sample of the compound structure of the English tongue it also possesses much interest.

Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets. By the Rev. EDWIN PAXTON HOOD.
London: Jackson, Walford, & Hodder. 1867.

THE volume bearing this rather unsuggestive title contains a series of lectures on the vocation of the preacher, addressed to a College of "Students for the Ministry," founded by Mr. Spurgeon. The lectures exhibit much shrewdness and good sense, and the fruits of a large and varied reading, put together in a rather loose and rambling way. But the interest of the book for a Catholic reader lies in its treatment of Catholic Saints and men of note. The author proposes to illustrate his subject by a review of great preachers of various ages; he could not therefore avoid all mention of the Catholic Church; but he has, in fact, been far from attempting to do so. Not to speak of the chapters on the Apostolic and Early Church, accompanied by a glowing description of St. John Chrysostom, he has a lecture on "Medieval and Post-Medieval Preachers," coupled with a monograph of St. Bernard as a representative of the preachers of his age. This is followed, later on, by an admiring critique on the preaching of "Pusey, Manning, and Newman," and a sketch of Father Lacordaire. The whole book, too, is interspersed with frequent references to Catholic Saints, and anecdotes from their lives. It is the fact of his acquaintance with these matters, and of the tone and spirit in which they are referred to in his lectures, which seems to us so interesting.

One of the chief grounds of hope in the minds of Catholics, five-and-twenty years ago, when they first began to be startled by the literature of the Oxford movement, must have been this, that thinkers and earnest men of the Church of England were now fairly in the presence of Catholic theology, and still more of Catholic sanctity. Would it be too much to say that the study of the lives of the Saints has been in fact the most powerful agent in the religious revolution which we have lived to witness in England? Hitherto it has seemed as if the Dissenters were quite inaccessible to the light of the Catholic Church. An impenetrable and self-satisfied ignorance has seemed to shut out hopelessly all her thought, life, and sanctity from their vision. Are we too sanguine in accepting this book as a sign of a dawning change—as a symptom that the winter is over and the ice breaking up? English dissent, it is well known, has not been without its æsthetic movement: is it now about to enter upon its doctrinal one? Let our readers judge from a few specimens whether there is not something quite new among Dissenters in Mr. Paxton Hood's manner of speaking of the Catholic Church.

Of medieval preachers generally, he says:—

"I am sorry to agree with Dr. Neale when he affirms that there was an immense and intuitive knowledge of Scripture possessed by those preachers, setting them, in those particulars, far above the preachers of our own or of any times since the Reformation; there was a perfect affluence of Scripture reference in them, very instructive" (p. 134).

"It is impossible to forbear interest in the magical effect of the harangues of St. Anthony of Padua, and the spell of holiness which even now seems to attract in the life and words of St. Bonaventure" (p. 136).

He has words of admiration for St. Adalbert of Prussia, John Corvinus, the missionary to the Tartars, St. Gall, St. Bernardine of Siena, St. Philip Neri, who "preached a sermon on non-residence before Pope Gregory, and thirty bishops, it is said, started to their episcopates the next day." He gives a brief but enthusiastic account of the Jesuit Father Segneri.

"I admire Segneri; it is impossible—even reading, and reading through a translation—not to be carried away irresistibly by his earnestness" (p. 149).

On St. Bernard he dwells for thirty-five pages, with an admiration as hearty as if he were a Catholic. Of St. Charles Borromeo, he writes,

"It was St. Charles Borromeo—a great example for us all—every way a Cardinal, but a great Sunday-school teacher, perhaps the first of Sunday-school teachers, a beautiful and blessed labourer among the poor, &c." (p. 440).

In his lecture on the formation of style, he recommends especially two Catholic writers, the Abbé Mullois's "Clergy and Pulpit in their Relations to the People," and the Rev. Thomas J. Potter's "Sacred Eloquence," quoting freely from the former.

He is not afraid to speak with glowing eulogy of the preaching of Father Newman, and the Archbishop of Westminster, though he only refers to their Protestant sermons. He devotes seventeen pages to Father Lacordaire, of whose conferences at Notre Dame he says:—

"I will suppose (them) to be in all my hearers' hands; to me they have been long familiar, and . . . they may be mentioned as the most admirable grappling-line thrown from the modern pulpit over the consciousness of the intelligent and cultivated mind of the present generation" (p. 677).

Of Lacordaire's connection and parting with Lamennais, our author says:—

"The sentiments of De Lamennais were developing in a direction where Lacordaire was not likely to follow. The first had the shapeless and indefinite longings of free impulses, but Lacordaire was a Christian, a priest, and a child of the Church. . . . The two Abbés parted company then; the course of De Lamennais certainly was disastrous. I believe his honest endeavour was to *see*. Lacordaire said, 'the Church does not say to you *see*; this power does not belong to her; she says to you *believe*,' and Lacordaire was right. It may seem strange that I find so much that touches my sympathy in the course taken by a Popish priest. In fact, while our reasons may differ, it strikes us that all intelligent

minds reach a point in their history when they have to summon themselves to a determination like that which claimed and compelled Lacordaire either to plunge on thoughtlessly through what seems to be the light, as though light alone gave the power of seeing, and then to hand over the spirit to what the Abbé well styled the most fearful bondage of all, 'the bondage of the mind,' or to take shelter, as he took shelter, in the conviction that as there exists in the world a necessity for a power to protect the weak mind against the strong mind, God has appointed it, not in seeking for peace and liberty along the highway of grief and slavery, but in prayer and in the offices of the Church. . . . It might be well for all of us if we had some centre to which we felt we owed the debt of religious obedience" (pp. 673-674).

Mr. Paxton Hood can afford to speak with kindly appreciation and admiration even of existing religious communities.

"My readers will not suspect me of Papal bearings and tendencies, but it is in that (the Catholic) Church, which numbers assuredly holy, blessed, and devoted men amongst its members, we must look for illustrations of the *instinct for souls*. Catholic Home Missions are very successful."

After speaking of the requirements for this success, and their absence amongst Protestants, he continues:—

"Alas! what would the brothers of the Oratory say to an attempt to win over England to Popery and Rome, conducted after this fashion? Instead of that they try the method of the Pauline madness—'beside themselves,'—snatches of profane song made sacred; walking to and fro in courts and alleys and out-of-the-way nooks; winning by a strong word accompanied by a kind smile, by a lightning-like truth conveyed at the end of an almost entertaining anecdote; and so in the course of a year or two, behold a Church, a Cathedral, and Rome flourishing in that neighbourhood. This goes on while we twaddle upon committees, and read minutes of the last meeting, and get out reports, and wonder who will subscribe. And where are the reports of all the Roman Catholic affiliations? What printer prints them? Where are the magazines that glorify them? The thing rises as silently as a fog, creeps up like an autumn mist over the whole landscape. Gentlemen who are interested in these matters . . . would do very well to read the late Father Faber's essay on Catholic Home Missions."

And then follows the well-known anecdote of Père Morcain, from Father Faber's "Home Missions," quoted with genuine admiration (p. 439).

So again:—

"Remarkably, in this department of plain speaking the Roman Catholics are before us. The work of the Methodist revival is being done by the children of St. Philip Neri, the Oratorians.* These are the only people almost who preach to the poor. What do Independents, or Baptists, or, for that matter, the Old Methodists either, know about preaching to the poor—the very poor. Our chapels and churches are, for

* It is evidently only imperfect acquaintance with the work done by the secular clergy and other religious bodies throughout England, which has led the author to give this exclusive praise to the Oratorians.

the most part, it is to be feared, luxuries they cannot afford; and if we send ministers down to the alleys and low courts, we do not send as Rome sends, gentlemen and men of genius, with a presence of dignity and a heart of affection; we make the great mistake of sending those who, while they possess frequently the coarseness which repels, do not carry along with it the sweetness and the dignity which would affect and command" (p. 29).*

Mr. Paxton Hood is far from maintaining this tone consistently, but we do not draw attention to the many passages throughout the book which might be taken as a set-off to those we have quoted, in which the familiar expressions consecrated by the great Protestant tradition are used, attributing superstition, bigotry, cruelty, &c., to Catholic faith, institutions, or persons. We cannot forget the way in which many, now fervent children of the Church, thought it right to speak of Catholics, whilst the Oxford movement was bringing them nearer and nearer to the true fold. We are content to rejoice at the new victories which must be in store for the faith in England, if once the educated mind of the immense body of Dissenters can be brought face to face with Catholic history, theology, and sanctity. One swallow does not make a summer: but we cannot be mistaken in supposing that a series of lectures first addressed to a College of Students for the Ministry, and then published to the world, must express much more than the individual views of one man.

La Somme des Conciles Généraux et Particuliers. Par L'ABBE GUYOT.
2 vols. Paris: Victor Palmé. 1868.

THIS is likely to prove a very useful summary. The Councils are undoubtedly the most important facts of Church history. But they seldom receive the study they deserve, partly because, taking them altogether, few students have patience to wade through the thick tomes in which they are contained, and partly because every manual of history professes to give something like a summary of their acts and decisions. Such a summary, necessary enough to give completeness to an historical compilation, and sufficient for a general view, becomes worse than useless for the minute study of a particular period. Moreover, all who are in the habit of using Church histories know that compilers have a bad habit of copying each other, an evil which often results in the stereotyping of some particular view or mistake. The more the exact text of the several Councils is brought under the eye of readers, the more secure will they feel themselves in forming conclusions. Not that the mere text of the Councils is sufficient; a complete and clear commentary is also necessary

* The author makes a kindly reference to this Review, as "almost the only one of our higher order of Reviews" which has formed what he considers a respectful "estimate, in substance kindly expressed," of Mr. Spurgeon. The article to which he refers, was in the first series of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

to guide the enquirer; for no Council can speak with half its fulness of meaning when its accompanying circumstances are not half understood. Whilst waiting for some one to translate into English or French the most valuable *Concilien geschichte* of Dr. Hefele, we may thank the author of the compilation before us for supplying in a handy shape the wants we have pointed out.

In a preliminary essay, the Abbé Guyot explains at some length what a Councils, who may assist at it, who may vote in it, who presides over it, when it is Œcumenical, and in what sense its decrees are infallible. At the present moment such a treatise is extremely useful. It is pleasing to find that the author is quite clear on the subject of the relations between the Pope and a Council. He fully agrees with the following words of De Maistre, which are worth reproducing here. "We know well that the gates of hell will not prevail against the Church; but why? On account of Peter, on whom she is founded. Take away this foundation, and how can she be infallible, since she no longer exists? To be infallible, or anything else, she must first *be*. Let us never forget that no promise has ever been made to the Church apart from her head; and, remember this, reason itself must conclude that, since the Church is a moral body, and therefore *one* body, the promise can only have been made to unity, and there cannot be unity without the Pope." (*Du Pape*, l. 1, c. 2).

The author does not follow the strict chronological order in dealing with the Councils. He prefers to group them round a fact or a heresy, or to assemble several minor Councils round the Œcumenical Synod to which they relate. He is, we need not say, a most loyal Catholic, though not by any means an exaggerated partisan. Once or twice, indeed, he seems to err slightly by defect; for instance, in his account of the Nicene Council, he says it was convoked by Constantine *with the consent* of Pope Sylvester. The express words of the Sixth General Council might have authorized him to say that it was convoked by the Emperor *and* the Pope; and there is no doubt that the Pope's instrument in the matter was Hosius of Cordova.

The New Testament Narrative in the Words of the Sacred Writers.

Translated according to the Vulgate, with Notes, Maps, Chronological and other Tables. London: Burns & Oates. 1868.

THIS little book contains a narrative of the Life of our Lord and the Acts of the Apostles, compiled as far as possible from the words of the New Testament itself, without comment or abridgment. An introductory chapter contains some useful remarks on the authorship, design, and characteristics of the four Gospels, and a chronological analysis of the events of Holy Week. The book is also furnished with lists of miracles, prophecies quoted from the Old Testament, parables classified according to the truths illustrated by them, and chronological tables and maps. The text is neatly printed, and the whole well arranged and brought out in a form very useful for school use.

As, however, the compilation is evidently designed as an elementary

work for the young, we regret to find traces here and there of too great reference to Protestant authorities. It is a pity, we think, when so much has been done by recent writers on the Gospel chronology and harmony, that our youth should be continually reminded of Robinson, Greswell, and Alford, rather than made familiar with the great names amongst Catholics. For the same reason we should prefer to adhere closely to our old traditional words and spellings, even to a letter, when sanctioned by the Vulgate. In the book before us there are signs of haste, and slips which might have been avoided by a more careful revision, such as the frequent occurrence of *Isaiah* for *Isaias*. Why should we not also keep to the *Pasch* instead of the *Passover*? and why, by the use of Hughes' maps, should we have to retain *Joppa*, *Capernaum*, and *Beersheba*? Moreover, the very brief explanatory notes occasionally met with in the volume are, we fear, somewhat misleading. For instance, a discrepancy between the Evangelists is roundly stated in p. 140, without a hint being given that it is only apparent, or an attempt at a solution of the difficulty. Is there not some confusion, too, in the chronological table, where the birth of our Lord is assigned to the year B.C. 4, and the annunciation to the preceding year B.C. 5? Again, in a note to the words of our Lord, "That which my Father hath given me is greater than all" (S. John x. 29), the remark is appended, "Or, as it is in the Greek, 'My Father who hath given them to me is greater than all'" (p. 118). Now we should object in any case to such a vague reference to "the Greek" as an authority in opposition to a Vulgate reading, but it so happens in this particular instance that, critically speaking, it is more than doubtful if "the Greek" contains anything of the sort. A reference to Professor Ornsby's valuable edition of the Vatican codex might have warned our author that at least there was one very respectable Greek authority in favour of the Latin reading of the Vulgate. For the Vatican by itself is of no small weight, and when supported as it is by other ancient Greek manuscripts, the old "*Itala*," and the testimony of Tertullian, Ambrose, and Augustine, it is not surprising that it should induce such critics as even Alford and Tregelles among Protestants to adopt the Vulgate reading. In fact we have here a very good example of what is familiar enough to textual critics, that fresh discoveries and a more scientific criticism are constantly tending to prove the value of the old Latin readings in preference to the modern *Textus receptus*.

A mistaken judgment in a matter of mere scholarship would be of little consequence in itself in a book of this sort, but it becomes a real evil when it helps to perpetuate a blind tradition in favour of an exploded text, which nowadays even the most prejudiced Protestants are learning to mistrust. We think it a pity that our youth should not be trained, even in the least details of study, to look to Catholic guides and Catholic traditions.

Notices of Books.

The Liturgical Year. By DOM P. GUÉRANGER, Abbot of Solesmes. Translated by DOM LAURENCE SHEPHERD, Monk of the English Benedictine Congregation. Vol. I. Advent. Vols. II. III. Christmas. Dublin and London: Duffy. 1867-8.

THE two Christmas volumes of this admirable translation of Dom Guéranger's *Année Liturgique*, will doubtless be in the hands of many of our readers before this notice appears. Liturgy in England is now in a position to make its influence felt. We have got beyond the days when the mere essentials of Catholic worship were all that could be aimed at, and have happily arrived at times when the august ceremonial of the Church may be studied with as much profit by those who attend at it, as it is conducted with solicitous decorum by those who are its ministers. The present Ritualistic controversy in England, which is stirring questions far deeper than its name imports, has made the question of liturgical forms, in its widest sense, familiar to most Englishmen. On the one hand there is the party which wars against all liturgy as superstitious, or scoffs at it as unnecessary and childish. We believe it is the truth that the first thoughts of the mass of the English middle class, when they think of vestments, of incense, or of genuflections, are thoughts of contemptuous disparagement. They have been bred up to look at these things as superstitious. The logical reason for such a posture of mind, is their inability to see any necessity for such a thing as outward worship; and the cause of this inability, though few would acknowledge so much, is, the slenderness of their conviction, that any worship whatever, as distinct from the practice of certain human virtues, is a precept of either natural or positive law. But another real reason why so many respectable people sneer at ritual observance, is their utter ignorance of Church traditions, and the density of their darkness regarding the meaning of the simplest ceremonies. It is quite true to say that man is naturally attracted by a beautiful ceremony, or a symbolical action. But this is true, first, only of men whose minds have not been educated in a perverse direction; and secondly, only of ceremonies and rites whose meaning is extremely clear and apparent. An ignorant Catholic, brought up in his faith, will be unable even to comprehend the ridicule of his Protestant neighbour; and the Protestant neighbour, with a real attempt to be charitable, will fail to see how a man can honestly consider it a meritorious act to sprinkle himself with water.

The ridicule of the ignorant multitude is, doubtless, provoking enough; and all the more so, because, like certain pachydermatous animals, it seems so utterly impervious to argument. But there is another state of mind on this subject, not indeed by any means as deplorable, but still very bad, both in itself and in its effects. Ignorance on the part of devout believers is a great evil to the believers themselves, because it deprives them of much instruction and consolation, and of many incentives to piety. It is even more disastrous in its effects on the outside world of unbelievers, because these last are sure to come into frequent

contact with it; and whenever they do so, the apparent blindness and unreasoning bigotry which it displays seems almost to be a justification of their own hostility. And, what is the worst of all, the ignorant believer himself, in no long time, becomes sensibly affected by the criticisms and sneers he is continually hearing.

The ignorance here spoken of is by no means confined to the lowest class, such as the poor Irish who throng our chapels. It is found among them, and it tends, perhaps, to generate superstition and a certain irregular enthusiasm. But it is found, in a far more aggravated form, in classes that ought to know better. There is nothing more painful than to see moderately educated Catholics ashamed of the religious ceremonies of their worship; and it is a thing by no means uncommonly seen. Now, to be ashamed of one's worship may arise from various causes; but as often as not it comes from mere ignorance and unfamiliarity. A grand and worldwide institution, like the Church, with her centuries of history and her vast developments in every age, needs some little study before she is thoroughly understood. Minute ramifications of her system are inexplicable by themselves; isolated acts are meaningless in their isolation; insignificant forms require sometimes the light of a bygone century to show them in their true colours. But in proportion as the eye takes in the whole Catholic temple, in the length of its years, the breadth of its peoples and tongues, the depth of its doctrines and height of its heavenward tendencies, the mind comes to see that the darkest ceremony is part of an awful creation, and that the least ritual act has a tradition at its back that stirs the blood and sets the heart on fire.

The work of the celebrated Abbot of Solesmes, now presented by an English Benedictine Father in such an attractive English dress, is a work that is very much needed. No tongue can express (and tongues more eloquent than ours have often attempted the task) the blessings of which the Holy Liturgy is the channel to man. Nothing can be more solid, or more fruitful.

We wish we had space to quote largely from F. Shepherd's translation. But we must be satisfied with giving the following abstract of his first volume of Christmas, that our readers may see what they have to expect. The first Christmas volume contains the History, Mystery, and Practice of Christmas; seventy Hymns, &c., from the Ancient Liturgies; Christmas Day—a hundred and twenty pages of instruction in all that relates to the feast, including the Services, &c. The Saints' feasts occurring from December 26 to January 5. These feasts give rise to instructions on Virginity, Martyrdom, Innocence, Liberty of the Church, &c. The Feast of the Circumcision; its liturgy meaning, importance, &c. Mary's innocence, dignity as Mother of God. A Prayer from an Ancient Rite on New Year's Day. Letter written by an Archdeacon of Bath, immediately after the death of S. Thomas of Canterbury.

This bare enumeration is better than any recommendation we can give.
